The Catechism and Capital Punishment: A Reply to Annett

Some yearsback, in my article “Threequestions for Catholic opponents of capital punishment,” I arguedthat Pope Francis’s statements on the death penalty cannot plausibly be read ina way that would make assent to them binding on Catholics.  This week, in anarticle at Where Peter Is,Tony Annett offers a reply.  Let’s take alook.

Criticizing Catholic teaching?

Let me startout by saying that I appreciate Annett’s attempt seriously to respond to thearticle.  In the years since it waspublished, I have found that its critics almost always simply dismiss itsconclusion without addressing the arguments for that conclusion, or at bestraise objections that obviously beg the question.  Though I don’t think his own objectionssucceed, I give Annett credit for trying to do better than that.  Many readers will be aware that Annett is asparring partner of mine on Twitter, and that our exchanges are sometimesheated.  So I also appreciate that heresponds here in a civil manner.

Having said that,it is unfortunate that Annett misrepresents my position from the get go (evenif, I am happy to allow, inadvertently). He characterizes my article as “criticizing Catholic teaching on thedeath penalty.”  That is notcorrect.  By “Catholic teaching” Annettpresumably has in mind teaching that theChurch requires the faithful to assent to. I do not criticize, and would not criticize, any such teaching.  My article addresses the question whether PopeFrancis’s thoroughgoing abolitionist position vis-à-vis the death penaltyactually is in fact a teaching to which Catholics must assent, or is instead aprudential judgment which they must consider respectfully but are not bound toassent to.  I argue that it is the latter,and that there is no other plausible way to read it when all the relevant evidence is considered.

I realizethat Annett disagrees with me about this. That’s fine, he has every right to try to make the case that I ammistaken.  But charity and justicerequire him to represent my position accurately before criticizing it. 

On Twitter,Annett routinely characterizes all disagreement with the pope’s statements oncapital punishment as “dissent.”  Now, Iam no less opposed than Annett is to dissent from Catholic teaching.  But the Church has made clear that not allcriticism of statements that come from the Magisterium constitutes“dissent.”  The document DonumVeritatis, issued during the pontificate of Pope St. John PaulII, acknowledges that in exceptional cases “it can happen… that a theologianmay… raise questions regarding the timeliness, the form, or even the contentsof magisterial interventions.”  Thedocument elaborates as follows:

When it comes to the question ofinterventions in the prudential order, it could happen that some Magisterialdocuments might not be free from all deficiencies.  Bishops and their advisors have not alwaystaken into immediate consideration every aspect or the entire complexity of aquestion…

If, despite a loyal effort on thetheologian's part, the difficulties persist, the theologian has the duty tomake known to the Magisterial authorities the problems raised by the teachingin itself, in the arguments proposed to justify it, or even in the manner inwhich it is presented.  He should do thisin an evangelical spirit and with a profound desire to resolve thedifficulties.  His objections could thencontribute to real progress and provide a stimulus to the Magisterium topropose the teaching of the Church in greater depth and with a clearerpresentation of the arguments.

Donum Veritatis then goes on explicitly to say thatthis sort of respectful criticism “mustbe distinguished” from “dissent” from the Church’s binding teaching.

In anotherarticle, I examine DonumVeritatis in greater detail, along with other relevant teaching fromCatholic tradition.  I show that“dissent” is essentially about trying to subvertthe traditional teaching of the Church, so that those who defend continuity with traditionalirreformable teaching cannot justly be accused of dissent when they merely askthe Magisterium more clearly to reaffirm such teaching.  I also show that the Church allows criticismof deficient magisterial statements to be made publicly under certain conditions. 

I won’trehash all of that here.  Again, see thatearlier article (as well as a couple of follow-up pieces, oneof which discusses in greater detail Aquinas’s teaching on thissubject, and theother of which discusses Pope Francis’s own repeated acknowledgmentthat certain kinds of criticism of popes can be legitimate).  The point for present purposes is thatnothing that I have said about Pope Francis’s teaching on capital punishmentamounts to “dissent.”  All of it fallswithin what Donum Veritatis and othertraditional teaching allow to be within the range of legitimate criticism ofmagisterial statements.

