Eugene Volokh's Blog, page 2709
September 19, 2011
Cert Petition in Fisher v. Texas
A cert petition has been filed in Fisher v. Texas, which challenges the racial and ethnic admission preferences at UT-Austin. The cert petition is here. David and Ilya blogged on this after the Fifth Circuit's ruling. It is an important case for the reasons that David and Ilya noted at the time and I hope the Supreme Court will take it.




September 18, 2011
Google changes my life, again
I find even good flight search sites, like Hipmunk, Yapta, and Kayak, a little frustrating. Now Google Flight Search is getting ready to do what Google does best – transform Internet tools for free. Google's new travel search service is the first fruit from its acquisition last year of ITA Software, a travel search firm.
Lots of travel sites trembled when Google bought ITA. And well they should.
This thing is cool.
You kind of have to explore it yourself, but the visualization tools are excellent and will save you money. Example: A weekend trip Burlington from Washington would cost $845 right now. Last time I took that trip, I had to fly to Albany and drive to get a decent fare. Now, thanks to Google Flight's visualization of future weekend fares, I've discovered that United will sell me a $219 weekend ticket from Dulles to Burlington if I just make reservations about a month in advance. (To see this example, go to the search page for that trip and click on the little calendar icon on the top right side of the page.)
That's the kind of thing you could learn from the other sites only by laboriously typing dates over and over again, then waiting to see what turned up. With Google Flight, the low fare just jumps out at you. There's lots more geeky fun to be had with other tools, too.




EPA Postpones Another Air Rule
Two weeks ago, President Obama asked EPA Administrator Lisa Jackson to shelve plans to tighten the National Ambient Air Quality Standard for ozone, leaving any reconsideration of the current standard until 2013. This past week, the EPA announced it was delaying the planned release of proposed regulations to control greenhouse gas emissions from power plants under the Clean Air Act. This is the second time EPA has delayed publication of these rules.
Viewed together, these decisions suggest the Obama Administration is making a conscious effort to moderate its regulatory policy, particularly in the environmental area. If so, why would this be? Could it possibly make political sense for the Obama Administration to acquiesce to GOP attacks on environmental protection? After all, as Ann Carlson noted at Legal Planet, environmental protection remains popular,and polls suggest relatively few Americans believe environmental regulation costs jobs (though it can).
It is inconceivable that the Obama Administration believes that these moves will placate Tea Party opposition or win plaudits from across the aisle. But that's not the point. Nor is aggregate popular opinion on these questions particularly relevant to the political calculus. Rather, as I noted in comments to Ann Carlson's post, what matters are the views of marginal voters and, in particular, marginal voters in politically significant states. That is, the opinions of moderates and independents in Ohio, Pennsylvania and West Virginia matter more than the views of environmental activists in San Francisco or Washington, D.C.
Viewed in this light, the political rationale of these decisions is easier to understand. Insofar as these moves are politically inspired, it would appear the aim is to placate those potential constituencies in battleground states most sensitive to the costs of new and impending environmental regulations. Think coal and power company unions, small businesses in what remains of the industrial midwest, and moderate Democrats in state and local governments whose enthusiasm is essential for voter turnout. These sorts of groups are more likely to notice whether the Obama Administration appears to be moderating the EPA's regulatory zeal or tightening the screws, and such issues may influence their votes. There's a reason Joe Manchin (D-WV) ran against environmental regulation, and the White House is certainly understands where proposed environmental rules would have the greatest economic effect.
None of this means that the Obama Administration's decisions were politically driven — I have no deep inside sources — or that they are politically wise. The ozone NAAQS decision was almost certainly political, but the latest decision may well have been influenced by other concerns. But if the Obama Administration is deliberately trimming the EPA's sails, the political calculus is easy to understand.




Ignoring the Text of Federal Rule of Evidence 702
I've noted before that many federal courts simply ignore the text of Federal Rule of Evidence 702 in favor of their own formulations, sometimes relying on cases that were decided before Rule 702 was amended in 2000, and that conflict with the amended rule. I just came across a good example. On September 7th, the Eleventh Circuit decided the case of Rosenfeld v. Oceana Cruises, in which the court overturned a district court ruling excluding the testimony of a floor safety expert.
Here's the Eleventh Circuit, quoting a 2004 case that in turn quoted a 1998 case–a case that predates not only amended Rule 702, but also the Kumho Tire case that established standards for the admissibility of non-scientific expert testimony while overruling, you guessed it, an overly lenient Eleventh Circuit opinion:
[T]rial courts determining the admissibility of expert testimony under Federal Rule of Evidence 702 must "engage in a rigorous three-part inquiry," considering whether:(1) the expert is qualified to testify competently regarding the matters he intends to address; (2) the methodology by which the expert reaches his conclusions is sufficiently reliable as determined by the sort of inquiry mandated in Daubert [v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993)]; and (3) the testimony assists the trier of fact, through the application of scientific, technical, or specialized expertise, to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.
That is perhaps a reasonable test, but it doesn't happen to be the same as the three-part test that Rule 702 quite explicitly enumerates, to wit:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.
The Eleventh Circuit notes that "Oceania argues that Vournechis's methods failed to accurately test for wet conditions, and that his conclusions were 'imprecise and unspecific' and based on 'incorrect assumption[s]' about the location of Rosenfeld's fall." Then, applying its own test, the court concludes that "these arguments attack the weight and the persuasiveness of Vournechis's testimony, not its admissibility."
