Daniel Orr's Blog, page 117

November 5, 1978 – Iranian Revolution: In a television broadcast, the Shah of Iran acknowledges the ongoing revolution but disapproves of it

On November 5, 1978, Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi acknowledged in a nationwide broadcast the ongoing popular revolution taking place but says
that he disapproved of it. He also pledged to make amends for his mistakes and work to restore democracy. The following day, he dismissed Prime Minister Sharif-Emami, replacing him with General Gholam Reza Azhari, a moderate military officer.  The Shah also arrested and jailed 80 former government officials whom he believed had failed the country and ultimately were responsible for the current unrest; the loss of his staunchest supporters, however, further isolated the Shah.  Simultaneously, he also released hundreds of opposition political prisoners.

(Taken from Iranian Revolution – Wars of the 20th Century – Volume 4)

Background

Under the Shah, Iran developed close political, military, and economic ties with the United States, was firmly West-aligned and anti-communist, and received military and economic aid, as well as purchased vast amounts of weapons and military hardware from the United States.  The Shah built a powerful military, at its peak the fifth largest in the world, not only as a deterrent against the Soviet
Union but just as important, as a counter against the Arab countries (particularly Iraq), Iran’s traditional rival for supremacy in the Persian Gulf region.  Local opposition and dissent were stifled by SAVAK (Organization of Intelligence and National Security;
Persian: Sāzemān-e Ettelā’āt va Amniyat-e Keshvar), Iran’s CIA-trained intelligence and security agency that was ruthlessly effective and transformed the country into a police state.

Iran, the world’s fourth largest oil producer, achieved phenomenal economic growth in the 1960s and 1970s and more particularly after the 1973 oil crisis when world oil prices jumped four-fold, generating huge profits for Iran that allowed its government to embark on massive infrastructure construction projects as well as social programs such as health care and education.  And in a country where society was both strongly traditionalist and religious (99% of the population is Muslim), the Shah led a government that was both secular and western-oriented, and implemented programs and policies that sought to develop the country based on western technology and some aspects of western culture.  Iran’s push to westernize and secularize would be major factors in the coming revolution.  The initial signs of what ultimately became a full-blown uprising took place sometime in 1977.

At the core of the Shiite form of Islam in Iran is the ulama (Islamic scholars) led by ayatollahs (the top clerics) in a religious hierarchy that includes other orders of preachers, prayer leaders, and cleric
authorities that administered the 9,000 mosques around the country.  Traditionally, the ulama was apolitical and did not interfere with state policies, but occasionally offered counsel or its opinions on government matters and policies.

In January 1963, the Shah launched sweeping major social and economic reforms aimed at shedding off the country’s feudal, traditionalist culture and to modernize society.  These ambitious reforms, known as the “White Revolution”, included programs that
advanced health care and education, and the labor and business sectors.  The centerpiece of these reforms, however, was agrarian reform, where the government broke up the vast agriculture landholdings owned by the landed few and distributed the divided parcels to landless peasants who formed the great majority of the rural population.  While land reform achieved some measure of success with about 50% of peasants acquiring land, the program failed to win over the rural population as the Shah intended; instead, the deeply religious peasants remained loyal to the clergy.  Agrarian reform also antagonized the clergy, as most clerics belonged to wealthy landowning families who now were deprived of their lands.

Much of the clergy did not openly oppose these reforms, except for some clerics in Qom led by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, who in January 22, 1963 denounced the Shah for implementing the White Revolution; this would mark the start of a long
antagonism that would culminate in the clash between secularism and religion fifteen years later.  The clerics also opposed other aspects of the White Revolution, including extending voting rights to women and allowing non-Muslims to hold government office, as well as because the reforms would reduce the cleric’s influence in education and family law.  The Shah responded to Ayatollah Khomeini’s attacks by rebuking the religious establishment as being old-fashioned and inward-looking, which drew outrage from even moderate clerics.  Then on June 3, 1963, Ayatollah Khomeini
launched personal attacks on the Shah, calling the latter “a wretched, miserable man” and likening the monarch to the “tyrant” Yazid I (an Islamic caliph of the 7th century).  The government responded two days later, on June 5, 1963, by arresting and jailing
the cleric.

Ayatollah Khomeini’s arrest sparked strong protests that degenerated into riots in Tehran, Qom, Shiraz, and other cities.  By the third day, the violence had been quelled, but not before a disputed number of protesters were killed, i.e. government cites 32 fatalities, the opposition gives 15,000, and other sources indicate hundreds.

Ayatollah Khomeini was released a few months later.  Then on October 26, 1964, he again denounced the government, this time for the Iranian parliament’s recent approval of the so-called “Capitulation” Bill, which stipulated that U.S.
military and civilian personnel in Iran, if charged with committing criminal offenses, could not be prosecuted in Iranian courts.  To Ayatollah Khomeini, the law was evidence that the Shah and the Iranian government were subservient to the United States.  The ayatollah again was arrested and imprisoned; government and military leaders deliberated on his fate, which included execution (but rejected out of concerns that it might incite more unrest), and finally decided to exile the cleric.  In November 1964, Ayatollah Khomeini was forced to leave the country; he eventually settled in Najaf, Iraq, where he lived for the next 14 years.

While in exile, the cleric refined his absolutist version of the Islamic concept of the “Wilayat al Faqih” (Guardianship of the Jurisprudent), which stipulates that an Islamic country’s highest spiritual and political authority must rest with the best-qualified member (jurisprudent) of the Shiite clergy, who imposes Sharia (Islamic) Law and ensures that state policies and decrees conform with this law. 
The cleric formerly had accepted the Shah and the monarchy in the original concept of Wilayat al Faqih; later, however, he viewed all forms of royalty incompatible with Islamic rule.  In fact, the ayatollah would later reject all other (European) forms of
government, specifically citing democracy and communism, and famously declared that an Islamic government is “neither east nor west”.

Ayatollah Khomeini’s political vision of clerical rule was disseminated in religious circles and mosques throughout Iran from audio recordings that were smuggled into the country by his followers and which was tolerated or largely ignored by Iranian government authorities.  In the later years of his exile, however, the cleric had become somewhat forgotten in Iran, particularly among the younger age groups.

Meanwhile in Iran, the Shah continued to carry out secular programs that alienated most of the
population.  In October 1971, to commemorate 25 centuries since the founding of the Persian Empire, the Shah organized a lavish program of activities in Persepolis, capital of the First Persian Empire.  Then in March 1976, the Shah announced that Iran
henceforth would adopt the “imperial” calendar (based on the reign of Persian king Cyrus the Great) to replace the Islamic calendar.  These acts, considered anti-Islamic by the clergy and many Iranians, would form part of the anti-royalist backlash in the coming revolution.

November 4, 1962 – Sino-Indian War: China offers India a mutual secession of territory

On November 4, 1962, the Chinese government through Premier Zhou Enlai offered to relinquish its claim to the North-East Frontier Agency (NEFA)
in exchange for India doing the same for Aksai Chin. The offer was made during a lull in the fighting
during the Sino-Indian War. On November 14, Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru rejected the offer, leading to a resumption of fighting after a three-week lull. In mid-November, the Indian government declared a state of emergency throughout the country.

(Taken from Sino-Indian War – Wars of the 20th Century – Twenty Wars in Asia)

The Sino-Indian War began on October 20, 1962 when Chinese forces launched offensives in two main sectors: in the eastern sector (North-East Frontier Agency; NEFA) north of the McMahon Line, and in the western sector in Aksai Chin.  Some fighting also occurred in the Nathu La Pass, Sikkim near the China-India border.  The Chinese government called the operation a “self-defensive counterattack”, implying that India had started the war by crossing north of the McMahon Line.

Sino-Indian War.