Indeed, Ihave not even accused Pope Francis of doctrinal error, even though that is inprinciple possible when popes are not speaking ex cathedra.  What I havesaid is that some of his statements on the topic of capital punishment are tooimprecise, or ambiguous, or fail to address all the relevant considerations, orare otherwise potentially misleading.  Ihave also said that the change he has made to the Church’s presentation of herteaching on capital punishment is prudential in nature – something Annett seemsto agree with (as we’ll see below).

Now, noting thata prudential intervention lacks sufficient clarity, or fails to address all therelevant aspects of an issue, or is otherwise deficient, is something that Donum Veritatis explicitly says can be legitimate and does not amount to “dissent.” Hence it is unjust for Annett to characterize my position as “dissent”or as “criticizing Catholic teaching.”  Ihave said nothing except what the Churchherself allows to be within the permissible range of debate.

At the veryleast, even if Annett thinks I am wrong about that too, the burden is on him actually to make the case that I amwrong about it.  And that entails that heneeds carefully to read and consider the arguments I have given in articleslike the ones just linked to, and show that I am wrong about what the Churchpermits in the way of criticism of magisterial statements.  Unless he does that, he is simply committingthe fallacy of begging the question by asserting that my position amounts to“dissent.”

A false binary?

So much forpreliminaries.  Let’s turn now to Annett’sobjections.  The main point of contentionconcerns the pope’s 2018 revision to section 2267 of the Catechism of the Catholic Church, which now reads:

Recourse to the death penalty on thepart of legitimate authority, following a fair trial, was long considered anappropriate response to the gravity of certain crimes and an acceptable, albeitextreme, means of safeguarding the common good.

Today, however, there is anincreasing awareness that the dignity of the person is not lost even after thecommission of very serious crimes.  Inaddition, a new understanding has emerged of the significance of penalsanctions imposed by the state.  Lastly,more effective systems of detention have been developed, which ensure the dueprotection of citizens but, at the same time, do not definitively deprive theguilty of the possibility of redemption.

Consequently, the Church teaches, inthe light of the Gospel, that “the death penalty is inadmissible because it isan attack on the inviolability and dignity of the person”, and she works withdetermination for its abolition worldwide.

Endquote.  There’s a lot that can be saidabout this, as we’ll see.  But the firstquestion to ask concerns the force of the statement that “the death penalty isinadmissible because it is an attack on the inviolability and dignity of theperson.”  As I say in the article towhich Annett is replying, there are two ways to read it.  First, one could read it as claiming that thedeath penalty is always and intrinsically wrong, and thus ruled outabsolutely and in principle.  Or second,one could read it as claiming that while the death penalty is not always and intrinsically wrong,current circumstances support the judgment that it should no longer ever beused. 

As I went onto argue in the article, if the first interpretation is correct, then therevision to the Catechism would contradict the consistent and irreformableteaching of scripture and 2,000 years of tradition that capital punishment canbe legitimate at least in principle.  Inthat case, it would amount to a straightforward doctrinal error (which ispossible when popes are not speaking excathedra) and should not beassented to. 

On the otherhand, if the second interpretation is correct, then the revision to theCatechism amounts to a prudential judgment – an application of doctrinalprinciple to concrete circumstances in light of certain empirical assumptions,such as assumptions about what methods of punishment are sufficient today toprotect society.  In that case, aCatholic need not assent, because theMagisterium has no special expertise with respect to the empirical assumptionsin question.  For example, the empiricalquestion of whether all governments today are in fact capable of protectingtheir citizens without ever resortingto capital punishment is simply not something about which popes or otherchurchmen have any special knowledge.  (I’ll return to this point below.)

To this lineof argument, Annett objects that “this distinction between intrinsic evils andprudential judgments is problematic and offers a false binary.”  Now, one would naturally expect from thisremark that Annett would propose a thirdalternative reading of the revision to the Catechism – a reading on which it isneither teaching that capitalpunishment is intrinsically evil norproposing a prudential judgment about its applicability today.

Oddly,though, Annett proposes no such third alternative reading.  What he does instead is, first, to point out thatnot everything that is intrinsicallywrong is gravely wrong, whereas some prudentialjudgments do concern grave moralmatters.  Now, Annett is right about thatmuch, but I never denied it.  Forexample, I have never claimed that all and only intrinsically wrong acts are gravelywrong acts.  And I have never deniedthat prudential judgments can concern matters of grave moral importance.  So Annett is just attacking a straw man here.

