The vice of insensibility

Temperance ormoderation is the virtue governing the enjoyment of sensory pleasures.  In particular, and as Aquinas says,“temperance is properly about pleasures of meat and drink and sexual pleasures.”  These pleasures reflect our bodily nature(which is why angels, unlike us, neither need the virtue of temperance norexhibit the vices opposed to it). Specifically, they reflect our needs for self-preservation and forpreservation of the species.  Eating anddrinking exist in order to meet the first need and sex exists in order to meetthe second.  The pleasures associatedwith these activities exist in turn so that we will be drawn to carrying themout.  And temperance is needed so that thepleasures will perform that motivating task successfully.  In short, temperance exists in order that wewill be drawn to the right kinds of sensory pleasures and to the right degree;those pleasures exist for the sake of encouraging eating, drinking, and sexualintercourse at the right times and in the right ways; and those actions exist,in turn, in order that the individual and species will carry on.

It goeswithout saying that it is extremely common for people to seek these pleasures toofrequently, or at the wrong time, or in the wrong way.  In doing so they exhibit the vice of intemperance or licentiousness.  But mostvirtues are means between extremes, one of excess and one of deficiency.  And that is true in this case.  Intemperance is the vice of excess where sensorypleasure is concerned.  The vice ofdeficiency in this area – of being toolittle disposed to seek sensory pleasure – is known as insensibility.  Becauseintemperance is far and away the more common vice, especially today,insensibility is rarely discussed.  But,precisely because intemperance is more common, it is important to understandinsensibility, because those rightly concerned to avoid the first vicesometimes overreact and fall into the second.

Aquinas sumsup as follows the reason why insensibility is a vice:

Whatever is contrary to the naturalorder is vicious.  Now nature hasintroduced pleasure into the operations that are necessary for man's life.  Wherefore the natural order requires that manshould make use of these pleasures, in so far as they are necessary for man'swell-being, as regards the preservation either of the individual or of thespecies.  Accordingly, if anyone were toreject pleasure to the extent of omitting things that are necessary for nature'spreservation, he would sin, as acting counter to the order of nature.  And this pertains to the vice ofinsensibility.  (SummaTheologiae II-II.142.1)

Hence, hegoes on to say, it is an error to think that avoiding pleasure altogether is agood way to avoid sin.  On the contrary,“in order to avoid sin, pleasure must be shunned, not altogether, but so thatit is not sought more than necessity requires.”

Now, doesthis entail that it is always andinherently wrong to avoid a certain kind of sensory pleasurealtogether?  And what does it mean for akind of pleasure to be “necessary”?  Let’s address these questions in order. First, Aquinas acknowledges that there are cases where it is good toshun sensory pleasure.  In the samearticle, he writes:

It must, however, be observed that itis sometimes praiseworthy, and even necessary for the sake of an end, toabstain from such pleasures as result from these operations.  Thus, for the sake of the body's health,certain persons refrain from pleasures of meat, drink, and sex; as also for thefulfilment of certain engagements: thus athletes and soldiers have to denythemselves many pleasures, in order to fulfil their respective duties.  On like manner penitents, in order to recoverhealth of soul, have recourse to abstinence from pleasures, as a kind of diet,and those who are desirous of giving themselves up to contemplation and Divinethings need much to refrain from carnal things. Nor do any of these things pertain to the vice of insensibility, becausethey are in accord with right reason. 

Endquote.  Similarly, Aquinas says thatforsaking marriage (and thus the pleasure of sex) for the sake of the highergood of complete devotion to the contemplation of God is not only lawfulbut superior to marriage. 

However, ineach of these cases, sensory pleasure is forsaken for the sake of some specialsituation or state in life.  Absent suchcircumstances, it can be vicious to eschew the pleasures in question.  For example, suppose a person is married, anddesires to abstain from sex altogether for the sake of complete devotion tospiritual things, but his spouse has not consented to this.  Then, as Aquinas says,it would be wrong to refuse sexual intercourse with the spouse.  In the typical case, sexual pleasure issimply a normal part of married life, and ought no more to be shunned than thepleasures of eating and drinking that are also a normal part of life.

What, then,of the other qualification Aquinas makes, to the effect that “pleasure must beshunned, not altogether, but so that itis not sought more than necessityrequires”?  Some readers might assumethat he is saying that we ought to indulge in those pleasures that simplycannot be avoided (such as the minimal pleasure that accompanies any normal actof eating or having sexual relations) but should avoid any pleasure that goesbeyond that.

