THE WORLD WAR TWO GROUP discussion
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2015 - April - Theme Read - Warfare on the Russian Front
Yes, I read about that in the book as well, obviously caused major issues during the winter!
It was the Russians who were different by having the pipes inside. The cold effected not only the Germans' locomotives but also their optical equipment and most of their lubricants. The Russians also used a wider gauge track, so the Axis had to do a lot of work to employ the rail system in Russia.
Very good points Howard about the lubricants and optical equipment. The German forces really suffered that first winter.
Just recently read about a civil effort to help German troops on the Eastern Front in WWII to deal with cold. I think school children suggested cutting holes in socks to use as gloves. The troops didn't think it was much help because their socks already had plenty of holes. The most intriguing fact about Russian winters in WWII for me was Manstein's feud with Hitler over the use of artillery shells. Manstein knew he had to get his troops below ground level to keep from freezing to death, so they were using artillery shells to blow craters in the frozen earth. Hitler, who had an eye for detail, immediately spotted the increased ammunition use and inquired. He had a big row with Manstein over it.
Thanks Howard, that is interesting.
I found the last sentence of this account interesting, from my current book; The Battle for Moscow:"While British tanks in the Soviet Union may have had a psychological impact, they were little better suited to the Russian late summer and winter conditions than German tanks. The fact that German tanks in 1941 had much narrower tracks than the Soviet T-34 and Kv-1 was also true of British Valentine and Matilda tanks. Accordingly, while Soviet tanks could still perform in up to 70 cm of snow the British tanks were only capable of operating in up to 40 cm. There was even a suggestion that British tanks should be held back from service until March 1942 as they were 'apparently African vehicles'."
'Aussie Rick' wrote: "I found the last sentence of this account interesting, from my current book; The Battle for Moscow:"While British tanks in the Soviet Union may have had a psychological impact, they were little b..."
Those KV-1's were sure hard to knockout, think that took the panzer forces by surprise.
I thought this was a pretty good quote from a German soldier, Willy Peter Reese, in regards to how they treated Russian civilians:" ... and weren't bothered by tears, hand wringing and curses. We were the victors. War excused our thefts, encouraged cruelty, and the need to survive didn't go around getting permission from conscience."
'Aussie Rick' wrote: "I thought this was a pretty good quote from a German soldier, Willy Peter Reese, in regards to how they treated Russian civilians:" ... and weren't bothered by tears, hand wringing and curses. We..."
Most brutal times for all on each side.
While Stalin could never have been expected to surrender, he did choose to stay in Moscow, therefore it would not be inconceivable that had German operations gone better Stalin might have been killed or captured.
Sorry, I posted this on the wrong goodreads page: While Stalin could never have been expected to surrender, he did choose to stay in Moscow, therefore it would not be inconceivable that had German operations gone better Stalin might have been killed or captured.
Dan Carlin's Ghosts of the Ostfront podcast series provides quite a sampling of the "gloves off" brutality committed on both sides. While drawn from several books, no single book could really compete with his litany of some of the worst examples of man's inhumanity. (Edited to add--Carlin's presentation makes these atrocities all the more chilling! Get the podcasts!)Apropos the trains being used for the Final Solution instead of military matters, I've read similar comments with regards to both East Front and Normandy battles. My takeaway is a bit out of the box but to me it illustrated the skewered command structure of the Nazis. One thing that has always been highlighted in books of WWII is that the Allies were often divided and cooperation was so difficult that they won was a miracle. Furthermore, the "democracies" were considered inferior to the dictatorships of Stalin and Hitler.
However, the trains are the example of how dysfunctional the Nazi system was. The SS had greater power than even the military in wartime--thus train, vehicles, and men that were essential to the war effort were diverted by the SS--who could not be questioned--to engage in the Final Solution, not just at the camps but in the occupied countries in the East.
Fortunately for the rest of us, the Nazi hatred of Communists, Jews, Slavs, Gypsies, and others, overruled their desire to defeat the Soviet Union.
