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2015 - April - Theme Read - Warfare on the Russian Front
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message 151:
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'Aussie Rick', Moderator
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Apr 21, 2015 09:58PM
Glad you enjoyed the book Mike, I thought it was a great read when I first read it.
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I've started a theme read for April of:
Red Star Under the Baltic: A Firsthand Account of Life on Board a Soviet Submarine in World War Two by Victor KorzhThe Soviet Baltic Fleet was pushed out of its bases in the Baltic republics as the Germans advanced. The submarine squadrons retreated to Leningrad and Kronshtadt. Unfortunately, neither location had any support facilities -- no sub tenders, drydocks, depots, etc. Korzh's sub, S-7, tied up in the Neva River along the embankment in central Leningrad. Facilities were so crude, than any hull work had to be completed by divers. Not too bad a situation, until you consider it was winter. The crews would use axes to cut holes in the river ice, then send the divers down to mend valve outlets, prop shrouds, etc. They did this kind of labor on rations of 200 grams of inferior bread per day (7.14 ounces). Soon scurvy appeared. This was treated with the ancient remedy of pine needle tea -- the sailors hated it.
Frozen hell!
Mike wrote: "Frozen hell!"I would never underestimate the Russians. They're some pretty tough customers.
From:
Red Star Under the Baltic: A Firsthand Account of Life on Board a Soviet Submarine in World War II.Submarine operations in any ocean are arduous, but especially so in the Gulf of Finland. In order to reach the Baltic Sea to attack German shipping, particularly iron ore carriers bound for Germany from Sweden, Soviet subs had to transit the entire length of the gulf. The gulf is 250 miles long from the mouth of the Neva to Hango (Finland's southernmost point) and only about 45 miles wide. The biggest problem: the average depth is 110 feet with the maximum at 330. That is not very deep for a sub. The Germans and Finns mined it heavily, patrolled in constantly (by sea and air) and controlled both shores. Each run to sea by the Soviets was a nail-biter.
Sounds like the perfect bottleneck, any mention yet on casualty rates for that run to the sea?
My copy of this new release arrived today although I doubt I will get a chance to start it this theme month!
Stalingrad: The City that Defeated the Third Reich by Jochen HellbeckDescription:
The turning point of World War II came at Stalingrad. Hitler’s soldiers stormed the city in September 1942 in a bid to complete the conquest of Europe. Yet Stalingrad never fell. After months of bitter fighting, 100,000 surviving Germans, huddled in the ruined city, surrendered to Soviet troops.
During the battle and shortly after its conclusion, scores of Red Army commanders and soldiers, party officials and workers spoke with a team of historians who visited from Moscow to record their conversations. The tapestry of their voices provides groundbreaking insights into the thoughts and feelings of Soviet citizens during wartime.
Legendary sniper Vasily Zaytsev recounted the horrors he witnessed at Stalingrad: “You see young girls, children hanging from trees in the park.[...] That has a tremendous impact.” Nurse Vera Gurova attended hundreds of wounded soldiers in a makeshift hospital every day, but she couldn’t forget one young amputee who begged her to avenge his suffering. “Every soldier and officer in Stalingrad was itching to kill as many Germans as possible,” said Major Nikolai Aksyonov.
These testimonials were so harrowing and candid that the Kremlin forbade their publication, and they were forgotten by modern history—until now. Revealed here in English for the first time, they humanize the Soviet defenders and allow Jochen Hellbeck, in Stalingrad, to present a definitive new portrait of the most fateful battle of World War II.
'Aussie Rick' wrote: "Sounds like the perfect bottleneck, any mention yet on casualty rates for that run to the sea?"Twenty-two of the thirty-eight subs were eventually lost.
Pretty bad then eh!
That's about 58 %. Very tough. Don't forget that loss rate for the ENTIRE German U-boat fleet was 75 %. Submarine duty was pretty tough all around. My favorite submarine statistic of WWII is that there were three emergency appendectomies performed by USN pharmacist mates and all three were successful.
