Edward Feser's Blog, page 69

COMING SOON: By Man Shall His Blood Be Shed

I am pleased to announce the forthcoming publication by Ignatius Press of By Man Shall His Blood Be Shed: A Catholic Defense of the Death Penalty , which I have co-authored with Prof. Joseph Bessette of Claremont McKenna College.  You can order it from Amazon or directly from Ignatius. 
From the promotional materials:The Catholic Church has in recent decades been associated with opposition to the death penalty. It was not always so. This timely work recovers, and calls for a revival of, the Catholic tradition of support for capital punishment. Drawing upon a wealth of philosophical, scriptural, theological, and social scientific arguments, the authors show that it is the perennial and irreformable teaching of the Church that capital punishment can in principle be legitimate – not only to protect society from immediate physical danger, but also for purposes such as retributive justice and deterrence. They show that the recent statements of churchmen in opposition to the death penalty are merely "prudential judgments" with which faithful Catholics are not obliged to agree. They also show that the prudential grounds for opposition to capital punishment offered by Catholics and others in recent years are without force.

The extreme statements made by some Catholics in opposition to the death penalty do grave harm to the Church by falsely suggesting a rupture in her traditional teaching, thereby inadvertently casting doubt on the reliability of the Magisterium. And they do grave harm to society by removing a key component of any system of criminal justice which can protect the lives of the innocent, inculcate a horror of murder, and affirm the dignity of human beings as free and rational creatures who must be held responsible for their actions.
By Man Shall His Blood Be Shed is a challenge to contemporary Catholics to move beyond simple-minded sloganeering to a serious engagement with scripture, tradition, natural law, and the actual social scientific evidence, and a faithful exercise of the "hermeneutic of continuity" called for by Pope Benedict XVI.
“Based primarily on the natural law, this excellent and much-needed book will be valuable to Catholics and readers of any faith who ask why capital punishment is justified.”
— J. Budziszewski, Ph.D., University of Texas
“At long last, we have a serious and intelligent look at all aspects of the death penalty — its causes, its justification, its consequences for the victim, the criminal himself, and for civil society.”
— James V. Schall, S. J., Professor Emeritus, Georgetown University
“An illuminating study of a subject often clouded by emotions.  An essential read for anyone who wants to understand this thorny subject.”
— Robert Royal, President, Faith and Reason Institute
“The arguments in this book have clarified many of the contentions of this critical issue in my mind.”
— Fr. Robert A. Sirico, President, The Acton Institute

Auld links syne

Get your geek on.  Blade Runner 2049 will be out in 2017.  So will Iron Fist , Guardians of the Galaxy Vol. 2 , Alien: Covenant , Spider-Man: Homecoming , The Defenders , and Thor: Ragnarok .  Season 2 of The Man in the High Castle is already here.
Bioteaching lists the top books in philosophy of science of 2016.
The 2017 Dominican Colloquium in Berkeley will take place July 12-15.  The theme is Person, Soul and Consciousness.  Speakers include Lawrence Feingold, Thomas Hünefeldt, Steven Long, Nancey Murphy, David Oderberg, Ted Peters, Anselm Ramelow, Markus Rothhaar, Richard Schenk, D. C. Schindler, Michael Sherwin, Eleonore Stump, and Thomas Weinandy.Prospect interviews David Oderberg on the subject of “three-parent babies.”

R. D. Ingthorsson’s book McTaggart's Paradox is reviewed at Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.
New from Encounter Books: Neven Sesardic’s When Reason Goes on Holiday: Philosophers in Politics .
Robert Heinlein and Arthur C. Clarke discuss the moon landings as they happen.  How Isaac Asimov was so prolific.
Lenin, Gramsci, and all that: Angelo Codevilla on the origins of political correctness, in the Claremont Review of Books.
If you really care about the poor, you should oppose the sexual revolution.  Dorothy Day knew that, as Dan Hitchens explains at First Things.
The First Aquinas Winter School organized by the Institute of Thomistic Philosophy will take place February 17 - 22 in Eichstätt, Germany.  The topic is Dualism and Hylemorphism in the Philosophy of Mind and the invited teachers are Uwe Meixner and Klaus Obenauer. 
 At Public Discourse, R. J. Snell on C. S. Lewis and natural law.
City Journal on the left-wing war on science.  Jerry Coyne on how his fellow leftists reject science when it conflicts with egalitarian dogma.
The Economist on what the West has gained from Christianity.
Also at Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, Richard Cross reviews Jeffrey Brower’s Aquinas's Ontology of the Material World.
David Albert Jones on the injustice of destroying embryonic human beings, at Mercatornet.  David Mills responds to Jones’s critics at Human Life Review.
The College Fixreports that conservative philosopher Daniel Bonevac will, after thirty years, no longer be teaching his Contemporary Moral Problems course.  Interview with Bonevac at Fox News Insider.
Sir Roger Scruton on the music of the avant-garde.
Liberal professor Mark Lilla argues that campus identity politics is dooming liberal causes, at The Chronicle of Higher Education.  Lilla’s new book on reactionary politics is reviewed at The New Criterion.
Can a serious philosopher resort to humor?  Serious philosopher Susan Haack thinks so.
At The Washington Post, astronomer Howard Smith argues for the specialness of mankind.
The Weekly Standard on the failings of Evelyn Waugh.
It begins with butthurt and quickly progresses to complete disconnect from reality.  It’s called Trump Derangement Syndrome (a “high energy” analogue of Bush Derangement Syndrome).  Get diagnosed by Roger Kimball at PJ Mediaor by Justin Raimondo at the Los Angeles Times. 
Speaking of complete disconnect from reality: what progressivism has come to, in a nutshell. 
The Claremont Review of Books on the elitism of art critic Robert Hughes.
Mike Flynn at The TOF Spot continues to blog the Crusades. 
In The Tablet, two articles by philosopher John Haldane on the election of Donald Trump.  (You’ll need to register to read them.)

