Eugene Volokh's Blog, page 120

[Ilya Somin] Supreme Court Issues Unusual Order in Alien Enemies Act Deportation Case

[The order temporarily blocks AEA deportations. It likely also reflects the Court's growing frustration with the Trump Administration.]

The Supreme Court. (NA)

 

Last night, the Supreme Court issued a very unusual order in an Alien Enemies Act deportation case. Here it is in its entirety:

There is before the Court an application on behalf of a putative class of detainees seeking an injunction against their removal under the Alien Enemies Act. The matter is currently pending before the Fifth Circuit. Upon action by the Fifth Circuit, the Solicitor General is invited to file a response to the application before this Court as soon as possible. The Government is directed not to remove any member of the putative class of detainees from the United States until further order of this Court. See 28 U. S. C. §1651(a). Justice Thomas and Justice Alito dissent from the Court's order. Statement from Justice Alito to follow.

As I write these words (Saturday morning), we do not yet have Justice Alito's statement, and therefore do not yet know why he and Thomas dissented.

What do we make of this? I largely agree with the analysis of Georgetown Prof. Steve Vladeck. After providing a helpful overview of the AEA litigation to date, he writes:

Obviously, there's still a lot we don't know. But at least initially, this strikes me as a massively important—and revealing—intervention by the Supreme Court, for at least three reasons:

First, the full Court didn't wait for the Fifth Circuit—or act through the individual Circuit Justice (Justice Alito).2 Even in other fast-moving emergency applications, the Court has often made a show out of at least appearing to wait for the lower courts to rule before intervening—even if that ruling might not have influenced the outcome. Here, though, the Court didn't wait at all; indeed, the order specifically invites the government to respond once the Fifth Circuit weighed in—acknowledging that the Fifth Circuit hadn't ruled (and, indeed, that the government hadn't responded to the application in the Supreme Court) yet. This may seem like a technical point, but it underscores how seriously the Court, or at least a majority of it, took the urgency of the matter….

Second, the Court didn't hide behind any procedural technicalities. One of the real themes of the Court's interventions in Trump-related emergency applications to date has been using procedural technicalities to justify siding with the federal government—including in J.G.G. itself (the first AEA ruling). One could've imagined similar procedural objections to such a speedy intervention, on a class-wide basis, in last night's ruling. (Indeed, I suspect some of those objections are forthcoming in Justice Alito's impending dissenting opinion.) Here, though, the Court jumped right to the substantive relief the applicants sought—again, reinforcing not just the urgency of the issue, but its gravity.

Third, and perhaps most significantly, the Court seemed to not be content with relying upon representations by the government's lawyers. In the hearing before Chief Judge Boasberg, Drew Ensign had specifically stated, on behalf of the government, that "no planes" would be leaving either Friday or Saturday. True, the government hasn't formally responded in the Supreme Court, but the justices (or at least their clerks) would have been well aware of the exchange—indeed, some of the clerks were likely listening to the hearing as it happened. In a world in which a majority of the justices were willing to take these kinds of representations at face value, there might've been no need to intervene overnight Friday evening; the justices could've taken at least all day Saturday to try to sort things out before handing down their decision.

But this case arose only because of the Trump administration's attempt to play Calvinball with detainees it's seeking to remove under the Alien Enemy Act. The Court appears to be finally getting the message—and, in turn, handing down rulings with none of the wiggle room we saw in the J.G.G. and Abrego Garcia decisions last week. That's a massively significant development unto itself—especially if it turns out to be more than a one-off.

Whether it turns out to be more than "one-off" remains to be seen. But, for the moment, I think Vladeck is right to highlight the Court's growing frustration with the Trump Administration.

I do differ with Vladeck on one point: It is not entirely true that "no court has yet to rule on whether the government even has the power to use the Alien Enem[ies] Act this way in the first place." The AEA can can only be used to detain and deport immigrants in the event of a declared war, or an "invasion" or "predatory incursion" perpetrated by a "foreign nation or government." In the DC Circuit ruling previously vacated by the Supreme Court on procedural grounds, Judge Karen LeCraft Henderson' opinion clearly indicates there is no war, invasion, or predatory incursion occurring, though without providing a completely definitive ruling. While technically, this was the opinion of only one judge on the three-person panel, Judge Millett appeared to agree, in her own concurring opinion, noting that the AEA is only supposed to be used during a "shooting war."

I agree with Henderson and Millett. In earlier writings, I have emphasized that the meaning of "invasion" in the AEA tracks the meaning of the same term in the Constitution. If courts were to accept the Trump argument that illegal migration and drug smuggling qualify as "invasion," that would have dire  implications, such as enabling states to "engage in war" in response and the federal government to suspend the writ habeas corpus (including for US citizens) virtually anytime it wants, thereby enabling it to detain people without due process.

The Supreme Court's own previous decision also resolved an important substantive question, by unanimously rejecting the Trump Administration's position a presidential invocation of the AEA is immune from judicial review.

While we do not yet have a complete and definitive judicial ruling on the applicability of the AEA to Trump's efforts to detain Venezuelan migrants, the DC Circuit and earlier Supreme Court ruling indicate widespread (and well-justified) judicial skepticism of the Trump position.

Last night's Supreme Court decision suggests we may get a more definitive ruling on the merits sooner rather than later.

UPDATE: I have made minor additions and revisions to this post.

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[Eugene Volokh] Can Harvard Lose Tax Exemption for "Pushing Political, Ideological, and Terrorist Inspired/Supporting 'Sickness'"?

[Just as the government can't generally deny tax exemptions to groups that engage in supposed "hate speech," so it may not deny tax exemptions to universities that promote or tolerate ideological agendas that the government disapproves of.]

President Trump suggested on April 15 that:

Perhaps Harvard should lose its Tax Exempt Status and be Taxed as a Political Entity if it keeps pushing political, ideological, and terrorist inspired/supporting "Sickness?" Remember, Tax Exempt Status is totally contingent on acting in the PUBLIC INTEREST!

The IRS is apparently planning something along those lines, though the details are unclear. But, if Harvard was indeed stripped of its tax exemption because of the "political, ideological, and terrorist inspired" views that it "push[es]," would that be consistent with the First Amendment? (I set aside here the separate question whether there may be federal statutory or administrative law constraints applicable here.)

