We know from political crises in Africa that foreign intervention is a bad idea

In Africa, foreign support for governments that benefit privileged elites and their external backers has perpetuated violence and instability. It won't be any different for Latin American countries like Venezuela.





Image credit David Hern��ndez via Flickr (CC).

The��political, economic, and humanitarian��crisis in oil-rich��Venezuela��has caught the world���s attention.��As foreign powers position themselves for intervention, lessons from Africa��offer��insights into��what will��not��work��and��the dangers that lie ahead.

This is what we know.��When��Juan Hugo��Ch��vez��won��Venezuela���s��presidential election��in 1998, he was swept into office��on��a��platform calling for social revolution.��Although its huge��oil reserves made��Venezuela��one of��Latin America���s��richest��counties, it was��profoundly��unequal, with the��descendants of European settlers��dominating��the��state and economy.��Venezuela���s poor,��indigenous,��and African-Venezuelan��populations��rallied to Ch��vez��and his��call to��redistribute��wealth and power.��Following��Ch��vez���s��death��in 2013,��Nicol��s Maduro��was elected to office, claiming��his predecessor���s��socialist mantle. However,��the Maduro��government was��marred by authoritarian practices, human rights abuses,��and��economic mismanagement.��The vast majority of Venezuelans continued to live in extreme poverty,��and��millions��left the country��to survive.��Returned to office in��2018��in elections widely viewed as fraudulent, Maduro was confronted by massive popular protests��from across��the political and economic spectrum.

The crisis intensified in��January 2019,��when��Juan��Guaid��,��president of the��Venezuelan��National Assembly,��declared himself��president.��Deemed��a savior by some and a��usurper��by others,��Guaid����based��his��legitimacy��on��a constitutional clause that, in the absence of an elected head of state, vests power in the National Assembly president until free and��fair��elections��occur. Maduro, predictably,��refused to step aside;��his military and police remained loyal,��and��protests continued.��The��international community lined up to take sides��that aligned��with��their��political and��economic interests.��Some, including the United States,��hinted that military intervention may be in the offing.

Guaid�����s��international backers claim to be responding��to��a��power grab��by an illegitimate authoritarian regime.��They point to widespread opposition to Maduro��within��Venezuela��and��present��themselves as enforcers of the people���s will.��What is really��at stake��is��Venezuela���s enormous wealth���who��will��control it and whom��will��it��benefit.��Rather than resolve a humanitarian crisis, foreign intervention is certain��to intensify it.��The legacy of US intervention in Latin America, which��the United States has treated as its ���backyard��� since the nineteenth century, has left a bitterness that is far more powerful than��local��hostility toward��a brutal��president.��Foreign��meddling, with the aim of returning to power��the old oligarchy that enriched��foreign��businesses, is��likely��to��sharpen divisions, increase violence,��and��create a dangerous power vacuum.

Lessons from recent interventions in Africa��should be heeded.��Cases��from across the continent��underscore the fact that, regardless of the official rationale, external powers tend to intervene only where their own political, economic, and strategic interests are at stake.��Rather than promoting peace and stability,��foreign��military intervention��has��more��often��increased��outside support for repressive regimes,��exacerbated��local conflicts,��and undermined��prospects for regional peace.

Take the cases��of Libya��and Somalia���two of many that illustrate these points.��During the Arab Spring uprisings of 2011, foreign governments and��organizations��intervened in Libya, ostensibly��to protect civilian lives, but with��regime change��as��an��unofficial��objective.��The��NATO-backed��overthrow of��Muammar��Qaddafi��resulted��in��a power vacuum that opened the door to��civil war��and terrorist infiltration��in Libya, with widespread regional ramifications���including a military coup and jihadist insurgency in Mali��with��ripple effects throughout the Sahel.

Foreign intervention in Somalia, which��provoked��decades of instability and��a terrorist insurgency, is especially instructive.��After the Cold War, Western powers abandoned��the��Somali strongman, Siad Barre, whom they��no longer needed as a��regional policeman.��Warlords and militias vied for power, state institutions and basic services��crumbled, the formal economy ceased to function, and southern Somalia disintegrated into fiefdoms ruled by rival warlords and their militias. War-induced famine, compounded by drought, threatened the lives of much of the population.

In 1992, the UN Security Council authorized the establishment of a U.S.-led multinational military task force to��ensure the delivery of humanitarian relief.��In 1993, another UN mission, also led by the United States, permitted military personnel to forcibly disarm��and arrest��Somali warlords and militia��members.��As the��United States embroiled��itself��in Somalia���s civil war,��it��generated��enormous hostility��within the civilian population.��As a result, when US Special Operations Forces��attempted to capture key militia leaders in October 1993,��and��Somali��militias shot down two Black Hawk helicopters, angry crowds attacked the surviving soldiers and their rescuers.�� Eighteen American��troops��and some one thousand Somali men, women, and children were killed in the��violence that ensued.

The United States and��UN hastily withdrew��from Somalia, and the turmoil��intensified.��Islamist groups gained widespread popular support by providing essential social services and��courts to enforce��law and order. However, the United States, which viewed��all��Islamists as a threat,��worked with Somali warlords and neighboring Ethiopia to oust them.��The result was an anti-foreign��backlash��and the��transformation��of al-Shabaab,��originally��a��youth militia that defended the Islamic courts, into��a violent jihadist organization that quickly gained the support of al-Qaeda.��As��al-Shabaab took control of large swaths of��central and southern Somali��in 2007, the UN��and��African��Union��intervened,��neighboring countries��interceded to��push their own agendas, and al-Shabaab extended its targets to include them.��Today,��the Somali government,��weak��and��beholden to��outsiders, has little internal support, and al-Shabaab continues��to wreak havoc��in Somalia and��the region.

What lesson should be learned?��In Africa, foreign support for governments that��benefit��privileged elites and their external backers has��perpetuated violence and instability. It is��bound to do the same in Latin America.��Latin American��pro-democracy movements, like their��African��counterparts,��demand��access to education, employment, health care, clean water, sanitation,��electricity, and��infrastructure. They��call for��responsive democratic governments that respect the rule of law, eliminate corruption, and��distribute��resources��more equitably.��If��underlying political, economic, and social grievances are��ignored, intervention by outsiders��will��only��intensify violence and instability and��undermine��prospects for��an enduring peace.