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2017 - February - Theme Read on any WW2 Battle/Campaign from the Defeated Perspective
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Jonny
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Feb 02, 2017 06:16AM

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Thanks Jonny. It was a slim hope as it rarely gets a mention, which is a shame when losses compare to those of their fathers' actions in WWI battles.

Thanks for taking the time to type and post such detailed information on each chapter, really appreciate it.
I will try and get started on my theme book soon so I can join in.


Worth a go, and its sad that the efforts of individual units are going unnoticed. Sign of the confusion of the period I guess.
I can't remember if there was any mention of them in



D DAY Through German Eyes - The Hidden Story of June 6th 1944
It's a collection of interviews that the (father of the author) had with some German survivors of the landings. Interesting to read, but at the same time terrifying to hear what the Allied war machinery did to the German soldier.
Some things that have struck me so far:
(1) The influence of German propaganda on the minds of the soldier: they really believed they were fighting for a good cause, protecting a 'unified' Europe and could not understand why they were attacked
(2) The hope for the arrival of the Panzers, which never came
(3) The devastating effect that the use of napalm had on German columns and fortifications - a weapon that was untill then unknown to the Germans

There is a story that he had an affair with a woman and also her two daughters which makes you wonder how he had anytime for writing or politics. Never would happen in Australia !!!

At the same time? Kinky!


I haven't reached them yet but peeked ahead. The unit and fight are covered in two pages and there is no indication of a pitched battle or any holdup of the German attack. More like the 7th was a minor speedbump in the way of the panzers. But the account does talk to the severe losses, basically rifles and bayonets against armor.

Thanks for taking the time to type and post such d..."`
I picked it up for only $4 from an RSL sale last year and I am glad that is all I paid for it. At this point it is not a 1 star review, it not that terrible for all my complaining. 2 star and 3 if the author can restrain himself from here to the end. The info though is very informative. I have generally understood the patterns of attack and defence and the authors criticisms generally seem valid even with a couple of reservations from me. The lack of maps, or a detailed map is a fault. Books such as this need them but we do live in the world of google maps and that helps. This book though is for the likes of experience WW2 buffs such as yourself and the rest of the group and I would never recommend it to anyone with little in-depth knowledge of the European theatre. In fact even for my years of reading I have since joining this group realised that my WW2 reading tended to be a bit more macro than micro.

I read about that just now. I am so limited on WW1 so can hardly comment but revisionist history tends to generally fail to pass muster.

This chapter begins on the night of 21st/22nd May with the Germans in a “highly precarious” position. When fresh reinforcement began to arrive late afternoon on 21st they were amazed at how the Germans had held up. Various issues such as such the state of the airfield, shortage of ammo, lack of food for example. As the night went on a German commander, Von Der Heydte, was waken up and he witnessed the sea battle and also Freyberg witnessed it from his position. The Germans were depresses and the allies upbeat as their counter attack he thought that the counter attack was on. It had not started. Its “essential and complicated preliminary” had not even been finished. One of the (various) issues was that a stray German position was in the way and the on the ground commander Hargest held conference where it was decided to was too late to mop up. The author calls his “extreme restraint” “curious.” The author then writes of the plan that he is critical of. It is a bit too complicated to go into depth here but does make very interesting reading. The last sentence of this critique the author writes “But the whole essence of the planning was speed of execution. The hours of darkness were limited. Every minute of the night, before the Luftwaffe patrolled once again at tree top height, was priceless.” Superiority in the air has been my thought for long periods of this book.
The next few pages cover the counter attack and its trials and tribulations. It is a bit too complex for me to summarise in a sentence or two but the loss of some of the tanks in the counter attack was of great importance ultimately. And by the time day light came the Luftwaffe began to have an effect on the attackers. As the morning proceeded the counter attack commander Hargest actually became a bit more optimistic as he was under the impression that the Germans were trying to evacuate such was the amount of aircraft landing and taking off from the airfield. Unfortunately Hargest was mistaken. The landings were not troops being taken out of the conflict but reinforcement landing and being sent straight to the defence of the airfield. By the afternoon the NZers were becoming exhausted and began to lack ammo. Progress even with reinforcements and even at night fall was now difficult. The counter attack was now at a halt and further was required. This would take it into the 3rd day. The author called this the “last opportunity”.

