Fastiggi on Capital Punishment and the Change to the Catechism, Part I

In 2018,Pope Francis revised the section of the Catechismof the Catholic Church dealing with the topic of capital punishment, sothat it now states that “the death penalty is inadmissible because it is anattack on the inviolability and dignity of the person.”  Flatly to assert that capital punishment is“an attack on the inviolability and dignity of the person” might be read asimplying that the death penalty is intrinsicallyevil, or immoral of its very natureand not just under the wrong circumstances. Such a claim would contradict scripture and two millennia of consistentmagisterial teaching.  For this reason,the revision has been criticized as at least badly formulated, even by someCatholic thinkers who support the abolition of capital punishment.  For example, after the revision wasannounced, an appealwas made by forty-five prominent Catholic academics and clergy to the cardinalsof the Catholic Church to call upon the pope clearly to reaffirm traditionalteaching on the subject.

In afour-part series of articles titled “CapitalPunishment and Magisterial Authority” at the website Where Peter Is, theologian RobertFastiggi criticizes those who have criticized the revision.  He cites the appeal, specifically, as amongthe criticisms that he objects to.  Inthis article and in a follow-up to come, I respond to Fastiggi’sarguments.  I apologize for the length,but Fastiggi’s series is itself quite long and addresses a variety of complexissues.  In this first part, I addresswhat Fastiggi has to say about the obligations of theologians and Catholics ingeneral vis-à-vis the teaching of the Magisterium.  In the follow-up, I will address what he saysabout scripture and the teaching of previous popes. 

I want tosay at the outset that while I think Fastiggi makes serious errors of judgment,I have nothing but respect for him as a scholar, a gentleman, and a loyalCatholic.  In my experience, too manydefenders of the revision refuse to address or even to bother reading what Iand other critics have written on the topic, but prefer to attack straw men andattribute bad motives.  Fastiggi is notguilty of that.  Too many defenders ofthe revision are also woefully ignorant of the history of the Church’s teachingon capital punishment and of the relevant theological literature.  Fastiggi, by contrast, knows it well, even ifI disagree with his interpretations of the relevant evidence.  I also admire Fastiggi’s loyalty to the pope,even though I think it blinds him to grave deficiencies in some of Pope Francis’swords and actions.  For I think thisloyalty is clearly motivated by love of the Church and the papacy.  I do not see in it any of theself-righteousness and lack of charity and basic fairness that is evident inthe work of too many of Pope Francis’s other defenders.  Finally, Fastiggi is a good sport.  He and I have tangled over this issue manytimes, and occasionally our exchanges have been somewhat heated.  But he has always shown an admirable even temper.

On toFastiggi’s series, then.  In partI, he writes: “Who has the authority to resolve the dispute?  The answer, of course, is the Magisterium,which consists of the Catholic bishops in communion with the successor of Peter.”  And again: “Who has the authority todetermine the context, meaning, and ongoing applicability of Scripture?  It is the Magisterium of the Church not agroup of scholars and clerics.”

So far sogood.  I know of no participant in thedebate over the change to the Catechism who denies any of this.  Furthermore, I know of no participant whodenies that “religious submission of mind and will must be shown in a specialway to the authentic magisterium of the Roman Pontiff, even when he is notspeaking ex cathedra,” in the wordsof LumenGentium.

The reasonit is nevertheless legitimate for Catholics to debate the revision to theCatechism is that the Church herself acknowledges a qualification on the dutyto assent to non-infallible magisterial statements, and it is a qualificationthat clearly applies in this case.  Thequalification is recognized in the instruction DonumVeritatis issued during the pontificate of Pope St. John PaulII, and it has also been affirmed repeatedly in the tradition of the Church,including in the teaching of St. Thomas Aquinas.  Indeed, Pope Francis himself has acknowledgedthe legitimacy of certain kinds of critical discussion of magisterialstatements.  I have discussed Aquinas’steaching on this matter at length inan earlier article, and the teaching of Donum Veritatis and the rest of the tradition inanother.  I have discussedPope Francis’s statements inyet another. 

