Military Intervention and Development Aid - Lessons for the Department of Defense, USAID and World Bank
Development Aid and Military Intervention
- by Paul F Davis -
info @PaulFDavis.com
http://www.PaulFDavis.com
The ‘close affinity between recipients of aid and the security concerns of donors’ (Rudbeck) ensures the success of neither. Arms ‘shipped from France to Rwanda, in contravention of a UN arms embargo’ (Uvin 97), led to the genocide that claimed 1.2 million lives. ‘Around 40 percent of Africa’s military spending is inadvertently financed by aid’ (Collier 103) which has often proven to be dysfunctional and susceptible to revert to conflict (Collier 132).
‘External military guarantees’ against coups and the formation of internal protection rackets have proven successful and far less costly (Collier 133-134), assuming UN peacekeepers, Dutch, and French military troops when called upon by developing countries to intervene are willing to fight and show themselves able soldiers (Collier 127,129 and Power 333).
As U.S. failures in Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq have proven (and U.S. General Petraeus has said), wars cannot be fought, nor won ‘through military means alone’ (Sachs 217). President Bush himself recognized: “I don’t think you can win it [the war on terrorism]…” (Sachs 215). Roosevelt rightly sought to defend the ‘four freedoms’ -- from fear and want, of speech and belief (Sachs 216).
The military-industrial-complex and U.S. war machine that exploits the ‘vagueness of war’ (De Waal 254) to pursue its aims, must recognize militaristic ‘confrontation will only nurture intolerance’ (De Waal 257).
Throughout the Islamic world intellectual leadership, creativity, and courage is needed to nonviolently confront jihadist Islamists and intellectual derelicts that misinterpret and use religion as a tool to control, kill, and thwart the freedom of expression and societal progress.
Tony Blair said ‘poverty and frustration could breed terrorism’ (De Waal 232). The U.S. therefore must learn how to uphold the dignity of individuals and nations, before endeavoring to liberate them from oppressors and uplift them with benefits of aid. Benefits of U.S. aid have often been ‘purchased at an excessive political and psychological cost to both lenders and borrowers. The critical question is whether the transfer of wealth between nations can be made compatible with human dignity…’ (Fulbright 225).
‘The way in which the gift, or loan, is provided’ (227) can disrupt or preserve human dignity. The Americans lectured and humiliated the Cambodians, whereas the Chinese upheld their esteem despite their weaknesses. Exhorting fellow Americans, Senator Fulbright warned: ‘Extended in the wrong way, generosity can be perceived by its intended beneficiary as insulting and contemptuous’ (227).
Internal ‘turf battles’ (Cooper) at U.S. Aid disrupting the flow of charitable contributions to the needy abroad must not be permitted to hinder aid. Internal rivalries, partisan bickering, differing philosophies of diplomacy, ideological interests, and corporate constituents should neither get in the way, nor slow the distribution of strategic aid to the poor in developing countries.
Douglas B. Wilson, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, confirmed these internal "turf battles" occurring at the U.S. State Dept. and desires to bring in a new generation to connect on a deeper cross-cultural level with those abroad we seek to serve. Yet it will take "a long time until politics will permit" (Wilson) a change, since nepotism in Washington appears to remain an obstacle.
Perhaps this explains why President Obama chose former Dallas Mayor Ron Kirk for the job of U.S. trade representative, despite the fact Mr. Kirk ‘doesn't have a background as a trade negotiator’ according to the Wall Street Journal (Davis and Meckler).
Aiding developing countries requires knowledge of their struggles, willingness to listen and study the issues, humility to put our agenda aside, and patience to act wisely and gain credibility. “Certainty is not in itself an asset; that depends on whether what one is certain about is actually true” (Albright 283). The Rwandan army fooled the world for months, while it imprisoned ‘intellectuals, priests, teachers, businessmen, and opponents to the regime’ (Uvin 64).
‘Predicting human behavior is an uncertain art even after the most thorough preparation’ (Odell 109-110). ‘Real diplomats’ achieve development abroad by expanding the pie (14-15). ‘In international economic bargaining, a mixed strategy will gain more than a strict distributive strategy under some conditions. …Strict power-and-security thinking alone is too simple. …Sticking rigidly to a preconceived plan and failing to learn during the process could cost a negotiator missed opportunities’ (155,202,206).