The answer is "no," as I argued to a Democrat-controlled House subcommittee in 2019, and before that in 2016 (and as Dale Carpenter elaborated on in 2019). Like other such programs that protect a wide range of private speech in order to serve the "public interest," the government can't define the scope of the program or the term "public interest" in a way that turns on the viewpoint that the speaker expresses. My testimony focused on calls for stripping tax exemptions from groups that allegedly engaged in "hate speech," but the same analysis applies to other viewpoint-based denials as well.

(Note that, as I explain below, the government may provide that tax exemptions are unavailable to groups that engage in certain kinds of nonspeech conduct. Likewise, the government provides that tax exemptions are unavailable to groups that engage in electioneering or substantial lobbying, regardless of viewpoint. But here President Trump's stated rationale is all about the viewpoints that Harvard expresses, perpetuates, or protects.)

* * *

Dear Chairman Lewis, Ranking Member Kelly, and Members of the Committee:

Many thanks for inviting me to testify about "How the Tax Code Subsidizes Hate." The Tax Code indeed subsidizes hate, just as it subsidizes Socialism, Satanism, and a wide variety of dangerous and offensive ideas. Under the First Amendment, tax exemptions have to be distributed without discrimination based on viewpoint; that means that evil views have to be treated the same way as good views.

1. The Supreme Court has repeatedly made clear that tax exemptions can't be denied based on the viewpoint that a group communicates. This was first made clear in Justice Brennan's opinion in Speiser v. Randall (1958), which struck down a denial of a property tax exemption to people and organizations that "advocate[] the overthrow of the Government of the United States … by … violence … or who advocate[] the support of a foreign government against the United States in the event of hostilities":

[A] discriminatory denial of a tax exemption for engaging in speech is a limitation on free speech. It is settled that speech can be effectively limited by the exercise of the taxing power. To deny an exemption to claimants who engage in certain forms of speech is in effect to penalize them for such speech. Its deterrent effect is the same as if the State were to fine them for this speech…. [T]he denial of a tax exemption for engaging in certain speech necessarily will have the effect of coercing the claimants to refrain from the proscribed speech. The denial is "frankly aimed at the suppression of dangerous ideas."

The Supreme Court reaffirmed this in 1983, and again in 1995. Though "the Government is not required to subsidize" speakers, once it chooses to provide such a subsidy—including through "tax deductions for contributions"—it must abide by "the requirement of viewpoint neutrality in the Government's provision of financial benefits." And the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit has specifically applied this to denials of a 501(c)(3) tax exemption, holding that "in administering the tax code, the IRS may not discriminate on the basis of viewpoint" (there, against pro-Israel speech that departed from the Administration's foreign policy).

2. The Court has also made equally clear that excluding speech that manifests or promotes "hate" is forbidden viewpoint discrimination. The Court said so unanimously in Matal v. Tam, which struck down a rule that excluded "disparag[ing]" trademarks from certain kinds of trademark enforcement benefits. In Matal, the Patent and Trademark Office refused to register the trademark "The Slants," because it perceived the mark as a derogatory term for Asians. This refusal was just the denial of a benefit; no-one was being threatened with jail or fines for using the name—owners of this mark were just not being given access to certain useful remedies against those who would infringe the mark. But the Court still concluded that such exclusion of disparaging marks was forbidden viewpoint discrimination.

3. The law may treat groups differently based on their actions, but not based on the views they express. Thus, for instance, in Bob Jones University v. United States, the Supreme Court upheld the denial of a tax exemption to a university that banned interracial dating by its students, and that threatened to expel students who violated the ban. Likewise, in Christian Legal Society v. Martinez, the Supreme Court held that public universities could deny generally available benefits to student groups based on those groups' exclusionary membership policies. But the government may not deny tax exemptions or similar benefits to universities, churches, student groups, or other groups simply because they advocate against interracial dating, or against interfaith dating, or against same-sex dating. As the Court made clear in Christian Legal Society,

Although registered student groups must conform their conduct to the Law School's regulation by dropping access barriers, they may express any viewpoint they wish—including a discriminatory one. Today's decision thus continues this Court's tradition of "protect[ing] the freedom to express 'the thought that we hate.'"

4. Groups may be denied tax exemptions for deliberately engaging in speech that falls within one of the few narrow exceptions to the First Amendment, such as true threats of criminal attack, or incitement intended to and likely to cause imminent criminal conduct. But "hate speech" writ large doesn't fall within any such exceptions, as cases such as Matal and Christian Legal Society make clear.

And any such rule denying tax exemptions for constitutionally unprotected speech must itself be administered in a viewpoint-neutral way. For instance, if Congress enacts a statute denying tax exemptions to groups that engage in libel, or threats, or incitement, that statute would equally have to cover racist groups, anti-police groups, animal rights groups, and any other groups. Likewise, if the government enforces bans on fraudulent fundraising by 501(c)(3) educational groups, it must do that for all kinds of groups, regardless of viewpoint.

5. Tax exemptions cannot be limited (as the IRS once tried to limit them) to groups that "present[] a sufficiently full and fair exposition of the pertinent facts as to permit an individual or the public to form an independent opinion or conclusion." Any such test, the D.C. Circuit has held, "lacks the requisite clarity, both in explaining which applicant organizations are subject to. the standard and in articulating its substantive requirements."

It's possible that tax exemptions to advocacy groups might be allowed only for groups that support their arguments with "intellectual exposition" consisting of "a rational development of a point of view," rather than merely "express[ing] … emotions" (in the words of a 1983 D.C. Circuit decision, which the IRS has since adopted into its regulations). I'm not certain this is so; I think the Supreme Court may well conclude that this so-called "methodology" standard, like the "sufficiently full and fair exposition" standard, is so subjective as to provide too much room for deliberate or subconscious viewpoint discrimination.

But even if such a "methodology" test is sufficiently clear to be constitutional, it must be applied in a way "neutral with regard to viewpoint." Indeed, the government's argument in favor of such a test, which the D.C. Circuit decision approved, stressed that the test supposedly "leads to the minimum of official inquiry into[,] and hence potential censorship of, the content of expression, because it focuses on the method of presentation rather than the ideas presented."