Besong on Scholastic Metaphysics

In the December issue of New Oxford Review, philosopher Brian Besong kindly reviews my book Scholastic Metaphysics .  From the review:
Philosopher Edward Feser has earned significant fanfare in recent years for his lucid presentations and defenses of Thomism… The fanfare is well deserved, for in addition to a witty polemical style, Feser has a mostly unrivaled ability to present faithfully the views of Aquinas in a deep and systematic way…There is a lot to like in this relatively small volume, especially for advanced readers -- and those having some Anglo-American philosophical background -- who are interested in becoming acquainted with Thomistic metaphysics and the reasons why Thomism endures as a compelling philosophical position…

[I]t’s difficult to think of another single text that presents and defends Thomistic metaphysics so systematically, worthily examining some of the finer points on which the schoolmen debated alongside many other historically weighty criticisms of the Thomistic position.  Feser fans will be delighted, and those unfamiliar with his work have one more reason to acquaint themselves with him.
Besong puts forward three criticisms of the book as well.  First:
[T]hose searching for an introduction to Scholastic metaphysics accessible to the general reader should look elsewhere, for a few reasons… [A]lthough Feser’s explanations carefully avoid assuming any prior Thomistic background, the speed with which he introduces much of the relevant material indicates a target audience of academic philosophers (or at least advanced philosophy students) who do not need much extended explanation.  The general reader will thus find the book slow-going and difficult, requiring frequent repeated readings of some sections.
Here I plead guilty, though I don’t think I’ve actually committed an offense.  Yes, the book is aimed at academics and philosophy students, but I never claimed otherwise, the title notwithstanding.  Some readers seem to think that to label a book an “introduction” is to imply that it is an introduction for the absolute beginner.  That is not the case.  All it entails is that it introduces some specific topic to readers who aren’t familiar with that specific topic.  But an introduction may still presuppose that readers will have other relevant knowledge.  Lots of “introductory” books in philosophy are like this.  For example, many an “introduction” to philosophy of mind or philosophy of science will presuppose that the reader already knows something about philosophy, and is simply trying to find out about the specific sub-discipline in question.  To make every “introduction” accessible to the absolute beginner would require making it twice as long and tedious for readers who don’t need a refresher on the very basics.
Besong’s second criticism is:
[T]he book appears far more concerned with defending Thomistic metaphysics against a range of historical alternatives than introducing distinctively Scholastic views on given topics.  For although Feser discusses rival Scholastic positions, such as those of William of Ockham, Duns Scotus, and Francisco Suárez, his discussions are abbreviated and polemical.  Most of the minor Scholastic thinkers go completely unmentioned.  A more apt title for the book might have been Thomistic Metaphysics and Its Critics.
Here too I plead guilty, but once again I think I’m not really guilty of any offense.  Any “introduction” is always an introduction for a certain audience and for certain purposes.  You can’t possibly meet the needs or interests of every possible introductory reader, or address every purpose for which someone might need an introduction to a subject.  Now, the audience my book is aimed at (as I make pretty clear in the introductory chapter) are readers familiar with and/or interested in contemporary analytic philosophy, and my intent was to demonstrate the contemporary relevance and defensibility of certain key Scholastic ideas rather than to provide a historical overview of the Scholastic tradition. 
Those aims entailed that I emphasize those ideas and arguments that I think are the most plausible and most useful in a dialogue with contemporary analytic philosophy.  Since I happen to be a Thomist, and since, among Scholastic ideas and arguments, Thomistic ones are those with which contemporary analytic philosophers are most likely to have at least a passing familiarity (given e.g. the existence of the “analytic Thomist” school of thought), it was natural that Thomistic ideas would dominate the book.
I submit that there is nothing wrong with that, and in particular that it is no reason to regard the title of the book as misleading.  Any introduction that is itself a work of philosophy and not merely a dry and non-committal rehearsal of various competing ideas is inevitably going to reflect a certain point of view.  Again, here my book is like lots of other “introductory” books in philosophy.  For example, an introductory book on philosophy of mind might reflect either a materialist or dualist point of view, even if it aims to introduce the key ideas and arguments from all sides.  An introductory book on philosophy of science might reflect a realist or instrumentalist point of view, even if it aims to introduce the key ideas and argument from all sides in that sub-discipline.  And so forth.  And my book does introduce Scholastic ideas and arguments other than Thomistic ones, even if the overall point of view is Thomist.  (I addressed these issues in greater depth in a couple of posts responding to Michael Sullivan’s review of my book, hereand here.)
It is worth adding that Besong’s description of my book as “polemical” might be misleading for some readers.  To call a book “polemical” can be merely to describe it as defending a certain controversial point of view and criticizing rival points of view.  I think that’s what Besong has in mind, and in that sense my book is indeed “polemical.”  But the word “polemical” also often connotes an approach that is rhetorically caustic or otherwise highly aggressive.  And my book is not “polemical” in thatsense.  (Sure, I’ve written other things that are “polemical” in that sense, but Scholastic Metaphysics is not like that.  It is, for the most part anyway, fairly dispassionate and academic in tone.)
Besong’s third criticism is as follows:
[M]y main critical concern is that Feser tries to do too much at once.  Given the apparent aims of the work, I would have preferred to see a two-volume set that first dives into the Scholastic debates (in isolation from broader historical concerns) from an “orthodox” Thomistic perspective, addressing in greater depth the premodern views and arguments raised against Thomistic metaphysical positions, and then, in a separate work, addresses the sort of criticisms that have been raised from early modernity forward.  Scholastic Metaphysics combines both efforts, and this can at times make the presentation appear hurried, especially if the intended audience includes academics.
Here I plead not guilty.  As in his second criticism, Besong here essentially criticizes the book for failing to do something it wasn’t trying to do in the first place, viz. provide a complete overview of “premodern” and “early modern” disputes both within the Scholastic tradition and between Scholastic views and their non-Scholastic rivals.  It is true that I do say a bit in the book about these historical issues, but the reason is not that I was trying to do too much – namely, both give a historical overview and also address contemporary relevance.  The reason is rather that I was only trying to accomplish the second task of addressing contemporary relevance, and that saying a little bit about the historical issues is sometimes crucial to doing that.  For example, given the massive influence Hume has had on how contemporary analytic philosophers tend to think about causation, it was important to say something about the historical background to Hume’s ideas.  Many contemporary readers tend to think that Hume’s background assumptions are just natural and obvious, and saying what I did about the historical background to those assumptions was intended to help show just how contingent and challengeable they in fact are.
All the same, Besong’s criticisms are thoughtful, and I thank him for them and for his very kind words about the book.