Effective leaders recognize a mixed development strategy that combines all of our strengths gains more than overly simplistic and narrow minded strict power-and-security thinking. U.S. Army General Abizaid warned that “unless the State Department devoted more people and money to developing Iraq’s government and economy, the surge wouldn’t work.” (Cloud & Jaffe 247)
Governance and economics were the State Department’s turf, but no matter how hard they tried without sufficient funding their proposed reconstruction and development projects in each of the eighteen Iraq provinces would not be fulfilled. While the Pentagon had a half-trillion-dollar-a-year budget to work with, the Bush administration’s ‘minimalist approach’ limited funding for the State Department and thereby what they could do (Cloud & Jaffe 203-205).
Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld controlled the flow of information, keeping the State Department in the dark to prevent them from meddling with his plans. An ‘expert bureaucratic infighter’ Rumsfeld isolated (191) and essentially crippled the State Department. When former CIA director Robert Gates replaced Rumsfeld at the Pentagon, he called for a bigger budget for the State Department (238,272).
The effectiveness of aid prior to reform ‘depends on how it is given’ (Collier 117). Among the key variables proven to help failing states succeed is ‘governance conditionality’ (110) with accountability to citizens and ‘money spent’ wisely on ‘technical assistance’ (115) for ‘project supervision’ (118). ‘Supervision costs money’ (118), without which agency budgets tend to get misdirected, bureaucracy mismanaged, and efficiency misplaced.
When General Casey asked for advisors from the State Department to help the new Maliki government in Iraq, six days after the Maliki government was already formed Secretary of State Condi Rice offered a paltry sum of forty-eight advisors. ‘Colonel Hix, who had done a major strategy assessment for Casey months earlier, had estimated that it would take as many as 10,000 people to mount a reconstruction effort’ (Cloud & Jaffe 228-229). General Casey became perturbed and frustrated with the State Department’s inability to produce when needed.
The above scenario confirms ‘in the parlance of the agencies, technical assistance is supply-driven rather than demand-driven…without much regard to political opportunities’ (Collier 115). Hence an opportunity to reshape Iraq was missed by the U.S. because of an inadequate supply of supervisors ready to provide technical assistance when called upon.
The Defense Department’s failure to have a clear postwar plan prior to invading and occupying Iraq, the State Department’s ‘sabotaging democracy’ by playing favorites preferring secular over religious parties when disbursing material assistance, and attempting to ‘arrange outcomes’ were tragic errors that destroyed U.S. credibility, raised suspicions, and thwarted security (Albright 170,176-178).
Colonel Lee Donne Olvey’s confession: “We followed a policy of unabashed elitism” (Cloud & Jaffe 52) is an indictment against the failed U.S. military intervention and aid operation in Iraq during the second Bush administration. These painful lessons learned must be remembered and never repeated.
Bibliographic References
Albright, Madeleine. The Mighty & The Almighty: Reflections on America, God, and World Affairs. New York: Harper Perennial, 2007. Print.
Cloud and Jaffe, David and Greg. The Fourth Star: Four Generals And Their Epic Struggle For The Future of The United States Army. New York: The Rivers Press, 2009. Print.
Collier, Paul. The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries Are Failing and What Can Be Done About It. New York: Oxford University Press, 2007. Print.
Cooper, Helene. "Economic Crisis Sidelines Fate of the World’s Poorest." New York Times. NY Times, 10 Nov. 2010. Web. .
Davis, Bob, and Laura Meckler. "Obama's Picks Show Split on Trade - WSJ.com." Business News & Financial News - The Wall Street Journal - Wsj.com. 9 Dec. 2008. Web. 14 Feb. 2011. .
De Waal, Alex. Islamism and Its Enemies in the Horn of Africa. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2004. Print.
Fulbright, J. William. The Arrogance of Power. New York: Random House, 1966. Print.
Odell, John. Negotiating the World Economy. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000.
"Petraeus Sees No Solution from Military Alone - Washington Times." Washington Times - Politics, Breaking News, US and World News. Web. 14 Feb. 2011. .
Power, Samantha. A Problem From Hell: America and the Age of Genocide. New York: Harper Perennial, 2007. Print.
Rudbeck, Jens. Developing Countries in the Global Economy. Syllabus: NYU, Spring 2011.
Uvin, Peter. Aiding Violence: The Development Enterprise in Rwanda. West Hartford, CT: Kumarian Press, 1998. Print.
Wilson, Doug. "Public Diplomacy Can Help Restore Lost U.S. Credibility." Center for American Progress Action Fund. 2008. Web. 14 Feb. 2011. .
Wilson, Douglas B. Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, speaking at NYU's School of Continuing Professional Studies on November 15, 2011 to Professor Judy Siegal's class confirmed the existence of internal "turf battles" at the U.S. State Department.
info @PaulFDavis.com
http://www.PaulFDavis.com
Military and foreign aid adviser Paul F Davis serving governments worldwide.
