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deliberately used in negotiations.
when they encounter an implausible number, they automatically bring to mind considerations that would reduce its implausibility.
excessive coherence: we form coherent impressions quickly and are slow to change them.
Confirmation bias—the same tendency that leads us, when we have a prejudgment, to disregard conflicting evidence altogether—
made us assign less importance than we should to subsequent data.
halo e...
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general, we jump to conclusions, then stick to them.
our interpretation of it are likely to be distorted, at least to some extent, to fit our initial snap judgment.
All three types of biases can, of course, produce statistical bias. They can also produce noise.
Substitution can also be a source of occasion noise.
Prejudgments also produce both bias and noise.
individual differences in biases can cause massive system noise. Of course, the system can also be biased to the extent that most or all judges are biased similarly.
excessive coherence can produce either bias or noise, depending on whether the sequence of information and the meaning assigned to it are identical for all (or most) judges.
positive halo will result in a shared error: a bias.
many complex decisions require compiling information that arrives in an essentially random order.
Excessive coherence means that these random variations will produce random distortions in the final judgments. The effect will be system noise.
suggests that anything that reduces psychological biases will improve judgment.
we should resist the urge to blame every error on unspecified ‘biases.’”
“When we substitute an easier question for the one we should be answering, errors are bound to occur.
“Prejudgments and other conclusion biases lead people to distort evidence in favor of their initial position.”
form impressions quickly and hold on to them even when contradictory information comes in.
“Psychological biases cause statistical bias if many people sh...
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people differ in their biases. In those cases, psychological biases ...
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elementary example of matching.
your task is to find a value on the judgment scale that matches your mood or experience.
extraordinary versatility of matching, which is particularly obvious in judgments about people.
presence of conflicting cues characterizes complex judgments, in which we expect to find a lot of noise.
relatively simple judgments—especially those made on intensity scales.
Some of the scales on which we express judgments are qualitative:
values of the scale are not ordered:
quantitative intensity scales.
judgments on more abstract scales,
question “Which is more?” can be answered about any pair of values on the same dimension.
express your appreciation of a restaurant by comparing it to the length of
this request would strike you as quite bizarre but not at all infeasible.
meaning of words like large and small depends entirely on a frame of reference.
intuitive prediction
substitution of an easy question for a difficult one.
The optimal prediction must lie between these two extremes of perfect knowledge and zero knowledge.
These examples of matching predictions are more likely than not to end in disappointment.
(The technical term for such prediction errors is that they are nonregressive, because they fail to take into account a statistical phenomenon called regression to the mean.)
taking the outside view means anchoring your prediction on the average outcome.
Our limited ability to distinguish categories on intensity scales constrains the accuracy of the matching operation.
potentially important source of noise.
is a genuine limit on people’s ability to assign distinct labels to stimuli on a dimension, and that limit is around seven labels.
The matching operation is a versatile tool of fast, System 1 thinking and the core of many intuitive judgments, but it is crude.
finer distinctions by hierarchical categorization.
Categorization is not under voluntary control when you are in the fast-thinking mode.
Our ability to compare cases is much better than our ability to place them on a scale.
Explicit comparisons between objects of judgment support much finer discriminations than do ratings of objects evaluated one at a time.