The teaching of St. Thomas

I can’trepeat here everything said in those earlier articles, but a few key pointswill suffice for present purposes.  Let’sbegin with Aquinas’s teaching on the matter, the most important sources forwhich are the Summa Theologiae andhis Commentary on Saint Paul’s Letter tothe Galatians.  In Summa Theologiae II-II.33.4,Aquinas says:

It must be observed… that if thefaith were endangered, a subject ought to rebuke his prelate evenpublicly.   Hence Paul, who was Peter'ssubject, rebuked him in public, on account of the imminent danger of scandalconcerning faith, and, as the gloss of Augustine says on Galatians 2:11, “Petergave an example to superiors, that if at any time they should happen to strayfrom the straight path, they should not disdain to be reproved by theirsubjects.”

Commentingon this passage, Fastiggi says:

This passage of Aquinas is widelyused by papal critics to justify any resistance to the Pope, his teachings, anddecisions.  They forget that Paul’scorrection of Peter had to do with Peter’s behavior not his teaching.  In addition… this particular question of the Summa concerns fraternal correction in general.  It is not focused on the correction of popes.

However, itis not difficult to show that these assertions are mistaken.  First of all, Aquinas clearly takes Paul’srebuke of Peter to involve precisely his teaching,and not merely his behavior.  He characterizes the episode of Paul’s rebukeof Peter as a case where “the faith[was] endangered,” and says that Peter brought “danger of scandal concerning faith.”  In Chapter 2, Lecture3 of the Galatians commentary, he says that what Peter had doneposed “danger to the Gospel teaching,”and that Peter and those who followed his example “walked not uprightly unto the truth of the Gospel, because its truth was being undone” (emphasisadded).  Peter failed to do his dutyinsofar as “the truth must be preachedopenly and the opposite nevercondoned through fear of scandalizing others” (emphasis added).  Clearly, then, in Aquinas’s view the problemwas not merely that Peter actedbadly, but that he seemed to condonedoctrinal error and risked leading others to do the same.

Second,Aquinas is explicitly not commentingmerely on fraternal correction in general. The Summa article is about the correction of prelates, specifically.  Not only are popes prelates, but Aquinas usesthe example of a pope (Peter) to illustrate the legitimacy in somecircumstances of correcting prelates. Aquinas says that the episode of Paul’s correction of Peter “gave anexample to superiors… that theyshould not disdain to be reproved bytheir subjects.”  He is not making ageneral point about the faithful correcting one another, but a specific point aboutthe correction of superiors by their subjects.  In the Galatians commentary, Aquinas says ofPaul’s rebuke of Peter:

Therefore from the foregoing we havean example: prelates, indeed, an example of humility, that they not disdaincorrections from those who are lower and subject to them; subjects have anexample of zeal and freedom, that they fear not to correct their prelates,particularly if their crime is public and verges upon danger to the multitude.

Contrary towhat Fastiggi says, then, Aquinas clearly is teaching about the correction of prelates, including popes,rather than fraternal correction in general, and he is talking about correctionwith respect to their teaching, andnot merely with respect to their behavior. (There is a lot more to say about these passages from Aquinas.  Again, see the article linked to above for afuller treatment.)

Now, thosewho issued the appeal to the cardinals criticized the revision to the Catechismprecisely because it is formulated in such a way that it might be read asconflicting with scripture and tradition. In other words, they believe that “the faith [is] endangered,” thatthere is “imminent danger of scandal concerning faith.”  Accordingly, they are simply calling on thepope to reaffirm the teaching of scripture and tradition, just as Paul urgedPeter to reaffirm the teaching that had been handed on to him. 

Clearly,then, the appeal is perfectly in line with Aquinas’s teaching about thepossibility of subjects correcting prelates. Of course, Fastiggi would no doubt disagree with the judgement that therevision poses “imminent danger of scandal concerning faith.”  But thatis a different question.  If he wantsto defend the revision, fine, but he should not speak as if the critics have noright to issue such an appeal.  Rather,he should acknowledge that they do havesuch a right, and simply argue that in this case they were mistaken to thinkthe right needed to be exercised.