How Pope Benedict XVI dealt with disagreement

In 1988, Archbishop Marcel Lefebvre of the Society of St. Pius X (SSPX) consecrated four bishops against the express orders of Pope John Paul II.  The Vatican declared that the archbishop and the new bishops had, by virtue of this act, incurred a latae sententiae (or automatic) excommunication.  This brought to a head years of tension between the Society and the Vatican, occasioned by the Society’s disagreement with liturgical and doctrinal changes following Vatican II.  Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger, then the chief doctrinal officer of the Church and later to become Pope Benedict XVI, had worked strenuously, if in vain, for a reconciliation.On July 13 of that year Cardinal Ratzinger addressed the controversy in a talk in Santiago, Chile to that country’s bishops.  Naturally, he was very critical of the Archbishop, and insisted that the fault was ultimately Lefebvre’s rather than the Vatican’s.  Yet Ratzinger also called upon Lefebvre’s critics to consider how their own actions may have needlessly alienated those sympathetic to the SSPX.  Events following Vatican II, he suggested, had understandably “[led] a great number of people to ask themselves if the Church of today is really the same as that of yesterday, or if they have changed it for something else without telling people.”

To the extent that churchmen had fostered this impression, they bore, in Ratzinger’s view, some responsibility for the crisis with the SSPX.  He said:
[I]t is a duty for us to examine ourselves, as to what errors we have made, and which ones we are making even now…
[S]chisms can take place only when certain truths and certain values of the Christian faith are no longer lived and loved within the Church… It will not do to attribute everything to political motives, to nostalgia, or to cultural factors of minor importance…
For all these reasons, we ought to see this matter primarily as the occasion for an examination of conscience.  We should allow ourselves to ask fundamental questions, about the defects in the pastoral life of the Church, which are exposed by these events…
[W]e want to ask ourselves where there is lack of clarity in ourselves…
End quote.  So, according to Cardinal Ratzinger, churchmen can be guilty of scandalizing the faithful by virtue of (a) apparent surreptitious departures from truths and values traditionally upheld by the Church, (b) a lack of clarity, and (c) a tendency to dismiss criticism as politically motivated, an expression of mere nostalgia, etc.
Ring any bells?
After becoming pope himself, Ratzinger would lift the excommunications of the SSPX bishops, affirm the right of all Catholic priests to use the Extraordinary Form of the Mass (i.e. the “Latin Mass”), and begin doctrinal talks with the SPPX -- all in compliance with the conditions the SSPX had set on regularizing its position within the Church. 
This solicitude for critics of papal policy may seem odd coming from the man whom liberal journalists liked to describe as the “Panzer Cardinal.”  But the image of Ratzinger as a grim inquisitor ruthlessly quashing dissent is an urban legend.  As he complained in the 1988 Santiago talk:
The mythical harshness of the Vatican in the face of the deviations of the progressives is shown to be mere empty words.  Up until now, in fact, only warnings have been published; in no case have there been strict canonical penalties in the strict sense.
It is true that heterodox progressive theologians like Hans Küng and Charles Curran are not permitted to teach Catholic theology in an official capacity.  But these famous dissenters were never excommunicated or defrocked.  They maintained their academic careers, their influence within the Church, and the fawning attention of the media. 
In 1990, the CDF under Cardinal Ratzinger issued the instruction Donum Veritatis , addressing the issue of dissent among theologians.  As I had reason to note in a recent post, despite insisting on fidelity to the Magisterium, Donum Veritatis is very generous in recognizing the legitimacy and value of certain kinds of criticism of magisterial statements.  (See the passages quoted in that post.)
So, both as head of the CDF and as pope, while Ratzinger by no means gave away the store either to the SSPX or to the progressives, he did strive as far as possible to understand and accommodate their concerns. 
Naturally, he was no less reasonable when dealing with criticism and queries coming from more mainstream quarters.  An example: In its teaching on the morality of lying, the 1994 edition of the Catechism of the Catholic Church gave the impression that one was bound to refrain from lying only to “someone who has a right to know the truth.”  This seemed to depart from the more traditional teaching that lying is always and intrinsically wrong, whether or not the person lied to has a right to the truth.  Many Catholic theologians wrote to then-Cardinal Ratzinger at the time, asking that the text be changed to conform with the more traditional teaching.  He did not dismiss this criticism as rigid, or as insufficiently sensitive to the complexities of concrete circumstances requiring discernment, etc.  Rather, in the revised 1997 edition of the Catechism, the text was indeed changed to remove the problematic non-traditional formulation.  (I had reason to discuss the details of this case in an earlier post.)
Another example: In 1995, Pope John Paul II’s Evangelium Vitae appeared, and took a very restrictive position on the application of capital punishment.  Concerned about the impression that traditional Catholic doctrine on capital punishment was being overturned, Fr. Richard John Neuhaus wrote to Cardinal Ratzinger asking for clarification.  Ratzinger did not accuse Neuhaus of a bad spirit, of dissent, of trying to put the pope into a difficult situation, of quibbling about what was already perfectly clear, etc.  Rather, he straightforwardly answered the question, reassuring Neuhaus that “the Holy Father has not altered the doctrinal principles which pertain to this issue” but was merely “appl[ying the]… principles in the context of present-day historical circumstances.”  And in 2004, Ratzinger further reaffirmed the continuing validity of traditional teaching by making it clear that“there may be a legitimate diversity of opinion even among Catholics about… the death penalty” and that a Catholic could even be “at odds with” the pope on that subject – something that could not be the case if the relevant doctrinal principles had been reversed.
This willingness to allow for diverse opinions wherever that is consistent with orthodoxy, and as far as possible to engage those who are critical of papal policy and teaching non-polemically and at the level of rational argumentation rather than by authoritative diktat, plausibly stem from Benedict’s high regard for reason.  In his famous Regensburg address of 2006, Benedict emphasized the centrality of reason to the Catholic faith and to the Christian conception of God, contrasting it sharply with the voluntarist tendency to see God as an unfathomable will who issues arbitrary commands.  He approvingly quotes Byzantine emperor Manuel II Palaeologus’s remark that “whoever would lead someone to faith needs the ability to speak well and to reason properly,” and endorses the emperor’s view that (as Benedict paraphrases Manuel) “not to act in accordance with reason is contrary to God’s nature.”  Benedict added:
[T]he faith of the Church has always insisted that between God and us, between his eternal Creator Spirit and our created reason there exists a real analogy… God does not become more divine when we push him away from us in a sheer, impenetrable voluntarism; rather, the truly divine God is the God who has revealed himself as logos… Consequently, Christian worship is… worship in harmony with the eternal Word and with our reason.
This attitude toward reason contrasts sharply with that evinced by many of the critics of the four cardinals and others who have formally and politely asked Pope Francis to clarify Amoris Laetitia and to reaffirm the traditional Catholic teachings that some think are contradicted by that document.  Most of these critics have refused to address the substance of the four cardinals’ concerns.  They have preferred to question the cardinals’ motives and to issue insultsand threatsand false statements.  They have expressed scorn for the cardinals’ “intellectual discussion” and “sophisticated arguments.”  One critic opines that those who sympathize with the four cardinals tend to be “intellectuals” and “educated” people, “who put great store in their reason” and in “arguments, logically developed from absolute first principles… building to a case that cries out to be answered” – as if these were bad things!  Even Pope Francis himself has in the past criticized “trust in clear and logical reasoning” as a kind of “Gnosticism”! 
And yet it is only fair to note that Pope Francis has, like his predecessor, been surprisingly generous even to the SSPX.  Evidently his motivation has less to do with concern for doctrinal continuity and rational engagement than with charity and mercy.  But perhaps this same charity and mercy will, ultimately, lead him to respond to the four cardinals. 