Whoa! Part (3) of Rule 702 specifically states that expert testimony is only admissible if
"the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case." If, in fact, Vournechis did, for example "fail to accurately test for wet conditions," then he did not apply his principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case, and this is an issue of admissibility, not mere weight. But since the Eleventh Circuit doesn't quote or otherwise pay any attention to the text of the rule it's purporting to apply, and instead applies the test it invented instead, it not surprisingly gets the law wrong.
In fairness to the court, though, I should point out that none of this was explained by the defendant's attorneys, who never cite the text of Rule 702 in their brief.




Prof. Nick Rosenkranz (Georgetown), Guest-Blogging
I'm delighted to report that Prof. Nick Rosenkranz (Georgetown) will be guest-blogging starting Monday about his new article, The Objects of the Constitution, 63 Stanford Law Review 1005 (2011), as well as his earlier The Subjects of the Constitution, 62 Stanford Law Review 1209 (2010) (which drew a great deal of attention when it was published, including raves from our own Randy Barnett). Here's a summary of Nick's approach:
Two centuries after Marbury v. Madison, there remains a deep confusion about quite what a court is reviewing when it engages in judicial review. Conventional wisdom has it that judicial review is the review of certain legal objects: statutes, regulations. But strictly speaking, this is not quite right. The Constitution prohibits not objects but actions. Judicial review is the review of such actions. And actions require actors: verbs require subjects. So before judicial review focuses on verbs, let alone objects, it should begin at the beginning, with subjects. Every constitutional inquiry should begin with a basic question that has been almost universally overlooked. The fundamental question, from which all else follows, is the who question: who has violated the Constitution?
As judicial review is practiced today, courts skip over this bedrock question to get to the more familiar question: how was the Constitution violated? But it makes no sense to ask how, until there is an answer to who. Indeed, in countless muddled lines of doctrine, puzzlement about the predicates of constitutional violation follows directly from more fundamental confusion about the subjects.
Confusion about the who (and, relatedly, the when) of constitutional violation has been the root cause of many of the deepest puzzles of federal jurisdiction — puzzles of ripeness, of standing, of severability, of "facial" and "as-applied" challenges. Simply by focusing attention on this crucial constitutional feature, the subjects of the Constitution, these puzzles may be solved once and for all. And as they are solved, it becomes clear that this approach constitutes a new model of judicial review.
But the implications of this new paradigm are not limited to federal jurisdiction. It turns out that confusion over the deep puzzles of federal jurisdiction has had subtle but profound feedback effects on substantive constitutional doctrine as well. Once these jurisdictional puzzles are solved, the scope of constitutional rights and powers comes into new focus as well. These implications ripple through the most important and controversial doctrines of constitutional law, from the scope of the Commerce Clause to the reach of the First Amendment, from the meaning of equal protection to the content of privileges and immunities, from the nature of due process to the shape of abortion rights.
And all of it derives from nothing more complicated than asking the right first question: who has violated the Constitution?
I much look forward to Prof. Rosenkranz's visit.




Should We Support the "Whole Constitution"?
Co-bloggers Eugene Volokh and Jonathan Adler have made some powerful criticisms of the "Whole Constitution Pledge"put together by various liberal organizations. As Jonathan points out, there are some parts of the Constitution that most liberals prefer to underenforce, if not completely repudiate.
I would go further than that and note that at least a few parts of the Constitution are completely indefensible, including by the standards of modern liberals. For example, how many of the organizations behind the Whole Constitution Pledge support the provision in the Constitution that allows only native-born citizens to run for the presidency? I know I don't — and it's not because I have any desire to run for president myself. At best, this provision reflects unjustified suspicion of immigrants; at worst it's rank bigotry. How about the rule under which the vice president (in his capacity as president of the Senate) gets to preside over his own impeachment trial? Does anyone, liberal or otherwise, believe that's a good idea?
There are other parts of the Constitution, which though not obviously wrong, are at least open to serious criticism. For example, I think that it should be easier to break up excessively large and dysfunctional states, such as California. A number of liberal legal scholars, such as Sanford Levinson, believe it's a bad idea to give some states fifty times greater representation per capita in the Senate than others. Are their ideas beyond the pale of reasonable discourse? Obviously not.
The Founding Fathers did a great job overall. But a few parts of their handiwork were flawed from the start, and some others that may have been defensible in 1787 or 1868 are no longer so today. For these reasons, I do not pledge to support the whole Constitution. Some parts of it are unworthy of support. I do urge judges and other government officials to impartially enforce all of its provisions for so long as they remain unamended. But that is not the same thing as endorsing their propriety.
Obviously, not all constitutional reform proposals are good ideas. For example, I am skeptical of calls by some on the right for the repeal of the 17th Amendment. But if you want to defend that Amendment against its critics, it's not enough to endorse the "Whole Constitution" or to make general claims that "our Constitution has been improved by the Amendments adopted over the last 220 years," as the Pledge puts it. You have to explain, as I tried to do, why repealing this particular amendment would do more harm than good.




September 17, 2011
New law school textbook on the Second Amendment and firearms regulation
Very early next year–in time for 2d semester classes in the 2011-12 academic year–Aspen Publishers will publish the first law school textbook on the the Second Amendment. The title is Firearms Law and the Second Amendment: Regulation, Rights, and Policy. The co-authors are Nicholas Johnson (Fordham), Michael O'Shea (Oklahoma City), George Moscary (Connecticut), and me.
Below the fold is the full Table of Contents and Preface for the book. (Pasting the Word document into the blog format significantly altered many of the indents, line spacing, and outline numbering for chapter subdivisions, so the TOC below does not look exactly like the TOC of the book itself.) Because the textbook is currently in the production process, review copies are not yet available. Indeed, the Aspen website's promotional page for the book is still several weeks away. However, if you might use the textbook next semester, and would like to see some chapters, just contact any of the co-authors, and we can mail them to you.