Armor and Blood: The Battle of Kursk: The Turning Point of World War IIHalfway on the edge of May... so expect a review by the end of the weekend.
Will be keen to see your review Dimitri as I have an unread copy of the book in my library :)
Maybe this is too picky, but who would like to discuss the use of the word turning point here, applied to Kursh. What was Stalingrad? The Axis forces had just surrendered over 250,000 in N. Africa in May. Things were definitely turning against the Germans already. Sure, they threw away forces that could have retained the opportunity to retake the initiative later, but they still scraped up two panzer armies the next year in the Ardennes. The Battle of the Atlantic was the longest campaign of WWII and while see-saw, there was a big shift toward the Allies in mid-43. If that ties in with Kursh and N. Africa, it makes some more sense,but it seems a stretch to call Kursk itself to be the turning point. Citadel was delayed, the Russians knew they were coming and made excellent preparations for defense and counter-attack. Big difference seems that the opening blow of the campaign failed to penetrate whereas 41 and 42 started with success. That is a definite shift, but I still balk at "turning point." Thanks for your attention. Whadayathink?
Howard wrote: "Maybe this is too picky, but who would like to discuss the use of the word turning point here, applied to Kursh. What was Stalingrad? The Axis forces had just surrendered over 250,000 in N. Africa ..."As I've always understood from general histories, Kursk was a turning point in the offensive (panzer-based) potential of the Wehrmacht in the principal theater; after that, it was one long backward push that drained most of the military resources. Stalingrad stands next to it in terms of psychological impact on Hitler.
message 166:
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Geevee, Assisting Moderator British & Commonwealth Forces
(last edited Apr 30, 2015 01:20PM)
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To extend Howard's question, I'm of the view that Moscow was the key turning point both in terms of German forces in distance and the moment Russia thought it could perhaps hold their line in front of the capital. For Hitler's commanders they knew the fresh troops from the East and winter weather had come with losses mounting and supplies and reinforcements already showing gaps.It still amazes me - regardless of the political views and abhorrent war crimes - how well the German military forces fought and held ground in one long retreat.
Thank you for that clarification, Dimitri.
Howard wrote: "Maybe this is too picky, but who would like to discuss the use of the word turning point here, applied to Kursh. What was Stalingrad? The Axis forces had just surrendered over 250,000 in N. Africa ..."Absolutely agree. Without the turn at Stalingrad, Kursk doesn't happen. No way can Kursk be called the turning point of either the Eastern front or the 2nd world war. I can see it being a major domino in kicking Germany out of Russia, but not a turning point.
As far as what Dimitri offered, I can see the frame of reference regarding the severe depletion of the most capable offensive ground forces, and possibly the impact on Hitler's psyche, though he ordered many more attacks until the day he died. So in that limited sense you could call it a turning point. There was a book "June 1944" and though while it was oriented toward the western front, discussed the pivotal nature of that month in the overall war.
Howard wrote: "Maybe this is too picky, but who would like to discuss the use of the word turning point here, applied to Kursh. What was Stalingrad? The Axis forces had just surrendered over 250,000 in N. Africa ..."While I am a big fan of the Bulge Battles, I don't think I would call it much more than a Last Gasp event, although there would be another one later in Hungry, It wasn't a turning point so much as a speed bump, costly to be sure but not something that changed much in regards to strategy or even timing really.
I am also not sure I would honor it would the longest campaign of the war. I am not at all sure that Guadalcanal didn't last longer, I am sure that the U-boat campaign did. On a larger scale Italy most assuredly did.
And of course Leningrad. I am amply proud of what the US achieved in the war, and I tend to think that most of it is pretty much overlooked in a way, but the Russian's did in fact do most of the bleeding. They also overcame massive losses to come back and stomp on the German Army, which just goes to show with all the advantages of intangible force multipliers that the Germans had, in the end numbers do in fact take on a power all their own.