Hiroshima, mon Amoris? (Updated 12/16)

Pope Francis’s Amoris Laetitia has been something of a bombshell.  And its critics worry that it will have something like a bombshell’s effect on the Church.  Most readers are no doubt aware of the four cardinals’ now famous dubia (“doubts”), requesting from the pope clarification on certain doctrinal questions raised by the document.  This was preceded earlier this year by a statement from forty-five theologians and clergy asking the pope to repudiate theological errors they take to be apparent in the document.Some defenders of Amoris have been decidedly heated in their response to these developments.  Fr. Pio Vito Pinto, Dean of the Roman Rota, alleges that the cardinals have caused “a very grave scandal, which could even lead the Holy Father to take away their red hats.”  Retired Bishop Frangiskos Papamanolis accuses the cardinals of “sin,” “apostasy” and “sacrilege.”  Papal advisor Fr. Antonio Spadaro opines that Amoris is “very clear” and that “a questioning conscience can easily find all the responses it is seeking, if it is seeking sincerely” and criticizes those who “pose questions in order to place another in difficulty, provoking divisions.” 

So far, however, the pope himself has not responded, either to the four cardinals or to the forty-five theologians.
But the controversy is evidently just getting started.  This week, twenty-three prominent Catholic academics and clergy have issued a statement in support of the four cardinals.  Philosopher Robert Spaemann, a friend of Pope Benedict XVI, also supports the cardinals and calls on others to join them.
At First Things, “new natural law” theorists John Finnis and Germain Grisez today summarize their own letter to the pope urging him to condemn certain errors being propagated in the name of Amoris.  (E. Christian Brugger, another “new natural law” theorist, has also been critical of Amoris and of the pope’s endorsement of the Argentine bishops’ interpretation of the document.)
At Crisis, Fr. James Schall notes that “to avoid giving answers, when giving answers is your job, seems odd.”
The Catholic Thing warns of “the dangerous road of papal silence.” 
Phil Lawler at Catholic Culture notes what the pope cannot say if he does decide to speak.
At Crux, even veteran liberal Catholic journalist John Allen rejects the glib assurances of the critics of the four cardinals that the meaning of Amorisis perfectly clear.
At Catholic World Report, Carl Olson asks: Can Amoris Laetitia be reconciled with Pope St. John Paull II’s Veritatis Splendor? 
Cardinal Gerhard Müller, the Church’s chief doctrinal officer, refrains from answering the dubia, but does insist that the teaching of John Paul II remains binding.
The Catholic Herald worries about the “intemperate and angry,” “emotive,” and “sentimental” reactions of some of the critics of the four cardinals, about the “anti-intellectualism” and “contempt for rationality and logical discourse” these critics exhibit, and about the “cult of personality” they have built around the pope.
The Herald also marvels that, interpreting Amoris, “a papal adviser has [in effect] said that extramarital sex could be a moral duty.” 
Canon lawyer Edward Peters demonstrates the theological muddleheadedness of some of the remarks made by critics of the four cardinals. 
Bishop Athanasius Schneider compares the abuse the cardinals have received to the treatment of dissidents under the Soviet regime.  He has compared the current situation to the Arian crisis.  Two other bishops also defend the four cardinals.
The National Catholic Register reminds Cardinal Cupich that the synod on the family in fact did not approve communion for the divorced and “remarried.”
Ross Douthat at The New York Times weighs competing interpretations of Amoris Laetitia and warns of “the end of Catholic marriage.”
More dueling interpretations: Philosopher Rocco Buttiglione attempts to answer the dubia and argues that Amoris can be reconciled with past teaching.  In sharp contrast, at Rorate Caeli, philosopher John Lamont argues that we are essentially in a situation like the one which faced the Church in the time of Pope Honorius.
Both defenders and critics of Amoris Laetitia fear that schism will be the sequel. 
Nor is Amoris the only statement from Pope Francis to have raised questions about continuity with traditional teaching on marriage and related matters.  The remarks the pope made this summer about the validity of Catholic marriages and cohabitation are problematic in ways noted by Fr. Gerald Murray, Robert Royal, Ed Peters, and others.  There are also problematic aspects of the pope’s reform of the annulment process.  Brugger, Christopher Tollefsen, and others have noted the problematic character of some of the pope’s remarks about contraception.  And so on.
Whatever happens next, both the pope’s actions and those of the four cardinals and forty-five theologians should be kept in theological and historical perspective.

UPDATE 12/11: Regina interviews influential Vatican-watcher Edward Pentin about what is going on in Rome.  I will add further new links as the occasion arises. 

UPDATE 12/15: An Australian archbishop denounces “absolutism” and the four cardinals’ “false clarity.”  At Crux, Austen Ivereigh accuses defenders of the four cardinals of being “dissenters” comparable to those who argue for “women priests, an end to mandatory celibacy and an opening in areas such as contraception.” 

Meanwhile, back on planet Earth, another cardinal comes to the defense of the four.  Bishop Schneider defends Christ’s teaching on marriage.  And at First Things, Prof. Joseph Shaw explains why Catholic academics are supporting the four cardinals.

UPDATE 12/16: Canon lawyer Edward Peters on popes and heresy.  Cardinal Burke is interviewed.  Historical parallels to the four cardinals.

Some commentary of my own forthcoming soon. 