Moreover,Annett says that he is “willing to concede that the death penalty might not beintrinsically evil.”  And after notingthat “prudential judgements… could entail gravely evil acts,” he says thatwhile “in some past societies, it might have been simply impossible toconstrain the malefactor without recourse to the death penalty,” today “thisargument no longer applies.”  Thatindicates that he thinks that the revision to the Catechism does after allamount to a prudential judgment.  Butit’s a prudential judgment about a matter of grave moral importance.

In thiscase, though, Annett has not shown that I have proposed “a false binary.”  On the contrary, he implicitly concedes thatthere really are, after all, only two ways to read the revision to the Catechism– namely, either as claiming that the death penalty is intrinsically evil, oras making a prudential judgment to the effect that it is no longer needed today– and he opts for the second reading rather than the first.

The “falsebinary” charge, then, is incorrect, and a red herring.  On closer inspection, Annett’s real objectionseems to be that while there are indeed only two alternative readings of therevision to the Catechism – and the second, “prudential judgment” reading isthe correct one – nevertheless, Catholics are bound to assent to thisprudential judgment.  Why?  Because it concerns a matter of grave moral importance.

But now wehave another problem with Annett’s argument, which is that it is a non sequitur.  He is implicitly assuming that if aprudential judgment concerns a grave moral matter, then it follows that assentto it is binding on Catholics.  And thatis not true.  Indeed, the Church herself has told us that that isnot true.

St. John Paul II on war, capitalpunishment, and prudential judgments

To see this,let’s take a look at the teaching of Pope St. John Paul II on matters of war,capital punishment, and prudential judgments. This teaching is not only important in itself, but crucial for properlyunderstanding the teaching of Pope Francis. For as Annett himself emphasizes, Francis’s teaching is meant as an extension of John Paul II’s teaching.  Annett thinks that this supports theconclusion that Catholics are obligated to assent to Francis’s teaching.  What he does not realize is that it actually undermines that conclusion, andreinforces the view that Pope Francis’s teaching is a prudential judgment thatneed only be respectfully considered but not assented to.  For John Paul II’s teaching on capitalpunishment was itself clearly merely prudential and non-binding.  And that is true even though it concerned matters of grave moral importance.

Considerfirst what Pope John Paul II had to say about the topic of war.  The Catechism he promulgated reasserts theChurch’s traditional just war teaching, which states that a war can bejustified only under certain conditions – that it is necessary to defendsociety against lasting, grave and certain harm by the aggressor, that there beserious prospects of success, and so forth (section 2309).  This much is a matter of doctrinal principleto which Catholics are obligated to assent. But what about questions concerning whether some particular war meetsjust war criteria?  For example, whoseresponsibility is it to determine whether a particular war really is necessaryto defend society against an aggressor, or whether it has a serious chance ofsuccess?  Here the Catechism states:

The evaluation of these conditionsfor moral legitimacy belongs to the prudential judgment of those who haveresponsibility for the common good. 

Public authorities, in this case,have the right and duty to impose on citizens the obligations necessary fornational defense. (sections 2309-2310)

It is notchurchmen, then, but public authorities – government officials, militaryleaders, and the like – who have the right and responsibility to apply just warteaching to concrete circumstances.  Why?  Because they, and not churchmen, are the oneswith the relevant competence.  Forexample, popes have special competence to issue the moral teaching that a warcan be just only if it has a serious prospect of success.  But they do not have any special competence to determine whether someparticular war is likely to succeed.  Forexample, their office does not give them any special knowledge about whichmilitary tactics are the most effective ones, what the enemy’s troop strengthis and how able its commanders are, and so on. 

