Cage match in a cornfield: G. Gentile wrestles J. Nagl on counterinsurgency

By A. A. Cohen

Best Defense intellectual
pugilistics correspondent

Warrior-profs Gian Gentile and
John Nagl,
the two best-known heavyweight contenders in the national security debate
surrounding irregular warfare, squared off a few weeks ago at Grinnell College
in the wilds of Iowa on the merits of counterinsurgency and the future of
Afghanistan.

The moderated 60-minute debate was
kicked off with a three-word question: "Is COIN dead?"

In this corner, Gentile,
who has for years passionately opposed the very notion that counterinsurgency
worked in Iraq (the "Surge," along with Petraeusism, seem to be his two pet
peeves), let alone in Afghanistan, fired at his rival from the position: "The
idea that nation-building can be achieved at a reasonable cost of blood and
treasure is dead." Translation: COIN is not feasible for America -- ergo, COIN
is dead.

Gentile
propped up his argument by attacking what he describes as the "COIN narrative"
of the past decade, about which many "gripping tales" have been written, but
without any of these amounting to true, objective, "good history."
Gentile
charged that there was no significant change in generalship or
strategy between George Casey and David Petraeus in Iraq, and that the level of
violence there was bound to drop when it did, regardless of the change of
command and of the deployment of some 30,000 additional troops. Nagl parried by
citing RAND and other research that concludes the contrary. Recall as well that
General Casey was intent on drawing down U.S. forces, not surging them as
Petraeus sought to do in order to establish a semblance of order and security
prior to withdrawing from Iraq.

Nagl's
first response to the moderator's question was an expected zinger: Counter-insurgency cannot be dead for as
long as insurgency is alive and well. Obvious perhaps, but this full-body
slam was a good reminder that shedding the capability would not make future
needs for it disappear. Alas, what I wish he had mentioned, too, was that in
this debate again, military doctrine was being deliberately confounded with
matters of foreign policy. The United States has not conducted a nuclear
(atomic) strike since Nagasaki, and the intention to strike again in such a
fashion is absent, but the United States continues to maintain a nuclear
capability and doctrine.

Gentile scored his few real points, I believe, on the
issue that counterinsurgency operations on their own do not yield lasting
strategic results. True, but those operations constitute an important piece of
the puzzle. It is the role of statecraft to bring about stabilizing watersheds.
And what Gentile may wish to acknowledge is that counterinsurgency operations,
costly as they may be, will often be required to afford the time, the space,
and the conditions that are needed to enable statecraft to run its course.

While Gentile and Nagl
disagreed on many points of evidence, ultimately, their conclusions did not
appear to be altogether different. Both contenders agreed that the invasion of
Iraq was a strategic error, and that the price of a fully resourced
counterinsurgency campaign will rarely (Gentile: will never) justify the unsatisfying prize. Nagl takes the match on
style and substance... and of course, because he cited Galula.

Gentile's obsession with naysaying is certainly
understandable; we can all relate to his fear that should the counterinsurgency
campaign in Iraq go down in history as a victory, it will be tempting for our
elected leaders and their advisors to wish to repeat similar adventures again.
But the point is moot; history indicates that engaging in counterinsurgency
warfare is seldom a predetermined choice.

(Watch the
debate.)

A.A.
Cohen served in Afghanistan. He is a senior infantry officer in the Canadian
Army and the author of Galula: The Life and
Writings of the French Officer who Defined the Art of Counterinsurgency.