After its EFV and aviation blunders, the Marine Corps needs to strive to regain its old reputation of doing more with less

By Col. T.X. Hammes, USMC (Ret.)

Best Defense guest columnist

As Lt.
Gen. Victor Krulak noted, the nation doesn't need a Marine
Corps. It has a Marine
Corps because it wants one. Part of that want is the assurance the Corps
combines value for money and readiness to fight. Unfortunately, some of the
Corps' recent decisions have undercut those arguments.



We are adamant we need the F-35B -- the most expensive and least capable of the
F-35 family.  We state that we must have the "invaluable" STOVL
capability yet we cannot point to any example in the 30 years of flying
Harriers that STOVL has been essential operationally to the nation.  That
capability has been useful in several operations but not essential.  More
expensive and, in some ways, less capable than an upgraded F-18, the F-35B will
also be very expensive to operate.  Thus we will fly fewer hours and be
less ready.  This is all at a time that even open source reporting is
stating that new IRST (infra-red search and track) pods will allow any fighter
equipped with one to see the F-35. Defense
Technology International notes that IRST pods are standard on Sukhoi and
MiG fighter.  (Dec 2011, p. 39). Simulations indicate this will result in
more close-in fights -- exactly the arena where the F-35 is weak.



Interestingly, the Corps was just as adamant about the Expeditionary Fighting
Vehicle despite that fact that its purchase would have consumed the Corps's
budget for ALL ground equipment.  To get the EFV we would have had to give
up everything else.   Fortunately, this program has been cancelled.



In a similar way, the F-35B will consume a major portion of the Corps' aviation
acquisition budget.  To gain this "nice to have" STOVL capability,
the Corps will have to give up other fully tested and capable assets - during a
time of declining budgets.   It will also have to carry the much higher
operating costs for the life of the aircraft.



In sharp contrast, the Corps has updated the UH and AH to first class systems
for a fraction of the cost of developing new systems.   These programs are
in keeping with the Corps' historical frugality.   Similarly, the Corps'
purchase of the Brits used Harriers as parts blocks for our fleet is typical of
what Americans expect from us.



For despite these programs, decades of relentlessly pursuing three most
expensive end items in anyone's inventory - F-35B, MV-22 and EFV, means our
Corps needs to earn back its reputation for being ready with less money.
This includes getting serious about looming personnel cuts.  Being
ready is less about the total number of people than the correct number and mix
of people.  We were certainly ready for the conventional phases of
Afghanistan and Iraq when our force was about 170K.  Given that, I have a
great deal of trouble justifying the expense of the planned 182-186K once we
leave Afghanistan.   The last decade's rapid increase in personnel costs
means it will cost us a great deal more to maintain the same size force.



Of particular concern to this author, the Corps was being looked at for a cut
to 150K in 2001 -- when we had record surpluses.  It is prudent we start
looking hard at that number during this period of record deficits.  While
it may not make sense from a strategic point of view, political necessity may
well drive us there.  We need to think through how the Corps remains ready
at that number while simultaneously dealing with a reduced operations and
maintenance budget.



Our
Corps' ethos has carried it through lean times.  Part of that ethos is the
willingness of both individuals and the institution to question conventional
wisdom. Thus, it is particularly disturbing to see one's loyalty to the Corps
questioned if one questions the current policies.  Losing that is much
more of a danger to the Corps than a draw down.



The key, as always for the Corps, is to maintain our culture.  It was our
culture that allowed a Corps with only 76,000 on active duty to mobilize and
deploy a division/wing team in less than a month in 1950.  Readiness is
not tied to end strength but to attitude.  It is that attitude that
Americans treasure.



Semper Fi,

T. X. Hammes  

T.
X. Hammes served 30 years in the Marine Corps and is now a Senior Research
Fellow at National Defense University.  The views expressed are his
personal views and do not reflect the views of the Department of Defense or the
University.