Very valid point Rory in regards to how dysfunctional the Nazi system was when they put more effort into the Final Solution than trying to win the war. I went ahead and ordered a copy of the book; Holocaust versus Wehrmacht as I wanted to learn more about this issue.
by Yaron Pasher
Thank you everyone for your answers to my questions--more to come. But first, my thoughts:
1. Regarding when Barbarossa jumped the shark, well as tempting it is to say they never should invaded, you are talking about the two biggest baddest dudes in the whole damn town(take that, Leroy Brown!). Eventually they would have fought. Personally a prudent patient person would have prepared for the inept Soviets to invade and pull another Finland or repeat Tannenburg. However, the German military, while they proved to be tenacious defenders on all fronts in 1943-1945, were innately offensive. They had to attack first.
That being said, there were several points where I think they could have changed the course of events but for who they were. They were Nazis--the SS and Final Solution came first, so where an Alexander or Genghis Khan or Frederick the Great or even Ludendorff would have deftly played the anti-Stalin and ethnic divisions to overthrow Stalin, the Nazis didn't think that way. Killing as many Jews, Communists, and Slavs was priority, not making them allies. Vlasov's Army was just an afterthought and poorly supported at that.
Going after Baku instead of Stalingrad would have paid off hugely, but they were distracted at Stalingrad with the ultimate pissing contest that Hitler refused to lose.
Even at Kursk, with such power they could have still dealt a crippling blow, but not against a prepared defense. From that point on the Nazis not only gave up the fight against the Soviets, but they wasted resources in vengeful and brutal attacks on their former Hungarian and Italian allies, and devastating the Polish uprising of August.
It was simply who the Nazis were.
Overthrow and replace Hitler/Goebbels in 1942 or early 1943 with a Rommel or Rundstedt, and Germany would have been able to alter the outcome. July 1944 was too late.
As for Leningrad, not sure taking that had much more than symbolic importance--Singapore, Philippines and Wake Island were shocking blows to morale, but didn't lose the war for the Allies in the Pacific.
Regarding my other questions:1. Great answer about Romania. I, too, think if Bear was the attacker it would have happened 1942 in Romania.
2. Any fan of Axis & Allies game knows the "optional" rule about Japan not attacking Russia changes the whole game simply by pinning down those essential Siberian troops, plus keeping US out of the war. Heck, Japan attacking Singapore and Dutch East Indies without Pearl, Wake, and Philippines would most likely have kept USA out. Attacking Pearl, then the Germans idiotically declaring war on USA changed everything.
3. Germany's lack of wartime economy, and inability to produce like Soviets/US hurt it. More subs would have won battle of Atlantic, more bombers would have devastated Russia---think what a Dresden attack on Leningrad and Moscow would have done. Plus they shifted at all the wrong times--200,000 troops to Tunis AFTER Rommel fails at El Alamein, troops pulled from Kursk to go to Italy, the whole Moscow or Kiev or Baku or Stalingrad or Leningrad. They made a decision then changed their minds. No wonder likes of Von Bock, Rundstedt, Guderian, and Halder were so frustrated.
GeeVee,Great part of Herman Wouk's Winds of War where his pseudo Manstein writing a memoir (book in a book) where he outlines the plan dreamed up by the generals that Germans and Japanese link up at India. In fact the Japanese navy before Doolittle raid were threatening India. If the Germans had concentrated instead on the Caucasus and Egypt, instead of Moscow, it wasn't too implausible. Again comes down to resources and inability to keep to a strategy or even for the two "allies" to trust each other enough to pull it off.
Rory wrote: "Aussie Rick---15 tanks!"
Quite an impressive spearhead eh!
Strange things happened. For an example read about the shenanigans surrounding Vichy France and some of the business deals they made with the Germans, the French fleet, and particularly Admiral Darlan and his assassination. Or in fact, some of the convoluted sophistry of Goebbels' reconciliation of why the supreme Arian race made a pact with, gasp, the Japanese!!! Not to mention the pro-German/anti-Hitler officers at key places in the hierarchy of the Reich.The group of WWI comrades that stuck together after that war, some of whom rose to general officer rank by WWII, were identified as sending intel to the Russians. The speed with which the Russians were notified of German actions was such that it could not have had time to have been relayed through Switzerland, as had also been happening. There were two cases of Geman breakthroughs capturing high level Russian headquarters, blowing open the safe and finding their OWN operations order inside.