Background

In the 19th century, the British and Russian Empires were locked in a political and territorial rivalry known as the Great Game, where the two powers sought to control and dominate Central Asia.  The Russians advanced southward into territories that ultimately would form the present-day countries of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, while the British advanced northward across the Indian subcontinent.  By the mid-1800s, Britain had established full control over territories of British India and the Princely States (present-day India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh).  Just as it did with the Russians regarding British territories in northwest India, the British government sought to establish its territorial limits in the east with the other great regional power, China.  British authorities particularly wanted to delineate British India’s boundaries in Kashmir in the north with China’s Xinjiang Province, as well as British India’s borders in the east with Tibet (a semi-autonomous state under Chinese suzerainty), thereby establishing a common British India-China border across the towering Himalaya Mountains. 

In 1865, the Survey of India published a boundary for Kashmir that included the 37,000 square-kilometer Aksai Chin region (Figure 43), a barren, uninhabited high-altitude (22,000 feet) desert containing salt and soda flats.  However, this delineation, called the Johnson Line (named after William Johnson, a British surveyor), was rejected by the British government.

In 1893, a Chinese official in Kashgar proposed to the British that the Laktsang Range serve as the British India-China border, with the Lingzi Tang Plains to its south to become part of Kashmir and Aksai Chin to its north to become part of China.  The proposal found favor with the British, who in 1899, drew the Macartney-MacDonald Line (named after George Macartney, the British consul-general in Kashgar and Claude MacDonald, a British diplomat), which was presented to the Chinese government.  The latter did not respond, which the British took to mean that the Chinese agreed with the Line.  Thereafter, up until about 1908, British maps
of India featured the Macartney-MacDonald Line (Figure 44) as the China-India border.  However, by the 1920s, the British published new maps using the Johnson Line as the Kashmir-Xinjiang border.

Similarly, British authorities took steps to establish British India’s boundaries with Tibet and China.  For this purpose, in 1913-1914, in a series
of negotiations held in Simla (present-day Shimla in northern India), representatives from China, Tibet,
and British India agreed on the territorial limits between “Outer Tibet” and British India.  Outer Tibet
was to be formed as an autonomous Tibetan polity under Chinese suzerainty.  However, the Chinese delegate objected to the proposed border between “Outer Tibet” and “Inner Tibet”, and walked out of the
conference.  Tibetan and British representatives continued with the conference, leading to the Simla Accord (1914) which established the McMahon Line (named after Henry McMahon, the Foreign Secretary of British India). In particular, some 80,000 square kilometers became part of British India, which later was administered as the North-East Frontier Agency (NEFA).  The Tawang area, located near the Bhutan-Tibet-India junction, also was ceded to British India and would become a major battleground in the Sino-Indian War.

The Chinese government rejected the Simla Accord, stating that Tibet, as a political subordinate of China, could not enter into treaties with foreign governments.  The British also initially were averse to
implementing the Simla Accord, as it ran contrary to the 1907 Anglo-Russian Convention which recognized China’s suzerainty over Tibet.  But with Russia and Britain agreeing to void the 1907 Convention, the British established the McMahon Line (Figure 44) as the Tibet-India border.  By the 1930s, the British government had begun to use the McMahon Line in its British Indian maps.

In August 1947, British rule in India ended with the partition of British India into the independent countries of India and Pakistan.  Meanwhile, for much of the first half of the 20th century, China convulsed in a multitude of conflicts: the Revolution of 1911 which ended 2,000 years of imperial rule; the fracturing of China during the warlord era (1916-1928); the Japanese invasion and occupation of Manchuria in 1931, and then of other parts of China in 1937-1945; and the Chinese Civil War (1927-1949) between Communist and Nationalist forces.  By 1949, communist forces had prevailed in the civil war and in October of that year, Mao Zedong, Chairman of the Communist Party of China, proclaimed the formation of the People’s Republic of China (PRC).

The government of Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru was among the first in the international community to recognize the PRC, and in the years that followed, sought to cultivate strong Indian-Chinese relations.

In the early 1950s, a series of diplomatic and cultural exchanges between India and China led in April 1954 to an eight-year agreement called the Panchsheel Treaty (Sanskrit, panch, meaning five, and sheel, meaning virtues), otherwise known as the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, which was meant to form the basis for good relations between India and China.  The Panscheel five principles are: mutual
respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty; mutual non-aggression; mutual non-interference in each other’s internal affairs;
equality and cooperation for mutual benefit; and peaceful co-existence.  The slogan “Indians and Chinese are brothers” (Hindi: Hindi China bhai bhai) was popular and Prime Minister Nehru advocated a
Sino-Indian “Asian Axis” to serve as a counter-balance to the American-Soviet Cold War rivalry.

However, the poorly defined India-China border would overcome these attempts to establish warm bilateral relations.  From the outset, India and China
claimed ownership over Aksai Chin and NEFA. 
India released maps that essentially duplicated the British-era maps which showed both areas as part of India.  China likewise claimed sovereignty over these areas, but also stated that as it had not signed any border treaties with the former British Indian government, the India-China border must be
resolved through new negotiations.

Two events caused Sino-Indian relations to deteriorate further.  First, in the 1950s, China built a road through Aksai Chin that linked Xinjiang and Tibet.  Second, in 1959, in the aftermath of a failed
Tibetan uprising against the Chinese occupation forces in Tibet, the Indian government provided refuge in India for the Dalai Lama, Tibet’s political and spiritual leader.  Earlier in 1950, China had invaded and annexed Tibet.  The Indian government had hoped that Tibet would remain an independent state (and a buffer zone between India and China, as it had been in the colonial era), but in the early 1950s period of friendly Sino-Indian relations, India did not
oppose Chinese military action in Tibet.

November 4, 1962 – Sino-Indian War: China offers India a mutual ceding of territory

On November 4, 1962, the Chinese government through Premier Zhou Enlai offered to relinquish its claim to the North-East Frontier Agency (NEFA)
in exchange for India doing the same for Aksai Chin. The offer was made during a lull in the fighting during the Sino-Indian War. On November 14, Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru rejected the offer, leading to a resumption of fighting after a three-week lull. In mid-November, the Indian government declared a state of emergency throughout the country.

(Taken from Sino-Indian War – Wars of the 20th Century – Twenty Wars in Asia)

The Sino-Indian War began on October 20, 1962 when Chinese forces launched offensives in two main sectors: in the eastern sector (North-East Frontier Agency; NEFA) north of the McMahon Line, and in the western sector in Aksai Chin.  Some fighting also occurred in the Nathu La Pass, Sikkim near the China-India border.  The Chinese government called
the operation a “self-defensive counterattack”, implying that India had started the war by crossing north of the McMahon Line.

Sino-Indian War.

Background

In the 19th century, the British and Russian Empires were locked in a political and territorial rivalry known as the Great Game, where the two powers sought to control and dominate Central Asia.  The Russians advanced southward into territories that ultimately would form the present-day countries of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, while the British advanced northward across the Indian subcontinent.  By the mid-1800s, Britain had established full control over territories of British India and the Princely States (present-day India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh).  Just as it did with the Russians regarding British territories in northwest India, the British government sought to establish its territorial limits in the east with the other great regional power, China.  British authorities particularly wanted to delineate British India’s boundaries in Kashmir in the north with China’s Xinjiang Province, as well as British India’s borders in the east with Tibet (a semi-autonomous state under Chinese suzerainty), thereby establishing a common British India-China border across the towering Himalaya Mountains. 

In 1865, the Survey of India published a boundary for Kashmir that included the 37,000 square-kilometer Aksai Chin region (Figure 43), a barren, uninhabited high-altitude (22,000 feet) desert containing salt and soda flats.  However, this delineation, called the Johnson Line (named after William Johnson, a British surveyor), was rejected by the British government.

In 1893, a Chinese official in Kashgar proposed to the British that the Laktsang Range serve as the British India-China border, with the Lingzi Tang Plains to its south to become part of Kashmir and Aksai Chin to its north to become part of China.  The proposal found favor with the British, who in 1899, drew the Macartney-MacDonald Line (named after George Macartney, the British consul-general in Kashgar and Claude MacDonald, a British diplomat), which was presented to the Chinese government.  The latter did not respond, which the British took to mean that the Chinese agreed with the Line.  Thereafter, up until about 1908, British maps
of India featured the Macartney-MacDonald Line (Figure 44) as the China-India border.  However, by the 1920s, the British published new maps using the Johnson Line as the Kashmir-Xinjiang border.

