Strawson on free will and interpersonal relationships

In hisclassic paper “Freedomand Resentment,” P. F. Strawson addresses the question of whatdifference the widespread acceptance of determinism would make to our everydayways of dealing with each other.  Hejudges that our commonsense conception of human behavior is too deeply rootedin our nature to be dislodged even in such a scenario.  As in Strawson’s other work, he urges attentionto details of ordinary experience that are ineliminable but often overlooked byrevisionist systems of metaphysics.

Strawsondistinguishes between what he calls the participantreactive attitudes that are the norm in interpersonal relationships, andthe objective attitude that can inexceptional cases supplant it.  Let’sbegin with the first set of attitudes, which can be understood by reference tothe different ways we can harm or benefit each other, and the different ways wereact to these different harms and benefits.

Consider twooccasions, one in which someone deliberately pushes you, and the other in whichsomeone pushes into you by accident (as a result of tripping, say).  The physical harm caused to you might be thesame in either case.  But the first person’saction will generate in you a feeling of resentmentthat the latter person’s will not.  Orconsider a case where you are stranded and a stranger gives you money for cab fare,and also a case where you are stranded and find some money that someone haslost and with which you can pay for a cab. The benefit to you will be the same in either case, but the first willproduce in you a feeling of gratitude thatthe second will not.

Actions thatproduce in you a feeling like resentment do so because you take it that whatmoves the other person to perform them are factors like malevolence, rudeness,indifference, contempt, or an intention to insult.  Actions that produce in you a feeling likegratitude do so because you take it that what moves the other person to performthem are factors like kindness, goodwill, affection, and esteem. 

Consideralso forgiveness.  Strawson notes that this presupposes that theaction being forgiven was indeed appropriately met with resentment, but thatthe guilty party acknowledges this and repudiates the action.  The forgiving person accepts this repudiationon the part of the offender and, in turn, cancels the resentment.

Resentment,gratitude, and forgiveness are “participant reactive attitudes” insofar as theyinvolve reacting to other human beings as fellow participants in a commoninterpersonal form of life.  We see eachother, not as impersonal forces, but as rational agents having various beliefs,desires, and other propositional attitudes (as philosophers call them), asacting on the basis of these and thus subject to moral and rational appraisal,and as, accordingly, to be held responsible for the things we choose to do ontheir basis.

Within thisgeneral framework, various specific kinds of relationships exist – between familymembers, friends, lovers, colleagues, those who have some interest in common(such as a political cause or hobby), those we deal with temporarily in chanceencounters (such as a grocery store employee or a clerk at the post office),and so on.  The nature of theserelationships determines the specific expectations we have of people, the waysthey might offend or please us, etc.  Butthey are all variations on the same basic theme of regarding others as fellowpersons or rational agents, to whom it is appropriate to take the variousparticipant reactive attitudes.

Now, focusingon resentment in particular, Strawson says that there are, within thiscommonsense framework for dealing with others, two sorts of cases where resentmentat another person’s action can be removed or at least mitigated.  First, there are the cases where, after morecarefully considering the matter, we make judgments of the kind expressed insentences like “He didn’t mean to,” “He didn’t know,” “He couldn’t help it,” “Hehad no alternative,” and so on.  Wethereby absolve the person of responsibility. However, Strawson emphasizes, this is not because we judge that the participant reactive attitudes(resentment, gratitude, forgiveness, etc.) are not after all applicable to theperson.  On the contrary, we believe thatthey are in general applicable to him,that he is a fellow member of the community of rational agents.  Rather, we simply judge that in theparticular case at hand, the attitude of resentment is not after allappropriate.  For though we initiallysupposed that the person’s action was the result of ill will, we later come tojudge that it was not.

Second, though,there are cases where we drop the attitude of resentment because we judge thatthe other person is deranged, or acting under compulsion, or that “He wasn’thimself,” or that he is just a small child. In other words, we attribute the person’s behavior to psychological abnormalityor immaturity, and for that reason judge that he does not bear the sort ofresponsibility required in order for an attitude of resentment to bereasonable. 

Now in thissort of case, Strawson says, we do nottreat the person in question as a normal fellow member of the community ofrational agents, to whom it is appropriate to take the participant reactive attitudes.  Here is where the “objective attitude” comesin.  It involves not dealing with anotherin the ordinary interpersonal way, but instead as something to be managed, treated, cured, handled, trained, controlled, orthe like.

Think of theway we regard wind or rain that damages the house, or a stray neighborhood catthat leaves its droppings on the lawn.  Wemight get angry at these things, but we don’t literally resent them, because we don’t conceive of them in the personalterms that alone could make such an attitude intelligible.  Nor, for the same reason, do we literallyfeel gratitude toward wind and rainthat pass without leaving damage behind, or a cat that does its businesssomewhere other than the lawn.  We manage or control a situation involving wind, rain, or a cat, rather thandealing with them the way we would a fellow member of the community of rationalagents.