But that is notwhat he is saying.  To see why, considerfirst what more he says about the nature of the pleasures associated witheating, drinking, and sex, in the context of defending his view that sensorypleasures have primarily to do with the sense of touch.  He allows that there are secondary pleasuresassociated with these activities that involve the other senses:

Temperance is about the greatestpleasures, which chiefly regard the preservation of human life either in thespecies or in the individual.  On thesematters certain things are to be considered as principal and others assecondary.  The principal thing is theuse itself of the necessary means, of the woman who is necessary for thepreservation of the species, or of food and drink which are necessary for thepreservation of the individual: while the very use of these necessary thingshas a certain essential pleasure annexed thereto.  In regard to either use we consider assecondary whatever makes the use more pleasurable, such as beauty and adornmentin woman, and a pleasing savor and likewise odor in food. (Summa Theologiae II-II.141.5)

In otherwords, with food and drink, though what is absolutely inseparable from them arepleasures known through touch (such as a pleasing texture, temperature, and thelike), there are also secondary pleasures of taste and smell.  Nor are these somehow pointless, for as hegoes on to say, they “make the food pleasant to eat, in so far as they aresigns of its being suitable for nourishment.” Similarly, though the pleasure of sex involves primarily the sense oftouch, the activity is made “more pleasurable… [by] beauty and adornment inwoman,” and these pleasures are associated with sight more than touch.

Now, itwould be absurd to suppose that Aquinas thinks that temperance allows for theenjoyment only of what is “necessary” in the strictest sense of beingabsolutely inseparable from food, drink, and sex – for example, that it istemperate to enjoy the texture of food but intemperate to enjoy its taste orodor, and temperate to enjoy the feel of sexual intercourse but intemperate tofind pleasure in one’s wife’s beauty. For one thing, these pleasures, despite being “secondary” in Aquinas’ssense, are obviously as naturally associated with food, drink, and sex as thepleasures of touch are.  Nature makesfood taste and smell good for the same reason it makes eating it feel good,namely to get us to eat.  And the beautyof the female body, no less than the pleasures of touch associated withintercourse, is obviously also part of nature’s way of getting men togetherwith women so that they will have children.

For anotherthing, Aquinas explicitly says elsewhere that temperance allows for theenjoyment not only of pleasures that are necessary in the strictest sense, but alsothose that are necessary in a looser sense or even not necessary at all:

The need of human life may be takenin two ways.  First, it may be taken inthe sense in which we apply the term “necessary” to that without which a thingcannot be at all; thus food is necessary to an animal.  Secondly, it may be taken for somethingwithout which a thing cannot be becomingly. Now temperance regards not only the former of these needs, but also thelatter.  Wherefore the Philosopher says(Ethic. iii, 11) that “the temperate man desires pleasant things for the sakeof health, or for the sake of a sound condition of body.”  Other things that are not necessary for thispurpose may be divided into two classes. For some are a hindrance to health and a sound condition of body; andthese temperance makes not use of whatever, for this would be a sin againsttemperance.  But others are not ahindrance to those things, and these temperance uses moderately, according tothe demands of place and time, and in keeping with those among whom onedwells.  Hence the Philosopher (Ethic.iii, 11) says that the “temperate man also desires other pleasant things,”those namely that are not necessary for health or a sound condition of body, “solong as they are not prejudicial to these things.” (Summa Theologiae II-II.141.6)

So, sensorypleasure can in a relevant sense be “necessary,” for Aquinas, not only when itis strictly unavoidable in order for eating, drinking, and sex to exist at all,but also when it is simply “becoming” in relation to these things.  And temperance allows for pleasures as longas they are not a “hindrance” or “prejudicial” to health and soundness of body,even if they are not quite necessary either. One need merely consider the “demands of place and time, and [what is]in keeping with those among whom one dwells.” 

Aquinas doesnot think, then, that temperancerequires a meal or sexual relations to be quick and businesslike, such that anypleasure beyond the bare minimum associated with that would amount tointemperance.  And that is, of course,just common sense.  It is normal forhuman beings simply to get on with eating, drinking, or lovemaking withoutscrupling over whether they are taking too much pleasure in it.  Indeed, apart from cases where someoneclearly has disordered appetites (alcoholism, hypersexuality, or the like) itwould ordinarily be neurotic and spiritually unhealthy to fret over such things– to worry that one is guilty of sin for eating an extra slice of bacon, orkissing one’s spouse with great passion, or what have you.

That is notto deny that there can be excess short of addictions like the ones mentioned.  For example, Aquinas notesthat one manifestation of the vice of gluttony is evident in those preoccupiedwith “food prepared too nicely – I.e. ‘daintily.’”  I would suggest that the sort of thing he hasin mind is evident today among people who call themselves “foodies” – alwaysgoing on about food in an embarrassingly overenthusiastic way, endlesslyseeking out new culinary adventures, and so on. Similarly, even people who are not quite sex addicts can develop anunhealthy preoccupation with it.  Whenfood, drink, or sex becomes, not just a background part of normal human life,but a fixation, that is an indication that someone has fallen into hedonism andthus the vice of intemperance.

Then thereis the fact that one might now and again forego the pleasures of food, drink,or sex not because enjoying them would be excessive or in any other waydisordered, but simply in a spirit of sacrifice – that is to say, not out of ajudgment that they are bad, but rather out of a judgment that they are good butthat it would be better still to do without them for the sake of some higherend (to do penance, to develop self-discipline, or whatever).