Dj wrote: "Howard wrote: "Maybe this is too picky, but who would like to discuss the use of the word turning point here, applied to Kursh. What was Stalingrad? The Axis forces had just surrendered over 250,00..."As Stalin is supposed to have said, "Quantity is a quality of its own."
My reference to the longest campaign of the war was the Battle of the Atlantic (name given by Churchill.) It was considered to run from 3 Sep 39 to 8 May 45.How many have read "The 90 Division Gamble?" We could have fielded much larger armies but chose to bank on weapons production (for ourselves and our allies) and let those closer to the war provide the men. The Rainbow plans estimated we would need 350 Divisions to defeat Germany. Every soldier we sent had to be supplied on the other side of the world. It was an industrial type decision like most of ours at the time, and it cost us a huge price in the stress on our frontline combat troops because we literally had no back-up, and we replaced them like spare parts which hurt unit cohesion. We barely had enough troops to hold the line when the Germans attacked in Dec 44. We had about 12 million in service but that includes Navy, Air Corps, etc and a lot were in the Pacific and in the States in the training and support business. Our tooth-to-tail ratio was not impressive. But it turned out good enough. We used a lot of women in industry, etc. The Germans never did. The Russians seemed to have liberally employed women in digging trenches (yes, they had some excellent pilots and snipers who were women, but not huge numbers.) By the way, British combat strength declined in the last 6 months of the war as they insisted on maintaining a home army (but probably that was the propaganda reason given while they wished to reduce their casualties. You can understand if you recall their losses in WWI and they fought without us for the first years of WWII.) The only way they could replace losses was to break up combat units and parcel out the troops to fill the ranks. I think their frontline strength in Europe dropped by two infantry divisions.
Howard wrote: "My reference to the longest campaign of the war was the Battle of the Atlantic (name given by Churchill.) It was considered to run from 3 Sep 39 to 8 May 45.How many have read "The 90 Division Ga..."
I believe the original, 350 division estimate also assumed we would be fighting Germany alone with no Allies. I don't recall if it figured we would be fighting the Japanese as well.
Generally speaking I think for the ETO, Marshall was shooting for a 100 Division strength, but ended up settling for 90 world wide.
message 174:
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Geevee, Assisting Moderator British & Commonwealth Forces
(last edited May 01, 2015 11:57AM)
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Howard wrote: "My reference to the longest campaign of the war was the Battle of the Atlantic (name given by Churchill.) It was considered to run from 3 Sep 39 to 8 May 45.How many have read "The 90 Division Ga..."
Interesting post Howard. A book I've not read and one I shall look to find.
The combat strength is indeed correct and we (Britain) did disband/suspend divisions, brigades and regiments to keep full strength units in the field. It is certainly true too that without US (and Canadian) assistance we would not have set foot back on North European soil.
The battle of the Atlantic was indeed a titanic (no pun) struggle and my grandparents and parents (as young children) knew food and other goods were only on the table thanks to the merchant and allied navies work. The British merchant navy lost 30,000 men indicating the struggle from the first to last days. Also though grossly understated is the work done by the commonwealth navies, especially Canada, and the USN and its coastguard who provided support including prior to 7th December. Brazil also gave fine merchant naval service.
The US merchant marine lost around 10,000 men in service had a higher (edited to insert previous word) casualty ratio than any other US military unit.
Like Dj I too am proud of my country's role, but also of our commonwealth friends and the US' support - it is why I always plant remembrance crosses in US cemeteries as well as British/Commonwealth.