The discussion about Germany's chances against Russia seem to assume that Germany had completed all its previous campaigns. But if someone other than Hitler was in power, Germany probably would not have attacked Poland. So in that case, if Stalin would have eventually wanted to make war on Germany, he would have had to attack Poland, who would have treaties with France and England. It seems possible Germany might have entered that war on the side of the West.
But Speer was not in charge of the economy in 1938, nor did the Germans ever mobilize their women to any extent, using slave labor for the most part. Economics and its immediate impact on military logistics, was important, and Hitler, for all his foolishness in many areas, was very sensitive to Germany's need for natural resources. He just assumed he could take what he wanted with military action and with Germany's earlier success it is easy to see why he thought he could. But more than underestimating Stalin, he underestimated the whole thing and assumed he could make it work. The Allied fleet, as in the First World War, was successful in strangling Germany, though the u-boats threatened to turn the tables in the see-saw battle of the Atlantic.
From Colonel David Glantz self-published "Red Army Ground Forces in June 1941" he points out the KV and T34 tanks at outbreak of war were so new that drivers had not been trained, or had only 3-5 hours training as some KV were received only 7-8 days before Germany attacked.They also lacked support. The Full strength 10th Tank division lost 307 of its 310 operational tanks "between June 22 and July 15...151 due to maintenance problems.
On June 24th near Raseiniai Lithuania, KV tanks rammed and ran over German recce lightly armored vehicles without firing a shot. "The Germans discovered the tanks had run out of fuel and ammunition and had been ordered to "ram" opposing German tanks. Moreover, the guns on the Soviet KVs had not even been bore-sighted prior to battle."
Here is a quote from Paine, Lauran (1984). "German Military Intelligence in World War II: The Abwehr." New York: Stein and Day. (About Adm Cananris)Prior to the invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941, Canaris disclosed details of the plan to his Polish mistress, Halina Szymanska, whom he knew to be in touch with Polish, and presumably therefore British, intelligence officers. Canaris was dismissed following the defection of Erich Vermehren and was arrested in the aftermath of the 20 July plot. He is believed to have been hanged at Flossenberg concentration camp in February 1945. After his death, rumors abounded about the extent of his contact with the Allies, but no credible evidence has emerged to support assertions that he held a wartime meeting with the British Secret Intelligence Service chief Stewart Menzies in Spain. In February 1940 GRU defector Walter Krivitsky claimed to MIS that Canaris has been on the Soviet payroll before the war, but again the allegation is unsubstantiated.Churchill tried to warn Stalin of Germany's impending attack. The incredible help the Russians got throughout the war in the form of intelligence was like something out of the twilight zone and the Germans still ran over them in the first years. Even when the Soviets knew what the Germans were going to do they couldn't even slow them down, much less stop them.
The Germans refused to believe their code could be broken and continued to use the same system. Breaking their code was critical to overcoming the uboats, too and the German navy kept up the "Rose Pattern." Canaris may have contributed to that. It did give them surprise when they attacked in the Ardennes in '44 because for that operation they used only locked-box messenger and secure comms, but even then they did not figure that it was because their code system was compromised.
This has been some very good reading, great great comments..
Howard,First off, operational intelligence was at times amazing. Granted some was enigma filtered through British intelligence, or unfiltered through the Soviet spy Cairncross, but the other sources also provided details but much of this came after Stalingrad started in August 1942, as I recall. Kursk was best example of this operational intelligence being used.
Secondly, in Carlson's book on Joe Rochefort, it mentioned that using radio intercept intelligence tactically not just difficult to decipher quickly enough, it was a bad idea as much of transmissions were from confused pilots or others who didn't have a good overall view of what was happening.
Sorry, hit send too early. Guess point is that just like sports even if you know the opposing team's game plan, they may adjust or even so they may just still have more talent to pull it off even with you prepared.