This chapter begins on the night of 21st/22nd May with the Germans in a “highly precarious” position. When fresh reinforcement began to arrive late afternoon on 21..."
Is that for the Commonwealth forces, or you? Seriously, thanks for taking this one for the Team. Better luck in April!

"There is no doubt there is a vast difference between the treatment by the fighting soldier at the front and the administrative bastard at the back. I remember I found myself at a German gunnery colonel’s HQ. He looked at me and stood to attention and then gave me a bottle of beer. I also remember sitting on the pavement of a railway station, as we waited to be put into cattle trucks. A whole lot of German troops passed us, they were young lads – I don’t suppose they were more than eighteen or twenty. And somebody lobbed a cigarette into my lap. He did it quite secretly."
None of which, of course, applies to the Waffen SS, as the massacres at Wormhout and Le Paradis are covered, together with mention of a few less well documented incidents.
On to Chapter Three, dealing with the travails of 51st (Highland) Division. A whole different tone, looking forward to a bit of a change of pace.

Lol! All my complaints aside I am looking forward to ANZAC Fury now. This one has primed me somewhat. I am not going to specifically look for Beevor's book or others but if I see anything around on this subject I will give it serious consideration. Genuinely interesting.

As the author has mentioned previously he was of the opinion that Freyberg let his commanders down the line take too many decisions that caused the chain of command to become muddied. He writes that on the 3rd day of the Maleme campaign that the NZ official histories use the term that he ‘gave his order’ for the first time in relation to a fresh counter attack. Brigadier General Puttock went to inform Hargest of the new order but by this time Hargest had become very pessimistic, for various reasons such as exhaustion, with that his troops ability to perform. Puttock informed Freyberg who was reluctant to withdraw from the position so asked that 2 remaining battalions replace the 5th Brigade position. Puttock said that they could hardly do the job of the 5 that were there so the position was withdrawn from. The author says that this decision lost them the island inevitably. The author claims that Hargest underrated “the stamina and spirit” of his own brigade and the enemy threat. The next couple of pages cover in detail the positions of both sides as it was at that point in time.
Even as late as this 3rd day Churchill was sending messages to Wavell that Crete was to be held. He asked was it not possible “…..to send more tanks and thus reconquer any captured Aerodrome?” The author writes “That when Puttock and Hargest had convinced Freyberg that the final counter attack was not practable all hope of a clear cut victory went with it.”


I just finished the book and thought it was really good. But then I am more interested in individual's stories than I am large battles and campaigns. The book is a compilation of snippets soldiers' (and a few civilians') experiences gathered from diaries, letters and interrogations. In between the excerpts the author adds comments to put things in context.
The first half of the book is about German experiences and the second half Japanese experiences. The German ones seem more objective where the Japanese ones are often more spiritual and about the glory of dying for the Emperor. In both cases the Axis forces start off very optimistic and full of success. But soon they are both overwhelmed by Allied manpower and materiel. By the end illness and starvation are as much of a killer as combat is.
If personal accounts of WW2 are your thing I would recommend this book.


A good selection for the theme John!

I hope to start my book next week and I think I better grab one of my Crete books so we can compare notes :)


The 13th Chapter is called The Battle for Galatas and I searched for a map online with the Google map the best I could come up with but hardly useful for detail as to the battle.
But.........I then find this on the front page of the search.
http://www.my-crete-site.co.uk/galata...
After a very quick look who needs Clark's book with a very good site like this! Though a few years old and not updated for a while but looks good to me. Nice book store.

The 13th Chapter is called The Battle for Galatas and ..."
Excellent link!