Notice thatthis remains true even though churchmen might, like anyone else, have opinionsabout such matters.  Pope John Paul IIcertainly had opinions about specific wars, having famously opposed the IraqWar, for example.  But even though hestated his opposition publicly, repeatedly, and in strongly moralistic terms,Catholics were not obligated to agree with him, as the Church made clear at thetime.  For example, Cardinal Ratzinger,the pope’s chief doctrinal officer (and later to become Pope Benedict XVI) said,of John Paul II’s opposition to the Iraq War, that the pope “did not imposethis position as doctrine of the Church.” Similarly, Bishop Wilton Gregory, then president of the United StatesConference of Catholic Bishops, stated atthe time that “people of good will may and do disagree on how tointerpret just war teaching and how to apply just war norms to the controvertedfacts of this case.”

Now, inhindsight one could certainly argue that the pope and other churchmen whocriticized the Iraq War were in the right. But that doesn’t change the fact that their prudential judgment on thismatter was not binding on Catholics.  Andthat is true even though it concerned a matter of grave moral importance.  The Church herself teaches, in the Catechism,that despite the grave moral importance of matters concerning war, it is governingauthorities, and not churchmen, who have the responsibility to apply just warcriteria to concrete circumstances.  Andconsequently, the Church herself also acknowledged that the pope’s condemnationof the Iraq War, despite being a prudential judgment about a grave matter (andindeed, a judgement that in hindsight was arguably correct), was not somethingthat Catholics were obligated to assent to.

Hence Annett is simply mistaken to suppose, as heimplicitly does, that the gravity of the subject matter of a prudentialjudgment suffices to make assent to it binding on Catholics.

But iscapital punishment different?  Are papalprudential judgments on that topicbinding on Catholics in a way prudential judgments about the application ofjust war theory are not?  No, there is nodifference.  And once again, the teachingof the Church under Pope John Paul II makes this clear. 

For onething, that there is no difference clearly follows from the relevant generalprinciples.  John Paul II famously heldthat in modern circumstances, capital punishment should be used only “if thisis the only possible way of effectively defending human lives against theunjust aggressor” (as the 1997 version of section 2267 of the Catechism putit).  Otherwise, the Catechism says,non-lethal means should be used.  But howdo we know whether non-lethal means are sufficient to protect people fromunjust aggressors?  Is that somethingabout which churchmen have any special competence?  Clearly, it is not, any more than they haveany special competence of a military kind. To know whether non-lethal means are adequate, we need to know, forexample: whether capital punishment has any significant deterrence value;whether all modern prisons throughout the world are secure enough to preventthe escape of dangerous offenders; whether other prisoners can be kept safefrom murderous ones; and so on.  Theseare empirical matters which require expertise in social science, law, criminaljustice, and the like.  Popes are no moreexperts in these areas than they are experts in military strategy and tactics.

In the verynature of the case, then, the question of whether capital punishment is stillneeded today is not something about which popes could issue a binding judgmentany more than they could issue a binding judgment about whether some specificwar meets just war criteria.  By parityof reasoning with the case of applying just war theory, the final determinationof whether resort to capital punishment is ever needed must lie, not withchurchmen, but with “the prudential judgment of those who have responsibilityfor the common good,” namely “public authorities” (to borrow the language theCatechism uses when addressing the application of just war principles).

Moreover,the Church herself explicitly said duringthe pontificate of John Paul II that the cases are parallel. 

The Ratzinger memorandum

This bringsus to an important document that Catholic opponents of capital punishmentroutinely ignore.  During the 2004 U.S.presidential election, the question whether Catholic politicians who supportabortion or euthanasia should be denied Holy Communion became a hot buttonissue.  Some suggested that if thesepoliticians were denied Communion, then Catholic politicians who supportedcapital punishment or the Iraq War should be denied it as well.

To clarifythe matter, Cardinal Ratzinger, who was then Prefect of the Congregation forthe Doctrine of the Faith, sent a memorandum titled “Worthinessto Receive Holy Communion: General Principles” to then-CardinalTheodore McCarrick, who was at the time the archbishop of Washington, D.C.  (McCarrick has, of course, since beendisgraced and defrocked, though that is irrelevant to the present issue.)  Ratzinger noted that the cases are not at allparallel, writing:

Not all moral issues have the samemoral weight as abortion and euthanasia.  For example, if a Catholic were to be at odds with the Holy Father on theapplication of capital punishment or on the decision to wage war, he would notfor that reason be considered unworthy to present himself to receive HolyCommunion.  While the Church exhortscivil authorities to seek peace, not war, and to exercise discretion and mercyin imposing punishment on criminals, it may still be permissible to take uparms to repel an aggressor or to have recourse to capital punishment.  Theremay be a legitimate diversity of opinion even among Catholics about waging warand applying the death penalty, but not however with regard to abortion andeuthanasia.