Thank you, Rory. Did Col Glantz attribute, more of less, such poor preparedness of the Russians to the purges?
By the way, being in possession of the enemy's ongoing operations plan did not come from nervous pilots or tactical radio intercept operations or spies.
Howard,Glantz references the purge and Finland but generally his work on Kursk in 1987 contains his theme that runs the course through many of his books I've read. This is that the Russians excelled at learning from past mistakes so that by the time of Kursk they had become the masters of war. Granted this is what all successful armies do, but time again and again Glantz points out their need to document fully and honestly their mistakes. Have to admit my impression of Stalinism is that you never wanted to be completely honest about a mistake you made, could be fatal to your health, but Glantz seems to really run with this idea of Russian rigorous study during the war based on the archives he uses.
Not sure if it was him or someone else, but I do recall argument the purge was actually beneficial to the Soviets since they had chance to build with younger officers who were more open to tactics brought on by the new technologies.
Again, while there is merit in that point, I think point might be made that purge actually scared the bejesus out of the remaining officers to point that they were too petrified to make any decisions ala that famous scene in one of the Zulu movies where the British troops are being massacred and the quartermaster in charge of ammunition won't release it without orders. I am sure we have all encountered such "by the book" morons before so can't say it is strictly Communist/Russian mentality!
Next questions:1. What influence did American and British lend lease have on Soviet War effort?
2. Why capture Moscow or Leningrad? Seriously, if you want breadbasket, oil, and an area that is relatively warmer, go SouthEast young German. What would have happened if they had gone south and just did modest diversions toward L/M?
3. Related to above---anyone read Bryan Fugate's two books on Barbarossa? Thoughts?
4. And--serious answers only---how many bottles of vodka could Stalin possibly have consumed on his infamous bender between June 22nd and July 2nd 1941?
Howard wrote: "By the way, being in possession of the enemy's ongoing operations plan did not come from nervous pilots or tactical radio intercept operations or spies."Howard, sorry, tried to separate out the two.
1. As I understood it, the access to operations plans did not come regularly and accurately until after spring 1942.
2. All sides developed radio intercept abilities to some degree, but ability to use that intelligence was somewhat ineffective for variety of reasons. My example was Carlson citing use at Coral Sea battles
3. Sides also realized that for operational plans there was quite a bit of deception being done on all sides. Glantz also covers the Soviet deceptions and I am sure if they went to such elaborate lengths similar to operation fortitude they mirrored that ability onto the Germans and probably naturally distrusted very good intelligence that did come into their hands. For example, Stalin supposedly dismissed many early warnings as British trick to save their hide.
Oh and in fall 1940 the French published series of "what went wrong" articles and they mentioned the plane that went down in Belgium with the German plans and how that was a beautiful deception by the Germans---Soviets probably read that same set of articles. Of course, it wasn't a deception but German paranoia led to switch to Manstein's plan.
Since the Russians killed every army and corps commander and quite a few division commanders, I think it would be hard to imagine it did not hurt Russian preparedness. The younger officers learned but not overnight. If you read "Georgi Zhukov's Greatest Battles" you will find it useless for any specific information about anything that happened, but you might keep reading it for the same reasons I did. The footnotes were hilarious. The editor inserted comments as to why such and such couldn't be mentioned because he was currently a high ranking leader in the party, and what the political situation was at the time, and all kinds of inside information that more than proves your point about the need not to admit mistakes and be darned careful about making accusations, even if provable.
In response to message 80, number 2: Stalin kept large forces around Moscow in '42 despite German moves to the south because he was sure it was a deception and that the Germans were going for Moscow again in 42. In response to your number 1, there are raging debates on other websites to which I have contributed several pages. While some of the participants seem to be intelligent, well read, and (no less importantly) well mannered, some are not any of these, to say the least.
Excellent discussion folks. I am enjoying reading them.The later points on intelligence is well made and is likely to have played some part.
I do wonder though how it was treated within Red Army Command by Stalin and others with their seemingly innate distrust of all outsiders or to not use (notably Stalin for personal and political purposes to manage or create situations). I may of course be thinking too deeply and this may not have happened. We have many well read people contributing here so I wondered if there was any evidence of the above?