- by Paul F Davis -
info @PaulFDavis.com
http://www.PaulFDavis.com
The ‘close affinity between recipients of aid and the security concerns of donors’ (Rudbeck) ensures the success of neither. Arms ‘shipped from France to Rwanda, in contravention of a UN arms embargo’ (Uvin 97), led to the genocide that claimed 1.2 million lives. ‘Around 40 percent of Africa’s military spending is inadvertently financed by aid’ (Collier 103) which has often proven to be dysfunctional and susceptible to revert to conflict (Collier 132).
‘External military guarantees’ against coups and the formation of internal protection rackets have proven successful and far less costly (Collier 133-134), assuming UN peacekeepers, Dutch, and French military troops when called upon by developing countries to intervene are willing to fight and show themselves able soldiers (Collier 127,129 and Power 333).
As U.S. failures in Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq have proven (and U.S. General Petraeus has said), wars cannot be fought, nor won ‘through military means alone’ (Sachs 217). President Bush himself recognized: “I don’t think you can win it [the war on terrorism]…” (Sachs 215). Roosevelt rightly sought to defend the ‘four freedoms’ -- from fear and want, of speech and belief (Sachs 216).
The military-industrial-complex and U.S. war machine that exploits the ‘vagueness of war’ (De Waal 254) to pursue its aims, must recognize militaristic ‘confrontation will only nurture intolerance’ (De Waal 257).
Throughout the Islamic world intellectual leadership, creativity, and courage is needed to nonviolently confront jihadist Islamists and intellectual derelicts that misinterpret and use religion as a tool to control, kill, and thwart the freedom of expression and societal progress.
Tony Blair said ‘poverty and frustration could breed terrorism’ (De Waal 232). The U.S. therefore must learn how to uphold the dignity of individuals and nations, before endeavoring to liberate them from oppressors and uplift them with benefits of aid. Benefits of U.S. aid have often been ‘purchased at an excessive political and psychological cost to both lenders and borrowers. The critical question is whether the transfer of wealth between nations can be made compatible with human dignity…’ (Fulbright 225).
‘The way in which the gift, or loan, is provided’ (227) can disrupt or preserve human dignity. The Americans lectured and humiliated the Cambodians, whereas the Chinese upheld their esteem despite their weaknesses. Exhorting fellow Americans, Senator Fulbright warned: ‘Extended in the wrong way, generosity can be perceived by its intended beneficiary as insulting and contemptuous’ (227).
Internal ‘turf battles’ (Cooper) at U.S. Aid disrupting the flow of charitable contributions to the needy abroad must not be permitted to hinder aid. Internal rivalries, partisan bickering, differing philosophies of diplomacy, ideological interests, and corporate constituents should neither get in the way, nor slow the distribution of strategic aid to the poor in developing countries.
Douglas B. Wilson, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, confirmed these internal "turf battles" occurring at the U.S. State Dept. and desires to bring in a new generation to connect on a deeper cross-cultural level with those abroad we seek to serve. Yet it will take "a long time until politics will permit" (Wilson) a change, since nepotism in Washington appears to remain an obstacle.
Perhaps this explains why President Obama chose former Dallas Mayor Ron Kirk for the job of U.S. trade representative, despite the fact Mr. Kirk ‘doesn't have a background as a trade negotiator’ according to the Wall Street Journal (Davis and Meckler).
Aiding developing countries requires knowledge of their struggles, willingness to listen and study the issues, humility to put our agenda aside, and patience to act wisely and gain credibility. “Certainty is not in itself an asset; that depends on whether what one is certain about is actually true” (Albright 283). The Rwandan army fooled the world for months, while it imprisoned ‘intellectuals, priests, teachers, businessmen, and opponents to the regime’ (Uvin 64).
‘Predicting human behavior is an uncertain art even after the most thorough preparation’ (Odell 109-110). ‘Real diplomats’ achieve development abroad by expanding the pie (14-15). ‘In international economic bargaining, a mixed strategy will gain more than a strict distributive strategy under some conditions. …Strict power-and-security thinking alone is too simple. …Sticking rigidly to a preconceived plan and failing to learn during the process could cost a negotiator missed opportunities’ (155,202,206).
Effective leaders recognize a mixed development strategy that combines all of our strengths gains more than overly simplistic and narrow minded strict power-and-security thinking. U.S. Army General Abizaid warned that “unless the State Department devoted more people and money to developing Iraq’s government and economy, the surge wouldn’t work.” (Cloud & Jaffe 247)
Governance and economics were the State Department’s turf, but no matter how hard they tried without sufficient funding their proposed reconstruction and development projects in each of the eighteen Iraq provinces would not be fulfilled. While the Pentagon had a half-trillion-dollar-a-year budget to work with, the Bush administration’s ‘minimalist approach’ limited funding for the State Department and thereby what they could do (Cloud & Jaffe 203-205).
Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld controlled the flow of information, keeping the State Department in the dark to prevent them from meddling with his plans. An ‘expert bureaucratic infighter’ Rumsfeld isolated (191) and essentially crippled the State Department. When former CIA director Robert Gates replaced Rumsfeld at the Pentagon, he called for a bigger budget for the State Department (238,272).
The effectiveness of aid prior to reform ‘depends on how it is given’ (Collier 117). Among the key variables proven to help failing states succeed is ‘governance conditionality’ (110) with accountability to citizens and ‘money spent’ wisely on ‘technical assistance’ (115) for ‘project supervision’ (118). ‘Supervision costs money’ (118), without which agency budgets tend to get misdirected, bureaucracy mismanaged, and efficiency misplaced.
When General Casey asked for advisors from the State Department to help the new Maliki government in Iraq, six days after the Maliki government was already formed Secretary of State Condi Rice offered a paltry sum of forty-eight advisors. ‘Colonel Hix, who had done a major strategy assessment for Casey months earlier, had estimated that it would take as many as 10,000 people to mount a reconstruction effort’ (Cloud & Jaffe 228-229). General Casey became perturbed and frustrated with the State Department’s inability to produce when needed.
The above scenario confirms ‘in the parlance of the agencies, technical assistance is supply-driven rather than demand-driven…without much regard to political opportunities’ (Collier 115). Hence an opportunity to reshape Iraq was missed by the U.S. because of an inadequate supply of supervisors ready to provide technical assistance when called upon.
The Defense Department’s failure to have a clear postwar plan prior to invading and occupying Iraq, the State Department’s ‘sabotaging democracy’ by playing favorites preferring secular over religious parties when disbursing material assistance, and attempting to ‘arrange outcomes’ were tragic errors that destroyed U.S. credibility, raised suspicions, and thwarted security (Albright 170,176-178).
Colonel Lee Donne Olvey’s confession: “We followed a policy of unabashed elitism” (Cloud & Jaffe 52) is an indictment against the failed U.S. military intervention and aid operation in Iraq during the second Bush administration. These painful lessons learned must be remembered and never repeated.
Bibliographic References
Albright, Madeleine. The Mighty & The Almighty: Reflections on America, God, and World Affairs. New York: Harper Perennial, 2007. Print.
Cloud and Jaffe, David and Greg. The Fourth Star: Four Generals And Their Epic Struggle For The Future of The United States Army. New York: The Rivers Press, 2009. Print.
Collier, Paul. The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries Are Failing and What Can Be Done About It. New York: Oxford University Press, 2007. Print.
Cooper, Helene. "Economic Crisis Sidelines Fate of the World’s Poorest." New York Times. NY Times, 10 Nov. 2010. Web. .
Davis, Bob, and Laura Meckler. "Obama's Picks Show Split on Trade - WSJ.com." Business News & Financial News - The Wall Street Journal - Wsj.com. 9 Dec. 2008. Web. 14 Feb. 2011. .
De Waal, Alex. Islamism and Its Enemies in the Horn of Africa. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2004. Print.
Fulbright, J. William. The Arrogance of Power. New York: Random House, 1966. Print.
Odell, John. Negotiating the World Economy. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000.
"Petraeus Sees No Solution from Military Alone - Washington Times." Washington Times - Politics, Breaking News, US and World News. Web. 14 Feb. 2011. .
Power, Samantha. A Problem From Hell: America and the Age of Genocide. New York: Harper Perennial, 2007. Print.
Rudbeck, Jens. Developing Countries in the Global Economy. Syllabus: NYU, Spring 2011.
Uvin, Peter. Aiding Violence: The Development Enterprise in Rwanda. West Hartford, CT: Kumarian Press, 1998. Print.
Wilson, Doug. "Public Diplomacy Can Help Restore Lost U.S. Credibility." Center for American Progress Action Fund. 2008. Web. 14 Feb. 2011. .
Wilson, Douglas B. Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, speaking at NYU's School of Continuing Professional Studies on November 15, 2011 to Professor Judy Siegal's class confirmed the existence of internal "turf battles" at the U.S. State Department.
info @PaulFDavis.com
http://www.PaulFDavis.com
Military and foreign aid adviser Paul F Davis serving governments worldwide.
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