So if the IRS wants to deny tax exemptions to groups that spread certain ideas on the grounds that those groups are too "emotional" rather than "intellectual" or "rational" in their arguments, it must apply precisely the same standard to all groups—animal rights groups, pro-life groups, pro-gun-control groups, and more. And courts will then have to decide whether the government is indeed treating all viewpoints equally in that respect.

It's also not clear that much would be gained from requiring hate groups to support their views using factual arguments (which could easily be based on pseudoscience), or pressuring them to add the patina of "reasoned development" to their claims. Advocates of any position, however wrong-headed, can always cherry-pick some facts that they could use to buttress their arguments. And the IRS can't decide whether those arguments are correct; as the D.C. Circuit recognized, "because of First Amendment considerations, … the government must shun being the arbiter of 'truth.' Material supporting a particular point of view may well be 'educational' [and thus entitled to a tax exemption] although a particular public officer may strongly disagree with the proposition advocated."

As a result, having the IRS focus on the "methodology" of a group's arguments is unlikely to effectively sort good advocacy groups from bad ones. But it would exacerbate the risk that government officials will succumb to the normal human impulse to apply the rules selectively to their political enemies.

6. Of course, many Americans are understandably upset that their tax money flows—whether through tax exemptions or through university student group funding policies or subsidies for mailing newspapers or books—to views that they believe (perhaps quite correctly) to be evil. Many religious people are understandably upset when they have to subsidize blasphemy. Many pro-life advocates are understandably upset when they have to subsidize pro-choice groups, and vice versa.

Police officers and their friends and families may be understandably upset when their taxes go to speech that sharply condemns the police, and perhaps even creates a climate that encourages anti-police violence. In the 1950s, many Americans were understandably upset when tax exemptions benefited advocacy of Communist revolution and Communist tyranny (which explains the law struck down by the Court in Speiser v. Randall). And of course many Americans are understandably upset when tax exemptions benefit speech that is hateful towards blacks or whites or Jews or Muslims or evangelical Christians or any other group.

But giving the government the power to discriminate against some such viewpoints necessarily means the government will also have the power to discriminate against others. Would we feel comfortable giving this power to the Trump Administration? If we would, would we feel comfortable giving it to a possible Sanders Administration? I doubt there are many people who would trust both those Administrations; and this distrust of government power is one reason the First Amendment exists.

Many campaigns for democracy, liberty, and equality have been greatly helped by the First Amendment, and by courts' willingness to enforce the First Amendment. But the Court has recognized that this protection against governmental suppression of speech must apply to foes of these principles as well as friends. As Justice Brennan wrote in NAACP v. Button (1963)—an important win for the NAACP—the NAACP's civil rights mission was "constitutionally irrelevant" to the Court's First Amendment analysis. "The course of our decisions in the First Amendment area makes plain that its protections would apply as fully to those who would arouse our society against the objectives of the [NAACP]. For the Constitution protects expression and association without regard to the race, creed, or political or religious affiliation of the members of the group which invokes its shield, or to the truth, popularity, or social utility of the ideas and beliefs which are offered."

"[T]he freedoms … guaranteed by the First Amendment must be accorded to the ideas we hate or sooner or later they will be denied to the ideas we cherish." Justice Black wrote this in dissent in 1950, arguing for the rights of Communists. The Supreme Court adopted this principle in a majority opinion in 1972, protecting the Students for a Democratic Society's right of equal access to public university facilities. Those were wise words then, and they remain so today.

357 U.S. 513, 516, 518-19 (1958).

Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 548 (1983); Rosenberger v. Rector, 515 U.S. 819, 834 (1995).

Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 819.

Z Street v. Koskinen, 791 F.3d 24, 30 (D.C. Cir. 2015).

137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017).

There were two opinions in the case, one joined by four Justices and one by four others, but both opinions made clear that the exclusion of disparaging marks was unconstitutionally viewpoint-based. Id. at 1763 (Alito, J.) (lead opinion); id. at 1766 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Justice Gorsuch had not yet been confirmed to the Court when the case was argued, so only eight Justices participated.

461 U.S. 574 (1983).

561 U.S. 661 (2010).

Id. at 696 n.26. Likewise, in Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976), the Court held that the government may ban race discrimination by private schools, but only after distinguishing educational institutions that engage in "the practice of excluding racial minorities" (which can be forbidden) from those that promote "the belief that racial segregation is desirable" (which is constitutionally protected). Id. at 176.

See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).

Big Mama Rag, Inc. v. United States, 631 F.2d 1030, 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1980).

Id. at 1036.

National Alliance v. United States, 710 F.2d 868, 872 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Rev. Proc. 86-43, 1986-2 C.B. 729.

For instance, in Minnesota Voters Alliance v. Mansky, 138 S. Ct. 1876, 1891 (2018), the Supreme Court struck down a ban on an ill-defined category of "political" expression at polling places, reasoning:

It is "self-evident" that an indeterminate prohibition carries with it "[t]he opportunity for abuse, especially where [it] has received a virtually open-ended interpretation." Election judges "have the authority to decide what is political" when screening individuals at the entrance to the polls. We do not doubt that the vast majority of election judges strive to enforce the statute in an evenhanded manner, nor that some degree of discretion in this setting is necessary. But that discretion must be guided by objective, workable standards. Without them, an election judge's own politics may shape his views on what counts as "political."

National Alliance, 710 F.2d at 875.

Id.

Id. at 873-74.

See, e.g., True the Vote, Inc. v. IRS, 831 F.3d 551, 559 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (quoting 2013 Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration report called "Inappropriate Criteria Were Used to Identify Tax-Exempt Applications for Review," and noting that, among other things, "The Determinations Unit [of the IRS] developed and used inappropriate criteria to identify applications from organizations with the words Tea Party in their names."); Kelly Phillips Erb, Why Justice Matters: The Income Tax Trial of Martin Luther King, Jr., Forbes, Jan. 15, 2018 (discussing IRS targeting of Martin Luther King, Jr.); Chuck Hobbs, Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. [and] the IRS, Tallahassee Democrat, http://blogs.tallahassee.com/communit... (discussing IRS targeting of King and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, as well as of "religious organizations dubbed 'extremist groups'").

371 U.S. 415, 444-45 (1963).

Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 188 (1972) (quoting Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 367 U.S. 1, 37 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting)).

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[Josh Blackman] Today in Supreme Court History: April 19, 1920

4/19/1920: Missouri v. Holland decided.