At least, heshould acknowledge this given that Aquinas’s position is correct.  But Fastiggi makes another remark thatindicates that he thinks it is not correct. He says:

What Aquinas says in this passage isoffset by Pope Gregory XI’s 1377 censure of various errors of John Wycliffe.  Among these censured errors, number 19 reads: An ecclesiastic, even the RomanPontiff, can legitimately be corrected, and even accused, by subjects and laypersons. (Denz.-H, 1139).

But thereare several problems with the assumption that this undermines Aquinas’steaching.  First, as Aquinas himselfemphasizes, “corrected” and related terms are ambiguous.  They could be referring to correction of ajuridical sort, which involves having the authority to direct another to dosomething and to punish him for disobedience. As Aquinas acknowledges, no one can “correct” a pope in that sense.  But “correction” could mean instead the merepointing out of an error, which Aquinas says amounts to a kind of fraternalassistance rather than the exercise of authority.  For Pope Gregory’s condemnation to conflictwith Aquinas’s teaching, he would have to have correction of the second sort in mind, not just thefirst.  But Fastiggi gives us no reason tosuppose that he does.  Moreover, theother condemned propositions from Wycliffe involve juridical power of some sortor another.  Context indicates, then,that Gregory is only condemning the thesis that subjects may juridically correct a pope, not thethesis that they may give fraternalcorrection of the kind Aquinas defends.

Second, ifGregory were condemning the latter sort of correction, he would not only be atodds with Aquinas.  He would be at odds with St. Paul, and indeed with scripture,which teach that Paul was within his rights to correct Peter, despite being hissubject.

Third, asFastiggi is well aware, blanket condemnations of large sets of propositionslike the ones from Wycliffe need to be interpreted carefully.  The condemnation does not necessarily implythat each proposition in the set is problematic in exactly the same way.  In a single condemned set, one propositionmay be heretical, another not strictly heretical but proximate to heresy, yetanother simply badly formulated or otherwise misleading, and so on.  So, the fact that the proposition fromWycliffe referred to by Fastiggi appears in the list condemned by Pope Gregorydoes not suffice to show that Gregory intended to condemn the position taughtby Aquinas.  Indeed, to my knowledge, noone before Fastiggi has even suggested that Gregory was condemning the positiontaken by Aquinas.

Fourth, ifGregory were intending to condemn that position, he would be contradicting theteaching of another pope, namely Pope Innocent III, who held that “only onaccount of a sin committed against the faith can I be judged by the church”(quoted in J. Michael Miller, TheShepherd and the Rock: Origins, Development, and Mission of the Papacy, at p.292).  Since the rest of the Church issubject to the pope, this would be a case of a pope being “corrected… bysubjects,” to use the language condemned by Gregory.  If we read Pope Gregory as condemning evenfraternal correction of a pope, then, we will have a conflict between twopopes.  That is further reason not to read him that way.

The teaching of Donum Veritatis

A fifthpoint is that Donum Veritatisacknowledges that respectful criticism of magisterial statements can belegitimate, which it could not have done if Pope Gregory had been condemningall such criticism.  So, let’s turn tothat document.  Here are the relevantpassages:

The willingness to submit loyally tothe teaching of the Magisterium on matters per se not irreformable must be therule.  It can happen, however, that atheologian may, according to the case, raise questions regarding thetimeliness, the form, or even the contents of magisterial interventions…

When it comes to the question ofinterventions in the prudential order, it could happen that some Magisterialdocuments might not be free from all deficiencies.  Bishops and their advisors have not alwaystaken into immediate consideration every aspect or the entire complexity of aquestion…

Even when collaboration takes placeunder the best conditions, the possibility cannot be excluded that tensions mayarise between the theologian and the Magisterium…  If tensions do not spring from hostile andcontrary feelings, they can become a dynamic factor, a stimulus to both theMagisterium and theologians to fulfill their respective roles while practicingdialogue…

The preceding considerations have aparticular application to the case of the theologian who might have seriousdifficulties, for reasons which appear to him wellfounded, in accepting anon-irreformable magisterial teaching…