Hiroshima, mon Amoris? (Updated 12/15)

Pope Francis’s Amoris Laetitia has been something of a bombshell.  And its critics worry that it will have something like a bombshell’s effect on the Church.  Most readers are no doubt aware of the four cardinals’ now famous dubia (“doubts”), requesting from the pope clarification on certain doctrinal questions raised by the document.  This was preceded earlier this year by a statement from forty-five theologians and clergy asking the pope to repudiate theological errors they take to be apparent in the document.Some defenders of Amoris have been decidedly heated in their response to these developments.  Fr. Pio Vito Pinto, Dean of the Roman Rota, alleges that the cardinals have caused “a very grave scandal, which could even lead the Holy Father to take away their red hats.”  Retired Bishop Frangiskos Papamanolis accuses the cardinals of “sin,” “apostasy” and “sacrilege.”  Papal advisor Fr. Antonio Spadaro opines that Amoris is “very clear” and that “a questioning conscience can easily find all the responses it is seeking, if it is seeking sincerely” and criticizes those who “pose questions in order to place another in difficulty, provoking divisions.” 

So far, however, the pope himself has not responded, either to the four cardinals or to the forty-five theologians.
But the controversy is evidently just getting started.  This week, twenty-three prominent Catholic academics and clergy have issued a statement in support of the four cardinals.  Philosopher Robert Spaemann, a friend of Pope Benedict XVI, also supports the cardinals and calls on others to join them.
At First Things, “new natural law” theorists John Finnis and Germain Grisez today summarize their own letter to the pope urging him to condemn certain errors being propagated in the name of Amoris.  (E. Christian Brugger, another “new natural law” theorist, has also been critical of Amoris and of the pope’s endorsement of the Argentine bishops’ interpretation of the document.)
At Crisis, Fr. James Schall notes that “to avoid giving answers, when giving answers is your job, seems odd.”
The Catholic Thing warns of “the dangerous road of papal silence.” 
Phil Lawler at Catholic Culture notes what the pope cannot say if he does decide to speak.
At Crux, even veteran liberal Catholic journalist John Allen rejects the glib assurances of the critics of the four cardinals that the meaning of Amorisis perfectly clear.
At Catholic World Report, Carl Olson asks: Can Amoris Laetitia be reconciled with Pope St. John Paull II’s Veritatis Splendor? 
Cardinal Gerhard Müller, the Church’s chief doctrinal officer, refrains from answering the dubia, but does insist that the teaching of John Paul II remains binding.
The Catholic Herald worries about the “intemperate and angry,” “emotive,” and “sentimental” reactions of some of the critics of the four cardinals, about the “anti-intellectualism” and “contempt for rationality and logical discourse” these critics exhibit, and about the “cult of personality” they have built around the pope.
The Herald also marvels that, interpreting Amoris, “a papal adviser has [in effect] said that extramarital sex could be a moral duty.” 
Canon lawyer Edward Peters demonstrates the theological muddleheadedness of some of the remarks made by critics of the four cardinals. 
Bishop Athanasius Schneider compares the abuse the cardinals have received to the treatment of dissidents under the Soviet regime.  He has compared the current situation to the Arian crisis.  Two other bishops also defend the four cardinals.
The National Catholic Register reminds Cardinal Cupich that the synod on the family in fact did not approve communion for the divorced and “remarried.”
Ross Douthat at The New York Times weighs competing interpretations of Amoris Laetitia and warns of “the end of Catholic marriage.”
More dueling interpretations: Philosopher Rocco Buttiglione attempts to answer the dubia and argues that Amoris can be reconciled with past teaching.  In sharp contrast, at Rorate Caeli, philosopher John Lamont argues that we are essentially in a situation like the one which faced the Church in the time of Pope Honorius.
Both defenders and critics of Amoris Laetitia fear that schism will be the sequel. 
Nor is Amoris the only statement from Pope Francis to have raised questions about continuity with traditional teaching on marriage and related matters.  The remarks the pope made this summer about the validity of Catholic marriages and cohabitation are problematic in ways noted by Fr. Gerald Murray, Robert Royal, Ed Peters, and others.  There are also problematic aspects of the pope’s reform of the annulment process.  Brugger, Christopher Tollefsen, and others have noted the problematic character of some of the pope’s remarks about contraception.  And so on.
Whatever happens next, both the pope’s actions and those of the four cardinals and forty-five theologians should be kept in theological and historical perspective.

UPDATE 12/11: Regina interviews influential Vatican-watcher Edward Pentin about what is going on in Rome.  I will add further new links as the occasion arises. 

UPDATE 12/15: An Australian archbishop denounces “absolutism” and the four cardinals’ “false clarity.”  At Crux, Austen Ivereigh accuses defenders of the four cardinals of being “dissenters” comparable to those who argue for “women priests, an end to mandatory celibacy and an opening in areas such as contraception.” 

Meanwhile, back on planet Earth, another cardinal comes to the defense of the four.  Bishop Schneider defends Christ’s teaching on marriage.  And at First Things, Prof. Joseph Shaw explains why Catholic academics are supporting the four cardinals.

Some commentary of my own forthcoming soon. 

Hiroshima, mon Amoris? (Updated)

Pope Francis’s Amoris Laetitia has been something of a bombshell.  And its critics worry that it will have something like a bombshell’s effect on the Church.  Most readers are no doubt aware of the four cardinals’ now famous dubia (“doubts”), requesting from the pope clarification on certain doctrinal questions raised by the document.  This was preceded earlier this year by a statement from forty-five theologians and clergy asking the pope to repudiate theological errors they take to be apparent in the document.Some defenders of Amoris have been decidedly heated in their response to these developments.  Fr. Pio Vito Pinto, Dean of the Roman Rota, alleges that the cardinals have caused “a very grave scandal, which could even lead the Holy Father to take away their red hats.”  Retired Bishop Frangiskos Papamanolis accuses the cardinals of “sin,” “apostasy” and “sacrilege.”  Papal advisor Fr. Antonio Spadaro opines that Amoris is “very clear” and that “a questioning conscience can easily find all the responses it is seeking, if it is seeking sincerely” and criticizes those who “pose questions in order to place another in difficulty, provoking divisions.” 