The White Court (1920)

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[David Post] Judge Wilkinson's Opinion is Worth a Close Look

[Judge Wilkinson's plea for mutual respect between the Executive Branch and the Judiciary ]

One problem, these days, is that there is so much "shit" that is "flooding the zone" - Steve Bannon's metaphor, I  believe - that it is very difficult to know, from day to day, which amazing and unprecedented events matter, and which don't.

Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson's opinion for the 4th Circuit Court of Appeals in the Abrego Garcia case matters. Eugene has already excerpted much of the opinion here, and the full text is available here.

Though it was issued yesterday (!), it already feels like old news, superseded by Trump's attacks on Fed Chairman Jerome Powell, Senator van Hollen's visit to the El Salvador mega-prison where Abrego Garcia is being held, A U.S. threat to pull out of the negotiations to end the Ukraine war, etc. etc.

But I urge you, if you have not done so already, to spend a little of your time and attention on it.  It is a very powerful piece of legal prose, and it might well represent an important moment in the legal history of the United States.

As most (or all) readers of the Volokh Conspiracy surely know, Judge Wilkinson is a true conservative icon, one of the most highly respected conservative jurists in the country for the past 40 years. It gives added resonance to his plea to the Executive Branch:

"The basic differences between the branches mandate a serious effort at mutual
respect. The respect that courts must accord the Executive must be reciprocated by the
Executive's respect for the courts. Too often today this has not been the case, as calls for impeachment of judges for decisions the Executive disfavors and exhortations to disregard court orders sadly illustrate.

Now the branches come too close to grinding irrevocably against one another in a conflict that promises to diminish both. This is a losing proposition all around. The Judiciary will lose much from the constant intimations of its illegitimacy, to which by dent of custom and detachment we can only sparingly reply. The Executive will lose much from a public perception of its lawlessness and all of its attendant contagions. The Executive may succeed for a time in weakening the courts, but over time history will script the tragic gap between what was and all that might have been, and law in time will sign its epitaph. It is, as we have noted, all too possible to see in this case an incipient crisis, but it may present an opportunity as well. We yet cling to the hope that it is not naïve to believe our good brethren in the Executive Branch perceive the rule of law as vital to the American ethos. This case presents their unique chance to vindicate that value and to summon the best that is within us while there is still time.

Emphasis added.

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[Ilya Somin] Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Temporary Restraining Order, and Summary Judgement in Our Case Against Trump's "Liberation Day" Tariffs

[The motion was filed today, and sets out our case in detail.]

President Donald Trump signed two executive orders on April 2 instituting tariffs on a wide range of countries. ( Andrew Leyden/ZUMAPRESS/Newscom)

 

Today, the Liberty Justice Center and I filed a motion for a preliminary injunction, temporary restraining order, and summary judgment in our case challenging Donald Trump's massive "Liberation Day" tariffs. The motion sets out our arguments in greater detail than the complaint filed on Monday.  For a shorter and more accessible overview of the reasons why these tariffs are illegal, see my just-published Lawfare article "The Constitutional Case Against Trump's Trade War." The case is entitled VOS Selections, Inc. v. Trump.

We are litigating the case (pro bono) on behalf of five US businesses that import goods from many of the countries targeted by the tariffs. As explained in today's motion, the new tariffs are inflicting grave harm on them, and in at least some cases threaten their viability.

In earlier posts,  previewed our key arguments and explained why Trump's partial pause of the tariffs does not end the madness or obviate the need to challenge this usurpation of legislative power in court.

To briefly summarize our position, we argue that the International Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977 (IEEPA) doesn't authorize tariffs at all, that even if it does the trade deficits targeted by the "Liberation Day" tariffs do not qualify as an "emergency" or as an  "unusual and extraordinary threat" (both prerequsites to invoking IEEPA), that Trump's use of IEEPA to impose massive tariffs runs afoul of the "major questions" doctrine, and that - if these tariffs are somehow authorized by IEEPA - it would violate constitutional limits on delegation of legislative power to the executive. If we prevail on any one of these points, we win the case.

The new motion also explains why we are entitled to a preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order. If we get either or both, implementation of the tariffs will be blocked while the case is litigated, thereby protecting our clients and the US and world economy from grave and irreparable harm.

The court has ordered the government to file a response to our motion by close of business on Monday. This tight schedule may be a positive sign for us, as it suggests the court recognizes the importance of the case, and the potential need for a quick injunction to prevent further harm to our clients and others.

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[John Ross] Short Circuit: An inexhaustive weekly compendium of rulings from the federal courts of appeal

[A judge-on-judge benchslap, a pharmaceutical kickback, and a direct descendant of the Kings of France.]

Please enjoy the latest edition of Short Circuit, a weekly feature written by a bunch of people at the Institute for Justice.

New on the Short Circuit podcast: The eternal return of a qualified immunity case plus the long shadow of Judge Bork's VHS rentals.