Another short chapter.
With the withdrawal of the 5th Brigade from Maleme the airfield became fully operational for the German forces. BF 109 were added plus fresh troops and equipment. On May 24th Chiefs of Staff were still instant that Crete be held but Freyberg was no deeply pessimist. On the fifth day of the battle he was considering withdrawal.
“The Galatas heights were a naturally strong position” writes the author. He goes on to describe them and the defensive positions that 2 battalions of NZers held. Kippenberger took a tour of the positions and was of the opinion that it was in no condition to meet heavy attacks “…. that must come soon.” When the attack came the defenders put up such a strong defence that the assault was deferred until the next day as air attack was called in. The defence was strong enough for the German 5th Mountain Division war diary to praise the NZers. The NZers were able to keep the front intact for long periods due to the use of German airpower in other sectors of the front. With their equipment much strengthened the Germans were though able to attack with intense mortar and also several captured Bofors and 50mm anti-tank weapons. As the battle ensued 2 reserve NZ companies joined the fight as the situation was now considered critical. The defence was stabilised but reserves had been used. Any breaches in the line could not be filled. As the afternoon came the air attacks became very heavy. The line was broken in the centre. A new line was established with various withdrawals. The next few pages cover the German planned third assault and the very successful defence and retake of the positions previously lost.
At this point I am about 75% finished and all the fighting has been taking place in that north western sector. With 40 odd page to go I presume that the fall of Crete is now so rapid there is little to say by the author.

This chapter starts with the author giving 3 reasons there was no follow up as to the success at Galatas. 1. Exchange of messages between Freyberg and Puttick. 2. The disposition of the troops and the issues surrounding that. 3. That Freyberg and his senior commanders thought that a fight to the end was suicidal considering the overwhelming enemy air superiority. The author issues such as underrating the troops at the Allies disposal and the inability to send in fresh backups
I will quote this author at length as he discusses these issues further.
“But, equally, in considering Freyberg’s position, with the advantage of hindsight, we must remember that it was hard for him to conceive of the enemy pressure slackening. He could not see the battle in a strategic context – not at least from the enemy side – with the realisation that to their maximum effort hours were vital, before the demands of Operation Barbarossa reduced their air strength, compelled the withdrawal of their finest troops and caused the flow of supplies to dwindle”
Good old hindsight. If only Freyberg knew that Barbarossa was only a couple of weeks away.
At the point that the line on Galatas had been restored the commanders on the ground met to decide about a further counter attack. This they knew was required or Crete would be lost. Within this discussion it was decided that they did not have sufficient resources to take such an undertaking and with that decided to retreat back to the Daratsos line. The author makes criticism of that fact that Freyberg had not brought in various British battalions at least 24 hours prior so as to bolster what was the main front. At this point there is some confusion between the line commander and those further up the chain so when the battalions came into the line on 26th May but it was by then too late as the NZers were basically falling back and under heavy fire.
As the situation became desperate the allies began to fall back to Sfakia on the south coast. London asked that all aid possible be sent to the defence of the island but ground command were of the opinion that to do so would cause more loss of men and equipment than it was worth. The author writes of the various discussions and communications between the levels of command discussing this. He finishes the chapter with this final sentence that I will quote in full.
“Now would have to be paid the last instalments in the price of muddled strategy, neglected defence planning and tactical mistakes of the proceeding months and weeks. And the currency that this price was paid, as so many time in our.history, was the blood and heroism of the Navy”
Our history! I am very much not in favour of a book that is supposedly an in-depth study of a vital battle being chauvinistic in presentation even if for one tiny word. In fact a couple of things are coming to mind during my reading so far that the vast majority of the writing has been about the NZ and the Australian troops. I have had a look at wiki, for what that is worth, and notice approximately 15,000 troops from the UK and 11,000 Greeks. These hardly feature in this book. In fact the small discussion on the Greek troops was how committed the were to the defence of the island but little detail is given. The impression so far is that the NZ command was abysmal but the truth of the matter is that Freyberg (the buck stops here anyone) is British and was foisted on the NZ government. This sudden flag waiving stands out like a sore thumb to me. The lack of discussion in other areas is now noticeable.