So far, however, the pope himself has not responded, either to the four cardinals or to the forty-five theologians.
But the controversy is evidently just getting started.  This week, twenty-three prominent Catholic academics and clergy have issued a statement in support of the four cardinals.  Philosopher Robert Spaemann, a friend of Pope Benedict XVI, also supports the cardinals and calls on others to join them.
At First Things, “new natural law” theorists John Finnis and Germain Grisez today summarize their own letter to the pope urging him to condemn certain errors being propagated in the name of Amoris.  (E. Christian Brugger, another “new natural law” theorist, has also been critical of Amoris and of the pope’s endorsement of the Argentine bishops’ interpretation of the document.)
At Crisis, Fr. James Schall notes that “to avoid giving answers, when giving answers is your job, seems odd.”
The Catholic Thing warns of “the dangerous road of papal silence.” 
Phil Lawler at Catholic Culture notes what the pope cannot say if he does decide to speak.
At Crux, even veteran liberal Catholic journalist John Allen rejects the glib assurances of the critics of the four cardinals that the meaning of Amorisis perfectly clear.
At Catholic World Report, Carl Olson asks: Can Amoris Laetitia be reconciled with Pope St. John Paull II’s Veritatis Splendor? 
Cardinal Gerhard Müller, the Church’s chief doctrinal officer, refrains from answering the dubia, but does insist that the teaching of John Paul II remains binding.
The Catholic Herald worries about the “intemperate and angry,” “emotive,” and “sentimental” reactions of some of the critics of the four cardinals, about the “anti-intellectualism” and “contempt for rationality and logical discourse” these critics exhibit, and about the “cult of personality” they have built around the pope.
The Herald also marvels that, interpreting Amoris, “a papal adviser has [in effect] said that extramarital sex could be a moral duty.” 
Canon lawyer Edward Peters demonstrates the theological muddleheadedness of some of the remarks made by critics of the four cardinals. 
Bishop Athanasius Schneider compares the abuse the cardinals have received to the treatment of dissidents under the Soviet regime.  He has compared the current situation to the Arian crisis.  Two other bishops also defend the four cardinals.
The National Catholic Register reminds Cardinal Cupich that the synod on the family in fact did not approve communion for the divorced and “remarried.”
Ross Douthat at The New York Times weighs competing interpretations of Amoris Laetitia and warns of “the end of Catholic marriage.”
More dueling interpretations: Philosopher Rocco Buttiglione attempts to answer the dubia and argues that Amoris can be reconciled with past teaching.  In sharp contrast, at Rorate Caeli, philosopher John Lamont argues that we are essentially in a situation like the one which faced the Church in the time of Pope Honorius.
Both defenders and critics of Amoris Laetitia fear that schism will be the sequel. 
Nor is Amoris the only statement from Pope Francis to have raised questions about continuity with traditional teaching on marriage and related matters.  The remarks the pope made this summer about the validity of Catholic marriages and cohabitation are problematic in ways noted by Fr. Gerald Murray, Robert Royal, Ed Peters, and others.  There are also problematic aspects of the pope’s reform of the annulment process.  Brugger, Christopher Tollefsen, and others have noted the problematic character of some of the pope’s remarks about contraception.  And so on.
Whatever happens next, both the pope’s actions and those of the four cardinals and forty-five theologians should be kept in theological and historical perspective.

UPDATE 12/11: Regina interviews influential Vatican-watcher Edward Pentin about what is going on in Rome.  I will add further new links as the occasion arises. 

Hiroshima, mon Amoris?

Pope Francis’s Amoris Laetitia has been something of a bombshell.  And its critics worry that it will have something like a bombshell’s effect on the Church.  Most readers are no doubt aware of the four cardinals’ now famous dubia (“doubts”), requesting from the pope clarification on certain doctrinal questions raised by the document.  This was preceded earlier this year by a statement from forty-five theologians and clergy asking the pope to repudiate theological errors they take to be apparent in the document.Some defenders of Amoris have been decidedly heated in their response to these developments.  Fr. Pio Vito Pinto, Dean of the Roman Rota, alleges that the cardinals have caused “a very grave scandal, which could even lead the Holy Father to take away their red hats.”  Retired Bishop Frangiskos Papamanolis accuses the cardinals of “sin,” “apostasy” and “sacrilege.”  Papal advisor Fr. Antonio Spadaro opines that Amoris is “very clear” and that “a questioning conscience can easily find all the responses it is seeking, if it is seeking sincerely” and criticizes those who “pose questions in order to place another in difficulty, provoking divisions.” 

So far, however, the pope himself has not responded, either to the four cardinals or to the forty-five theologians.
But the controversy is evidently just getting started.  This week, twenty-three prominent Catholic academics and clergy have issued a statement in support of the four cardinals.  Philosopher Robert Spaemann, a friend of Pope Benedict XVI, also supports the cardinals and calls on others to join them.
At First Things, “new natural law” theorists John Finnis and Germain Grisez today summarize their own letter to the pope urging him to condemn certain errors being propagated in the name of Amoris.  (E. Christian Brugger, another “new natural law” theorist, has also been critical of Amoris and of the pope’s endorsement of the Argentine bishops’ interpretation of the document.)
At Crisis, Fr. James Schall notes that “to avoid giving answers, when giving answers is your job, seems odd.”
The Catholic Thing warns of “the dangerous road of papal silence.” 
Phil Lawler at Catholic Culture notes what the pope cannot say if he does decide to speak.
At Crux, even veteran liberal Catholic journalist John Allen rejects the glib assurances of the critics of the four cardinals that the meaning of Amorisis perfectly clear.
At Catholic World Report, Carl Olson asks: Can Amoris Laetitia be reconciled with Pope St. John Paull II’s Veritatis Splendor? 
Cardinal Gerhard Müller, the Church’s chief doctrinal officer, refrains from answering the dubia, but does insist that the teaching of John Paul II remains binding.
The Catholic Herald worries about the “intemperate and angry,” “emotive,” and “sentimental” reactions of some of the critics of the four cardinals, about the “anti-intellectualism” and “contempt for rationality and logical discourse” these critics exhibit, and about the “cult of personality” they have built around the pope.
The Herald also marvels that, interpreting Amoris, “a papal adviser has [in effect] said that extramarital sex could be a moral duty.” 
Canon lawyer Edward Peters demonstrates the theological muddleheadedness of some of the remarks made by critics of the four cardinals. 
Bishop Athanasius Schneider compares the abuse the cardinals have received to the treatment of dissidents under the Soviet regime.  He has compared the current situation to the Arian crisis.  Two other bishops also defend the four cardinals.
The National Catholic Register reminds Cardinal Cupich that the synod on the family in fact did not approve communion for the divorced and “remarried.”
Ross Douthat at The New York Times weighs competing interpretations of Amoris Laetitia and warns of “the end of Catholic marriage.”
More dueling interpretations: Philosopher Rocco Buttiglione attempts to answer the dubia and argues that Amoris can be reconciled with past teaching.  In sharp contrast, at Rorate Caeli, philosopher John Lamont argues that we are essentially in a situation like the one which faced the Church in the time of Pope Honorius.
Both defenders and critics of Amoris Laetitia fear that schism will be the sequel. 
Nor is Amoris the only statement from Pope Francis to have raised questions about continuity with traditional teaching on marriage and related matters.  The remarks the pope made this summer about the validity of Catholic marriages and cohabitation are problematic in ways noted by Fr. Gerald Murray, Robert Royal, Ed Peters, and others.  There are also problematic aspects of the pope’s reform of the annulment process.  Brugger, Christopher Tollefsen, and others have noted the problematic character of some of the pope’s remarks about contraception.  And so on.
Whatever happens next, both the pope’s actions and those of the four cardinals and forty-five theologians should be kept in theological and historical perspective.   