Come for the D.C. Circuit smackdown of a NEPA challenge to a decade-long, ultra-voluminous environmental review that the court already signed off on once. Stay for Judge Randolph's tutorial on "Knightian uncertainty," and what it means for the possibility of quantifying carbon impacts of natural-gas exports from Alaska. Man buys NYC house in 2014. When he goes to sell it in 2021, he discovers (for the first time) a $1,000 penalty from the city for failing to file a report about a boiler that had been removed before he bought the house. City: A third-party contractor's third-party contractor mailed the violations in 2015, so he probably got it then and should've filed suit several years ago. Man: I did not get it. Second Circuit: Good enough for government work. (This is an IJ case.) Buckle up for a Fourth Circuit judge-on-judge benchslap! It stems from a man's guilty plea for robbing a gas station and his plea's appeal waiver. Rather than explain what the waiver meant, detail its scope or exceptions, and probe to see if the man understood what he was waiving, the district court "decided 12 years of [his] life in 13 minutes." This is the "regular practice of the district court" knowing that it is generally shielded by appeal waivers, and is a "miscarriage of justice that cannot remain unaddressed." The man gets new sentencing in front of a new judge. It's no secret that IJ and Fourth Circuit Judge Harvie Wilkinson III haven't always seen eye-to-eye over the years. We've disagreed with his abdication in zoning cases. Been at odds over civil forfeiture. Taken differing views on judicial protection of economic liberty. And repeatedly called out his book's endorsement of "ultra-deferential judicial restraint." But on this Good Friday we are extremely pleased to bring good news of judicial engagement from him to you (and the Executive Branch) in the context of disappearing people to foreign prisons: "We yet cling to the hope that it is not naïve to believe our good brethren in the Executive Branch perceive the rule of law as vital to the American ethos." Prisoner alleges repeated abuse from prison officer. He first files a complaint with Bivens claims against several individuals but separately files a complaint with FTCA claims against the U.S. He loses in both cases but only appeals the Bivens case. Fourth Circuit: Oops! The FTCA loss means there's a "judgment bar" on the Bivens claims. Man built a pharmacy focusing on compounded drugs. Kickbacks involving federally reimbursed drugs are illegal. To avoid tripping that wire, the man restructured his business and converted those marketing drugs from independent contractors to W-2 employees. Marketers continued to offer incentives to physicians to write prescriptions, and the marketers received commissions tied to prescription value. Jury: That's a kickback. Fifth Circuit: Conviction and sentence affirmed, including the nearly $60 mil in restitution. If the government tries to fine you $57 mil, does that trigger the right to a jury trial? Fifth Circuit: Yes, even if you are a common carrier and your name is AT&T. Officers in Laredo, Tex. chase a driver for two hours, spike his tires, and box him in, at which point he rams one of their cruisers. Over the next ten seconds, officers fire nine rounds: three as the truck lurches forward, three more as the engine stops revving, and three immediately after. One of the bullets paralyzes the driver. District court says officers have QI for shots 1-3, but not 4-9. Fifth Circuit: Officers reasonably believed that they were still under threat from a "5,000-pound weapon" when they fired shots 4-9. QI for the entire volley. A lawful permanent resident facing removal asks a district court to make a determination on his still-pending naturalization application under 8 U.S.C. § 1447(b), which lets courts step in if the application languishes for more than 120 days. No can do, says the Sixth Circuit, because another provision, § 1429, bars naturalization determinations when there's a pending removal proceeding. Dissent: § 1429 ties only the AG's hands while there's a pending removal proceeding—it says nothing about courts. Dentist writes two hefty morphine scripts after an eight-hour dental procedure; the patient tragically ODs and her blood test comes back triple the fatal amount. The jury finds that the dentist knowingly issued an illegal prescription; he's convicted and faces a 20-year sentence. Dentist appeals, arguing that the jury wrongfully heard testimony about an earlier forged-prescription and a profanity-laced firing. Sixth Circuit: Yep, that's classic Rule 404(b) character stuff, not "intrinsic" evidence from the same criminal event. Here's a new trial. Ohio cop pulls over a car and sees marijuana residue inside. Driver, a convicted felon, claims he has a state medical marijuana license. A search reveals firearms. Was the search OK because pot is still illegal under federal law? Sixth Circuit: Damn right it was. Even though Congress has told federal officers they can't enforce federal marijuana law when the pot is legal under state law, it's perfectly fine if state officers enforce that federal law, even if they can't under state law. All law students in the past 25 years encountered the world "clickwrap" in their contracts class, an arcane body of case law that decides whether you're bound by all those terms you don't actually read when you buy stuff online. Here, the Ninth Circuit says an advice website wasn't sufficiently clear that users were agreeing to an arbitration clause for it to be enforceable. But the concurrence is where the action is, arguing for common-sense general principles rather than "rococo" rules on web design. Feds to Navajo family: Time to move! This is Hopi land now. We'll cover the cost, if you qualify. Hearing officer: Sorry, you don't qualify. Ninth Circuit (over a dissent): Rehearing. Hearing officer denied benefits after calling every witness not credible—for disagreeing with each other. That's not how evidence works. Brahimi (for those not in the know, David Lat's Twiqbal-esque portmanteau of Bruen and Rahimi) did not announce a new right for felons to possess arms. So no collateral review of a drug dealer's gun conviction, holds the Tenth Circuit. Bad man stays in jail. Head down to sunny Florida for the Eleventh Circuit's extremely readable explication of the quartet of SCOTUS cases that govern sentencing of juvenile offenders. The law, simplistically, is that sentencers have to consider youth in one way or another, depending on the crime. Eleventh Circuit: And, sorry, approximately 170 "juvenile lifers." Sentencing authorities in Florida do consider youth. They might be super stingy about it, but the system's not a sham, and that's all the Eighth Amendment requires. They say the best way to stop a bad guy with a gun is a good guy with a gun. Unless, that is, if a cop shoots and kills the good guy with a gun because the cop thinks he's the bad guy with a gun. Does that make the cop liable to the good guy's family? Eleventh Circuit: Look, accidents happen. Eleventh Circuit revives (some) Helms-Burton claims over Castro-confiscated Cuban land: If a shipping company is benefitting from confiscated land, a jury can award damages to the former owners. Concurrence: I'm on board—but let's talk about that frozen chicken defense. If you're a French Royalist of either the Bourbon or Orléans variety, get ready for some mauvaises nouvelles. In the Federal Circuit, the New Orleans Saints (no relation) fought off an attempt to cancel their fleur-de-lis trademark by a "direct descendant of the Kings of France (Scotland, Aragon, and Castille)." This despite the man alleging that "Louis VIII King of France was the father, and great…grandfather of the New ORLEANS SAINTS (Louis IX)!" and purported evidence that "My Family's Fleur de Lys" was first used "from c. 483-508 AD."

New case! Esperanza Gomez runs a small business near the U.S.-Mexico border providing everyday, small-dollar financial services. She helps people do things like cash paychecks and send money to their families. But now a federal agency, FinCEN, is enlisting her in a new, Orwellian surveillance scheme. Typically, businesses like Esperanza's must report cash transactions over $10,000 to the feds. But, for some areas near the border, FinCEN is dropping that limit to $200. Beyond the invasion of privacy, that means hours of paperwork—literally more hours than there are in a day. Esperanza and IJ are joining forces and fighting back.

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[Paul Cassell] The Victims' Families Seek a Plea Deadline in the Boeing Criminal Case

[I argue that the Crime Victims' Rights Act entitles the victims' families to know whether Boeing is really planning to go to trial ... or whether it will stick with its guilty plea.]

