Mark

“In this ultimate sense Taft had fallen out of step with his times. Too much himself to soften his profile, he happened on the national scene at the same time that Franklin D. Roosevelt was demonstrating the magic to be wrung from the mass media. Myopic and somewhat disdainful about “image,” he struggled to prominence just as public opinion polling developed into a powerful tool for his opponents. Instinctively partisan, he tried for the presidency after the depression had helped the Democrats build an electoral coalition that forced Republicans to turn to Dewey and even to such unpartisan figures as Willkie and Eisenhower. Fearful of commitments abroad, he reflected broad currents of thought about foreign policy more suited to the 1920s – or even the late 1960s – than to the frightening years spanned by Hitler and Stalin. Like the two men who had affected him most, his father and Herbert Hoover, Taft had clung steadfastly to a set of assumptions about the world. Like them again, he had been swept aside while new men of destiny – Wilson, FDR, Eisenhower – came in to fill the void. When the delegates whispered “Taft Can’t Win,” they were talking not only about a man who lacked charisma but a figure who seemed uncomfortable with the world of 1952.”
― James T. Patterson, Mr. Republican: A Biography Of Robert A. Taft

“Sherman was a warrior, not a scholar, but he thought deeply about the issues posed by war. The Marches were to Sherman fundamentally a moral expression of Union military power, even a moral equivalent of battle. That is to say, they were designed to humiliate the South and especially secessionist leaders, to humble its swaggering warriors, and to leave them in a state of despair contemplating unavoidable defeat. As the South had been humiliated, Northern arms should henceforth be treated with respect. The Marches thus sought a propaganda or moral victory aimed at the Confederate military and civil will. They would reveal to the world, not only to the South, that a tremendous change had occurred in the Civil War's military balance. Despite its redoubtable resistance throughout 1864, any Confederate success would prove transient⁠—another road pointing to defeat.”
― Brian Holden Reid, The Scourge of War: The Life of William Tecumseh Sherman

“Henry I was not an administrator or a social engineer. He was an extremely able ruler who understood the art of propaganda. of playing the waiting game, and of manipulating the hopes and fears of men. His nature was calculating, determined, even ruthless; he loved material possessions and was self-evidently a man of strong sexual appetites. Yet there was more to Henry than political cunning: this was a man who, if feared by some, could win and keep the loyalty of others. He possessed a clear sense of what it was to rule England and Normandy, and took his role as protector of the church in his realms very seriously. The churchmen who knew him, such as Peter the Venerable and Archbishop Hugh, and those who wrote about him, like Orderic Vitalis, recognized that in an imperfect world, peace and security in England and Normandy had come to rest on his shoulders.”
― Judith A. Green, Henry I: King of England and Duke of Normandy

“Having risked the loss of Canada in order to conquer Silesia for the King of Prussia, France was to lose it finally in the next war for the pleasure of attempting to restore that province to the Queen of Hungary. France, having played the game of Prussia in the War of the Austrian Succession, was to play that of Austria in the Seven Years War.”
― Albert Sorel, Europe and the French Revolution: The Political Traditions of the Old Régime