Why not annihilation?

Another post on hell?  Will this series never end?  Never fear, dear reader.  As Elaine Benes would say, it only feelslike an eternity.  We’ll get on to another topic before long.
Hell itself never ends, though.  But why not?  A critic might agree that the damned essentially choose to go to hell, and that it is just for God to inflict a punishment proportionate to this evil choice.  The critic might still wonder, though, why the punishment has to be perpetual.  Couldn’t God simply annihilate the damned person after some period of suffering?  Wouldn’t this be not only more merciful, but also more just?  
Suppose Hitler and Stalin merit millions of lifetimes worth of suffering given the number of people they killed, and that this punishment ought to be inflicted simply for the sake of retributive justice, since deterrence, rehabilitation, and protection are purposes of punishment that no longer apply after death.  Wouldn’t a punishment of many millions of years suffice?  Why would it have to go on forever?  Why not a prolonged period of great misery following by nothingness?
On reflection, however, this annihilationist position doesn’t make sense, for several reasons.  Begin with a consideration that does involve deterrence.  In The End of the Present World and the Mysteries of the Future Life , Fr. Charles Arminjon argues that if the sufferings of hell were temporary, they would be insufficient to deter at least some wrongdoing.  At least some people might judge certain sins to be so attractive that they would be willing to suffer temporarily, even if horribly and for a long time, for the sake of committing them.  They might even thumb their noses at God, knowing that however grave are the evils they commit, they will only ever have to suffer finitely for them.  They will see their eventual annihilation as a means of ultimately escaping divine justice and “getting away with” doing what they wanted to do.

Now, I think this is plausible, though it would be a mistake to take deterrence to be the fundamental consideration here.  For deterrence value is not a sufficient condition for just punishment.  An offender must in the first place deservea certain punishment before we can go on to consider whether inflicting it would also have value as a way of deterring others.  However, given what has been said in my previous posts on this subject, it is clear that an offender can deserve everlasting punishment.  For (as I have argued, following Aquinas) those who are damned perpetually will to do what is evil, never repenting of it.  They are perpetually in a state that merits punishment, and thus God perpetually ensures that they receive the punishment they merit.  If such an offender adds to his intention to do this evil the further intention of “getting away with it” by virtue of being annihilated, that only adds to the reasons why he must be punished perpetually rather than annihilated. 
Annihilationism and this response to it take for granted, though, that the person who is damned wants to be annihilated, and as Jerry Walls argues, that is open to question.  Annihilationism also assumes that it would be good and indeed more merciful to annihilate the damned person, assumptions challenged by Jonathan Kvanvig and Eleonore Stump.  As Stump points out, from a Thomistic point of view, being and goodness are convertible, so that to keep a soul in being rather than annihilating it is as such to bring about good rather than bad.  As Kvanvig points out, just as capital punishment is a harsher penalty than life imprisonment, annihilation is plausibly, by analogy, a harsher punishment than perpetual confinement in hell.  And as Walls points out, a soul that is damned may prefer to persist forever willing the evil it has chosen, even though this involves unhappiness.
Keep in mind that, as I have suggested in earlier posts, it is a mistake to begin reflection on the subject of hell by calling to mind stereotypical and simplistic specific examples of sins and punishments.  The skeptic who starts by imagining someone being roasted over a pit and punctured with pitchforks over and over forever for the minor crime of stealing a candy bar is, naturally, going to find it hard to believe that anyone would choose to keep this sort of thing up eternally rather than being annihilated.  After all, people often choose suicide over lesser tortures than that.  But that is, again, precisely the wrong way to begin the inquiry.
The right way is to begin with the most relevant general metaphysical and moral principles, then work through concrete examples that most clearly illustrate those principles, and only after that to proceed to all the less clear and more controversial questions about whether this or that particular sin would merit eternal punishment and whether this or that particular sort of punishment would be fitting for someone to suffer eternally.  Hence in previous posts I started by setting out considerations concerning the fixed nature of the will of a disembodied soul, the nature and justification of punishment in general, and so forth.
Where the question of annihilation is concerned, among the general principles we have to keep in mind is Aquinas’s dictum that “every substance seeks the preservation of its own being, according to its nature” (Summa Theologiae I-II.94.2).  This is true even of the suicidal person, who will spontaneously duck if your throw a knife at him, struggle at least initially if you start to choke him, and so forth.  Preserving himself in being is his natural tendency.  It can be resisted (as it is when someone actually commits or attempts suicide), but self-preservation is a thing’s default position.
A second general Thomistic principle to keep in mind is that, as John Lamont emphasizes in an excellent article on Aquinas’s understanding of hell, the choice to do good or evil is (whether or not we always consciously think of it this way) fundamentally a choice for a certain kind of life – a choice for being a certain kind of person, for having a certain kind of character -- rather than merely for a certain specific action.  And a third general Thomistic principle to keep in mind is that we always choose what we take to be in some way good, even when what we choose is in fact bad and even when we know it to be in some respects bad.
So, take some way of life X that is in fact bad and leads to misery but which many people nevertheless take to be good and actively pursue even when they know it is making them miserable.  X might be a life of cruel domination over others, or of the greedy pursuit of wealth at all costs, or of the envious tearing down of others, or of sexual debauchery, or of drunkenness or drug addiction, or of immersion in endless trivial distractions, or of self-glorification.  The specific example doesn’t matter for present purposes (though it might be a salutary exercise to think in terms of whatever sin it is you personally find the most appealing or difficult to resist).  
Now, we are all familiar with the phenomenon of people who live lives of one of these sorts, and who are miserable as a result but who nevertheless stubbornly refuse to change their ways.  They love the evil to which they have become habituated more than they hate the misery it causes them.  They may also love defying those who urge them to change.  They insist that there is nothing wrong with them, that their unhappiness is due to others rather than to themselves, that it is in any case better to live on their own terms than to concede anything to those criticize them, etc.  They do not wish for death.  On the contrary, they perversely relish their unhappy lives, focusing their attention on the good they think they perceive in the end they have chosen, trying not to dwell on its bad fruits, and being firmly intent on proving wrong those who criticize them.  They manifest the sort irrationality often said to be paradigmatic of insanity, viz. doing the same foolish thing over and over and hoping for a different result. 
The right way to begin thinking about the person who is damned is, I would suggest, to imagine someone like this, but who persists in this particular kind of irrationality in perpetuity.  The damned person is the person whose will is fixed at death on the end of being a person of type X.  That is to say (to apply the general Thomistic principles referred to above), it is fixed on something taken to be good (however mistakenly), and thus on something desired; it is fixed on an overall way of life, and not merely on some momentary act; and it is fixed on being or existing as a person who lives that way of life.  What the damned person is “locked onto” at death is precisely a way of being, rather than on annihilation. 
In refraining from annihilating the person who is damned, then, God is precisely letting that person have what he wants.  As C. S. Lewis puts it, the saved are those who say to God “Thy will be done,” and the damned are those to whom Godsays “Thy will be done.”
But wouldn’t the damned change their minds?  Wouldn’t buyer’s remorse set in after a season in hell, leading them to say “Whoa, on second thought, I’ll go for annihilation!”  No, because, for the reasons set out in my first post in this series, the soul after death cannot change its basic orientation, cannot alter the fundamental end onto which it is locked.  And opting for annihilation would require such a change.  Hence the soul that is damned, I am suggesting, perpetually wills to exist despite being perpetually miserable.  If this seems insane, that is because it is.  But again, we are familiar with something like this kind of perverse thinking even in this life, in the example of miserable people who refuse even to try to reform but also have no desire to stop living.
Now, we often feel sorry for such people.  So wouldn’t those in heaven feel sorry for the damned – especially if some of their own loved ones are among the damned?  Wouldn’t God therefore annihilate the damned for the sake of the saved, even if not for their own sakes? 
No, and here too, as John Lamont points out in the article linked to above, we can be misled by the examples we take as our models for the damned.  In particular, we might think of that person we know who is habituated to a certain bad way of life, who is miserable as a result, but who might still reform if given enough time and who also has certain good traits.  We might imagine that this person, when in hell, would be essentially like he is now.  And we might then think: “He has such good in him too!  Wouldn’t that lead him to change his ways eventually?  And doesn’t it merit him some happiness, even if he has to be punished for his sins?”  And the problem is that in imagining this, we are, as Lamont points out, attributing to the person in hell traits which he has now but which do not and cannot exist any longer in the afterlife.  For the reason people in this life are mixtures of good and evil is that they are still embodied, and thus not absolutely fixed on either good or evil.  And after death, this is no longer the case.  (Again, see my first post in this series.) 
Hence the good that was in the evil person in this life has completely dropped away after death.  What is left in the lost soul is nothing soft, nothing kind, nothing merciful or wanting mercy, nothing that could generate in the saved the slightest sympathy.  There is only perpetual irrational malice.  If you want an image of the damned, imagine human faces on which there is written only blind, defiant, miserable rage and hatred forever and ever.  Basically, a non-stop Occupy Hell rally.  To which the saved can only shrug and say: “Whatever.  Knock yourselves out, guys.”