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Geevee, Assisting Moderator British & Commonwealth Forces
(last edited Apr 09, 2015 03:09AM)
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On Rory's next points: For number 1, I believe it had some operationally but greater benefit was probably taken by the Russians from the technology/design and manufacturing insight they gained by operating and maintaining the kit. Edited to add that of course the US and GB were never given any due credit publicly for their support efforts on kit or intelligence.
The flip side is the influence it had on GB and USA. For the USA I believe it was not so great as the kit and convoys were going anyway (not in anyway discounting the US contribution to Arctic convoys).
For Britain it was greater based on scale and the closeness and worry of the deteriorating situation at home, in the East and the Desert. Churchill consciously areed to send aircraft, tanks, AA guns, lorries (trucks) and other items including medical kit, food and machinery when these were needed at home and abroad. There is domestic wartime propaganda on Britain supporting Russia as well as the mindset of sections of society seeing communism as a answer to many of the world's problems prior to post-1948.
I'm with Rory on point 2 but as many have said this was was ideological and during the planning of Barbarossa the Germans believed they had military might and tactics to best anyone. Once Hitler took overall command only his removal would have changed any direction; and I doubt much would have been done as they were then engaged and stuck in the mill.
Likewise on NCOs in the British Army Howard both in WWII and modern day. I agree with your comments on the importance of NCOs (as I know Aussie Rick/Happy and others do too). In my squadron (Chieftains and Challenger Is) our troops were commanded by a troop leader (2nd Lieutenant) with a troop sergeant and troop corporal (sometimes lance corporal or if we ran 4 tank troops).
The troop NCOs had the experience and in essence ensured the troop/squadron ran whereas the troop leader was a young soldier like the troopers (privates) and lance corporals.
Squadron HQ was a slightly different with the squadron leader - who I later gunned for - being a Major with a Sergeant and Corporal crewing the other tanks.
It is also worth stating that our officers pitched in with cooking, bombing up, cleaning weapons and maintenance. I respected my officers as much as my other crew mates and would certainly serve under them again if ever needed.
This make up and approach was something my regimental forebears would also be familiar with and was always something that evoked much discussion when the regimental association visited the regiment.
Folks I believe in replying to Howard's post about Russian tank commanders and his very interesting information on Russian views of the US during a visit to see a demonstration with the M1 I may have deleted the post inadvertently.I can only apologise to Howard for this error. I have tried to "find" the original post as a asst mod but cannot. I am very sorry and hope Howard will be able to re-post and also forgive the mistake.
Thank you for your kindness and courtesy. I have pretty much copied all my own postings because of my own past mistakes...until this one HA. I am pressed for time now but will recompose and send later. I appreciate the knowledge of all participants and their good will and interest.
Howard thank you for the generous response. Again I apologise for the error and also the extra effort I am putting you to.
Good posts and discussions going on here, well done to all those involved!
In regards to Stalin's purges prior to Barbarossa this book may be of interest to those who want to carry out some further reading. I have a copy but have failed to read it yet.
Stalin's Claws: From the Purges to the Winter War: Red Army Operations Before Barbarossa 1937-1941 by E.R. Hooton
agree re a very interesting discussionoverall highlights the lack of a strategic approach by Germany towards WW2 which in essence reflects the nature of the NAZI Gov and its divide and rule governing and administrative structure.
Cant remember who said it but quite a true comment "German military very good at a battle but not at a war"
This is rehash of my post that was deleted. (Response to hypothetical advantages to the Russians getting fresh material in their officer corps after the purges.) I had a couple of problems with the basic idea. First, while younger officers moved up, they took their old ideas with them, and also the point was made about the purges scaring the creeps out of all of them anyway. Moreover, the Soviets installed the Commissars, and that stifled a lot of initiative. Eventually Zhukov and Timoshenko earned Stalin’s trust. Stalin employed them in a Huntley-Brinkley mode with one planning the next big operation with STAVKA back in Moscow (that he would lead)with Stalin looking over their shoulder, while the other was up front supervising the current operation that he had previously planned. The "plan" was very centralized and there are plenty of examples of punishment for deviation. Again, not lots of room for new thought outside the sacred STAVKA.