If, despite a loyal effort on thetheologian's part, the difficulties persist, the theologian has the duty to makeknown to the Magisterial authorities the problems raised by the teaching initself, in the arguments proposed to justify it, or even in the manner in whichit is presented.  He should do this in anevangelical spirit and with a profound desire to resolve the difficulties.  His objections could then contribute to realprogress and provide a stimulus to the Magisterium to propose the teaching ofthe Church in greater depth and with a clearer presentation of the arguments…

For a loyal spirit, animated by lovefor the Church, such a situation can certainly prove a difficult trial.  It can be a call to suffer for the truth, insilence and prayer, but with the certainty, that if the truth really is atstake, it will ultimately prevail…

[T]hat public opposition to theMagisterium of the Church also called “dissent”… must be distinguished from thesituation of personal difficulties treated above.

Note thefollowing crucial points.  First, Donum Veritatis acknowledges that whilethere is a strong presumption of assent even to non-irreformable magisterialstatements, nevertheless it can in some cases be legitimate to “raise questionsregarding the timeliness, the form, or eventhe contents” of such statements, since they “might not be free from alldeficiencies.”  These deficiencies mightconcern “the teaching in itself, inthe arguments proposed to justify it, or even in the manner in which it ispresented.”  It can be that “the truth really is at stake.”  All of this makes it clear that it is notmerely the behavior of magisterial authorities or the manner of their teachingthat can in some cases legitimately be criticized, but the teaching itself.

Second, Donum Veritatis acknowledges that evenin the best circumstances, such legitimate criticism may lead to “tensions”with the Magisterium, but that this is not necessarily a bad thing.  The critic even “has the duty” to raise suchobjections, which “could… contribute to real progress” insofar as they serve asa “stimulus” to the Magisterium to present its teaching in a more adequate way. And it can even be that in such asituation, it is the critic who undergoes “a difficult trial” and thereby “suffer[s]for the truth.”  Donum Veritatis thus makes it clear that it can happen that when acritic finds himself in some sort of conflict with magisterial authorities,that does not necessarily mean that he is the one who is in the wrong.

Third, Donum Veritatis explicitly states thatwhat the critic in this sort of situation is engaged in “must be distinguished” from “dissent” from the Magisterium.  It is possible, then, respectfully tocriticize magisterial acts without thereby meriting the label “dissenter.”  How can this be?  Wouldn’t anyone who disagrees in some waywith a magisterial statement ipso factobe “dissenting” from it and thereby count as a “dissenter”?

The answeris No, because “dissent” in this context does not connote mere disagreement,but has a narrower, technical meaning.  Donum Veritatis goes on to identifyseveral marks of “dissent.”  It involves “attitudesof general opposition to Church teaching,” motivated by “the ideology ofphilosophical liberalism, which permeates the thinking of our age.”  For the dissenter, “freedom of thought comesto oppose the authority of tradition.” The dissenter “aims at changing the Church following a model of protestwhich takes its inspiration from political society.”  In defense of his rejection of traditionalteaching, he appeals to “the obligation to follow one's own conscience,” the “weightof public opinion,” “models of society promoted by the ‘mass media,’” and thelike.  These sources of opinion lead the dissenter toconclude, for example, that “the Magisterium… ought to leave matters ofconjugal and family morality to individual judgment.”  And so on. Obviously, then, “dissent” involves, specifically, rejection of traditional Catholic doctrine, of the kind associatedwith liberalism and modernism and represented by theologians like Hans Küng andCharles Curran.

Donum Veritatis does not say more about the precisenature of the legitimate sort of criticism that it distinguishes from “dissent.” But it is clear that if “dissent”involves the rejection of traditionalteaching, then a critic who upholdstraditional teaching, and does so in the respectful manner demanded by Donum Veritatis, cannot justly beaccused of “dissent.”  In particular,those who have respectfully criticized the revision to the Catechism for givingthe appearance of a rupture with tradition cannot justly be accused of“dissent.”  That does not entail thatFastiggi cannot justifiably disagree with them. The point is just that, whatever one thinks of their position, it is not comparable to criticism of the Magisteriumof the kind associated with the likes of Küng and Curran.