Noticeseveral things about this teaching.  Asis well known, Pope St. John Paul II held that the cases where capitalpunishment is necessary to protect society are “very rare, if not practicallynonexistent” (as the 1997 version of the Catechism puts it).  Indeed, the pope made even strongerstatements at other times, calling the death penalty “cruel and unnecessary”and calling for its outright abolition. All the same, Ratzinger acknowledged that “there may be a legitimatediversity of opinion even among Catholics about… applying the death penalty,”and indeed that a Catholic in good standing could even be “at odds with theHoly Father” on the subject.  He couldnot have said that if assent to the pope’s position was obligatory.  And notice that this is true even though thepope’s prudential judgment concerned a matter of grave moral importance, andwas put forward publicly, repeatedly, and in stern moralistic terms.

Note alsothe reference to “civil authorities,” and how war and recourse to capitalpunishment can in some cases be permissible despite the fact that the Churchurges such authorities to seek peace and exercise mercy on criminals.  The clear implication is that it isultimately civil authorities who havethe responsibility to make a prudential judgment about whether capitalpunishment is necessary, just as they have the responsibility to determinewhether war is necessary.

Now onTwitter recently, Annett dismissed the memorandum as merely “aprivate opinion of Joseph Ratzinger.” But this is clearly not the case. Ratzinger was writing, not as a private theologian, but precisely in hisofficial capacity as Prefect for the Congregation of the Doctrine of the Faith. And he was writing to a fellow bishopprecisely to clarify for him a matter of Church doctrine and discipline.

Furthermore,the passage from the memo quoted above was incorporated almost verbatim into aUSCCB document written by Archbishop William Levada (who would latersucceed Ratzinger as head of CDF).  Thepurpose of this document was precisely to clarify for Catholics the same issuesRatzinger aimed to clarify in his memo. And the fact that a USCCB document incorporates the passage in questionobviously indicates that it has doctrinal weight, and is not merely Ratzinger’spersonal opinion.  It is worth addingthat E. Christian Brugger, who is the preeminent opponent of capital punishmentamong Catholic theologians, acknowledges in the second edition of his book Capital Punishment and Roman Catholic MoralTradition that the memo was written by Ratzinger “as prefect of the CDF” (p.xxviii).

Now, keep inmind that as head of CDF, Ratzinger’s job was to be Pope St. John Paul II’sdoctrinal spokesman.  Hence he was anauthoritative interpreter of the pope’s teaching on the issue of capitalpunishment.  Since he explicitly saidthat there could be “a legitimate diversity of opinion” about the matter evenamong faithful Catholics – and indeed, that faithful Catholics could even be“at odds with” the pope on the matter – it follows that Pope John Paul II’sposition that capital punishment is no longer needed was not somethingCatholics are obligated to agree with.

This bringsus back to Pope Francis.  For the maindifference between John Paul’s teaching and Francis’s teaching is that theformer allowed that there may still be rare cases where capital punishment isneeded in order to protect society, whereas the latter denies that.  Even Pope Francis’s appeal to the “dignity ofthe person” is not novel, because Pope John Paul II made the same appeal whencriticizing capital punishment.  Forexample, the 1997 edition of the Catechism says that non-lethal means ofdealing with offenders are preferable because they are “more in conformity withthe dignity of the human person.”

Now, JohnPaul II’s view that the cases where capital punishment are still needed toprotect society are “very rare, if not practically nonexistent” was of its verynature a prudential judgment concerning matters of social science, law,criminology, etc. about which popes have no special expertise.  For that reason, as Cardinal Ratzinger madeclear, Catholics were not obligated to agree with that judgment.  But Francis’s view that non-lethal means arein every case sufficient to “ensure the due protection” of society is also, ofits very nature, a prudential judgment concerning matters of social science,law, criminology, etc. about which popes have no special expertise.  So, how can Catholics be obligated to assentto the latter view any more than they were obligated to assent to theformer?  What the Ratzinger memorandumsays about John Paul’s teaching applies mutatismutandis to Francis’s teaching.