This afternoon, I filed a motion for the Boeing 737 MAX crashes victims' families whom I represent in the criminal case against Boeing. As readers of the blog will recall from my earlier posts (e.g., here, here, and here), Boeing previously agreed to plead guilty to the charge of conspiring to defraud the FAA in connection with the safety of its 737 MAX aircraft. Boeing's criminal conspiracy caused two plane crashes, killing 346 passengers and crew in what the federal district court judge handling the case (O'Connor, J.) has described as the "deadliest corporate crime in U.S. history." According to recent media reports, Boeing is now trying to walk back from its earlier plan to plead guilty. Judge O'Connor has set a trial date of June 23.

In today's motion, I argue that the Crime Victims' Rights Act (CVRA) entitles the victims' families to know in advance whether Boeing truly intends to go to trial.  Here's the introduction to my motion:

Naoise Connolly Ryan et al. (the "victims' families" or "families") … respectfully file this motion for the Court to set a deadline for any proposed plea agreement or other pre-trial resolution—e.g., an Ellis deadline. See United States v. Ellis, 547 F.2d 863, 864 (5th Cir. 1977) ("The [district] court [has] the prerogative to make and strictly enforce a deadline on plea bargaining.")). The families respectfully request an Ellis deadline of May 5, 2025. On the unique facts of this case, such a deadline is required to protect the victims' families' rights under the Crime Victim's Rights Act (CVRA) to be treated with fairness, to be free from unreasonably delayed proceedings, and to not be excluded from any trial. See 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(3), (7), (8). Grieving families need advance notice of whether this case is really going to trial so that they can begin the process of preparing to exercise their right to attend the trial. Also, an Ellis deadline will permit the Court to properly discharge its duty to review—and accept or reject—any proposed pre-trial resolution.

The motion raises an important issue about the treatment of crime victims (and, in death cases, their families) in the plea bargaining process. All too often, the parties in criminal cases drag out negotiations, with little regard for the consequences of the delays on the victims. In an effort to address this concern, Congress added a provision to the CVRA giving crime victims in federal cases the right to "proceedings free from unreasonable delay." As recounted in the motion, the CVRA's Senate sponsors explained that "too often … delays in criminal proceedings occur for the mere convenience of the parties and those delays reach beyond the time needed for defendant's due process or the Government's need to prepare. The result of such delays is that victims cannot begin to put the crime behind them and they continue to be victimized. It is not right to hold crime victims under the stress and pressure of future court proceedings merely because it is convenient for the parties …." 150 CONG. REC. S4260-01l) (April 22, 2024) (colloquy between Senators Kyl and Feinstein).

As I argue in today's motion, Boeing has had ample time—literally years—to resolve the conspiracy charge against it. Boeing first began negotiations over contemplated criminal charges in 2020, producing the illegally negotiated deferred plea agreement (DPA) that kicked off the case in early January 2021. After years of litigation about the effect of the victims' rights violation (including a published decision in the Fifth Circuit), Boeing violated its DPA obligations. Boeing's intransigence produced another round of plea negotiations, and the company finally presented to the district court a proposed plea agreement on July 24, 2024. The district court rejected Boeing's proposed plea on December 5, 2024. Since then, Boeing has requested multiple extensions of time for its legions of lawyers to do more wheeling and dealing.

As noted in the motion, in January of this year, new leaders took office in the Justice Department. But from what the victims' families can glean from media reports, the current delays stem not from inaction by the Justice Department but rather from Boeing contriving to "withdraw [from] an earlier agreement to plead guilty …." Dave Michaels & Emily Glazer, Boeing Is Pushing to Withdraw Guilty Plea Agreement, WALL ST. J., Mar. 24, 2025. Of course, Boeing possesses a constitutional right to force the Justice Department to prove its guilt at a trial—even though it has previously confessed to all of the elements of its deadly crime and even though, in other public settings, Boeing has professed sorrow for causing the deaths of hundreds of passengers and crew. But Boeing should not be free to extend the years-long proceedings any further than necessary. Boeing has yet to offer any real reason for additional delay. As of May 5, Boeing will have had a full five months to determine how it wants to proceed—after having already agreed to plead guilty in another proposed plea agreement.

As my motion concludes: "Today, 346 victims' families are left wondering whether they should plan to travel to Fort Worth to represent their lost loved ones at a trial to determine Boeing's guilt. They deserve to know whether Boeing really intends to go to trial—and they deserve that answer by May 5."

This issue now goes to Judge O'Connor for his decision.

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[Josh Blackman] The Major Separation of Powers Problems with J.E.B. v. Trump

[Judge Boasberg is about to unleash a truly independent counsel on the Trump Administration, and the President himself, subject to none of the strictures that Alexia Morrison faced.]

On Wednesday, I briefly wrote about Judge Boasberg's proposed criminal prosecution briefly. Here, I would like to highlight several of the significant separation of powers problems, many of which were raised in DOJ's latest mandamus petition to the D.C. Circuit. Specifically, this special prosecutor would truly be untethered, and would be burdened by none of the modest restrictions that Alexia Morrison confronted.

Let's recap how the Ethics in Government Act (EIGA) operated. First, the Attorney General had to determine if there was "reasonable grounds to believe that further investigation or prosecution is warranted." Second, when such a finding is made, the EIGA called for a special three-judge panel of the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit to "appoint an appropriate independent counsel" and "define that independent counsel's 'prosecutorial jurisdiction.'" Third, the special division was authorized to expand the independent counsel's "prosecutorial jurisdiction." Fourth, the independent counsel could be removed by the Attorney General for "good cause." That removal would be subject to review by the Special Division.

After Congress let the Independent Counsel statute lapse, Attorney General Reno issued a series of regulations that created the new "special counsel" regime. This was the authority that Robert Mueller and Jack Smith invoked to investigate and prosecute President Trump. I've argued at some length why I think those regulations are unconstitutional, but I'll table those issues for now. At least under those regulations, the special counsel was subject to some supervision by the Attorney General, and could be removed for cause. Moreover, Mueller adhered to DOJ policy, and did not indict the President.

Now, let's consider the path that Judge Boasberg is going down.