Sometimes itis claimed that Donum Veritatis doesnot allow the public expression ofeven legitimate criticism, on the basis of its remark – typically quoted out ofcontext – that “the theologian should avoid turning to the ‘mass media’, buthave recourse to the responsible authority.” But Donum Veritatis does not rule out public expression of suchcriticism, as is clear from several considerations.  First, we need to consider the completesentence from which this remark is quoted:

In cases like these, the theologianshould avoid turning to the ‘mass media’, but have recourse to the responsibleauthority, for it is not by seeking toexert the pressure of public opinion that one contributes to theclarification of doctrinal issues and renders service to the truth. (Emphasis added). 

Relevant toois Donum Veritatis’s other referenceto mass media, in a passage characterizing the tactics of liberal dissentingtheologians:

The weight of publicopinion when manipulated and its pressure to conform also have their influence.  Often models of society promoted by the "mass media" tend toassume a normative value.  The viewis particularly promoted that the Church should only express her judgment onthose issues which public opinion considers important and then only by way ofagreeing with it.

With thiscontext in mind, it is clear that what DonumVeritatis is criticizing is notthe mere publication of criticism in journals, magazines, or other mass mediaas such.  Rather, it is criticizing thetactic of using mass media to stir uppublic opinion against the Magisterium, as a means of trying to force theChurch to conform to the values that prevail in such media.

Second, Donum Veritatis also says that the theologianwho raises legitimate criticisms is obligated to “examine the objections whichhis colleagues might offer him.”  But thenormal way in which such debate is conducted is in theological journals and thelike, which entails publicizing one’s criticisms.  DonumVeritatis also states that “the theologian will refrain from giving untimely public expression” of hiscriticisms.  So it is only untimely or inappropriate public expression that is ruled out, not all publicexpression as such.

Third, afterDonum Veritatis was issued, CardinalRatzinger, as head of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith,explicitly affirmed, when commenting on a hypothetical theologian who raiseslegitimate criticisms, that “we have not excluded all kinds of publication, norhave we closed him up in suffering” (quoted in Anthony J. Figueiredo, The Magisterium-Theology Relationship,at p. 370).

Now, in part4 of his series, Fastiggi addresses the relevance of Donum Veritatis to the controversy overthe revision to the Catechism.  He doesnot accuse the critics of being “dissenters.” Nevertheless, he does claim that those who issued the appeal to thecardinals did not satisfy the norms of DonumVeritatis.  In particular, he objectsthat they “do not simply raise questions… [but] manifest a spirit of oppositionto a papal teaching,” that they are “so cock-sure of their position” that they“present as a non-arguable conclusion that their opinion of the Church’steaching on capital punishment is definitive and infallible,” and so on. 

One problemwith such remarks is that they are aimed at a straw man.  No critics of the revision to the Catechismhold that “their opinion of the Church’steaching on capital punishment is definitive and infallible.”  Rather, they claim that the consistent teaching of scripture and two millennia of traditionis definitive and infallible.  Fastiggimay disagree with his opponents about what scripture and tradition teach, but heshould characterize their position accurately.  Another problem with Fastiggi’s remarks hereis that they rest on a misreading of a further passage from Donum Veritatis.  Addressing the manner in which respectfulcriticism of a magisterial statement should proceed, the passage in question says:

In the dialogue, a two-fold ruleshould prevail.  When there is a questionof the communion of faith, the principle of the “unity of truth” (unitasveritatis) applies.  When it is aquestion of differences which do not jeopardize this communion, the “unity of charity”(unitas caritatis) should be safeguarded.

Even if the doctrine of the faith isnot in question, the theologian will not present his own opinions or divergenthypotheses as though they were non-arguable conclusions.  Respect for the truth as well as for thePeople of God requires this discretion.