Similarly, British authorities took steps to establish British India’s boundaries with Tibet
and China.  For this purpose, in 1913-1914, in a series of negotiations held in Simla (present-day Shimla in northern India), representatives from China, Tibet, and British India agreed on the territorial limits between “Outer Tibet” and British India.  Outer Tibet
was to be formed as an autonomous Tibetan polity under Chinese suzerainty.  However, the Chinese delegate objected to the proposed border between “Outer Tibet” and “Inner Tibet”, and walked out of the
conference.  Tibetan and British representatives continued with the conference, leading to the Simla Accord (1914) which established the McMahon Line (named after Henry McMahon, the Foreign Secretary of British India). In particular, some 80,000 square kilometers became part of British India, which later was administered as the North-East Frontier Agency (NEFA).  The Tawang area, located near the Bhutan-Tibet-India junction, also was ceded to British
India and would become a major battleground in the Sino-Indian War.

The Chinese government rejected the Simla Accord, stating that Tibet, as a political subordinate of China, could not enter into treaties with foreign governments.  The British also initially were averse to
implementing the Simla Accord, as it ran contrary to the 1907 Anglo-Russian Convention which recognized China’s suzerainty over Tibet.  But with Russia and Britain agreeing to void the 1907 Convention, the British established the McMahon Line (Figure 44) as the Tibet-India border.  By the 1930s, the British government had begun to use the McMahon Line in its British Indian maps.

In August 1947, British rule in India ended with the partition of British India into the independent countries of India and Pakistan.  Meanwhile, for much of the first half of the 20th century, China convulsed in a multitude of conflicts: the Revolution of 1911 which ended 2,000 years of imperial rule; the fracturing of China during the warlord era (1916-1928); the Japanese invasion and occupation of Manchuria in 1931, and then of other parts of China in 1937-1945; and the Chinese Civil War (1927-1949) between Communist and Nationalist forces.  By 1949, communist forces had prevailed in the civil war and in October of that year, Mao Zedong, Chairman of the Communist Party of China, proclaimed the formation of the People’s Republic of China (PRC).

The government of Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru was among the first in the international community to recognize the PRC, and in the years that followed, sought to cultivate strong Indian-Chinese relations.

In the early 1950s, a series of diplomatic and cultural exchanges between India and China led in April 1954 to an eight-year agreement called the Panchsheel Treaty (Sanskrit, panch, meaning five, and sheel, meaning virtues), otherwise known as the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, which was meant to form the basis for good relations between India and China.  The Panscheel five principles are: mutual
respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty; mutual non-aggression; mutual non-interference in each other’s internal affairs; equality and cooperation for mutual benefit; and peaceful co-existence.  The slogan “Indians and Chinese are brothers” (Hindi: Hindi China bhai bhai) was popular and Prime Minister Nehru advocated a Sino-Indian “Asian Axis” to serve as a counter-balance to the American-Soviet Cold War rivalry.

However, the poorly defined India-China border would overcome these attempts to establish warm bilateral relations.  From the outset, India and China
claimed ownership over Aksai Chin and NEFA.  India released maps that essentially duplicated the British-era maps which showed both areas as part of India.  China likewise claimed sovereignty over these areas, but also stated that as it had not signed any border treaties with the former British Indian government, the India-China border must be resolved through new negotiations.

Two events caused Sino-Indian relations to deteriorate further.  First, in the 1950s, China built a road through Aksai Chin that linked Xinjiang and Tibet.  Second, in 1959, in the aftermath of a failed
Tibetan uprising against the Chinese occupation forces in Tibet, the Indian government provided refuge in India for the Dalai Lama, Tibet’s political and spiritual leader.  Earlier in 1950, China had invaded and annexed Tibet.  The Indian government had hoped that Tibet would remain an independent state (and a buffer zone between India and China, as it had been in the colonial era), but in the early 1950s period of friendly Sino-Indian relations, India did not
oppose Chinese military action in Tibet.

November 3, 1969 – Vietnam War: Nixon delivers his “silent majority” speech

On November 3, 1969, U.S. President Richard Nixon addressed the nation on television and radio in what became known as the “silent majority” speech. In his address, Nixon stated “…to you, the great silent majority of my fellow Americans—I ask for your support”, in reference to the ongoing Vietnam War. Nixon was continuing his predecessor President Lyndon B. Johnson’s program of “Vietnamization”, that is, gradual American disengagement from the war, with the South Vietnamese military gradually taking over the fighting after a period of being built up. During his campaign for president, Nixon had stated that he had a “secret plan” to end the war, which anti-war advocates believed was a quick end of American involvement in Vietnam. But once in office, Nixon continued with the United States being involved in the war, stating that a sudden withdrawal “would result in a collapse of confidence in American leadership”, and that “a nation cannot remain great if it betrays its allies and lets down its friends”.

In October 1969, protesters staged a giant rally in Washington, D.C., prompting President Nixon to address the nation on November 3 with his “silent majority” speech. In it, he stated that the United States must continue with gradual disengagement from the war to achieve “peace with honor”. He concluded by appealing to the “great silent majority” for support. A White House official later stated that “silent majority” refers to “a large and normally undemonstrative cross-section of the country that…refrained from articulating its opinions on the war”. Nixon also said that he would not be “dictated by a minority staging demonstrations in the streets”.

Southeast Asia during the 1960s

(Taken from Vietnam War – Wars of the 20th Century – Twenty Wars in Asia)

Nixon and the Vietnam
War

In 1969, newly elected U.S. president, Richard Nixon, who took office in January of that year, continued
with the previous government’s policy of American disengagement and phased troop withdrawal from Vietnam, while simultaneously expanding Vietnamization, with U.S. military advice and material
support.  He also was determined to achieve his election campaign promise of securing a peace settlement with North Vietnam under the Paris peace talks, ironically through the use of force, if North Vietnam refused to negotiate.

In February 1969, the Viet Cong again launched a large-scale Tet-like coordinated offensive across South Vietnam, attacking villages, towns, and cities, and American bases.  Two weeks later, the Viet Cong launched another offensive.  Because of these attacks, in March 1968, on President Nixon’s orders, U.S. planes, including B-52 bombers, attacked Viet Cong/North Vietnamese bases in eastern Cambodia
(along the Ho Chi Minh Trail).  This bombing campaign, codenamed Operation Menu, lasted 14 months (until May 1970), and segued into Operation Freedom Deal (May 1970-August 1973), with the latter targeting a wider insurgent-held territory in eastern Cambodia.

In the 1954 Geneva Accords, Cambodia had declared its neutrality in regional conflicts, a policy it maintained in the early years of the Vietnam War.  However, by the early 1960s, Cambodia’s reigning
monarch, Norodom Sihanouk, came under great pressure by the escalating war in Vietnam, and especially after 1963, when North Vietnamese forces occupied sections of eastern Cambodia as part of the Ho Chi Minh Trail system to South Vietnam.  Then in the mid-1960s, Sihanouk signed security agreements with China and North Vietnam, where in exchange for receiving economic incentives, he acquiesced to the North Vietnamese occupation of eastern Cambodia.  He also allowed the use of the port of Sihanoukville
(located in southern Cambodia) for shipments from communist countries for the Viet Cong/NLF through a newly opened land route across Cambodia.  This new route, called the Sihanouk Trail (Figure 5) by the Western media, became a major alternative logistical system by North Vietnam during the period of intense American air operations over the Laotian side of the Ho Chi Minh Trail.

In July 1968, under strong local and regional pressures, Sihanouk re-opened diplomatic relations with the United States, and his government swung to being pro-West.  However, in March 1970, he was overthrown in a coup, and a hard-line pro-U.S. government under President Lon Nol abolished the monarchy and restructured the country as the Khmer Republic.  For Cambodia, the spill-over of the Vietnam War into its territory would have disastrous
consequences, as the fledging communist Khmer Rouge insurgents would soon obtain large North Vietnamese support that would plunge Cambodia into a full-scale civil war.  For the United States (and South Vietnam), the pro-U.S. Lon Nol government served as a green light for American (and South Vietnamese) forces to conduct military operations in Cambodia.