The 11 chapters of the printed textbook proceed chronologically, from ancient Rome, Greece, and China, all the way to the post–Heller cases. Four additional, on-line only chapters cover some special topics. Those electronic chapters will be available to all students and professors using the textbook.
Besides being sold as a conventional hardback, Firearms Law will also be available in individual electronic chapters. So if you are teaching a constitutional law course and would like to include a 2 or 3 week unit on the Second Amendment, your students could buy chapter 9 (Heller and McDonald) plus chapter 11 (post–Heller cases in the lower courts). Or if you're teaching an advanced criminal law class, you might want to have your students buy chapter 8, which covers the modern criminal law of gun control, particularly under the federal Gun Control Act.
Summary of Contents
Contents
Preface
Acknowledgements
Editorial Note
PART ONE
THE ORIGINS OF THE RIGHT TO ARMS
Chapter 1. A Brief Introduction to Firearms and Their Regulation
Chapter 2. Antecedents of the Second Amendment
Chapter 3. The Colonies and the Revolution
Chapter 4. The New Constitution
Chapter 5. The Right to Arms, Militias, and Slavery in the Early Republic and Antebellum Periods
Chapter 6. Reconstruction and Beyond
PART TWO
THE RIGHT TO ARMS IN THE MODERN WORLD
Chapter 7. A New and Dangerous Century
Chapter 8. Between Miller and Heller: The Second Amendment in the Modern Era
Chapter 9. The Supreme Court Affirms an Individual Right to Arms
Chapter 10. The Right to Arms after Heller
Chapter 11. Firearms Policy and Status: Race, Gender, Age, Disability, and Sexual Orientation
Table of Cases
Table of Statutes and Constitutions
Table of Authorities
Index
PART THREE (ON-LINE)
SPECIAL TOPICS ON ARMS AND SELF-DEFENSE
Chapter 12. Social Science on Guns and Self-Defense
Chapter 13. International Law
Chapter 14. Comparative Law
Chapter 15. Detailed Explanation of Firearms and Ammunition
Contents
Preface
Acknowledgements
Editorial Note
PART ONE
THE ORIGINS OF THE RIGHT TO ARMS
Chapter 1
A Brief Introduction to Firearms and Their Regulation
A. The Parts of a Firearm and Ammunition
B. Firearm Features
Firing MechanismAmmunition FeedingSafety DevicesFirearm User SafetyC. The Major Types of Firearms
HandgunsSemi-Automatic PistolsRevolversLegitimate Uses of HandgunsCriminal Uses of HandgunsRiflesBolt-ActionSemi-AutomaticLever-ActionSingle-ShotCharacteristics of RiflesLegitimate uses of riflesCrime with riflesShotgunsShotgun ShellsTypes of ShotgunsLegitimate Uses of ShotgunsCrime with shotgunsD. Modern Gun Control Laws
Purchasing a Gun from a Commercial DealerPurchasing a Gun from Other PersonsPurchases in Various LocationsGun RegistrationKeeping the Gun at HomeTarget ShootingHunting with a GunCarrying a Gun for Protection At Home, or in Your Place of BusinessIn your automobileIn Public PlacesLocal laws10. Using a Gun for Self-defense
E. Gun Control Controversies Today
Appendix: The Right to Arms in State Constitutions
Chapter 2
Antecedents of the Second Amendment
A. The Early Far East
ConfucianismThe Analects of Confucius
Mencius
TaoismTao Te Ching
Wen Tzu
The Master of the Hidden Storehouse
Huainanzi
B. Ancient Greece and Rome
1. Greece
Greek lawPlato vs. AristotlePlatoAristotleAristotle's Constitution of Athens, ch XV
RomeCorpus Juris
C. Judeo-Christian Thought
Jewish ThoughtEarly Christian ThoughtThe Sermon on the MountThe Final Instructions to the ApostlesThe Arrest of JesusPaul's Letter to the RomansOther Early Christian WritingsMedieval Christian ThoughtJohn of Salisbury's PolicraticusThomas AquinasD. Second-millennium Europe
Italian InfluenceCesare Beccaria, An Essay on Crimes and Punishments, ch. 40
EnglandMagna ChartaEnglish statutesAssize of Arms
Statute of Northampton
Gun and crossbow control
Castle Doctrine CasesHue and Cry, the Militia, the Glorious Revolution, and the Declaration of RightBlackstoneJohn Locke, Jean de Barbyrac, and John AdamsJohn Locke, Second Treatise of Government
Novangelus
Chapter 3
The Colonies and the Revolution
A. Firearm Control in the Colonies
Early Arms MandatesColonial Statutes Mandating Arms PossessionMassachusetts
Maryland
Connecticut
New York
Virginia
New Jersey
New Hampshire
North Carolina
Delaware
Pennsylvania
Colonial Statutes Mandating Arms CarryingVirginia
Connecticut
Massachusetts
Rhode Island
Maryland
South Carolina
Georgia
Statutory requirements for Arming Free Servants and ChildrenEarly Firearm Regulation and ProhibitionSafety RegulationsLimits on Gun Sales to IndiansGun Restrictions on BlacksSporadic Disarmament of DissidentsB. Firearms, Self-Defense and Militias in Pre-Revolutionary America
The Boston Massacre TrialA Colonial View of the English Right to ArmsE.A. [Samuel Adams], Boston Gazette, Feb. 27, 1769
C. Religion, Arms, and ResistanceJonathan Mayhew, A Discourse Concerning Unlimited Submission and Non-Resistance to the Higher Powers: With Some Reflections on the Resistance Made to King Charles I and on the Anniversary of his Death