Now,Fastiggi seems to think that the second paragraph here entails that when atheologian raises even a legitimate criticism, everything he says must be presented in a tentative way.  But that is not what the passage says.  What it says is that even if a theologian isnot dissenting from a doctrine of the faith, that doesn’t license him intreating what are really just matters of mere opinion or hypothesis asnon-arguable conclusions.  But it doesn’tfollow that he cannot treat anythingas a non-arguable conclusion.  Forexample, the theologian is perfectly within his rights to treat the consistent teaching of scripture and ofthe ordinary Magisterium over two thousand years as a “non-arguableconclusion,” because the Magisterium itself holds that teaching of that sort isinfallible.  (I have discussed theconditions under which the ordinary Magisterium is infallible inanother article.)

Of course,Fastiggi may disagree with the claim that scripture and the ordinaryMagisterium really do teach that capital punishment is not intrinsicallyevil.  The point for the moment, though,is that Fastiggi is mistaken in thinking that a lack of tentativeness is per se problematic.

Moreover,there are several historical cases where popes were legitimately criticized,and their critics rightly presented their criticisms in a non-tentativeway.  Paul’s criticism of Peter was in noway tentative, but in fact extremely bold, and scripture tells us that Paul wasin the right.  Pope Honorius’s critics werenot tentative in criticizing him for giving aid and comfort to the Monotheliteheresy, and Pope John XXII’s critics were not tentative in criticizing him forfailing to uphold traditional teaching on the particular judgement.

Now, in part3 of his series, Fastiggi addresses these sorts of examples, andsays:

Some critics of the revised teachingof the Church on the death penalty claim that they can oppose the teachingbecause popes have taught errors in the past, and they usually bring up cases suchas Pope Honorius I (r. 625 - 638) and John XXII (r. 1316 - 1334).  What these critics don’t understand is that itwas the Magisterium itself that resolved the doctrinal issues involved in thesecases not the critics.  It is certainlypermitted for scholars to raise questions about non-definitive papal teachingsand to ask for clarifications.  It is notpermitted, though, for private scholars to assume the authority to correct thepopes.  

But thehistorical claims Fastiggi makes here are mistaken or at least misleading.  Honorius was condemned by a council (threecouncils, in fact), and councils are subordinate to popes.  It is true that popes then confirmed thesecouncils, but the point is that the first of these councils condemned Honorius before papal approval was given, and wasnot accused of insubordination or the like for doing so.  (I have discussed the case of Honorius indetail hereand here.)  John XXII was criticized by the theologiansof his day, and while the Magisterium did settle the issue (beginning with JohnXXII himself, who recanted) it was prodded to do so precisely because these critics pressed the issue. 

Fastiggiadds the remark that “if dissent from authoritative magisterial teachings canbe justified because of alleged errors of prior popes, then any magisterialteaching can be rejected.”  But that doesnot follow at all.  The reason thesepopes were criticized was only because they failedto affirm traditional teaching, and that is the only reason Pope Francis’srevision to the Catechism has been criticized. The theological principles that justify such criticism would by no meansentail that just “any magisterialteaching can be rejected.”  Rather, theywould only justify criticisms of failures to uphold traditional teaching.

The problemwith Fastiggi’s position is that he treats all criticisms of magisterialstatements as if they were of a piece, when they clearly are not.  He fails to take account of the teleology of the Magisterium, the reasonit exists in the first place, which is to preservethe deposit of faith, not to give popes and other churchmen carte blancheto teach whatever they feel like.  Andthis is something that the Church herselfhas constantly emphasized.  Forexample, the First Vatican Council teaches:

For theHoly Spirit was promised to the successors of Peter not so that they might, by his revelation, make known some new doctrine,but that, by his assistance, they might religiously guard and faithfullyexpound the revelation or deposit of faith transmitted by the apostles.

Similarly,the Second Vatican Council teaches:

[T]heliving teaching office of the Church… is not above the word of God, but servesit, teaching only what has been handedon, listening to it devoutly, guarding it scrupulously and explaining itfaithfully.

And PopeBenedict XVI taught:

The Pope is not an absolute monarch whose thoughts and desires are law. On the contrary: the Pope's ministry is a guarantee of obedience toChrist and to his Word.  He mustnot proclaim his own ideas, but rather constantly bind himself and the Churchto obedience to God's Word, in the face of every attempt to adapt it or waterit down, and every form of opportunism.