The U.S. bombing operations on Viet Cong/North Vietnamese bases in eastern Cambodia forced North
Vietnam to increase its military presence in other parts of Cambodia.  The North Vietnamese Army seized control particularly of northeastern Cambodia,
where its forces defeated and expelled the Cambodian Army.  Then in response to the Cambodian government’s request for military assistance, starting in late April to early May 1970, American and South Vietnamese forces launched a major ground offensive into eastern Cambodia.  The main U.S. objective was to clear the region of the North Vietnamese/Viet Cong in order to allow the planned American disengagement from the Vietnam War to proceed smoothly and on schedule.  The offensive  also served as a gauge of the progress of Vietnamization, particularly the performance of the South Vietnamese Army in large-scale operations.

In the nearly three-month successful operation (known as the Cambodian Campaign) which lasted until July 1970, American and South Vietnamese
forces, which at their peak numbered over 100,000 troops, uncovered several abandoned major Viet Cong/North Vietnamese bases and dozens of underground storage bunkers containing huge quantities of materiel and supplies.  In all, American and South Vietnamese troops captured over 20,000 weapons, 6,000 tons of rice, 1,800 tons of ammunition, 29 tons of communications equipment, over 400 vehicles, and 55 tons of medical supplies.  Some 10,000 Viet Cong/North Vietnamese were killed in the fighting, although the majority of their forces (some 40,000) fled deeper into Cambodia.  However, the campaign failed to achieve one of its objectives: capturing the Viet Cong/NLF leadership COSVN (Central Office for South Vietnam).  The Nixon administration also came under domestic political pressure: in December 1970, and U.S. Congress passed a law that prohibited U.S. ground forces from engaging in combat inside Cambodia and Laos.

Before the Cambodian Campaign began, President Nixon had announced in a nationwide broadcast that he had committed U.S. ground troops to the operation.  Within days, large demonstrations of up to 100,000 to 150,000 protesters broke out in the United States, with the unrest again centered in universities and colleges.  On May 4, 1970, at Kent State University, Ohio, National Guardsmen opened fire on a crowd of protesters, killing four people
and wounding eight others.  This incident sparked even wider, increasingly militant and violent protests across the country.  Anti-war sentiment already was
intense in the United States following news reports in November 1969 of what became known as the My Lai Massacre, where U.S. troops on a search and destroy mission descended on My Lai and My Khe villages and killed between 347 and 504 civilians, including women and children.

American public outrage further was fueled when in June 1971, the New York Times began publishing the “Pentagon Papers” (officially titled: United States
– Vietnam Relations, 1945–1967: A Study Prepared by the Department of Defense), a highly classified study by the U.S. Department of Defense that was leaked to the press.  The Pentagon Papers showed
that successive past administrations, including those of Presidents Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy, but especially of President Johnson, had many times
misled the American people regarding U.S.
involvement in Vietnam.  President Nixon sought legal grounds to stop the document’s publication for national security reasons, but the U.S. Supreme
Court subsequently decided in favor of the New York Times and publication continued, and which was also later taken up by the Washington Post and other
newspapers.

As in Cambodia, the U.S. high command had
long desired to launch an offensive into Laos to cut off the logistical portion of the Ho Chi Minh Trail system located there.  But restrained by Laos’ official neutrality, the U.S. military instead carried out secret bombing campaigns in eastern Laos and intelligence gathering operations (the latter conducted by the top-secret Military Assistance Command, Vietnam – Studies and Observations Group, MACV-SOG
that involved units from Special Forces, Navy SEALS, U.S. Marines, U.S. Air Force, and CIA) there.

The success of the Cambodian Campaign encouraged President Nixon to authorize a similar ground operation into Laos.  But as U.S. Congress had prohibited American ground troops from entering Laos, South Vietnamese forces would launch the offensive into Laos with the objective of destroying the Ho Chi Minh Trail, with U.S. forces only playing a supporting role (and remaining within the confines of South Vietnam).  The operation also would gauge the combat capability of the South Vietnamese Army in the ongoing Vietnamization program.

November 2, 1949 – Indonesian War of Independence: The Netherlands and Indonesian revolutionary government establish the United States of Indonesia

Indonesia in Southeast Asia. During its colonial period, Indonesia was known as the Dutch East Indies.

(Taken from Indonesian War of Independence – Wars of the 20th Century – Twenty Wars in Asia)

By late 1946, the British military had completed its mission in the Dutch East Indies (present-day Indonesia), that of repatriating Japanese forces to Japan and freeing the Allied prisoners of war following the end of World War II.  By December 1946, British forces had departed from the islands, but not before setting up mediation talks between the Dutch government (which wanted to restore colonial rule) and the Indonesian revolutionaries (which desired independence), an initiative that led the two sides to agree to a ceasefire in October 1946.  Earlier in June 1946, the Dutch government and representatives of ethnic and religious groups and the aristocracy from Sulawesi, Maluku, West New Guinea, and other eastern states met in South Sulawesi and agreed to form a federal-type government attached to the Netherlands.  In talks held with the Indonesian revolutionaries, Dutch authorities presented a similar proposal which on November 12, 1946, produced the Linggadjati Agreement, where the two sides agreed to establish a federal system known as the United States of Indonesia (USI) by January 1, 1949.  The Republic of Indonesia (consisting of Java, Madura, and Sumatra) would comprise one state under USI; in turn, USI and the Netherlands would form the Netherlands-Indonesian Union, with each polity being a fully sovereign state but under the symbolic authority of the Dutch monarchy.

This Agreement met strong opposition in the Indonesian government but eventually was ratified in February 1947 with strong pressure for its passage being exerted by Sukarno and Hatta.  In December 1946 in South Sulawesi, Pemuda fighters who opposed the agreement restarted hostilities.  Dutch forces, led by Captain Raymond Westerling, used brutal methods to quell the rebellion, killing some 3,000 Pemuda fighters.  The Agreement also was resisted in the Netherlands, but in March 1947, a
modified version was passed in the House of Representatives of the Dutch parliament.

Then in July 1947, declaring that the Indonesian government did not fully comply with the Agreement, Dutch forces launched Operation Product, a military offensive (which the Dutch government called a “police action”) in Java and Sumatra, seizing control of the vital economic regions, including sugar-producing areas in Java, and the rubber plantations in Medan,
and petroleum and coal facilities in Palembang and Padang.  Dutch ships also imposed a naval blockade of the ports, restricting the Indonesian Republic’s economic capacity.

In early 1947, acting on the diplomatic initiative of India and Australia, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) released Resolution 27, which called on the two sides to stop fighting and enter into peaceful negotiations.  On August 5, 1947, a ceasefire came into effect. A stipulation in Resolution 27 established the Committee of Good Office (CGO), a three-person body consisting of representatives, one named by the Netherlands, another by Indonesia, and a third, mutually agreed by both sides.  In subsequent negotiations, the two sides agreed to form the Van Mook Line to delineate their respective areas of control which, because of the fighting, the Dutch-held territories in Java and Sumatra increased, while those of the Indonesian Republic decreased.

In January 1948, the two sides signed the Renville Agreement (named after the USS Renville, a U.S. Navy ship where the negotiations were held), which confirmed their respective territories in the Van Mook Line, and in the Dutch-held areas, a referendum would be held to decide whether the
residents there wanted to be under Indonesian or Dutch control.  Furthermore, in exchange for Indonesian forces withdrawing from Dutch-held areas as stipulated in the Van Mook Line, the Dutch Navy would end its blockade of the ports.

The Indonesian Republic, already weakened politically and militarily, was undermined further when its Islamic supporters in now Dutch-controlled West Java objected to the Renville Agreement and broke away to form Darul Islam (“Islamic State”), with the ultimate aim of turning Indonesia into an Islamic country.  It opposed both the Indonesian government and Dutch colonial authorities.  Darul Islam subsequently would be defeated only in 1962, some 13 years after the war had ended.