Simeon Howard, A Sermon Preached to the Ancient and Honorable Artillery Company in Boston
C. The British Crackdown
The Coercive (Intolerable) Acts and the Powder AlarmsDisarmament Orders from LondonThe Import BanCalls for Defiance: Patrick Henry and the SouthPatrick Henry, The War Inevitable, Speech at the Second Revolutionary Convention of Virginia
Defiance in Practice and the Independent MilitiasD. Arms and the American Revolution
Gun Confiscation at Lexington & ConcordGun Confiscation in BostonDeclaration of Causes of Taking Up ArmsThe Declaration by the Representatives of the United Colonies of North America, July 6, 1775
Falmouth DestroyedThe Declaration of IndependenceThe Declaration of Independence
Thomas Paine on Self-Defense, Resistance, and MilitiasGun Confiscation and Smuggling ReprisedThe Militia, the Continental Army, and American MarksmanshipE. The Articles of Confederation
F. The Right to Arms, Standing Armies, and Militias in the Early State Constitutions and Statutes
South Carolina
Virginia
New Jersey
Pennsylvania
Delaware
Maryland
North Carolina
Georgia
New York
Vermont
Massachusetts
New Hampshire
Connecticut
Rhode Island
Chapter 4
The New Constitution
A. Standing Armies, Militias, and Individual Rights—The Constitutional Convention of 1787
B. Ratification of the Constitution
Pennsylvania
Massachusetts
Maryland
New Hampshire
Virginia
Virginia Ratification Message
Resolution of Virginia's Proposed Amendments
New York
North Carolina
Resolution of North Carolina's Proposed Amendments
Rhode Island
C. Commentary During the Ratification Period
The Federalist PapersThe Federalist No. 29 (Alexander Hamilton)
The Federalist No. 46 (James Madison)
Tench CoxeOther FederalistsD. The Second Amendment
The Second Amendment's Path Through CongressCommentary on the Second AmendmentE. Post-Ratification
The Militia ActsFirst Militia Act of 1792
Second Militia Act of 1792
St. George TuckerTucker's BlackstoneTucker's Early Lecture NotesF. Federal and State Military Forces of Today
The United States Armed ForcesThe National GuardState Defense ForcesThe Unorganized Militia
Chapter 5
The Right to Arms, Militias, and Slavery in the Early Republic and Antebellum Periods
A. Militias as a Military and Political Force in the Post-Revolutionary Period
The Crisis of 1798–99The Federalist ProgramThe Kentucky and Virginia ResolutionsFries's RebellionRobert H. Churchill, Popular Nullification, Fries's Rebellion, and the Waning of Radical Republicanism, 1798–1801
The War of 1812B. Antebellum Case Law on the Right to Arms Under State and Federal Constitutions
A right to carry weapons openly for self-defenseNunn v. State
The "civilized warfare" test: militia weapons only?Aymette v. State
A collective "right of sovereignty" subject to legislative discretion?The use of antebellum state court decisions to interpret the Second AmendmentC. Weapons Control and Southern Culture
D. The Right to Arms and Slavery
State v. Newsom
Robert J. Cottrol & Raymond T. Diamond, "Never Intended to Be Applied to the White Population": Firearms Regulation and Racial Disparity—The Redeemed South's Legacy to a National Jurisprudence?
E. Antebellum Legal Commentary on the Right to Arms
William RawleJoseph StoryThe Second Amendment in Story's Familiar Exposition
Houston v. Moore
Chapter 6
Reconstruction and Beyond
A. The Initial Southern Response to Black Freedom
The Black CodesLouisiana
Mississippi
Landry Parish, Louisiana
Alabama
The Ku Klux Klan and Other Extra-legal Suppression of FreedmenB. The Congressional Response: The Fourteenth Amendment, the Freedmen's Bureau Acts, and the Civil Rights Act
Thirteenth Amendment
Civil Rights Act of 1866
Second Freedmen's Bureau Act
Fourteenth Amendment
United States v. Cruikshank
C. Labor Agitation and the Repressive Response
Presser v. Illinois
D. Nineteenth Century Commentary
Chief Justice Thomas M. CooleyThomas M. Cooley, A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations Which Rest Upon the Legislative Power of the States of the American Union
Thomas M. Cooley, The General Principles of Constitutional Law in the United States of America
Other CommentaryJoel Prentiss Bishop, Commentaries on the Law of Statutory Crimes
Joel Prentiss Bishop, Commentaries on the Law of Statutory Crimes (2d ed.)
E. Late Nineteenth Century State Laws and Cases
Andrews v. State
State v. Wilburn
The Postbellum Experience in Arkansas
State v. Duke
City of Salina v. Blaksley
F. State Constitutions at the Turn of the Century
G. The Self-Defense Cases
PART TWO
THE RIGHT TO ARMS IN THE MODERN WORLD
Chapter 7
A New and Dangerous Century
A. Immigration, Labor Unrest, and Alcohol Prohibition
Patsone v. Pennsylvania
People v. Nakamura
B. The Federal Government Begins To Act
National Firearms Act of 1934
Federal Firearms Act of 1938
Sonzinsky v. United States
United States v. Miller
C. National Firearms Act Regulation Today
Machine guns
Short barreled rifles
Short barreled shotguns.