Thedevelopment of Catholic doctrine is thus like a ratchet, which only goes oneway.  The body of teaching found inscripture, solemn conciliar definitions, excathedra papal statements, and the ordinary Magisterium when it meets theconditions for infallibility, is locked in place forever.  New implications can be drawn out of it(which is what “development” in the proper sense involves), but it cannot be contradicted or reversed (which would not be a true development atall, but rather a corruption of doctrine or failure to preserve the deposit offaith).

Now, it isprecisely in order to assist the Magisterium in its function of preserving thedeposit of faith that the teaching of Aquinas, of Donum Veritatis, and of the tradition more generally allow thatthere can be cases in which respectful criticism of magisterial statements isjustifiable.  Like the Magisterium, suchcriticism has precisely the function of maintainingfidelity to tradition, not of allowing the critics to say whatever theylike.  In short, and to oversimply, the teaching of Aquinas and of DonumVeritatis can never be used to justify“progressive” criticism of magisterial statements, but only certain kinds of “traditionalist”criticism.  That is not to say that just anything of thelatter sort goes.  The point is that theprinciples underlying the teaching of Aquinas and of Donum Veritatis are not neutralbetween the different sorts of criticism theologians might want to raise.  They favor those who want to preserve pastteaching, and disfavor those who want to depart from it.  Hence, again, Fastiggi is just mistaken tosuggest that if you allow anycriticism of magisterial statements, then everythingis up for grabs.

The teaching of Pope Francis

Let’s turnfinally to a statement from Pope Francis that is relevant to the issue athand.  As I’ve noted, he has onseveral occasions said that he welcomes respectful criticism.  One of his statements is especially importantin this context.  In the exhortation Gaudeteet Exsultate, the pope writes:

In the Church there legitimatelycoexist different ways of interpreting many aspects of doctrine and Christianlife; in their variety, they “help to express more clearly the immense richesof God’s word”.  It is true that “forthose who long for a monolithic body of doctrine guarded by all and leaving noroom for nuance, this might appear as undesirable and leading toconfusion”.  Indeed, some currents ofgnosticism scorned the concrete simplicity of the Gospel and attempted toreplace the trinitarian and incarnate God with a superior Unity, wherein therich diversity of our history disappeared. In effect, doctrine, or better, our understanding and expression of it,“is not a closed system, devoid of the dynamic capacity to pose questions,doubts, inquiries…”

Now, thosewho have criticized the revision to the Catechism are doing exactly what Pope Francis here acknowledges to be legitimate.  They are raising “questions, doubts,inquiries” about the formulation of the revision, on the grounds that it“leav[es] no room for nuance” and ignores “the rich diversity of our history”and “the immense riches of God’s word.”  Inparticular, the revision focuses only on statements from the tradition thatseem unfavorable towards capitalpunishment while entirely ignoring the mountain of statements from scripture,the Fathers and Doctors of the Church, and previous popes that are clearly favorable to it.  The revision also entirely ignores theempirical considerations favoring the judgment that there are at least somecases where public safety would best be served by keeping the death penalty onthe books.  The revision thereby givesthe impression that capital punishment is intrinsically wrong, and that socialscientists are in agreement that it is never needed in order to save lives –neither of which is true. 

The criticsof the revision to the Catechism thereby respectfully call upon the Magisteriumto remedy these deficiencies.  And theyargue that reading the revision as a deficiently formulated prudential judgmentrather than as a change in doctrinal principle ought to be among the “legitimatelycoexist[ing] different ways of interpreting” it (to use Pope Francis’swords). 

If PopeFrancis’s words in Gaudete et Exsultateapply to centuries of established Catholic teaching, it is hard to see how theycan fail to apply also to a novel revision that is only five years old.  Accordingly, those who accuse critics of therevision of “dissent” are not only at odds with the teaching of Aquinas and of Donum Veritatis.  They are at odds with the teaching of PopeFrancis himself.

In thefollow-up to this article, I will address Fastiggi’s remarks about scriptureand previous papal teaching on the subject of capital punishment.