The Indonesian Republic also faced opposition from its other erstwhile allies, the communists (of the Indonesian Communist Party) and the socialists (of the Indonesian Socialist Party), who in September 1948, seceded and formed the “Indonesian Soviet Republic” in Madiun, East Java.  Fighting in September-October and continuing until December 1948 eventually led to the Indonesian Republic
quelling the Madiun uprising, with tens of thousands of communists killed or imprisoned and their leaders executed or forced into exile.  Furthermore, the Indonesian Army itself was plagued with internal problems, because the government, suffering from acute financial difficulties and unable to pay the soldiers’ salaries, had disbanded a number of military units.

With the Indonesian revolutionary government experiencing internal problems, on December 19, 1948, Dutch forces launched Operation Kraai
(“Operation Crow”), another “police action” on the contention that Indonesian guerillas had infiltrated the Van Mook Line and were carrying out subversive
actions inside Dutch-held areas in violation of the Renville Agreement.  Operation Kraai caught the revolutionaries off guard, forcing the Indonesian Army to retreat to the countryside to avoid being annihilated.  As a result, Dutch forces captured large sections of Indonesian-held areas, including the
Republic’s capital, Yogyakarta.  Sukarno, Hatta, and other Republican leaders were captured without resistance and exiled, this action being deliberate on
their part, as they believed that this latest aggression by the Dutch military would be condemned by the international community.  Before allowing himself to be captured, Sukarno activated a clandestine “emergency government” in West Sumatra (to act as a caretaker government), which he had arranged
beforehand as a contingency measure.

On December 24, 1948, the UNSC passed Resolution 63 which demanded the end of hostilities and the immediate release of Sukarno and other
Indonesian leaders.  Also by this time, the international media had taken hold of the conflict.  The United States also exerted pressure on the Dutch government, threatening to cut off Marshall Plan aid for the Netherlands’ post-World War II reconstruction.  Operation Kraii also generated division within USI as the Cabinets of Dutch-controlled states of East Indonesia and Pasundan resigned in protest of the Dutch military actions. As a result of these pressures, a ceasefire was agreed by the two sides, which came into effect in Java (on December 31, 1948) and Sumatra (on January 5, 1949).

November 1, 1922 – Turkish War of Independence: The new nation of Turkey abolishes the Ottoman Sultanate

On October 29, 1923, the Republic of Turkey was established with Ankara as its capital and Mustafa Kemal as first president. This followed the successful Turkish War of Independence. One year earlier, on November 1, 1922, the Grand National Assembly (the Turkish national parliament), abolished the Ottoman Sultanate, forcing the Sultan Mehmed VI to abdicate and leave for exile abroad. The Ottoman Empire ended, and 600 years of Ottoman dynastic rule came to an end. In March 1924, the Caliphate was abolished, and Turkey transitioned into a secular, democratic state, which it is to this day.

The Ottoman Empire at its peak territorial extent

(Taken from The Ottoman Empire – Wars of the 20th Century – Volume 3)

History

The imperial Islamic power known as the Ottoman Empire has its origin as one of many semi-independent Turkish tribal states (called beyliks) that formed during the breakdown and collapse of the Seljuk Turkish Empire.  Founded by Osman I (whose name was anglicized to Ottoman and from whom the empire derived its name), the Ottoman beylik achieved sovereignty from the Seljuk Sultanate in 1299.  With the influx of large numbers of Ghazi warriors (both Muslims and Christians) into his beylik, Osman built an army hoping to expand his domain at the expense of the tottering Byzantine Empire* situated to the west of his beylik.

In 1324, the Ottomans captured Bursa, where they established their new capital; Bursa’s fall also ended the Byzantine Empire’s presence in Anatolia.  On Osman’s death in 1326, the succession of
Ottoman rulers, first by Osman’s son Orhan, continued to expand the emerging empire.  In 1387, Thessalonica was taken, marking the Ottomans’ first entry into Europe (via the southeast), a presence that would last, except for a brief pause, for six centuries.  Further expansion into Balkan Europe continued during the second half of the 1300s with the defeats of the Serbian and Bulgarian empires, and annexation of sections of what comprise modern-day Serbia, Bulgaria, Macedonia, and Albania.

In 1402, Ottoman power was briefly eclipsed when Tamerlane, the Turkic-Mongol conqueror, invaded Anatolia.  Bayezid, the Ottoman ruler, was captured by Tamerlane in battle, starting a turbulent period in the Ottoman court known as the Ottoman Interregnum.  After an eleven-year power struggle among Bayezid’s sons for succession to the throne,
Mehmed I prevailed and became the new sultan. 
With its leadership crisis resolved, the Ottomans resumed their campaign in Europe, recapturing parts of the Balkans that had been lost during the interregnum.

By the mid-fifteenth century, Constantinople, the Byzantine Empire’s capital, had been surrounded by
Ottoman territories.  In early April 1453, the Ottomans launched an attack on the city, starting a six-week siege on the nearly impregnable fortress that was protected by two layers of defensive stone walls.  On May 29, 1453, the walls were breached, and Constantinople fell.  The Ottomans then moved their capital to Constantinople.

Constantinople’s fall sent shock waves across Western Europe, which at that time was made up of many small rival Christian kingdoms, duchies, and principalities, and which all feared falling under Muslim rule.  The Ottomans advanced further into Europe with the invasion of lands that comprise
present-day Bulgaria, Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina,
Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Albania.  Other conquests also were made in parts of modern-day Hungary and Romania.  The invasion of Greece
began with the capture of Athens in 1458; by the end of the century, most of the Greek mainland had been
taken.  By the first quarter of the sixteenth century, nearly all of the Balkans and some sections of eastern and central Europe were under Ottoman control.  However, two attempts (in 1529 and 1532) to take Vienna failed, which were resisted by the combined forces of the Habsburg monarchy of Austria and its Christian allies.

Under the rule of Suleiman the Magnificent, the Ottomans reached the height of their power.  In
Anatolia, other Turkish beyliks were defeated, making the Ottoman Sultan the master of Asia Minor.  Suleiman’s forces also advanced into western Asia and northern Africa, incorporating more territories to those previously won under the previous rulers, Mehmed II and Selim I.  In the east, Mesopotamia
(present-day Iraq) also was taken, while in the south, the Ottomans advanced into the Arabian Peninsula.

            Ottoman expansion continued up to the mid-seventeenth century.  By then, the empire extended from Baghdad to Algeria and from the Caucasus to eastern Europe.  The Ottomans owed much of their military success to their Janissary Army, an elite corps made up of professional soldiers.  At its peak and like the Byzantine Empire before it, the Ottoman Empire was the wealthiest state in Europe, since its strategically located capital of Constantinople allowed the Ottomans to control the main trade routes of the Silk Road that connected
Europe and Asia.  Furthermore, peace prevailed in conquered lands, as the Ottoman Empire did not carry out forced conversion to Islam, but allowed its subjects to freely practice their own faiths.  As well as diversity in religion, the empire also contained many ethnicities, cultures, and languages, an aspect that ultimately would contribute to the Ottomans’ fall.

In May 1683, a major Ottoman offensive in Vienna was defeated by the Holy League, an alliance of the Habsburg, German, and Polish forces.  This defeat marked the farthest extent of the Ottoman advance into Europe and the start of the empire’s decline.

Then in the 1600s onward, Western Europe made rapid advances in the development of science and
technology, leading to the production of stronger weapons.  The West also became wealthy; starting in
1498 when the Portuguese discovered the sea route to Asia, the Ottoman Empire’s monopoly on the Silk trade ended.  Furthermore, Europe’s discovery and
development of the New World brought enormous
riches to the emerging Western European empires.

At the same time, the Ottoman Empire
experienced a long period of stagnation, where its economy floundered, bureaucratic corruption prevailed, and a rising inward-looking, Islam-centered
element in government resisted the demands to carry out reforms.