Silencers
Destructive devices
"Any other weapons"
The NFA transfer procedure
D. Miller's Aftermath: The Shrinking Second Amendment
Cases v. United States
United States v. Tot
E. Armed Citizens and the Second World War
The United StatesThe United Kingdom
Chapter 8: Between Miller and Heller: The Second Amendment in the Modern Era
A. The Second Amendment in the Lower Federal Courts
United State v. McCutcheon
Stevens v. United States
Cody v. United States
United States v. Brimley
United States v. Warin
United States v. Hale
B. Six Decades of Cryptic Supreme Court References to the Second Amendment
The Right to Arms as a Liberty Interest?Poe v. Ullman
Defining Terms Used in the Second AmendmentUnited States v. Verdugo-Urquidez
Muscarello v. United States
Gun Control and the Limits of Federal Power.United States v. Lopez
Printz v United States
Exercise: The Firearms Freedom Acts
Felons and the Right to ArmsLewis v. United States
C. The Social and Political History of the Right to Arms Between Miller and Heller
The calm before the storm
Racial tensions
Comprehensive National Gun Control
The Rise of the Modern Gun Control Movement and the Revolt at the NRA
Handgun prohibition
The NRA Counter-offensive, and the Growing Sophistication of the Gun Control Lobby
George H.W. Bush
The Clinton Era
The Re-emergence of the Second Amendment
Columbine and the 2000 Election
The Great American Gun War Winds Down
D. Federal Regulation of Firearms in the Modern Era
The Challenge of Defining Specially Regulated FirearmsUnited States v. Thompson/Center Arms Company
Regulation of Retail Sales of Conventional FirearmsRegulation of buyersNational Rifle Association of America Inc. v. Reno
United States v. Moore
Regulation of sellersUnited States v. Biswell
Private Sales, Private Manufacturers: The Secondary Market and Gun ShowsScope v. Pataki
Chow v. Maryland
"Sporting Use" as a Marker of "Legitimate" FirearmsGilbert v. Higgins
Policing of Illegal GunsTerry v. Ohio
Staples v. United States
Litigation Against the Gun Industry and the Legislative ResponseCity of New York v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp
Regulation of Firearms Designated "Assault Weapons"Springfield Armory, Inc. v. City Of Columbus
Regulation of Interstate Transportation of FirearmsRevell v. Port Authority of New York & New Jersey
Torraco v. Port Authority of New York & New Jersey
E. On the Threshold of an Individual Right to Arms: Full Engagement of the Second Amendment by the Fifth and Ninth Circuits
United States v. Emerson
Silveira v. Lockyer
Chapter 9
The Supreme Court Affirms an Individual Right to Arms
A. The Supreme Court Affirms an Individual Right to Keep and Bear Arms Against Federal Infringement
District of Columbia v. Heller
B. The Supreme Court Incorporates the Right to Keep and Bear Arms Against the States
McDonald v. City of Chicago
Comment: Modes of Constitutional Interpretation
Textualism
Originalism
Tradition and History
Emerging Awareness
Stare decisis
Values
Liberty
Popular Constitutionalism
Good Policy Results
Judicial Activism and Judicial Restraint
Exercise: Harm in the Speech Context
Exercise: Constitutional Drafting
Chapter 10
Firearms Policy and Status:
Race, Gender, Age, Disability, and Sexual Orientation
A. Firearms Policy and the Black Community
Brief for NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, District of Columbia v. Heller
Brief for Congress of Racial Equality as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, District of Columbia v. Heller
B. Gender
Brief for National Network to End Domestic Violence, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, District of Columbia v. Heller
Brief for 126 Women State Legislators and Academics as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, District of Columbia v. Heller
C. Age and Physical Disability
Brief for American Academy of Pediatrics et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of the Petition for Writ of Certiorari, District of Columbia v. Heller,
Brief for Southeastern Legal Foundation, Inc., et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, District of Columbia v. Heller
D. Sexual Orientation
Brief for Pink Pistols, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, District of Columbia v. Heller,
Exercise: Subjectivity in Forming Policy Views
Exercise: Empirical Assessments, Personal Risk Assessments, and Public Policy
Chapter 11
Applying the Affirmed Right to Arms
A. The Aftermath of Heller in the District of Columbia: Intermediate Scrutiny
Heller v. District of Columbia (Heller II)
B. The Aftermath if McDonald in the City Of Chicago: Historical Inquiry, Then Nearly Strict Scrutiny Toward The Core
Ezell v. City of Chicago
Exercise: Pressing the Edges of the Abortion Analogy
C. An Alternative Methodology: Substantial Burden
Nordyke v. King
D. The Presumptive Legitimacy of Disarming the Untrustworthy: Analogizing From Heller
United States v. Skoien
E. The Second Amendment and the Gun Control Act of 1968
United States v. Marzzarella
Exercise: Soldiers and Second Amendment Scrutiny
F. Guns In Common Use and the State Courts
People v. James
G. Child Access Prevention Laws
Commonwealth v. Runyan
H. The Right to Bear Arms and Carrying Handguns for Self-Defense
Peruta v. County of San Diego
Exercise: In-state Concealed Carry
I. Regulating the "Terror Gap"
Exercise: The Right to Bear Arms vs. Terrorism Concerns
J. Gun Regulation, Local Autonomy, and Urban Violence
Exercise: Adapting the Right to Bear Arms to Local Circumstances
K. Tyranny Control as a Justification for the Modern Right to Bear Arms
Silveira v. Lockyer
Exercise: Litigation Strategies and Ethics on Controversial Topics
Table of Cases
Table of Statutes and Constitutions
Table of Authorities
Index
PART THREE (ON-LINE)
SPECIAL TOPICS ON ARMS AND SELF-DEFENSE
Chapter 12
Social Science on Guns and Self-Defense
Chapter 13
International Law
A. Modern human rights treaties and other documents
United Nations General Assembly Resolution on the Definition of AggressionAfrican Charter on Human and People's RightsEuropean Convention on Human RightsB. International Gun Control Treaties and Documents
Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its AspectsUN Human Rights Council on the international right of gun controlNairobi ProtocolOrganization of American StatesCIFTA. Convención Interamericana Contra La Fabricación Y El Tráfico Ilícitos De Armas De Fuego, Municiones, Explosivos Y Otros Materiales Relacionados.