However,supposing that one is neither engaged in such occasional asceticism nor proneto hedonism, then, as I have said, it would be neurotic and spirituallyunhealthy to fret over the minutiae of everyday eating, drinking, and maritalsexual relations – to try to ferret out subtle sins, in oneself or others,relating to these things.  A person whotends to be overly suspicious of such pleasures is often characterized as aprig, killjoy, or “stick in the mud,” and I’d suggest that this character typeis one manifestation of the vice of insensibility.  Specifically, it involves insensibility of akind related to scrupulosity, the obsessive tendency to see sin where it doesnot exist.  It can arise as anoverreaction to the opposite extreme vice of intemperance, either in oneself orin the larger society around one.

However,that is not the only source of the vice of insensibility.  Some people are simply “cold fish,” eschewingsensory pleasures of one kind or another not because they suspect them of beingsinful but rather because they just lack much if any interest in them.  Of course, there is a normal range ofvariation in appetites for food, drink, and sex, just as there are normalranges of variation with respect to all human traits.  But just as some people have extremely strongappetites for one or more of these things and thus are in greater danger thanothers of falling into intemperance, so too do some people have extremely weakappetites and are in greater danger of falling into insensibility. 

Whatever thepsychological factors behind a given person’s insensibility, it is truly a vicerather than a mere variation in temperament, because it can harm both theperson himself and those with whom he lives. In his 1953 dissertation TheThomistic Concept of Pleasure, Charles Reutemann explains the individual’sneed for pleasure as follows:

The conscious suppression of pleasurewithout some form of sublimation can have very harmful effects, since therebyan appetitive tendency is frustrated in its natural movement.  Not only would the appetitive movement tend tobecome atrophied, but the whole man would be reduced to a state of sorrow anddepression…

Inasmuch as [intellectual] activitieshave constant recourse to the ministrations of sense, there must be a restingto relieve the attendant “soul-weariness.”

If pleasure is necessary as a curefor “soul-weariness,” it must be more necessary for the body, since even“soul-weariness” is reductively attributed to the body.  For two reasons the body demands pleasure: asa remedy against pain, and as an incentive to its own activity which isgenerally laborious.(p. 22)

And on thenecessity of pleasure to human social life, Reutemann writes:

Pleasure contributes mightily to theestablishing and facilitating of harmonious relations among men.  For, just as society would lose its integrityif men did not respect and manifest the truth to one another, so it would loseits intrinsic dynamism if pleasure were not used as a “lubricant” to facilitateinter-personal relationships.  Givingpleasure and living agreeably with one’s neighbor is considered by St. Thomasto be a matter of natural equity. (p.23)

Reutemannhas pleasure in general in mind here, but let’s consider, specifically, thepleasures governed by temperance.  Inhuman beings, eating is not mere feeding, but the having of a meal, which iscommonly a social occasion.  Drinking,too, is something people prefer to do together – in a bar, at a party, whilewatching a game together, or what have you. Routinely to have to eat or drink alone is commonly regarded assad.  Breaking bread or having a drink togetheris commonly thought to foster peace and understanding between people who mightotherwise be at odds.  What all thisreveals is that the pleasures of food and drink are typically shared pleasures, and the more intensewhen they are shared.  We take pleasurenot just in the meal, but in the fact that our family, friends, oracquaintances are taking pleasure in it too, and taking pleasure in it with us. Food and drink thereby reinforce social bonds, and all the goods thatfollow from having those bonds.  A personwho, due to the vice of insensibility, is insufficiently drawn to such pleasuresis thereby going to be less fulfilled as a social animal – lonelier, moreself-centered, less able to contribute to or benefit from the social orders ofwhich he is a part.

Sexualpleasure too, when rightly ordered, is inherently social in nature insofar asit functions to bond the spouses together via the most intense sort of intimacyand affection.  The vice of insensibilitymanifests itself in this context when, due either to priggishness or a colddisposition, one refuses sexual relations to one’s spouse, or participates inthem only grudgingly and unenthusiastically. The frumpish wife or boorish husband can contribute to an atmospherewherein this vice is likely to take root. When it does, sex is likely to become a source of marital tension ratherthan amity.

Temperance in sexual matters, specifically, isknown as the virtue of chastity, andit is a large topic of its own.  Needlessto say, for Aquinas and Catholic moral theology, the fundamental principle hereis that sexual intercourse is virtuous only between a man and a woman married toone another, and when not carried out in a contraceptive manner.  Within these constraints, there is much inthe way of lovemaking that is consistent with chastity.  I have spelled out the details in my essay “InDefense of the Perverted Faculty Argument,” from my book Neo-Scholastic Essays.  And I’ve said a lot more about sexualmorality in a number of other articles and blog posts, linksto which are collected here.

Whenaddressing matters of sexual morality, Thomist natural law theorists andCatholic moral theologians have much to say about the vice of intemperance inthis area.  This is quite natural andproper, given the extreme sexual depravity that surrounds us today.  Sins of excess related to matters of sex areby far the more common ones, and the ones modern people are most resistant tohearing criticism of.  All the same, thisis only part of the story, because there is an opposite extreme vice too, evenif less common.  Marital happiness, andthe good of the social order that depends on it, require avoiding that vice aswell.