Development of doctrine?

Annettclaims that Pope Francis’s revision to the Catechism involved a “development ofdoctrine,” one that reflects an “unfolding understanding of the nature of humandignity.”  It is this development, Annettsuggests, that underlies the pope’s moving beyond John Paul II’s allowance forcapital punishment in rare cases to an absolute prohibition of the penalty.

But exactly how does the purported doctrinaldevelopment support this revision?  Theclaim cannot be that this unfolding understanding of human dignity showscapital punishment to be intrinsicallywrong (and thus “inadmissible” for thatreason).  Again, that would contradictthe consistent and irreformable teaching of scripture and 2,000 years oftradition.  And again, Annett himselfexplicitly says that he is not claiming that capital punishment isintrinsically wrong.

LikeFrancis, John Paul II also appealed to respect for human dignity, yet stillstopped short of an absolute prohibition. The reason is that John Paul II allowed that there may be rare caseswhere capital punishment is still practically necessary.  Francis denies this.  But again, that is a prudential judgmentgrounded in empirical claims about modern prison facilities and the like.  There is nothing in the notion of human dignity as such that entails thatsuch-and-such a prison system is effective.

So, it isunclear exactly how a purportedly better understanding of human dignityjustifies the change from John Paul II’s teaching to Francis’s.  Nor does Annett explain how it does.  He just assertsthat it does, and repeats phrases like “human dignity” and “dignity of theperson” as if the repetition by itself sufficed to show that capital punishmentwas somehow a special affront to human dignity.

Sometimes itis claimed that, whatever one thinks of Pope Francis’s revision, Pope John PaulII’s teaching on capital punishment already marked a development ofdoctrine.  But as Joseph Bessette and Ishow in our book ByMan Shall His Blood Be Shed: A Catholic Defense of Capital Punishment,that is not the case.  At pp. 144-82 ofthe book, we offer a detailed and systematic analysis of all the relevantmagisterial texts issued during John Paul II’s pontificate.  We show that John Paul II’s change to previousteaching was entirely prudential innature and in no way doctrinal. 

To be sure,it is sometimes claimed that John Paul II made it a matter of doctrinal principle that capitalpunishment could never even in theory be used except when strictly necessaryfor the defense of society.  But we showthat the pope’s confining of the use of capital punishment to the defense ofsociety was itself a prudential judgement,not a doctrinal principle.  And theChurch has confirmed this.  After Evangelium Vitae was issued and it wasannounced that John Paul II would be updating the Catechism in light of it, Fr.Richard John Neuhaus inquired with Cardinal Ratzinger about whether thisamounted to a doctrinal revision.  As thecardinal said in reply in a letter published in First Things in October 1995, “the Holy Father has not altered the doctrinal principles which pertain to this issue asthey are presented in the Catechism, but has simply deepened the application ofsuch principles in the context of present-day historical circumstances.”

As we alsoshow in the book, such an alteration would itself contradict the teaching ofscripture, the Fathers, and previous popes, which clearly holds that it can be legitimate at least in principleto use capital punishment even forpurposes other than the defense of society. For example, several scriptural passages (such as Genesis 9:6, Numbers35:33, and Deuteronomy 19:11-13) teach that it can be legitimate simply for thepurpose of securing retributive justice. That does not entail that that is by itself a good enough reason toresort to capital punishment in modern circumstances.  But since the Church holds that scripturecannot teach moral error, it follows that it cannot possibly be intrinsically wrong to inflict the deathpenalty simply for the sake of retribution.

So, theclaim that Pope Francis’s revision to the Catechism amounts to a development ofdoctrine cannot be defended by appeal to its connection with John Paul II’steaching.  For again, John Paul II’steaching was itself not a development of doctrine.  If Annett denies this, I direct him to pages144-82 of By Man Shall His Blood Be Shed,where he’ll find the evidence laid out. I’d be happy to listen to any objections he’d raise against thearguments we set out there.