C. The Founders of International Law
Francisco de VictoriaFrancisco SuárezHugo GrotiusSamuel PufendorfEmmerich de VattelD. Genocide
Antonio Cassese, The Various Aspects of Self-Defence
David Kopel, The Genocide Convention and the Right to Arms to Resist Genocide
E. A Global Second Amendment?
Chapter 14
Comparative Law
A. National Constitutions
Constitutional Rights to ArmsMexico
Haiti
Guatemala
Constitutional right of self-defenseConstitutional self-defense against tyrannyConstitutional security against home invasionB. Comparative Studies
Franklin E. Zimring & Gordon Hawkins, Crime is Not the Problem: Lethal Violence in America
Martin Killias
David B. Kopel, Carlisle Moody & Howard Nemerov, Is There a Relationship between Guns and Freedom? Comparative Results from 59 Nations
C. United Kingdom in Modern Times
D. Japan
E. Nazi Germany
F. Switzerland
Chapter 15
Detailed Explanation of Firearms and Ammunition
A. A Brief Introduction to the Parts of a Firearm
B. Ammunition
BulletCasePrimerGun PowderC. Firearm Features
Firing MechanismMagazineSafety DevicesFirearm User SafetyD. The Major Types of Firearms
HandgunsSemi-Automatic PistolsRevolversi. Single Action Revolvers
ii. Double Action Revolvers
Legitimate Uses of HandgunsCriminal Uses of HandgunsRiflesBolt-actionSemi-AutomaticLever-actionSingle-shotCharacteristics of RiflesLegitimate uses of riflesCrime with riflesShotgunsShotgun ShellsTypes of ShotgunsLegitimate Uses of ShotgunsCrime with shotgunsSpecialty Types of Firearms And AccessoriesMuzzleloadersMachine GunsSilencers or SuppressorsArmor-piercing AmmunitionAir GunsPaint GunsNon-gun Arms
Preface
While this book proceeds chronologically, we expect that many users will approach the material out of sequence. Indeed, we have done so in our own classes. For example, it can be very effective to launch right into contemporary gun-law issues by starting with the Supreme Court's major cases on the Second Amendment, District of Columbia v. Heller, and McDonald v. Chicago in Chapter 9, followed by chapter 11 for post–Heller issues. It is also effective to assign the chapters covering the 17th and 18th century in conjunction with coverage of Heller and McDonald. This approach illuminates the originalist historical analysis in both cases. The most relevant original materials for Heller (from English origins to the first decades of American independence) appear in Chapters 2 through 5. The original materials relevant to the Fourteenth Amendment are in Chapter 6.
The book is sufficiently modular to accommodate instructors who wish to use particular chapters as part of more general courses, e.g., criminal law, constitutional law, or jurisprudence. For example, someone teaching criminal law might use Chapters 7 and 8 (covering the main federal gun control statutes) for a discrete segment on firearms violations. The treatments of Heller and McDonald in Chapter 9, and the material on standards of review in Chapter 11, are a nice vehicle for examining various general modes of constitutional decision-making. The material in Chapter 10 is a good choice for showing how the perspectives of divergent communities can affect assessment of legal and constitutional issues.
Instructors interested in particular policy topics, such as gun shows, import restrictions, handgun carry permits, or "assault weapons," will find sections covering them. Of course, the index will also highlight discrete treatments of such topics.
The Notes & Questions in the book frequently raise forward-looking issues and core questions that relate to current controversies. Some of the Notes & Questions are designated "Connection Questions" (CQ) to indicate their relevance to cases or topics in other chapters.
While the American debate on gun rights typically uses "the Second Amendment" as a shorthand for those rights, much of the legal history, and many of the contemporary legal battles, involves state constitutions. Today, 44 state constitutions have right-to-arms provisions. The book covers the state right-to-arms issues in depth, both for their intrinsic importance, and because the state cases sometimes provide guidance or background for understanding the Second Amendment. Because state issues appear throughout the book, readers should use the Table of Statutes and the Index to find all the material on any particular state.
An Overview of the Book
Chapter 1 explains how firearms function, and describes the major types of firearms. Chapter 1 also outlines the general scope of modern American gun laws, including variations among the states. The Chapter includes an Appendix of state constitutional provisions on the right to arms. The next nine chapters tell, in generally chronological order, the story of the development of gun regulation and gun rights in the United States.
The Second Amendment right to arms is widely viewed as a historical successor to the English right to arms, which was codified in the Declaration of Rights of 1689. Chapter 2 examines the historical and political background of the English right and English gun laws. It also explores the religious and philosophical background of the ideas of armed self-defense and a citizen militia. The chapter begins early Chinese philosophy, then covers ancient Greece and Rome, Judeo-Christian perspectives, medieval thought, and the Renaissance.
Chapter 3 examines the American colonial experience and the American Revolution. Colonial militias were important military and political institutions, and the militia regulations provide insight into the early understanding of the public and private roles of arms possession. The chapter also covers the British efforts to confiscate American firearms and gunpowder that played a major role in precipitating the American Revolution. Finally, the chapter covers the War of Independence and form of U.S. government before 1789.