Then, wars in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries against the Austrian Empire, and especially against the rising Russian Empire, revealed for the first time, the weakening Ottoman power.  In the Crimean War of 1853-1856, British and French forces intervened to prevent the Russians from seizing large parts of Ottoman territory, including Constantinople
itself.

Then after its defeat in the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878, the Ottoman Empire was forced to allow Romania, Serbia, and Montenegro to achieve their independences, while Bulgaria, though remaining under Ottoman rule, became de facto sovereign with its own government.  Some fifty years earlier, in 1832, Greece had won its own war of independence, which ended four centuries of Ottoman rule.  By the 1800s, the Ottoman Empire was referred to disparagingly as the “sick man of Europe”, since it was unable to defend its territories against attacks by European powers.

The Ottoman demise came following World War I, where the Ottoman Empire emerged as a spent power after throwing its support behind the Central Powers, which likewise was defeated in the war.  As a result, the Ottoman Empire lost all its remaining colonies and was itself partitioned by the victorious Allied Powers.  Turkish nationalists, led by Mustafa Kemal (whose surname “Ataturk” was added later),
then emerged and began the Turkish War of Independence (separate article), which established the modern state of Turkey, consisting of the Turkish
heartland of Anatolia as well as eastern Thrace, a sliver of land in the European mainland.

October 31, 1941 – World War II: The destroyer USS Reuben James is sunk by a German U-boat torpedo near Iceland, killing 100 sailors

On October 31, 1941, the U.S. Navy destroyer, USS Reuben James, was sunk after being struck by a torpedo from the German U-boat U-552 near Iceland.  Of the 144 crew comprising 7 officers, 136 sailors and 1 passenger, 100 were killed and 44 rescued.

At this point in World War II, the United States was still officially a non-belligerent, but effectively sympathetic to the side of the Allies. The American destroyer was part of the force escorting the convoys carrying war materials to Iceland, with Great Britain as their final destination. The American force protected the convoys to Iceland, after which escort security passed on to the British Navy.

(Taken from Wars of the 20th Century – World War II in Europe)

The United States enters World War II

At the outbreak of World War II, the isolationist United States declared its neutrality based on the U.S. Neutrality Act of 1937.  However, the U.S. government, led by President Franklin D. Roosevelt, was greatly alarmed by Hitler’s increasingly
belligerent foreign policy, and with its sympathy turned toward the European democracies, it had provided the 1937 Neutrality Act with a stipulation that the United States could sell weapons to hostile nations on a “cash and carry” basis, i.e. that the purchaser pay for the munitions in cash and transport them at its own expense and risk.  This provision was intended to benefit Britain and France, as their powerful navies dominated the seas.  In November 1939, the United States re-affirmed its neutrality, again with the “cash and carry” provision that favored the Allies.  In June 1940, with the defeat of France, and Britain losing much of its military equipment at Dunkirk, President Roosevelt approved the sale of thousands of old U.S. Army rifles and tons of ammunition to Britain.  Also, as the British Navy had lost many ships in the campaigns in Norway and France, and in the defense of the English coasts, in September 1940, the U.S. and British governments signed the “Destroyers for Bases” Agreement, where the United States transferred fifty old destroyers to Britain in exchange for the British granting to the United States 99-year leases to military bases in the Caribbean.  As well, the U.S. military was granted base rights in Newfoundland (in Canada) and Bermuda.

In a major act that moved the United States away from its nominal neutrality, March 1941, the U.S. government approved the Lend-Lease Act, where the United States could give weapons and other defense materials free of charge to “any country whose defense the [U.S.] President deems vital to the defense of the U.S.”  Armaments, food, and funds soon arrived in Britain (and China, and later, the Soviet Union).  The next month, April 1941, the Pan-American Security Zone (established in October
1939) was extended to 22° longitude to just west of Iceland.  In June 1941, following the U-boat sinking of the American vessel, the SS Robin Moor (its crew and passengers were allowed to board lifeboats beforehand), the U.S. government froze German assets in the United States, and ordered Germany (and Italy) to close their consulates, except their embassies.

Finally, on December 8, 1941, the United States entered World War II by declaring war on Japan following the attack on Pearl Harbor.  Three days later, December 11, Germany (and Italy) declared war on the United States; that same day, the latter
declared war on Germany (and Italy).

The United States in the Battle
of the Atlantic

At the outset, the United States was unprepared to confront the U-boat threat, despite being able to draw on the British experience and itself having faced many hostile encounters with U-boats.  The U.S. Navy ignored British Navy recommendations to impose a blackout of coastal areas, or that merchant ships travel in convoys, or that ships avoid regular maritime routes, and that lighthouses and other navigational aids be deactivated.

What ensued was the German U-boat fleet’s  (second) “Happy Time” from January to June
1942, where for the loss of only 22 U-boats, the Allies lost 1,000 lives and 609 ships (9.1 million tons), comprising 25% of all Allied number of ships lost
in World War II.  This episode in the Atlantic struggle was particularly tragic, as the U.S. Navy’s apparent disregard to implement war-time measures allowed the U-boats to attack with near impunity, most notably by using the nighttime silhouette of the docked merchant ships against the backdrop of the bright city lights to torpedo the vessels.  Admiral Ernest King, commander in chief of the U.S. Fleet, received criticism for not implementing the convoy
system, which British experience had shown was less vulnerable to U-boat attacks than individual ships traveling alone.  As well, he was blamed for the feeble naval defense of the American eastern seaboard, although at the outbreak of war, the U.S. Navy was severely overstretched, engaging in naval operations in Asia and providing convoy escort for Atlantic convoys.  Also, the sale of 50 destroyers to Britain
weakened U.S. naval strength, and the U.S. Eastern Sea Frontier, tasked to safeguard the East Coast, possessed obsolete vessels, including two 1905-vintage gunboats, three 1919-era patrol boats, four converted yachts, and four wooden submarines.

By May 1942, the U.S. Navy had assembled enough ships for convoy protection and coastal defenses.  In June 1942, the convoy system was extended to the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean, which had seen a rise in U-boat activity.  Other British recommendations, such as a coastal blackout, were enforced.  In July 1940, a fleet of British trawlers, refitted for anti-submarine warfare, arrived in the United States and were manned with British Royal Navy crews, to assist in convoy escort.  By
August 1942, with the Western Hemisphere Atlantic coast bristling with naval defenses, Allied merchant losses dropped considerably, and the withdrawal of
U-boats from the American continental coastline marked the end of the Second Happy Time.

The second half of 1942 marked the return of the U-boats to the Atlantic, with wolf pack attacks concentrated along the mid-Atlantic air gap.  During
this period, 575 merchant ships were sunk. 
Starting in November 1942, the Allies introduced many strategic and technological innovations that would finally turn the fortunes of the battle away from the Germans.  Aside from escorts that remained with the convoys, naval “support groups” were deployed, which patrolled known wolf pack haunts and were tasked mainly to hunt down and destroy U-boats.  Ahead-throwing weapons, such as the “hedgehog” and “squid”, were introduced against submerged U-boats, which had one vital advantage over the traditional depth charges in that these
new weapons, when fired, allowed the ASDIC to maintain contact with the U-boat.  The British success rate of 1.6% using depth charges rose to 17.5% using hedgehog and squid.

The “mid-Atlantic air gap” was finally closed with the long-range B-24 Liberator anti-submarine bombers.  As well, Allied planes were equipped with
very sensitive centimetric radars, (replacing the metric radars), which could detect surfaced U-boat towers and even periscopes from long distances.  A powerful spotlight, called a Leigh Light, worked at night in conjunction with the new radar: as the Allied plane approached its target, the Leigh Light, responding to radar tracking, automatically turned on and pointed at the surfaced U-boat, which was then
destroyed with the plane’s weapons.

Furthermore, merchant aircraft carriers (MAC ships) and U.S. escort carriers appeared in greater numbers and patrolled the whole range of the Atlantic, and together with their modern fighter planes equipped with powerful radars and anti-submarine weapons, made U-boat operations extremely difficult and dangerous.  Direct convoy protection also increased substantially, as large numbers of American destroyer escorts (aka
frigates) were introduced, largely replacing the less effective corvettes.  Also in October 1942, British intelligence broke the code of the German Navy’s new Enigma network, TRITON, following the
retrieval of codebooks and key settings of the advanced M4 Enigma machine from a captured U-boat at Port Said, Egypt.

