Why governance will go from bad to worse in Zimbabwe

Events around the recent election in Zimbabwe are evidence that transitional justice is needed before true political reform can take place.





President Ramaphosa of South Africa and Mnangagwa of Zimbabwe at the 10th BRICS summit in 2018. Image credit the Government of South Africa via Flickr.

���We have removed Mugabe but not Mugabe-ism.���

���Nelson��Chamisa,��Leader:��MDC��Alliance

Nine��months ago, I penned a��commentary piece��on the uncertain future of transitional justice��in Zimbabwe��following the so-called ���bloodless coup��� that removed��from power��president Robert Mugabe��after 37 years��and installed as interim president��Emmerson��Mnangagwa.��Mnangagwa��claimed ���the beginning of a new and unfolding democracy,��� inviting many to speculate about��whether governance in Zimbabwe would improve.��There was��some��optimism, both in��Zimbabwe��and��abroad. However,��it��proved mostly��misguided��and��premature, given regime elites��� aversion to transitional justice.��In countries like Zimbabwe,��failing to account for the past��and��guarantee��non-repetition of abuses��makes��democratization��exceedingly unlikely.��And,��Mnangagwa���s��and��his��collaborators�����actions��over the past��nine��months��suggest as much.

Transitional justice can be broadly defined as justice adapted to societies in transition from profound and sustained political violence.��Accounting for political violence, and establishing a historical record from which political actors cannot deviate, has��tremendous consequences for national politics,��such as which political parties perform well, whether violence recurs, and to what degree human rights are respected and the rule of law is maintained.��Transitional justice��has four main pillars���truth, justice, reparations��and institutional reforms���which collectively help create a foundation for��democracy, human rights��and the rule of law.

In��my��previous��article, I��identified��perhaps the most consequential��failed attempt��at��transitional justice��in��Zimbabwe in��the mid-1980s��and��that��forewarns��that there��will��not be substantial improvements to governance��without some degree of accountability��for��violence ordered and executed by Mugabe,��Mnangagwa��and company.��In 1983, a��truth commission��was established to account for��Gukurahundi, a repressive campaign which resulted in the killing of an estimated 20,000 people in Ndebele-majority Matabeleland.��Mnangagwa��claims he was not directly involved,��despite being��minister��of��state��security��and head of Zimbabwe���s Central��Intelligence Organization��(CIO)��at the time, and despite��himself��promising to kill the so-called ���dissidents��� and destroy their organizational infrastructure��(The Chronicle, April 5, 1983). These contradictory narratives are made possible in part because the truth��commission���s report was never released.��Contradictory��narratives��obstruct a��public acknowledgement of harm,��reparations for victims��� families, criminal accountability��for perpetrators,��and��institutional reforms���the last of which��may��be most consequential for Zimbabwe��at this point in its history.

Institutional reforms��can help advance democracy��following��authoritarian government.��Three kinds of reforms are especially important: legal reforms, personnel reforms��and electoral reforms.��Legal reforms��may��include��changes to��a country���s Constitution,��such as��reshaping��and constraining��the powers, privileges��and immunities��of the executive.��Personnel reforms��can involve removing from office persons who have directed, participated, or been complicit in human rights��violations��and other��abuses.��Electoral��reforms��may involve��installing term limits,��creating an independent electoral commission��and using monitors.��However,��none of these reforms are likely to be delivered because they��would��threaten those currently in power.

First, in terms of the law, the Zimbabwean Constitution provides for��presidential immunity��from civil and criminal proceedings, which the military honored for both the former president and��first lady.��Mnangagwa��is counting on��immunity from prosecution��should��he��ever find himself in the Mugabe���s��position.��Second, with��respect to personnel, there is a long and established record of regime insiders enjoying��both de jure and��de facto��amnesty, a practice that��is being applied��to��coup leaders��and��which��bolsters��the dominance of��ZANU-PF��and the��power��of the military.��Third, regarding��elections,��domestic and international audiences��have come to expect sham elections that are swiftly followed by acts of violence,��and intimidation��of��opposition��leaders��and��their��supporters.��The��July 30��elections��were��no exception.

Despite the presence of��international��election observers��and a captive global audience,��the first post-Mugabe elections��failed��to be��credible, free��and fair, and do not reflect the��general��will of the people.��Though��Mnangagwa��has been��declared��the winner, the MDC Alliance opposition party��claims��foul-play and that��its candidate,��Nelson��Chamisa,��is the real winner.��Disturbingly, the elections have been��marred by violence��directed at leaders, members, and supporters of the MDC Alliance. Scenes of��tear gas, live ammunition, and bloody corpses��in the streets of Harare hearken back to��previous episodes��of political violence designed to maintain regime and party power.��Activist groups��have documented��arrests,��abductions and beatings, as well as��harassment, including��raids onto private property.��With��many in the opposition��now��forced into hiding, politicians��and commentators warn that��repression has��gone���and will��continue to��go���from bad to worse��under��Mnangagwa, making prospects for democracy, human rights��and��the rule of law��dimmer��than ever.

The events of the past year, and especially the last week, reveal that��the��Mnangagwa��administration will extend, if not intensify,��kleptocracy, corruption��and repression��as practiced during the Mugabe administration.��A��lack of truth, justice, reparations��and��especially��institutional reforms typified the Mugabe regime, made possible��the rise of��Mnangagwa,��and��will continue to strengthen his and collaborators��� grip on power.