First, it is not the Attorney General, or some politically accountable figure, deciding whether the investigation and prosecution of the executive branch should begin. It is an inferior court judge. Now, you might reply that Attorney General Bondi is in fact a possible party to the case, since she signed pleadings in Judge Boasberg's court. I think that argument presumes that there was a crime committed, but I take the point. The bigger problem is that Judge Boasberg is also a party to the case. His oral and written orders are the basis of the contempt proceedings. Is he a disinterested party to determine how others should have construed his orders? I think not. When I tell my kids to do something, and they  largely ignore me, I am not a neutral party to decide whether my instructions were clear enough. I continue to think that all judges who initiate contempt proceedings should immediately ask to have the case reassigned to avoid any possible conflict of interest. Really, Judge Boasberg should be a witness in such a proceeding, rather than the deciding authority.

Second, under the EIGA, the three-judge panel decided who the independent counsel should be. And under the special counsel regulations, the Attorney General made that decision. The decision of who to appoint is foundational. Why did Merrick Garland appoint a war crimes prosecutor like Jack Smith to go after Trump, but appointed a mild-mannered former U.S. Attorney like Robert Hur to investigate Biden? Both cases involved alleged purloining of government documents. Why didn't Garland appoint the same official to investigate Biden and Trump? I think the question answers itself.

And in any event, it doesn't much matter who is appointed. Many men of integrity have been sullied by serving as independent counsels or special counsels. Justice Scalia was right in Morrison: when a prosecutor has only a single target, with no restrictions or accountability, he will stop at nothing to get his guy. Remember, Ken Starr, a well-regarded former federal judge, embarked on a modest investigation into President Clinton's business dealings. That case exploded to an inquisition about President Clinton's sex life, ultimately leading to an impeachment and a near-indictment. Robert Mueller, a well regarded former FBI director, started to investigate Trump's removal of Comey, but the investigation spiraled into a never-ending drip-drip-drip about obstruction and corruption. Trump was nearly impeached and indicted over Muellergate.

We all know how these sorts of special prosecutions wind up. Does anyone doubt that the special prosecutor will want to interview President Trump himself? If Trump refuses, would the District Court hold him in criminal contempt? Even if there is no violation found of Judge Boasberg's order, there will be a never-ending series of allegations based on "obstruction," the most malleable crime in federal law. I doubt all of these proceedings will uncover much useful information that we don't already know. But the collateral costs will be massive.

Third, there is a benefit to having judges unconnected with the controversy decide who the special prosecutor ought to be. The three-judge panel, appointed by the Chief Justice, were neutral, and had no role in adjudicating the actual matter. By contrast, Judge Boasberg cannot separate himself from this conflict. Yet, he can still decide who will be the next Inspector Javert.  Relatedly,  there is some value in having a three-judge panel make these decisions, rather than a unilateral judge. As Judge Ho's concurrence from yesterday explains, there is a big difference between a single-member court and a multi-member court.

Every level of the judiciary risks losing its credibility if judges fail to live up to these principles. But appellate courts have at least one built-in check: No appellate judge can act alone. Appellate courts act only through multi-member panels. So appellate judges must convince their colleagues before they can exercise the judicial power of the United States. District court decisions, by contrast, are (with rare exception) made by just one judge. District judges are the only members of the judiciary who can exercise the judicial power of the United States without anyone's consent but their own. With unilateral power, there's unique danger that some district courts may get off track. So it's vital that district judges exercise their powers carefully and with integrity—and critical that appellate judges be ready to intervene when district courts refuse to stay in their lane.

District Court judges have almost unlimited authority over their docket. Circuit judges have to persuade their colleagues.

Fourth, the EIGA and Reno regulations at least provided some mechanism for removal. Chief Justice Rehnquist cited the possibility of removal as a basis to uphold the EIGA. But is there any way to remove Judge Boasberg's special prosecutor? I don't think so. Short of mandamus by the D.C. Circuit or the Supreme Court, the special prosecutor can follow Trump to the ends of the earth.

Fifth, Judge Boasberg would sub silentio resurrect the EIGA. The history of the independent counsel statute is well known.  Republicans and Democrats agreed that the Independent Counsel statute was a mistake, and let it lapse. But who knew, all along, that Rule 42 permits a single district court judge to unilaterally install a truly independent counsel, subject to none of the restrictions under the EIGA? I realize the Supreme Court ducked the Rule 42 issue in the Donzinger case. Justice Gorsuch, and Judge Menashi (2nd Circuit) in dissent, were clearly right. That prosecution involved a private citizen. This was not a case where a special prosecutor is opening an investigation into the executive branch itself.

Sixth, at least in the Donziger case, the special prosecutor could ostensibly assert the authority of the United States in parallel to DOJ. But in the Boasberg case, the special prosecution would be asserting the sovereign authority of the United States in conflict with the Department of Justice. I see an analogy to United States v. Nixon. I remain convinced that Nixon was not justiciable because it was an intra-executive branch dispute. There was a conflict between the special prosecutor and the President. The courts had no business resolving that conflict. Here, Judge Boasberg is about do something far more problematic. He will be seizing the prosecutorial authority of the executive branch, delegating it to a private citizen, who will then prosecute the executive branch, all in the absence of clear statutory authorization. This sort of move makes anything Judges Reed O'Connor or Matthew Kacsmaryk did look like child's play.

The government's brief states the issue well:

The Executive Branch must itself prosecute, or face a court-appointed private prosecutor who would apparently exercise core executive powers of prosecution. And that private prosecutor would exercise those powers outside the President's or the Attorney General's control, all in service of a prosecution that the Executive Branch opposes. District courts cannot outsource prosecutorial power to private citizens, insulate them from Executive Branch control, and then unleash them against the Executive Branch.

Seventh, where will the budget come from for this special prosecutor? DOJ certainly will not give a penny. The lawyer cannot keep an office at Main Justice. Does the court have the budget to pay for this crusade? Or will the court order the government to divert funds for the lawyer and his team? Then again, there may be a line of attorneys who will gladly work pro bono to nail Trump.

Update: Judge Menashi's dissent discusses the funding issue. In Donzinger, the special prosecutor was paid from the judiciary's budget. He observed, "Providing judiciary-funded prosecutors to the executive branch creates tension with Congress's power of the purse."

