Daniel

“Because so many of our beliefs depend upon the culture we share with others, diagnosing patients from other cultures raises many problems. If hearing voices talking to you is a widely shared experience within a culture, then this experience cannot be treated as a sign of schizophrenia. On the other hand, people from within the same culture can easily recognize the kind of experiences that would be considered signs of madness.

In Northwick Park Hospital there were many patients who were adherents of religions with which the staff were not familiar – fundamental Christian sects as well as branches of oriental faiths. We could not be sure if it was reasonable for a man belonging to a Christian sect founded in California in 1962 to believe that by wearing a half-pound cross on a wire round his neck he pleased God, who would then pass him messages by directing his eyes to particular biblical texts. We could not be sure if it was reasonable for a devout Hindu to interpret individuals and animals in the local setting as manifestations of Krishna reborn. Reading accounts of the beliefs of adherents to these sects did not help us, but the relevant spiritual leaders, on the basis of a few moments’ conversation, could state with confidence that these ideas were due to illness. We therefore made a practice of always consulting them. Typically they considered that the patient believed literally in what was intended as a metaphor. The patients’ ideas were much too concrete.”
― Christopher D. Frith, Schizophrenia: A Very Short Introduction

“Putting it all together, we define populism as a political style that sets ‘sacred’ people against two enemies: ‘elites’ and ‘others’. In this special issue, our contributors do not necessarily take up this definition and, in some cases, they may critically depart from it. Even so, our contributors do, in different ways, reflect on the roles of religion in the stylistic inflections of populism. It is worth underlining that the definition of populism that we present here is intentionally broader than cases that involve religion. Furthermore, it points to the quasi-religious connotations of populism. It, therefore, can be used in the analysis of any kind of populism, potentially foregrounding how even the most secular styles of populist politics will inevitably instantiate distinctions between the ‘profane’ and the ‘sacred’.”
― Daniel Nilsson Dehanas, Religion and the Rise of Populism

“A frequent refrain of those defending the status quo is that the income tax system already heavily burdens the rich because the top 1 percent of earners pay 40 percent of all income taxes while 40 percent of Americans pay no income taxes at all. This is partially true: Individuals with the most taxable income do pay the most income tax. However, this statistic is about people who have high incomes, typically from work; it tells us nothing about the tax liability of those with the most wealth. Studies have shown that there is only about a 50 percent overlap between America’s wealthiest people and those who earn the most income. Moreover, as the leaked tax returns of several of the wealthiest Americans reveal, the ability of wealth owners to avoid taxable income means that they are just as likely to be among the 40 percent of nonpayers as they are the top 1 percent of earners.”
― Ray D. Madoff, The Second Estate: How the Tax Code Made an American Aristocracy

“In some cases, those who express extreme views start believing the things they share even if their initial goal was only to increase their standing within a group. And then there are cases where the theories being shared are so outlandish or unlikely that we have to wonder: Do they really believe these things? If we were to sit the person down for a polygraph test and quiz them about whether they truly think the earth is flat, the grieving parents who lost their children to gun violence are just actors, or Hillary Clinton is a pedophile, what would we find? Would they (or the lie detector machine) reveal that perhaps their beliefs are not quite so literal? If so, why are they spreading such lies? Understanding the mechanics of social groups—especially those connected by shared beliefs, such as religious groups, sects, and cults—can help shed light on this question. As Jonathan Haidt suggested, the deliberate sharing of a lie can act as a shibboleth—a kind of linguistic password that identifies people within a group. “Many who study religion have noted that it’s the very impossibility of a claim that makes it a good signal of one’s commitment to the faith,” he wrote. “You don’t need faith to believe obvious things. Proclaiming that the election was stolen surely does play an identity-advertising role in today’s America.”
― Dan Ariely, Misbelief: What Makes Rational People Believe Irrational Things