My other main concern is that there is a problem with the Russians. I won’t try to name it, but it is there and appears in all sorts of forms from all different fields of endeavor. They just can’t make it work. It feels like a result of living in fear and suspicion for decades. My personal reference here is an experience at Fort Hood in the 80’s when Adm Crowe was Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. Russian Gen Akrimeov and a number of other high ranking Russian officers were invited to witness our M-1 tanks in live fire exercises. We were briefed afterward about what was said and learned. After the demonstration the Russians were offered lunch. They said their tanks had the same capabilities as ours and they could do all the same stuff (What else would they say?) But they tipped their hand. They wanted to eat lunch with our NCOs. They were very impressed with the non-coms.
You could see they were envious. In the Russian army every single tank was commanded by an officer. Even 40 years after WWII they still had no concept of how to build a professional NCO corps. I opine it is just the same idea of centralized control and thinking. The professionalism and competence of the NCO Corps was critical to success in all the Western armies, including the German. Interestingly, Akrimeov killed himself a few years later. We also enjoyed making a big deal about officers and enlisted eating the same food, not common in many European or Asian armies, at least in those days.
We saw how old the French generals of WWI were and since then we have liked our Generals young, relatively speaking. And a lot is invested in developing junior leadership both in officer and NCO ranks. During WWII the Russians were just trying to hang in there. Lessons were learned but they did not change their nature.
Anyway, as a retired Army officer, I look back and can say I was happiest when I could enable my NCOs, and they rarely let me down.
Some very good points raised and a very interesting insight into your experiences with modern day Russians and their problems, thanks for sharing Howard.
Here is an interesting passage from the book I'm currently reading; The Battle for Moscow which once again highlights the problems Germany faced in Russia and I think also shows why Germany never really had a chance in winning the war in the east:"Part of Army Group Centre's problem was the loss of Kesselring's Air Fleet 2 with Loerzer's II Air Corps, all of which had been reassigned to the Mediterranean. This left just Richthofen's VIII Air Corps, which after months of Persistent combat was in poor condition and failing to adapt to the winter weather. On 3 December, for example, only sixteen of Richthofen's aircraft could be launched and five days later just three would see service. The rapid decline of the Ostheer and the inability of the German war economy to replace its high rate of loss was, in every sense, matched by the weakening of the Luftwaffe."
Final comment from my book, here is a very interesting statement made by a German staff officer after the war:"Even Greiffenberg, at Army Group Centre, wrote after the war: 'The effect of climate in Russia is to make things impassable in the mud of Spring and autumn, unbearable in the heat of summer and impossible in the depths of winter. Climate in Russia is a series of natural disasters'."
'Aussie Rick' wrote: "Here is an interesting passage from the book I'm currently reading; The Battle for Moscow which once again highlights the problems Germany faced in Russia and I think also shows why Germany never r..."Once they lost the close air support, that was it..
That Russian CAS plane, cant remember its name, but reading about it kinda reminded me of our A-10..
'Aussie Rick' wrote: "The Ilyushin Il-2 Sturmovik:http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ilyushin..."
There we go The Flying Tank..
THE WORLD WAR TWO GROUP
Books mentioned in this topic
Armor and Blood: The Battle of Kursk, The Turning Point of World War II (other topics)Stalingrad: The City that Defeated the Third Reich (other topics)
Red Star Under the Baltic: A First-Hand Account of Life on Board a Soviet Submarine in World War Two (other topics)
Red Star Under the Baltic: A Firsthand Account of Life on Board a Soviet Submarine in World War Two (other topics)
War on the Eastern Front 1941-1945 (other topics)
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Authors mentioned in this topic
Jochen Hellbeck (other topics)Lee Trimble (other topics)
Hans-Ulrich Rudel (other topics)
E.R. Hooton (other topics)
Yaron Pasher (other topics)
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Another item that surprised me was that the German locomotive's had their water pipes on the outside...