This starts by explaining the retreat back to the south coast and the chaos. The column was defended by 2 Australian and 1 NZ and the author writes that as gallant as this was there were 2 other factors to take into account in consideration of the “freedom from serious interference” on the part of the Germans. One was the “…..continuing resistance of the 8th Greek Regiment” in positions around the south. The author writes of a battle between these Greek forces and battalions from the German 85th Mountain regiment. Details at the time of writing are sketchy as the only available sources are German and the Greeks have left no sources. Creforce was under the impression that this Greek force did not exist but that it was responsible for blocking a move that would have closed the road south to Sfakia. The 2nd factor was that the German attack never moved from its initial plan priorities. They were more interested in relieving both Rethymno and Heraklion still held by the allies.
The author writes of the evacuation that as far as I can ascertain was about 8,000 with a lot of these non-combatants. The 2/7 “stalwart” Australians never got on the evacuation boats due to the chaos on the beach. The commanding officer Walker later told of a discussion he had with a 7th Parachute Division colonel who said he did not understand why they had ever given ground nor attacked. “Neither can we” he replied.
The garrisons at both Rethymno and Heraklion both were now under heavy air attack. A fleet came out of Alexandria to also evacuate the forces at Heraklion. The evacuation took place under the cover of darkness without any German interference but on its way back to port came under heavy and disastrous attack. Several ships sunk with many casualties and the Imperial being the first and a major problem as the air cover from was lost due to is dislocation. Rethymno had no evacuation and the Australian defenders fought to the end. Many troops that had not surrendered headed for the hills.
Chapter 16. Epilogue.
Troops that made their way into the interior were initially ok and able to forage and get assistance of the locals. But winter came and clothes wore out. Eventually the Germans had control over the island and sent the Gestapo and SS in to mop up. Reprisals to the locals that sheltered the deserters, as the Germans called them, paid a heavy price. The author again writes in a manner that leaves me cold. He writes the following.
“But many of the soldiers, or their comrades, survived. In spite of everything, their spirit held, and below are their stories. Personal accounts as such as these have an equivocal place in military history. They disturb the narrative and have no bearing on the facts, and those that are concerned with the facts of the battle for Crete may read no further”. That is up for debate in terms of personal accounts and as to be allowed to read no further! The term pompous is in the back of my mind.
As said follows some interesting, some less so, personal accounts that tend to be anything from a short sentence to a couple of page long.
And that's that. Very interesting military event but poor delivery among other things.


I'll second that. You've made me want to read a book about Crete.... just not this one!

I learnt a hell of a lot on the specifics of the invasion of Crete but I am wondering if I am becoming a bit harsh in my fast approaching old age. I suspect that really focused writers, such as Evans just to use one example, are my barometer.

I picked it up for $4 aus, less than £2. I would not want to put you off for that price.
Yes I am keen to read more now. I have the next theme read lined up with Anzac Fury so looking forward to that. When I finish my novel I will tag onto this read Charles Jager and his bio Escape From Crete.


Lieutenant Wolff Rudiger Guercke, of Schutzenregiment 1, whose company had also seized a French bunker beside thé Meuse, was resting with his comrades in a house near the captured heights when they heard steps outside. The men leaped up, grabbing their guns. But when the door was flung open and the light switched on, it was not vengeful Frenchmen with machineguns as they had feared. Instead they were confronted by a beautiful Frenchwoman, dressed immaculately in a fur coat, stockings and high heels, and smelling of the most intoxicating perfume, who said she had come from Paris to visit her lover, a captain in the artillery. After bringing her into the house to be interrogated, the Germans struck up quite a jolly rapport with her and Guercke's report on this incident concluded: ‘She began to laugh at her predicament, and so did we. She had ended up with twenty-five soldiers instead of the one she had been expecting, and she certainly had more balls than her Frenchman who had fled.