Annett makesanother problematic claim about the development of doctrine when he says that “thecorrect hermeneutic is to read past teaching in light of current teachingrather than vice versa.”  This ismisleading at best.  It is true that theMagisterium is the authoritative interpreter of scripture and tradition.  But that does not entail license to teachjust anything, as the Church herself has repeatedly insisted.  For example, the First Vatican Council teaches:

For the Holy Spirit was promised tothe successors of Peter not so that theymight, by his revelation, make known some new doctrine, but that, by hisassistance, they might religiously guard and faithfully expound the revelationor deposit of faith transmitted by the apostles.

and

That meaning of Holy Scripture mustbe held to be the true one, which Holy mother Church held and holds, since itis her right to judge of the true meaning and interpretation of HolyScripture.  In consequence, it is not permissible for anyone tointerpret Holy Scripture in a sense contrary to this, or indeed against theunanimous consent of the fathers.

Similarly,the Second Vatican Council teaches:

[T]he living teaching office of theChurch… is not above the word of God, but serves it, teaching only what has been handed on, listening to it devoutly,guarding it scrupulously and explaining it faithfully.

And PopeBenedict XVI taught:

The Pope is not an absolute monarchwhose thoughts and desires are law.  Onthe contrary: the Pope's ministry is a guarantee of obedience to Christ and tohis Word.  He must not proclaim his own ideas, but rather constantly bind himselfand the Church to obedience to God's Word, in the face of every attempt toadapt it or water it down, and every form of opportunism.

This entailsthat while the Church can settle disputes over scriptural interpretation, shecan never teach something contrary toscripture, or contrary to the wayscripture was understood by the Fathers of the Church or to what the Church hastraditionally held scripture to mean.

This is onereason why the Church cannot ever teach that capital punishment is intrinsicallyevil.  For as Joe Bessette and Idemonstrate in By Man Shall His Blood BeShed, scripture clearly and consistently teaches that capital punishmentcan be legitimate in principle, the Fathers unanimously understood scripture toteach this, and the Church has always understood scripture to teach this.  This teaching is thus irreformable.

As such, thetraditional teaching puts constraints not only on what the Church may currentlyteach, but on how to interpret whatthe Church currently teaches.  Forexample, if some recent magisterial statement seems, when considered in isolation, to teach that capitalpunishment is intrinsically wrong, but couldinstead be interpreted in a way that is consistent with capital punishment not being intrinsically wrong, then the latter interpretation must prevail.  In that way, current teaching must, contraryto what Annett says, be read in light of past teaching. 

That is byno means to deny that we must also read past teaching in light of currentteaching.  It means that Annett is posinga false choice when he says that we must read the past in light of currentteaching “rather than” the other way around. It’s not a matter of “rather than,” but of “as well as.”  But where there is any outright conflict orappearance of such a conflict, it is indeed past teaching that mustprevail.  That is not only theimplication of the statements from Vatican I, Vatican II, and Benedict XVIquoted above, but also the teaching of the Church’s great theologians of thedevelopment of doctrine, St. Vincent of Lerins and St. John Henry Newman.

Problems with the revision to theCatechism

Now, one ofthe problems with the 2018 revision to the Catechism is that some of what itsays does seem, at least consideredin isolation, to contradict past teaching. In particular, it does so when it quotes a remark from Pope Francis tothe effect that the death penalty “is an attack on the inviolability anddignity of the person.”  This statementseems, given its unqualified formulation, to be saying that the death penaltyis intrinsically, or of its very nature,an attack on the inviolability and dignity of the person.  And thus it seems, at least when consideredin isolation, to be saying that the death penalty is intrinsically wrong.

To be sure,the statement does not have to beread that way.  Given the larger context,it can be read instead as teaching that the death penalty is contrary to humandignity if certain conditions on its useare not met.  And that is indeed theway I think it should be read.  As I havesaid, I do not claim that the pope has taught doctrinal error on this point,but rather that he has spoken without sufficient precision.  And he has a record of doing so.  In thearticle Annett is responding to, I call attention to other examples,such as Pope Francis’s once quoting approvingly a line from Dostoevsky to theeffect that “to kill a murderer is a punishment incomparably worse than thecrime itself.”  Taken at face value, thisstatement is manifestly absurd, and certainly contrary to scripture and thetraditional teaching of the Church.