Chapter 4 discusses the framing of the U.S. Constitution and its Bill of Rights. Ratification of the U.S. Constitution in 1789 created a more active and powerful federal government; among those new powers were direct federal control over the militia. The Bill of Rights was added to the Constitution in 1791, including a Second Amendment that affirmed the necessity of a well regulated militia, and recognized the right of the people to keep and bear arms. Chapter 4 examines the debates over the Constitution's ratification, the drafting history of the Second Amendment, and the way the American right to arms was viewed by the earliest constitutional commentators.
Chapter 5 covers the first seven decades of the new republic. This period saw an evolution of the American understanding of both the role of militias and of the individual right to arms. The chapter starts with the political crisis of 1798–1800 that brought several states to the brink of armed resistance to the Federalist political agenda. The War of 1812 displayed both strengths and weaknesses of American militias. Chapter 5 also chronicles a significant transition in the direction of gun regulation in America. While colonial and revolutionary era gun control laws were mainly concerned with forcing people to own and carry guns, by the 1820s laws prohibiting people from carrying concealed guns and knives began to emerge, particularly in the South. These laws gave rise to the first judicial opinions addressing the scope of permitted regulation under the right to arms guarantees in the federal and state constitutions. The predominant view of the courts of this period was that the constitutional right to arms included an individual right to carry common weapons for self-defense, although legislatures could regulate the right. Many courts for example concluded that legislatures retained the power to prohibiting the concealed carrying of weapons. The Southern states continued the colonial practice of enacting highly restrictive laws prohibiting the ownership or carrying of guns by slaves and, sometimes, by free blacks, setting the precedent for broader restrictions after the Civil War. Abolitionists invoked the Second Amendment to complain about the disarmament of Free Soil settlers in Kansas in the 1850s, and to argue that the slavery and the Second Amendment were incompatible.
Chapter 6 begins with the period following the Civil War, proceeds through Reconstruction, and ends at the turn of the 19th century. In this period, the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted to protect individual civil liberties against state interference—and especially to combat abuses of newly freed slaves and their supporters. The Chapter offers examples of the many sources suggesting that the Amendment was intended to secure the individual liberties guaranteed in the federal bill of rights (including an individual right to arms for self-defense) against state infringement by state and local governments. The Chapter also tracks the decline of Reconstruction, and the failure of the initial promise of the Fourteenth amendment. Material includes the decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court narrowly interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment, rendering it of little value as a guarantor of individual liberties; adoption by the Southern states of restrictive laws of the Jim Crow era; and affirmation by Southern courts of increasingly restrictive (and often racially discriminatory) regulation of firearms—particularly the carrying and ownership of inexpensive handguns. As labor unrest grew in the North, some states prohibited mass armed parades, and the Supreme Court upheld such bans in Presser v. Illinois. The Court was, however, quite protective of armed self-defense by individuals, in "The Self-Defense Cases" which arose in federal territories.
Chapter 7 examines the early twentieth century. In this period, gun control for individuals expanded beyond the South, as Northern states, concerned about the labor movement and unassimilated immigrants, adopt a variety of handgun control laws. The Chapter also marks the emergence of the first Federal gun control laws. In the 1930s, the federal government imposed regulation on commercial gun sales. The most significant of these was National Firearms Act of 1934 (NFA), which severely restricted ownership of a few classes of firearms viewed as unusually dangerous, such as machine guns and short shotguns. Chapter 7 is anchored by the Supreme Court's treatment of a Second Amendment challenge to the NFA in United States v. Miller. Miller is a short and ambiguous opinion that declared that exercises of the Second Amendment right had to have a "reasonable relationship" to the maintenance of a well-regulated militia in order to be protected. For decades afterward, there was argument about whether Miller meant that the type of gun had to be suitable for a militia in order for it to be protected by the Second Amendment, or whether the individual had to be in a militia in order to have Second Amendment rights. After Miller, lower federal courts began to develop a state-government-focused conception of the Second Amendment that gave little or no credence to individual challenges to federal or state gun regulations.
Chapter 8 is the longest chapter in this book. It covers the balance of the 20th century. The scope of federal firearms regulation grew dramatically in this period, with the passage of several major statutes, including the federal Gun Control Act of 1968, the Firearms Owners Protection Act of 1986, and the federal "assault weapons" ban that was enacted in and which expired in 2004. The Chapter offers a detailed treatment of the various issues that arise under the modern statutes and accompanying regulations, the vast majority of which remain valid even after the Supreme Court's 2008 affirmation of the individual right to keep and bear arms in District of Columbia v. Heller. During the late 20th century, lower federal courts rejected any version of a Second Amendment right that would impose meaningful limits on gun regulation. However, the tenor of judicial treatments of the issue began to change towards the end of the century, as scholarly and political debates bolstered the individual rights theory. The Chapter includes section of social and political history that elucidates the most important bills, statutes, controversies and political battles of the period. This history provides important context for the Supreme Court's ultimate affirmation of the individual right to arms.
Chapter 9 is dedicated to the landmark decisions in District of Columbia v. Heller and McDonald v. Chicago. In these decisions, a five-Justice majority of the Supreme Court held that the Second Amendment protects an individual right to keep and bear arms for self-defense; that the Second Amendment right is a fundamental right made fully applicable against the states by the Fourteenth Amendment; and that handgun bans violate the Second Amendment.
Chapter 10 examines issues of gun rights and gun regulation from the special perspectives of race, gender, sexual orientation, and disability. The materials are mainly drawn from the amicus briefs filed in Heller by a variety of interest groups.