These new Allied measures did not become apparent immediately, and for a time, the British actually seemed headed for defeat.  Following a lull in fighting during the winter, in March 1943, Admiral Donitz, now commander-in-chief of the Kriegsmarine, confident of victory, unleashed virtually the whole U-boat fleet in the Atlantic.  Spectacular success was achieved, with wolf packs sinking over 80 Allied merchant ships in the Atlantic, this high loss
causing supplies in Britain to fall and so alarming Churchill that he considered ending the convoy
system.  But in April 1943, the new Allied anti-submarine measures from the previous months began to take effect: 15 U-boats were sunk for a loss of 39 merchant ships.  Then in May 1943, in what is known as “Black May”, the German Navy lost a catastrophic 43 U-boats against 34 merchant ships in the Atlantic (58 worldwide).  Admiral Donitz suspended all operations in the Atlantic, admitting that the war in the Atlantic was lost.

In the ensuing period until the end of the European war in May 1945, the Kriegsmarine introduced several technological measures to try and
wrest back the initiative in the Atlantic.  U-boats were equipped with improved radar warning systems, two types of modern torpedoes were developed: the acoustic torpedo that homed in on the enemy ship’s propeller and the FAT (Flächen-Absuch-Torpedo) that moved in a criss-cross pattern inside a convoy until it hit a ship; and sonar decoys that were launched from U-boats to generate false ASDIC readings.  A small
number of U-boats were modified as Flak Boats, which used their greater anti-aircraft firepower to engage (rather than avoid by submerging) enemy
aircraft. The German Navy’s most notable achievement was in the improvement of the submarine itself, with the introduction of the Type XXI U-boat “Elektroboote” (“Electric boat”), whose clean hull design became the model for modern-day submarines, and which allowed it to dive faster, range farther, and move faster underwater.  Only four
Elektroboote submarines were completed (two of which were deployed) as a result of production deficiencies and because U-boat factories were destroyed by the advancing Allies towards the end of the war.

These German innovations ultimately were futile, because of Allied counter-measures against them, and also because of the sheer number of Allied ships, both merchant and military, in the Atlantic, because of the enormous production output from the U.S. shipbuilding industry.  The elimination of the U-boat threat allowed the Allied buildup in Britain in 1943-1944, with some three million American and other Allied troops transported across the Atlantic, for the eventual launching in June 1944 of Operation Overlord, the reconquest of German-occupied Western Europe.

In the Battle of the Atlantic, the Allies lost 3,500 merchant ships and 175 warships, while the Germans lost 783 U-boats.

October 30, 1941 – World War II: The United States Congress approves $1 billion in Lend-Lease aid to the Soviet Union

On October 30, 1941, the U.S. Congress, urged on by President Franklin D. Roosevelt, approved $1 billion in Lend-Lease Aid to the Soviet Union, which at this time was reeling under the massive German offensives in Operation Barbarossa. The Lend-Lease to the Soviet Union was an interest-free loan which did not have to be repaid until five years after the end of the war. The aid was passed despite anti-communist sentiment among some of the legislators.

The Lend-Lease Act was first passed on March 11, 1941 with the intent of helping Britain in its war against the Axis Powers. The act also allowed the United States to could provide weapons and other defense materials free of charge to “any country whose defense the [U.S.] President deems vital to the defense of the U.S.”  The reasoning was that providing assistance to countries facing military aggression ultimately would be in the interest of the security of the United States.

By the end of World War II, more than $50 billion in Lend-Lease money, weapons, tanks, warplanes, and ships had been allocated to 44 countries.

(Taken from Wars of the 20th Century – World War II in Europe)

The United States enters World War II

In November 1939, two months after World War II had started in Europe, the United States declared its neutrality, which was a re-affirmation of its Neutrality Act of 1937.  The Neutrality Act maintained the United States’ long-standing position of non-involvement in European political and military
affairs.  But it also contained provisions that favored the Western democracies, particularly Britain and France, viewed in light of the rise of totalitarian states, e.g. Hitler’s Nazi Germany and Stalin’s communist Soviet Union.  U.S. foreign policy experienced a major shift in mid-1940 with Germany’s stunning victories in Western Europe,
which saw the fall in quick succession of Denmark,
Norway, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, and especially France.  Then with Germany concentrating its efforts on the conquest of Britain, the United States became alarmed at the prospect that the whole of Europe may very well come under Hitler’s control.

Although believing that Britain was doomed to fall, U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt rushed to help the government of British Prime Minister Winston Churchill.  In September 1940, the two governments signed the “Destroyers for Bases” Agreement, where the United States transferred to Britain 50 old destroyers in exchange for Britain
granting the United States long-term military leases to a number of strategic British territories in the Western Hemisphere.  Then in March 1941, the United States permanently moved away from
neutrality when U.S. Congress passed the Lend-Lease Act, where the United States could provide weapons and other defense materials free of charge to “any
country whose defense the [U.S.] President deems vital to the defense of the U.S.”  Armaments, food, and funds soon arrived in Britain (and China, and later, the Soviet Union).  The next month, April 1941, the Pan-American Security Zone (established in October 1939) was extended to 22° longitude to just west of Iceland.  In June 1941, following the U-boat sinking of the American vessel, the SS Robin Moor (its crew and passengers were allowed to board lifeboats beforehand), the U.S. government froze German assets in the United States and ordered Germany (and Italy) to close their consulates, except their embassies.

Finally, on December 8, 1941, the United
States entered World War II by declaring war on Japan following the attack on Pearl Harbor.  Three days later, December 11, Germany (and Italy) declared war on the United States; that same day, the latter declared war on Germany (and Italy); the United States was now a member of the Allies.

American and British strategic initiatives At the outset, U.S. and British military planners agreed to concentrate most of their combined efforts on first defeating Hitler (the “Europe First” policy) because of the immediate danger that Germany posed to the survival of Britain
and the Soviet Union.  By contrast, distant Japan did not directly threaten London and Moscow.  With Germany’s defeat, the Allies agreed to concentrate on defeating Japan.

But the two western Allies differed on the strategy for Europe: the United States, which desired a rapid end to the war, favored an immediate invasion of France from Britain through the English Channel, while Britain, which saw the war in geopolitical terms, particularly with curbing Soviet expansionism in post-war Europe, called for an invasion through the
Mediterranean region into southeastern Europe, that is, as far to the east as possible.  For British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, an attack further east, particularly into the Balkans, would achieve
simultaneous aims: it would First, deny the Germans vital resources, especially Romania’s oil; Second, meet up with the Soviet Red Army, and Third, allow the
Western Allies a stronger bargaining position after the war.  However, Stalin wanted the Allied invasion to be as far to the west as possible, as he saw Eastern
Europe as falling inside his sphere of influence.

In the end, the United States went along with Britain, and temporarily shelved its plans for a joint cross-channel invasion of France that had been slated for 1942 and 1943, this decision influenced by the disastrous attempt in August 1942 to seize the French port of Dieppe, where the Allies lost 60% of its invasion force.

October 29, 1956 – Suez Crisis: Israeli forces invade the Sinai Peninsula

On October 29, 1956, Israeli forces invaded the Sinai Peninsula during the Suez Crisis, which pitted the alliance of Israel, Britain, and France against Egypt for control of the Suez Canal. The three countries had various reasons for wanting to start the war against Egypt.  Britain and France wanted to regain control of the Suez Canal.  The British wanted to reassert itself in the region.  The French were embroiled in a
colonial war in Algeria against rebels whom they believed were being funded by President Nasser.  Israel wanted to stop the local terrorism which it attributed to Egypt’s instigation.  Furthermore, Israeli commercial vessels were blocked from entering the Suez Canal after Egypt seized the waterway.