A fantastic book. I hope you enjoy it. It gave me a new insight into Dunkirk.

"One receives a ticket with the name of the terminal point. The choice of the most suitable route, the different by-routes, shall be assigned to the traveller."
The author goes on to state:
"This task-oriented command and control method helped the German armoured units, despite having severely diminished armoured vehicle strength, to contain the Soviet's numerical superiority in infantry and tanks and at the same time inflict heavy losses on them."

"Realizing that the Seaforths would not surrender without a hard fight, the German commanders decided on an unorthodox tactic to convince them to lay down their arms. Central to the German plan was Colour Sergeant Edwin Fields, known as ‘Gracie’to his fellow Seaforths. After more than a month in the front lines, Gracie was exhausted and had finally been captured, along with a wounded sergeant and a young private. As a senior sergeant, he was selected for an unpleasant task. A machine-pistol-wielding German NCO appeared and forced him on to the front of a tank. With the German behind him, and a gun pointed at his back, the sergeant was driven towards the Seaforths’positions. Some reports have the tank advancing under the protection of a white flag. Other reports suggest no white flag was shown. In any event, as they reached a crossroads close to the forward positions, the tank was hit by a burst of gunfire. Still, the worried sergeant had no choice but to remain on his perch –if he stayed his own men might shoot him, but if he ran the Germans would certainly shoot him. Recognizing who it was seated on the front of the tank, the Seaforths held their fire, watching as their Gracie was driven ever closer. Eventually he was released and the tank withdrew towards the enemy lines. Reporting to the battalion HQ, the message he carried was simple. The Seaforths were in a hopeless situation. The rest of the division had surrendered and they were surrounded. If they did not stop resisting they would be bombed into oblivion. But surrender was not an option for the proud Seaforths. Sergeant Fields refused to return with the message to the Germans. Instead he chose to remain with his regiment as the decision was taken to split up and attempt to reach safety. During the attempted escape, Colour Sergeant Fields managed to reach the coast but was taken prisoner. While in captivity he was able to report the incident to General Fortune."

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dunkirk...
I remember there was one from the 50's I watched as a kid but can hardly recall it.


In case there was still any doubt in Nicholson’s mind, the War Office sent him the following message via HMS Wolfhound at 11:23 pm:
In spite of policy of evacuation given you this morning, fact that British forces in your area now under…[Fagalde], who has ordered no…evacuation, means you must comply for sake of Allied solidarity. Your role is therefore to hold on, harbour being for present of no importance to BEF…No reinforcements. You will select best position and fight on.
The next day, the Germans ask for the surrender of the Calais forces:
By then Nicholson’s morale had been buoyed up with the following stirring message from Anthony Eden, Secretary of State for War:
To Brigadier Nicholson. Defence of Calais to the utmost is of vital importance to our country as symbolizing our continued co-operation with France. The eyes of the Empire are upon the defence of Calais, and H. M. Government are confident you and your gallant regiments will perform an exploit worthy of the British name’
Shortly afterwards, Nicholson’s defiant reply to the German question, asking whether he would surrender, was delivered to Schaal: “The answer is no, as it is the British Army’s duty to fight as well as it is the German’s.’ The German response to this was a murderous artillery barrage fired into the Old Town.
Pretty tough to see your men be killed, wounded and captured for an esoteric reason like "solidarity" with an ally that was falling apart.


I have had this book on my shelf for a number of years but have always seemed to move something else ahead of it on the too be read pile. I have read quite a bit about the Battle of Midway and watched numerous documentaries, etc.
This book is written from the Japanese perspective by Fuchida who was one of the commanding pilots for Japanese naval aviation's greatest moments. Beginning with planning for the Pearl Harbor raid he and his co-author give a no holds barred honest look at Japanese planning, thinking, failures and yes, even fears.
A unique look at the situation rooms and combat information centers of the IJN. Really enjoying this read.