Chapter 11 addresses the aftermath of Heller and McDonald. This chapter covers several of the most important constitutional questions left unanswered by the two Supreme Court decisions, and how these topics are being addressed by state and federal courts. While, as Chapters 5 through 7 showed, state court case law on state right to arms provisions has been developing for almost two centuries, serious doctrinal development of the Second Amendment began only after Heller. Courts today are grappling with issue such as the standard of review, what types of arms are protected, and the right to "bear" arms in public places. Students and professors who want to explore gray areas in emerging legal doctrine will find Chapter 11 of particular interest.
The printed textbook ends with Chapter 11, but owners of the printed book have free access to three additional on-line chapters. These chapters are:
Chapter 12. Social science about the benefits and harms of firearms possession and use.
Chapter 13. International gun control law, from sources such as the United Nations, the Organization of American States, and other treaties and international law documents. The Chapter also covers the "Classical" period of international law, in which philosophers such as Grotius, Puffendorf, Vattel, Victoria, and Suárez built the foundations of international law partly by extrapolating from general principles of the rights and the limits of personal self-defense.
Chapter 14. Comparative gun control laws. Examining the gun laws of several nations, including Canada, the United Kingdom, Japan, Nazi Germany, Switzerland, and South Africa.
Chapter 15. While Chapter 1 provided an introduction to the different types of firearms and ammunition, and how they function, this Chapter covers the same topic in greater depth and detail. It includes many illustrations and diagrams.
While the on-line chapters are available through a locked website maintained by Aspen Publishers, there is also a free, public, website for this textbook, http://www.firearmsregulation.org. This public website provides numerous additional resources, including suggested topics for student research papers, a comprehensive list of published law review articles and ALR Annotations on arms-law topics, and links to numerous Internet resources on firearms law and policy.
Publishing Student research
Many students will use this book in upper-level classes in which they will write research papers. The public website offers some ideas for paper topics, as well as bibliographical and resource guides to help you get started.
Because Second Amendment doctrine is still in an early stage of development—especially in comparison to its closest analogue, the First Amendment, in which doctrinal development began in the 1930s—there are many opportunities for law student papers to make a genuine contribution to legal knowledge and analysis. If you write a good paper for your class, send it to us for consideration for publication on the public website.




Media Matters and Lochner
When we last encountered the Media Matters blog, its authors reacted to a George Will column on Rehabiltating Lochner by declaring that Lochner v. New York is "in no way a liberal bogeyman."
Today, reacting to a blog post of mine suggesting that the idea that federal power does not constitutionally extend to broad child labor laws is not all that shocking given that the states could and did regulate child labor before the feds stepped in, the MM blogger chimes in: "Is George Will on board with dismantling federal child labor laws, or did he not know what he was getting into when he endorsed Lochner?"
Three salient points: (1) my blog post did not mention or allude to Lochner in any way; (2) Lochner does not, in fact, have anything to do with the constitutionality of federal labor laws given that Lochner was a due process case about liberty of contract and the scope of the states' police power while the historical constitutional debate over child labor laws revolved around Congress's entirely distinct Commerce Clause power; and (c) if the Media Matters blogger (Adam Shah) had bothered to read my book, which I'm sure he has not, he would know that I point out that liberal legal commentators have spent the last several decades misusing Lochner to attack purportedly "conservative" constitutional doctrines that have nothing to do with the issues involved in Lochner. The Commerce Clause, Takings Clause, Contracts Clause, non-delegation doctrine, commercial speech and more get lumped into the "Lochner" framework because that's a lot easier than explaining why, e.g., the power to regulate commerce among the states includes the power to regulate home-grown marijuana that never enters the stream of commerce.
So, I'd like to thank Media Matters for illustrating my point. You might even say that Media Matters has shown that Lochner remains a liberal bogeyman, at least among the less constitutionally and historically sophisticated.



Eisenhower's Other Warning
We're all familiar with President Dwight D. Eisenhower's admonition about the "military-industrial complex." But this was only one of the "threats" he identified in his farewell address.
Akin to, and largely responsible for the sweeping changes in our industrial-military posture, has been the technological revolution during recent decades. In this revolution, research has become central; it also becomes more formalized, complex, and costly. A steadily increasing share is conducted for, by, or at the direction of, the Federal government.
Today, the solitary inventor, tinkering in his shop, has been overshadowed by task forces of scientists in laboratories and testing fields. In the same fashion, the free university, historically the fountainhead of free ideas and scientific discovery, has experienced a revolution in the conduct of research. Partly because of the huge costs involved, a government contract becomes virtually a substitute for intellectual curiosity. For every old blackboard there are now hundreds of new electronic computers. The prospect of domination of the nation's scholars by Federal employment, project allocations, and the power of money is ever present — and is gravely to be regarded.
Yet, in holding scientific research and discovery in respect, as we should, we must also be alert to the equal and opposite danger that public policy could itself become the captive of a scientific-technological elite.
Hat tip: Fred Smith.




To Really Support the Whole Constitution
Echoing Eugene's comment below, I would feel better about the Constitutional Progressives' "Whole Constitution Pledge" if I were confident that the drafters and signatories were truly pledging to support the whole Constitution, and not just those which can be used to advance a progressive political agenda through the courts. Not only does the whole Constitution include Article V, as Eugene notes, but it also includes the Contracts Clause, the Privileges and Immunities Clause, the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause, the Second Amendment, the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause, and the Ninth and Tenth Amendments as well. Given those spear-heading the pledge, including the Constitutional Accountability Center (the successor organization to Community Rights Counsel), the Center for American Progress, the People for the American Way Foundation, and Senator John Kerry, I have my doubts.




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