The material on the Rainbow plans is interesting in itself. Different colors (theoretical opponents) represented different scenarios, and there were changes and combinations. Besides general preparedness, the main goal was to get the War Dept and Dept of the Navy on the same page concerning the big picture. Japan had sided with the Allies in WWI and the most feared scenario was war against a British-Japanese alliance (Red-Orange.) Interestingly, this seems to have been the earliest establishment of the Europe-first tenet. It was not hard to swap Germany for England in terms of planning. Eventually the plan most like what we used for WWII was Rainbow 5. I wasn't so much referring to specific numbers as to the general notion that it made more sense for us to lead with industrial power and hedge on manpower. US held her total casualties below half million. The fact that the Russians were in the war before Pearl Harbor was a big factor in decision-making. The British Army has always been historically very professional but small.The French, on the other hand, have fielded large armies, but by shocking circumstances, were largely removed from the WWII equation early-on. The US Army could play with theoretical numbers of combat troops in Europe (or Pacific,) but the Navy would remind them of what I have already mentioned: every soldier we sent half-way around the world would have to be supplied from the US and that raised the tension and the stakes of the naval campaign. Churchill said the only thing that could ensure the defeat of the UK was the loss of the naval war to keep England supplied. It was the only thing in the war that truly frightened him.
The 90 division total for the US was rounded and included less than 90 actual division but counted fragments such as independent brigades, etc. Toward the end of the war the US disbanded a lot of anti-aircraft units to use the troops elsewhere.
Geevee, your comment 166 is very to the point. The US Army was extremely interested in what they termed the "combat cohesiveness" of German forces. The result of study shows that the Germans (and the British) recruited by county or local area. The result was that everyone knew everyone else through family ties. To shirk or fail in battle brought shame to the family amongst their co-habitants back home and on the positive side it made the units more quickly become like a family. Bonding is important. There is some good historical material on Alexander the Great and so many others about this factor. It lead the US Army to create a regimental system of sorts to get more of this feeling but is based on repetitive, cyclical assignments rather than place of origin.
Regarding a "turning point", I'm not sure there was one single point on the Eastern Front that I would point to as decisive. Moscow was one, Stalingrad another, Kursk a third. Certainly, it was all backwards (with very minor exceptions) for the Germans after Kursk, but a success there wouldn't have amounted to much, IMO.Regarding the 90-division gamble, I've heard the phrase, is there a book with that title?
Maurice Matlof: Of all the calculated risks taken by General George C. Marshall in World War II none was bolder than the decision in mid-war to maintain the U.S. Army's ground combat strength at ninety divisions. Students of warfare will long debate whether the decision was as wise as it was courageous, as foresighted as it was successful.
I read the book of that title long ago but if you google it there an excellent summation. Correction: Matloff
Comment 171: true, but note that it also applied to Stalin's casualties. He fortunately had enough men to use them like bullets, the powerful General Mud and General Winter, and plenty of space to fall back, stretch the enemy's supply line and operate in his vast rear area with partisans, not to mention material aid from the West. I noted recently that two German mechanized divisions were diverted to the west just before Operation Uranus in anticipation of an attack.
Lee wrote: "Regarding a "turning point", I'm not sure there was one single point on the Eastern Front that I would point to as decisive. Moscow was one, Stalingrad another, Kursk a third. Certainly, it was all..."177
http://www.history.army.mil/books/70-...
Looks like there is a whole chapter in one of the big green wall series. Looks like it is from Command Decisions.
http://www.historynet.com/the-90-divi...
Here is an interesting article
THE WORLD WAR TWO GROUP
Books mentioned in this topic
Armor and Blood: The Battle of Kursk, The Turning Point of World War II (other topics)Stalingrad: The City that Defeated the Third Reich (other topics)
Red Star Under the Baltic: A First-Hand Account of Life on Board a Soviet Submarine in World War Two (other topics)
Red Star Under the Baltic: A Firsthand Account of Life on Board a Soviet Submarine in World War Two (other topics)
War on the Eastern Front 1941-1945 (other topics)
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Authors mentioned in this topic
Jochen Hellbeck (other topics)Lee Trimble (other topics)
Hans-Ulrich Rudel (other topics)
E.R. Hooton (other topics)
Yaron Pasher (other topics)
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