No doubt thepope was here speaking with rhetorical flourish rather than literally.  And perhaps that is also the case with theline quoted in the revised passage of the Catechism.  But when teaching on doctrinal matters, popeshave a grave duty to speak with precision,especially in documents likeCatechisms.  Hence it is perfectlylegitimate, in light of the norms outlined in Donum Veritatis, respectfully to criticize the 2018 revision of theCatechism for failing to do so.

Anotherproblem with the revision to the Catechism concerns its prudential judgement tothe effect that “effective systems of detention have been developed, whichensure the due protection of citizens” without ever having to execute offenders. This is far from obviously true. Indeed, I would argue that it is false.

There areseveral relevant considerations here. First, the Catechism simply assumes, without argument, that capitalpunishment has no deterrence value.  Butthat is a question of social science, not theology.  And social scientists disagree on the matter,with many holding that the death penalty doesin fact deter when offenders know there is a good chance they really will beexecuted if they commit a murder.  JoeBessette and I set out the evidence in our book, and defend the claim thatcapital punishment has significant deterrence value.

Now if thatis correct, then innocent lives areendangered by abolishing capital punishment, in which case the Catechism’sprudential judgement that “due protection of citizens” can be achieved withoutcapital punishment is mistaken.  Ofcourse, whether the death penalty really does deter is controversial.  But the point is that, of its nature, this isnot a matter of theological principle but rather an empirical question aboutwhich churchmen have no special expertise.  

Anotherimportant consideration is that some offenders remain threats to the lives ofothers even when effectively imprisoned. Organized crime leaders can order murders from behind prison walls.  Some imprisoned murderers kill prison guardsor fellow prisoners.  And if capitalpunishment is entirely off the table, then they have no incentive not to do soif they are already in prison for previous murders.  Then there are those sentenced to life in prisonwho escape from prison.  What is toprevent them from killing while on the run, if the threat of capital punishmentdoes not hang over them?  For theyalready face a resumption of their life sentences if recaptured. 

Having theoption of threatening offenders with capital punishment also gives theprosecutor an invaluable tool for convincing them to plea bargain.  And this can save innocent lives if thecooperation of such offenders helps police catch other murderers.  Then there is the fact that it is simply nottrue that systems of imprisonment sufficient to protect citizens exist everywhere in the world.  Yet the revision to the Catechism does not acknowledgethis.  It simply speaks of abolishingcapital punishment worldwide, full stop, rather than abolishing it when and where it is safe to do so.

Naturally, acritic of capital punishment might try to develop responses to thesepoints.  But again, they are not mattersthat can be settled by appeal to abstract theological principle.  Like the question of how to apply just war theoryto particular cases, determining whether capital punishment is still necessaryto protect citizens requires a prudential judgement about matters that popesand bishops have no expertise about.  Andas with the application of just war theory, the decision must ultimately bemade by the public authorities who have the responsibility for protectingcitizens, not churchmen.  This is why theRatzinger memorandum acknowledges that “there may be a legitimate diversity ofopinion even among Catholics” about capital punishment.  It is simply not the sort of thing the Churchcan reasonably foreclose public debate about. 

Finally, Iwould argue that it is in any event a bad idea to insert prudential judgmentsinto the Catechism, and especially to keep changing them (as the Catechism’sstatement on the death penalty has now been changed two times).  It confuses the average person, who typicallydoes not understand the difference between matters of doctrine and prudentialapplications of doctrine, and therefore wrongly comes to think that the Churchhas changed or could change the longstanding teaching of scripture andtradition.  This makes it seem in turn asif everything the Church teaches might be “up for grabs.” 

Again, thesecriticisms of the revision to the Catechism in no way constitute “dissent” frombinding Catholic teaching.  They areentirely within the range of the respectful criticism that Donum Veritatis acknowledges to be permissible.  And to those faithful Catholics whorespectfully raise criticisms of deficient magisterial statements, Donum Veritatis offers the followingreassuring words:

For a loyal spirit, animated by lovefor the Church, such a situation can certainly prove a difficult trial.  It can be a call to suffer for the truth, insilence and prayer, but with the certainty, that if the truth really is atstake, it will ultimately prevail.