Ming Quotes

“As Wang Shouren, at the time an official in the Ministry of Works and later a major intellectual figure in the development of Ming interpretations of Confucianism, put it optimistically in a memorial on border security in 1500, "If I am sufficient, then the enemy becomes increasingly exhausted; if I am flourishing, then the enemy declines; if I am strong and vigorous, the enemy is
increasingly bent, weak; if I am rested, then the enemy is increasingly exhausted;
if I am strengthened, then the enemy is increasingly empty and weak; if I am
sharp, then the enemy is increasingly dulled, and ineffectual "(Wang Shouren
MCZY: 167).”
― Alastair Iain Johnstonohnston

“As Wang Shouren, at the time an official in the Ministry of Works and later a major intellectual figure in the development of Ming interpretations of Confucianism, put it optimistically in a memorial on border security in 1500, "If I am sufficient, then the enemy becomes increasingly exhausted; if I am flourishing, then the enemy declines; if I am strong and vigorous, the enemy is increasingly bent, weak; if I am rested, then the enemy is increasingly exhausted;
if I am strengthened, then the enemy is increasingly empty and weak; if I am
sharp, then the enemy is increasingly dulled, and ineffectual "(Wang Shouren
MCZY: 167).”
― Alastair Iain Johnston, Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History

“The Chinese case, then, suggests a skeptical attitude toward the claims of both those who suggest there are vast and obvious differences between strategic cultures across states (like most who use the term), and those who suggest that symbolic strategy plays an important role in framing strategic options and excluding alternatives. The former take symbolic strategy too literally and too seriously—indeed, they do not recognize its symbolic status at all—and place far too much explanatory power on the side of a strategic language or discourse that may well be disconnected from the deeper argument structures behind policy preferences. The latter may exaggerate the constraining effects of this symbolic strategy because of their emphasis on the political instrumentality of strategic language. It may well be, of course, that the constraining effects of symbolic strategy increase in political systems where attentive publics do play at least some role in legitimating or acquiescing to the strategic choices of the political elite (i.e., in liberal democracies). But this was not the case in Ming China.”
― Alastair Iain Johnston, Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History

“But it seems fairly evident that the operative Chinese strategic culture does not differ radically from key elements in the Western realpolitik tradition. Indeed, the Chinese case might be classified as a hard realpolitik sharing many of the same tenets about the nature of the enemy and the efficacy of violence as advocates of nuclear war-fighting on both sides in the Cold War, or late nineteenth century social Darwinian nationalists.7 While it does not represent the breadth or complexity of the realist tradition of statecraft, hard realpolitik is in essence one of the three Western traditions in international relations as identified by Martin Wight (the others being revolutionism and rationalism) (Wight 1991: 220-21). It is characterized by positions at the high end of the three dimensions that comprise the central paradigm of a strategic culture (see fig. 4.2)”
― Alastair Iain Johnston, Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History