The Coldest Winter Quotes

“Fear was the terrible secret of the battlefiled and could afflict the brave as well as the timid. Worse it was contagious, and could destroy a unit before a battle even began. Because of that, commanders were first and foremost in the fear suppression business.”
― David Halberstam, The Coldest Winter: America and the Korean War

“Gen. Matthew Ridgeway "intended not to impose his will on his men, but to allow the men under him to find something in themselves that would make them more confident, more purposeful fighting men. It was their confidence in themselves that would make them fight well, he believed, not so much their belief in him. His job was to keep them to find that quality in themselves.”
― David Halberstam, The Coldest Winter: America and the Korean War

“Fear was the terrible secret of the battlefield and could afflict the brave as well as the timid. Worse it was contagious, and could destroy a unit before a battle even began. Because of that, commanders were first and foremost in the fear suppression business.”
― David Halberstam, The Coldest Winter: America and the Korean War

“The truth posed a great dilemma for a man who always had to be right, and yet, for all his grandeur, was often wrong.”
― David Halberstam, The Coldest Winter: America and the Korean War

“This was the mark of an uncommon soldier, someone whose courage away from the battlefield was the same as that on it.”
― David Halberstam, The Coldest Winter: America and the Korean War

“What looked safe was not safe. What looked hard and unsafe was probably safer. Anyway, safe was somewhere else in the world.”
― David Halberstam, The Coldest Winter: America and the Korean War

“Most commanders wanted as many good sources of information as possible. MacArthur was focused on limiting and controlling his sources of intelligence.”
― David Halberstam, The Coldest Winter: America and the Korean War

“The author describes megalomania as seen in Chairman Mao by saying that what he was familiar with, he was really familiar with. This zeal moved the megalomaniac with a complete lack of appreciation for what he DID NOT know.”
― David Halberstam, The Coldest Winter: America and the Korean War

“Major General John Coulter, known as Nervous John to much of his staff, was the most timid of the three corps commanders. That he was not up to the job was not exactly a secret. When Matt Ridgway took over the command of the Eighth Army a month later, Coulter was the first corps commander relieved, though the relief was masked as a promotion, for generals were always to be protected, and a star, his third, was added along with the Distinguished Service Medal.”
― David Halberstam, The Coldest Winter

“They came from peasant backgrounds, had hated the Japanese colonization of Korea, and believed that the Americans and their proxies in Seoul were agents of the past, not enablers of the future; the Americans were now the allies of the Japanese, as well as the old Korean ruling class, and thus this was a continuation of the struggle that had forced them to leave their native soil years earlier. The leadership of the South Korean Army was in their minds a reflection of those Koreans who had fought alongside the Japanese, and in the upper-level ranks this was often true. The North Koreans troops had trained hard and were extremely well disciplined and motivated. They camouflaged themselves exceptionally well, stayed off the roads, and often moved over the harsh terrain by foot, as the Americans did not. Like the Chinese Communists who had trained them and with whom they had fought, they tended to avoid all-”
― David Halberstam, The Coldest Winter

“had come all this way and this was what I get paid to do. So I went out and found his home and for four hours it all poured out, what had happened in those three days at Chipyongni when he was a young platoon leader. It was if he had been waiting for me to come by for fifty-five years, and he remembered everything as”
― David Halberstam, The Coldest Winter

“The problem with a great democracy like the United States, George Kennan once noted, was that it was almost always like a sleeping giant, impervious to its surroundings until suddenly and belatedly awoken, when it proved so angry about what it discovered that it started lashing out wildly.”
― David Halberstam, The Coldest Winter

“In 1947, Kennan wrote, “The men of the Kremlin would suddenly discover that this fluid and subtle oriental movement which they thought they held in the palm of their hand had quietly oozed away between their fingers and there was nothing left there but a ceremonial Chinese bow and a polite giggle.”
― David Halberstam, The Coldest Winter

“The Tydings Committee eventually criticized McCarthy for his behavior and exonerated most of those attacked by him. McCarthy’s accusations, it reported, “represented perhaps the most nefarious campaign of half-truths and untruths in the history of the Republic.”
― David Halberstam, The Coldest Winter

“He and Willoughby preferred that the Pentagon and the Truman administration be completely dependent upon them for any information about what was going on in their area of Asia—with no countervailing intelligence to limit his hand. Control intelligence, and you control decision-making.”
― David Halberstam, The Coldest Winter

“Sometimes the best virtue learned on the battlefield is modesty.”
― David Halberstam, The Coldest Winter: America and the Korean War

“Because history became his (Keenan's) genuine passion, he tended to see the world in terms of deep historical forces that, in his mind, formed a nation's character in ways almost beyond the consciousness of the men who momentarily governed it, as if these historical impulses were more a part of them than they knew.”
― David Halberstam, The Coldest Winter: America and the Korean War

“If he (George Keenan)felt on occasion more than a little uncomfortable when being listened to, then he was truly unhappy when not being listened to.”
― David Halberstam, The Coldest Winter: America and the Korean War

“Peterson thought it an unusual friendship, one only the Army could forge.”
― David Halberstam, The Coldest Winter: America and the Korean War

“the thirty-eighth parallel, selected by the Americans and the Russians back in 1945 as the dividing line between the two Koreas, as a border at all.”
― David Halberstam, The Coldest Winter

“What had happened in the Chinese civil war as much as anything else reflected those changes, something MacArthur never chose to understand. Part of that was his very nature, and what had become the nature of his mystique. He did not ask questions; that would imply there was something he did not know. Instead he was oracular, the man that others came to hear. Major”
― David Halberstam, The Coldest Winter

“If the bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki had seemed to inaugurate a brand-new chapter in the history of warfare, supposedly making all other weapons obsolete and creating a world where military power rested only with the richest, most technologically advanced nations, then the Korean battlefield defeats of early July 1950 shattered that belief”
― David Halberstam, The Coldest Winter

“The UN of 1950 was still very much a reflection of American and Western European interests, the only significant dissent coming from the Soviets and their satellites. It was in some ways very much a last vestige of a white man’s world.”
― David Halberstam, The Coldest Winter