Eighth, please do not forget about "officer stuff." In the Florida special counsel litigation, Seth Barrett Tillman and I argued that the special counsel was not an officer, but was at most an employee, and as an employee lacked the "significant authority," per Buckley, to bring a criminal indictment. (Our 11th Circuit brief in the since-mooted case is a good place to start.) In the past, DOJ has argued that court-appointed special prosecutors were employees. Thus, in our view, the special prosecutors could not exercise the "significant authority" to investigate and prosecute the executive branch, and perhaps the President himself. Remember, a court-appointed prosecutor would not be subject to the DOJ opinion on whether the President could be indicted. Alternatively, the special prosecutor position would be appointed for only a single purpose. This position would lack duration because it is not continuous. Therefore, it cannot be an "officer" of any type. The current qui tam case before the Eleventh Circuit just became far more important. I will probably write about that case soon.

Even assuming Morrison v. Olson is valid, what Judge Boasberg is doing is unconstitutional. Indeed, he is taking all of these steps after the Supreme Court ruled he lacks jurisdiction! Putting aside the venue issue, the absence of a cause of action is a jurisdictional defect. (Seth and I addressed this issue in our Emoluments Clause briefing at p. 8-9.) The Chief Justice gave Judge Boasberg an easy jurisdictional out: issue a grumbling opinion, but dismiss the contempt proceedings. Instead, the court seeks to push forward.

Going forward, the airplane case should no longer be known as J.G.G. v. Trump. It is better captioned as J.E.B. v. Trump, as Judge James E. Boasberg ("Jeb" for short) is going down a personal path against the Trump Administration. He will be the judge, jury, and executioner about the fate of the executive branch. Hell hath no fury like a scorned inferior court judge.

We are treading down a very dangerous path. I fear the judiciary will suffer the same fate of Ken Starr, Robert Mueller, and Jack Smith. None of this bodes well for the separation of powers.

The D.C. Circuit must intervene here. I know it was fashionable to dunk on the Fifth Circuit as this rogue right-wing court, but in candor, that court was never quite that conservative. There are many moderate members who can tip the en banc vote. The D.C. Circuit, by contrast, has an over-whelming liberal majority, and will have that majority for a generation. If the D.C. Circuit upholds this action, I will see it as no different than the new liberal majority on the Wisconsin Supreme Court that upheld a 400-year line item veto. A special prosecutor is not the way to deal with Trump.

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[Ilya Somin] My New Lawfare Article on "The Constitutional Case Against Trump's Trade War"

[It explains why the IEEPA "Liberation Day" tariffs are illegal and how our case against them relates to the other three cases challenging Trup's tariffs.]

Today, Lawfare published my article "The Constitutional Case Against Trump's Trade War." Here is an excerpt:

President Trump's massive "Liberation Day" tariffs, imposed April 2, on goods imported from almost every country in the world are likely to do grave damage to the U.S. and world economies, impose an enormous tax increase on Americans (an average of some $1,300 per household per year), and poison relations with America's allies. They are based in part on a completely nonsensical "reciprocity" formula, compounded by mathematical errors.

The tariffs are also a blatantly illegal usurpation of legislative power. That is why, on Monday, the Liberty Justice Center and I filed a lawsuit challenging the tariffs in court on behalf of five American import businesses severely harmed by them. We have a strong case.

Article I of the Constitution clearly gives Congress, not the president, the power to regulate "commerce with foreign nations" and to "lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises." The administration claims the tariffs are authorized by the International Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977 (IEEPA). IEEPA gives the president authority to impose various types of sanctions in situations when there is "any unusual and extraordinary threat, which has its source in whole or substantial part outside the United States, to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States, if the President declares a national emergency with respect to such threat." But, as Peter Harrell points out, it doesn't mention tariffs, and no previous president has used IEEPA to impose them.

Even if tariffs are permitted, they can be used only to address an "emergency" that amounts to an "unusual and extraordinary threat." The supposed "emergency" here is the existence of trade deficits with various countries. An "emergency" is a sudden crisis. As a House of Representatives report leading to the enactment of IEEPA put it, the legislation is based on "a recognition that emergencies are by their nature rare and brief, and are not to be equated with normal ongoing problems." The report adds that "[a] national emergency should be declared and emergency authorities employed only with respect to a specific set of circumstances which constitute a real emergency, and for no other purpose…. A national emergency should not be a normal state of affairs."

There is nothing new about bilateral trade deficits. They have existed for decades and are in fact a "normal state of affairs." Economists across the political spectrum recognize they are not actually a danger at all. America's bilateral trade deficit with Canada or the European Union is no more a threat than is my trade deficit with my local supermarket: I buy a lot from them; they virtually never buy anything from me….

Even if courts defer to the president's claim that trade deficits are an "emergency," they still aren't an "unusual and extraordinary threat." There is nothing unusual and extraordinary about them (again, they have existed for many years), nor do they pose any genuine danger….

If there is any ambiguity over the meaning of IEEPA, courts should resolve it against the government by applying the major questions doctrine. Since 2021, the Supreme Court has invalidated several presidential initiatives under that rule, which requires Congress to "speak clearly" when authorizing the executive to make "decisions of vast economic and political significance." If the law isn't clear, courts must reject the executive's assertion of power…

If Trump's sweeping use of IEEPA to start the biggest trade war in a century is not a major question, it is hard to say what is. The magnitude of the Liberation Day tariffs exceeds that of most of the other measures declared major questions by the Supreme Court….

Trump's IEEPA tariffs also violate constitutional limits on delegation of congressional power to the executive. While there is much disagreement on where to draw the line, there must be at least some limit to Congress's ability to give away its lawmaking powers. Congress cannot just simply pass a law giving the president the power to establish any tariffs he wants, without limitation…

The enormous scale of Trump's power grab runs afoul of even the most modest nondelegation constraints. If long-standing and perfectly normal bilateral trade deficits qualify as an "emergency" and an "unusual and extraordinary threat," the same can be said of virtually anything. The president would have the power to impose tariffs of any magnitude on any country for any reason, any time he wants. If that does not violate constitutional constraints on delegation, nothing does. That might be acceptable to those who believe there are no limits on delegation whatsoever. But both liberal and conservative Supreme Court justices have rejected that extreme view.

The article also explains how our case relates to the other three lawsuits challenging Trump's IEEPA tariffs, filed by the state of California, the New Civil Liberties Alliance, and members of the Blackfeet Nation Native American tribe.

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[Josh Blackman] Today in Supreme Court History: April 18, 1775

4/18/1775: Paul Revere's ride.

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