Mexican link off

Argentine standoff: Pope Francis and the four cardinals, as reported by National Catholic Register and Catholic Herald .  Commentary from First Things and Bishop Athanasius Schneider.
Richard Dawkins misrepresents science, according to British scientists. 
Philosophy and laughs at Oxford with J. L. Austin, at Aeon.
Enter the Brotherhood of Steely Dan, at Vinyl Me, Please.  Live for Live Music looks back on Gaucho.
At Crisis magazine, Anthony Esolen asked: What will you do when persecution comes?  And then the persecutors came for Anthony Esolen, as reported by The American Conservative , National Review , Touchstone , and Catholic World Report.
Michael Lind on how science fiction fails us, at The Smart Set.

At Vanity Fair, Exorcist director William Friedkin on exorcist Fr. Gabriele Amorth.
To deal with ISIS, says the Archbishop of Canterbury, let’s start by admitting the obvious.
A new edition of The Gifts of the Holy Spirit by John of St. Thomas is forthcoming from Cluny Media.  A translation of Fr. Josef Kleutgen’s Pre-Modern Philosophy Defended is forthcoming from St. Augustine’s Press.
Simon Evnine’s Making Objects and Events: A Hylomorphic Theory of Artifacts, Actions, and Organisms is reviewed by Lynne Rudder Baker at Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.
Bleeding Cool reviews the new book Art of Atari .
Catholic World Report on Anthony McCarthy’s new book Ethical Sex.
Matthew Levering’s Proofs of God: Classical Arguments from Tertullian to Barth is reviewed by William Carroll at Public Discourse.
At BuzzFeed, how Trump advisor Steve Bannon sees the world.
Passing on the Right: Conservative Professors in the Progressive University by Jon Shields and Joshua Dunn, Sr., is reviewed at the Claremont Review of Books.
The University Bookman on The War of the Worlds in H.G. Wells, Orson Welles, Steven Spielberg, and beyond.
At Public Discourse, Allison Postell reviews Jonathan Sanford’s Before Virtue: Assessing Contemporary Virtue Ethics. 
Bill Maher, Michael Moore, and Slate Star Codex urge their fellow Trump critics to stop it with the PC bullshit already.
 
Real Clear Religion reports that Thomism is ready for its close-up.
James Gleick’s Time Travel: A History , reviewed at The New York Review of Books.
The late Scott Ryan, greatly missed friend of this blog, recorded an album, The Gift, before his death.  Scott’s wife Lilla has started a KickStarter campaign to get the album heard.
New from Stephen T. Davis: Rational Faith: A Philosopher's Defense of Christianity.
The Washington Post reviews Peter Ackroyd’s new book on Alfred Hitchcock.  An interview with Ackroyd at The University Bookman.  Los Angeles Review of Books on Stanley Kubrick. 
If, like me, you’ve spent a big chunk of your life hanging out in L.A. area bookstores that no longer exist, you’ll dig the Bookstore Memories blog.  (I remember well when Hollywood Boulevard was bookstore row.  You’d never know it today, alas.)