When we takewhat Strawson calls the “objective attitude” to another human being, we dosomething similar.  We judge that theperson has fallen from normal interpersonal capacity (in the case of severe psychologicalabnormality) or that he hasn’t yet risen to it (in the case ofimmaturity).  And thus we see hisbehavior as something to manage or control rather than to feel resentment,gratitude, forgiveness, etc. toward.

Now, supposebelief in determinism became widespread in society, rather than something thatonly intellectuals thought much about. It might seem that the result would be the disappearance of the participantreactive attitudes.  For those attitudespresuppose responsibility, and determinism might seem to undermine the viewthat people are responsible.  But Strawsonthinks that while it may be possible in theory to abandon the participantreactive attitudes, in practice it could never happen. 

For onething, he notes, accepting determinism would not entail abandoning attitudes like resentment for the usualreasons we cancel our resentment against another person.  Again, there are two such reasons.  First, we might judge that the person wasafter all acting out of goodwill rather than ill will.  But accepting determinism would hardly leadus to conclude that all people are really after all always acting out of goodwill!  It would not entail that anytime anyone doesanything, it’s because he didn’t know any better, didn’t mean it, etc.  Second, we might judge that a person waseither psychologically abnormal or immature and thus not responsible.  But accepting determinism would hardly leadus to conclude that all people are after all psychologically abnormal orimmature!  So, again, determinism would notentail that we should extend our usual reasons for denying that someone isresponsible for an action to allpeople and all actions. 

Strawson’spoint here seems to be that it is the context of our ordinary participantreactive attitudes that gives senseor intelligibility to our decisionnot to hold someone responsible.  And thatcontext makes the denial of responsibility the exception rather than the rule. What we cannot plausibly do is extend this denial of responsibility sothat it becomes the rule rather than theexception.

Strawsonalso suggests that to abandon the participant reactive attitudes would entail alevel of “human isolation” that we are simply incapable of bearing.  Imagine trying consistently to adopt theobjective attitude across the board to all human beings and all their actions –seriously regarding them as if they were like the wind, rain, or neighborhoodcat, something to be managed or controlled rather than sincerely reasoned with,grateful or resentful toward, etc.  Itwould be like trying to think of them on the model of an AI device (Alexa orSiri) or an ATM machine rather than a real human being.  Moreover, to be consistent you’d need to takethis attitude toward yourself aswell.  This is psychologically impossibleand would lead to a mental breakdown if seriously attempted.  The participant reactive attitude simply goestoo deep in human nature, no less than eating, sleeping, perceiving, andwalking do.  It is, Strawson says, notsomething we can simply choose either to accept or reject.

To expand onStrawson’s point, we might note that the participant reactive attitude goes so deep that it is evident even in the behaviorof those who deny the reality of free will, and indeed even in the very act ofdefending this denial and drawing implications from it.  For example, those who claim (quitemistakenly) that neuroscience or some other scientific finding shows freewill to be illusory try to convince people who disagree, sometimes accuse themof intellectual dishonesty if they resist, may express contempt for them andtheir purported ignorance, etc.  None ofthis is consistent with the denial of free will.  If people don’t have free will, then whileyou may speak to them as if you arereasoning with them (as you might with a dog or an AI like Alexa), you cannotreally do so.  Nor can you blame them forremaining unconvinced by your arguments if they are simply unfree in everythingthey think and do, including in their persistence in believing that they arefree.

Those whoclaim that free will is illusory also often take this to entail that we shouldabandon the notion of responsibility and, consequently, the institution ofpunishment.  But as Strawson’s analysisimplies, to give up the participant reactive attitudes would entail abandoning farmore than just that.  We would also haveto give up attitudes like resentment, gratitude, and forgiveness, along withpraise and blame of any kind, any attempt to reason with others, and soon.  Again, to be consistent we wouldhave to adopt the “objective attitude” wholesale, treating others and ourselvesas things to be managed or controlled, just as we would the wind and rain, adog, an ATM machine, or the like.  Thereis nothing special about punishment,specifically, that makes it intelligible why we would give that up but keep most of the other aspects of the participant reactiveattitude.  It all goes, or none of itdoes.  And as Strawson says, it simply isn’tpossible for it all to go.

Exactly whatare the metaphysical implications of Strawson’s analysis?  It could be taken in different directions.  For example, one could (though I certainlywould not) interpret it in a compatibilistway, holding that we are free as long as we do what we want to do withoutexternal compulsion of the ordinary kinds, but where this does not rule out ourwants being themselves determined.  Onecould take it in a Kantian direction, holding that it shows that we must ofnecessity think of ourselves as if weare free, but where this falls short of a metaphysical demonstration that wereally are free.  Or one could take it to provide theingredients for such a demonstration, an argument to the effect that denyingfree will is ultimately incoherent. 

I am partialto the latter approach, though demonstrating the reality of free will is atopic for another time.  (In fact it isone of the many topics addressed in the book on the soul that I am working onand hope at last to finish by the end of the summer.)