Excellent story Mike, thanks for sharing with the group.


Certainly on a Crete theme there! :)

"The Reiter-Regimente of the Kavallerie-Brigaden were equipped with a considerable number of Sturmgewehr 44 assault rifles and 8.8cm schwere Panzerbuchse 54 handheld rocket launchers (Panzershreck). The horses were only used by the Schwadrone while manoeuvring and just as the dragoons of the previous ages did, they usually fought 'off the horse'. The Kavallerie-Brigaden were swift and of great firepower, and supported by their own assault guns and armoured personnel carriers they paid off excellently on the Eastern Front."
The 8.8cm R PzB 54 (Panzershreck):
http://www.bergflak.com/pshistory.html


Certainly on a Crete theme there! :)"
Yes. And next theme as well. I might as well immerse my self for a couple of months and they are all sitting on the book shelf after all.
What I read in the previous book is covered in a very short couple of pages, good, as the story is the authors story. In fact after a few pages the story fast moves to the retreat to Sfakia.
I am interested in the use of "the absence of our Royal Air Force" (my italics) a couple of times as if sarcastic when describing the Luftwaffe attacks on the retreating columns. A bitter couple of sentences are worth quoting.
"Like a crowd pushing out of a football ground, a Cypriot labour battalion in British uniform streams out of a side road and pink faced pommy conscripts, with cushy jobs in non-combatant units like Mobile Laundry, Canteen and pay Corps, who should have been evacuated in the weeks before the fighting began, swell the column and clog the narrow road.
These are the pigeon-chested children of the Great Depression grown into men too puny to turn into fighting soldiers, whose packs and rifles are already an encumbrance. 'Useless mouths' Churchill called them; Freyberg 'odds and sods.'"


"There was dense fog when the 223rd Cavalry Regiment launched its attack. Suddenly, two M4A2 tanks of the 6th Company/9th Guards Tank Brigade, that had lost their way in the fog, opened fire on them. What is more, the crew were drunk and the Soviet artillery was forced to knock out one of the tanks. The cavalry regiment lost four soldiers in this peculiar friendly fire."


Certainly on a Crete theme there! :)"
Y..."
I came across this in

"The dependent disaster which resulted from it [The Greek Campaign} , the loss of Crete to an airborne assault, has by contrast stimulated several historians to fine achievement - including Anthony Beevor, Alan Clark and I. Stewart."

"The dependent disaster which resulted from it [The Greek Campaign} , the loss of Crete to an airborne assault, has by contrast stimulated several historians to fine achievement - including Anthony Beevor, Alan Clark and I. Stewart."
"
The Stewart book has one review on Goodreads. I will grab if I see it around.

Herr Bergmann claims he was part of a crew intending to fire an experimental ground to air missile called Taifun B that could deliver a mixture of oxygen and coal dust into the sky above enemy troop concentrations and then ignited by a second volley of incendiary rockets. I tried to find any reference to this on the internet, but couldn't find anything.
He claims it was intended to be used on the armour concentration that was assembled for operation Cobra, only to be cancelled in the last minute, due to an artillery bombardment. After that, it was decided not to further develop this weapon.
Perhaps one of you have ever heard of such a German weapon?

I see what you mean! Maybe this http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopi...

Books mentioned in this topic
D DAY Through German Eyes - The Hidden Story of June 6th 1944 (other topics)D DAY Through German Eyes - The Hidden Story of June 6th 1944 (other topics)
Firestorm Hamburg: The Facts Surrounding the Destruction of a German City, 1943 (other topics)
Battle of Hamburg: Allied Bomber Forces Against a German City in 1943 (other topics)
Battle of Hamburg: Allied Bomber Forces Against a German City in 1943 (other topics)
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Authors mentioned in this topic
Holger Eckhertz (other topics)Holger Eckhertz (other topics)
Martin Caidin (other topics)
Keith Lowe (other topics)
Norbert Számvéber (other topics)
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