We need to understand what we mean when we talk about command climate

By Andrew Bell and Kurt Sanger

Best Defense office of command climate
change

The commandant
of the Marine Corps recently issued a letter to all Marines regarding command
climate. He wrote, "There is a disturbingly frequent correlation between
Marines who act poorly and units with poor climates." The correlation has been
identified in many of the high profile, negative incidents involving the
military over the last decade in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as those
involving sexual assault. It is also often present in underperforming units. The
focus the commandant has placed on the issue will hopefully diminish all types
of incidents.

A major
obstacle presents itself in this area, however. As often as leadership raises
command climate, the concept is poorly defined and its meaning is not uniform
throughout the military. It is discussed in many publications, but there is no
doctrinal definition. There is a different answer to what command climate is
for virtually every servicemember.

Even were
there a common understanding, there are no DOD-wide metrics through which unit
performance and climate are correlated. In an informal survey of service
academies and professional military schools conducted last summer, we found
that there are no separate courses on developing command climate. If it is
addressed academically, it is done in the context of leadership studies.

Command
climate is not exclusively a product of leadership, and the two concepts must
be examined independently to be properly understood. Focusing on leadership
ignores group dynamics, the influence of non-leaders and non-traditional
leaders, and the development of "sub-climates" in small units. What
is acceptable in a platoon could differ from what is acceptable in a squad or
fire team; those differences are shaped by more than unit leaders.

This is not
to diminish the role of the leader in creating a command climate. He or she
will have more influence than anyone. However, an organization that expects its
climate to be controlled by its leader without accounting for other variables
does not fully understand climate, especially when the organization has leaders
who frequently change duty stations, or may get injured or killed. A leader has
failed when the unit cannot thrive in his or her absence.

Every
organization has a climate, whether it is an infantry platoon, a high school
baseball team, or a kindergarten class. The climate helps define what behavior
and actions will and will not be acceptable to the members of the organization.
In the armed forces, it is generally accepted that a healthy command climate is
necessary for an effective and efficient unit. A good one can be a cost-free
force multiplier; a poor one can cause servicemembers to make catastrophic
decisions. For this reason alone, command climate requires careful study and
attention by the military.

To emphasize
the importance of command climate and its hidden impacts, research of the
military's experience in Iraq and Afghanistan shows that healthy command
climates mitigate the effects of post-traumatic stress and improve resiliency.
While the links between climate and effectiveness seem obvious, the connection
between climate, PTS, and resiliency demonstrates that climate has second order
effects. This should elevate the urgency with which command climate is examined
so that it can be designed deliberately instead of allowing it to grow of its
own accord.

Command
climate is a vital element for individual, unit, and organizational
effectiveness and well-being. It is a subject that deserves examination by
security theorists and practitioners. As we continue to advance the concept of
command climate development as a separate field of study, we hope to be joined
by the service academies and professional military schools in this worthy
effort.

Andrew Bell is a Ph.D. candidate in
political science at Duke University and a predoctoral research fellow at the
Institute for Security and Conflict Studies at George Washington University. He
has served as an active duty Air Force officer and is a major in the Air Force
Reserve.

Kurt Sanger is a major and judge advocate
in the U.S. Marine Corps, and is an incoming National Security Law LL.M.
candidate at Georgetown University. The views expressed are those of the
authors and do not necessarily represent those of the Department of Defense or
any other organization .