In October 1956, the invasion plan had been finalized, which was to play out this way: Israel
would invade the Sinai Peninsula, prompting Egypt to react militarily.  Britain and France then would issue
ultimatums to Israel and Egypt to withdraw 16 miles from the Suez Canal, purportedly to prevent an escalation of the conflict.  Britain and France then would take control of the Suez Canal, declaring that
their presence in the region was necessary to protect the vital waterway.

The Suez Crisis was a war between Egypt against the alliance of Britain, France, and Israel for control of the politically and economically vital Suez Canal, a man-modified shipping channel that connects the Mediterranean Sea and the Red Sea.

(Taken from Suez Crisis – Wars of the 20th Century – Volume 2)

Background

The Suez Canal in Egypt is a man-made shipping waterway that connects the Mediterranean Sea and the Indian Ocean via the Red Sea (Map 7).  The Suez Canal was completed by a French engineering firm in 1869 and thereafter became the preferred shipping and trade route between Europe and Asia, as it
considerably reduced the travel time and distance from the previous circuitous route around the African continent.  Since 1875, the facility was operated by an Anglo-French private conglomerate.  By the twentieth century, nearly two-thirds of all oil tanker traffic to Europe passed through the Suez Canal.

In the late 1940s, a wave of nationalism swept across Egypt, leading to the overthrow of the ruling monarchy and the establishment of a republic.  In 1951, intense public pressure forced the Egyptian government to abolish the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of
1936, although the agreement was yet to expire in three years.

With the rise in power of the Egyptian nationalists led by Gamal Abdel Nasser (who later became president in 1956), Britain agreed to withdraw its military forces from Egypt after both countries signed the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement of 1954.  The last British troops left Egypt in June 1956.  Nevertheless, the agreement allowed the British to use its existing military base located near
the Suez Canal for seven years and the possibility of its extension if Egypt was attacked by a foreign power.  The Anglo-Egyptian Agreement of 1954 and foreign control of the Suez Canal were resented by many Egyptians, especially the nationalists, who believed that their country was still under semi-colonial rule and not truly sovereign.

Furthermore, President Nasser was hostile to Israel, which had dealt the Egyptian Army a crushing defeat in the 1948 Arab-Israeli War.  President Nasser wanted to start another war with Israel.  Conversely, the Israeli government believed that Egypt was behind the terrorist activities that were being carried out in Israel.  The Israelis also therefore were ready to go to war against Egypt to put an end to the terrorism.

Egypt and Israel sought to increase their weapons stockpiles through purchases from their main suppliers, the United States, Britain, and France.  The three Western powers, however, had agreed among themselves to make arms sales equally and only in limited quantities to Egypt and Israel, to prevent an arms race.

Friendly relations between Israel and France,
however, were moving toward a military alliance.  By early 1955, France was sending large quantities of weapons to Israel.  In Egypt, President Nasser was indignant at the Americans’ conditions to sell him arms: that the weapons were not to be used against Israel, and that U.S. advisers were to be allowed into Egypt.  President Nasser, therefore, approached the
Soviet Union, which agreed to support Egypt militarily.  In September 1955, large amounts of Soviet weapons began to arrive in Egypt.

The United States and Britain were infuriated.  The Americans believed that Egypt was falling under
the sphere of influence of the Soviet Union, their Cold War enemy.  Adding to this perception was that Egypt recognized Red China.  Meanwhile, Britain
felt that its historical dominance in the Arab region was being undermined.  The United States and Britain withdrew their earlier promise to President Nasser to fund his ambitious project, the construction of the massive Aswan Dam.

Egyptian troops then seized the Suez Canal, which President Nasser immediately nationalized with the purpose of using the profits from its operations to help build the Aswan Dam.  President Nasser ordered the Anglo-French firm operating the Suez Canal to leave; he also terminated the firm’s contract, even though its 99-year lease with Egypt still was due to expire in 12 years, in 1968.

The British and French governments were angered by Egypt’s seizure of the Suez Canal.  A few days later, Britain and France decided to take armed action: their military leaders met and began to prepare for an invasion of Egypt.  In September 1956, France and Israel also jointly prepared for war against Egypt.

October 28, 1940 – World War II: Italy invades Greece

Early on October 28, 1940, Italy delivered an ultimatum to Greece demanding that Italian forces enter Greek territory and occupy unspecified “strategic locations”, or face war. The popular story is that Greek Prime Minister Ioannis Metaxas replied to the ultimatum with the simple “No!”. His actual reply was “So this is war!”. (In present-day Greece, October 28 is celebrated as Ohi Day (or “Anniversary of the No”; Greek: Επέτειος του Όχι, Epéteios tou Óchi)).

A few hours later delivering the ultimatum, Italian forces in Albania, which were massed at the Greek-Albanian border, opened their offensive along a 90-mile (150 km) front in two sectors: in Epirus, which comprised the main attacking force; and in western Macedonia, where the Italian forces were to hold their ground and remain inside Albania.  A third force was assigned to guard the Albania-Yugoslavia frontier.  The Italian offensive was launched in the fall season, and would be expected to face extremely difficult weather conditions in high-altitude mountain terrain, and be subject to snow, sleet, icy rain, fog, and heavy cloud cover.  As it turned out, the Italians were supplied only with summer clothing, and so were unprepared for these conditions.  The Italians also had planned to seize Corfu, which was cancelled due to bad weather.

(Taken from Greco-Italian War – Wars of the 20th Century – World War II in Europe)

Background

Greece had become alarmed by the Italian
invasion of Albania.  Greek Prime Minister Ioannis Metaxas, who ironically held fascist views and was pro-German, turned to Britain for assistance.  The British Royal Navy, which had bases in many parts of the Mediterranean, including Gibraltar, Malta, Cyprus, Egypt, and Palestine, then made security stops in Crete and other Greek islands.

Italian-Greek relations, which were strained since the late 1920s by Mussolini’s expansionist agenda, deteriorated further.  In 1940, Italy initiated an anti-Greek propaganda campaign, which included the demand that the Greek region of Epirus must be ceded to Albania, since it contained a large ethnic Albanian population.  The Epirus claim was popular among Albanians, who offered their support for Mussolini’s ambitions on Greece.  Mussolini accused Greece of being a British puppet, citing the British naval presence in Greek ports and offshore waters.  In reality, he was alarmed that the British Navy lurking nearby posed a direct threat to Italy and hindered his plans to establish full control of the Adriatic and Ionian Seas.

Italy then launched armed provocations against Greece, which included several incidents in July-August 1940, where Italian planes attacked Greek vessels at Kissamos, Gulf of Corinth, Nafpaktos, and Aegina.  On August 15, 1940, an undetected Italian submarine sank the Greek light cruiser Elli.  Greek authorities found evidence that pointed to Italian responsibility for the Elli sinking, but Prime Minister
Metaxas did not take any retaliatory action, as he wanted to avoid war with Italy.

Also in August 1940, Mussolini gave secret orders to his military high command to start preparations for an invasion of Greece.  But in a meeting with Hitler, Mussolini was prevailed upon by the German leader to suspend the invasion in favor of the Italian Army concentrating on defeating the British in North Africa.  Hitler was concerned that an Italian incursion in the Balkans would worsen the perennial state of ethnic tensions in that region and perhaps prompt other major powers, such as the Soviet Union or Britain, to intervene there.  The Romanian oil fields at Ploiesti, which were extremely vital to Germany, could then be threatened.  In August 1940, unbeknown to Mussolini, Hitler had secretly instructed the Germany military high command to draw up plans for his greatest project of all, the conquest of the Soviet Union.  And for this
monumental undertaking, Hitler wanted no distractions, including one in the Balkans.  In the fall of 1940, Mussolini deferred his attack on Greece,
and issued an order to demobilize 600,000 Italian troops.

Then on October 7, 1940, Hitler deployed German troops in Romania at the request of the new pro-Nazi government led by Prime Minister Ion Antonescu.  Mussolini, upon being informed by Germany four days later, was livid, as he believed that Romania fell inside his sphere of influence.  More disconcerting for Mussolini was that Hitler had again initiated a major action without first notifying him.  Hitler had acted alone in his conquests of Poland, Denmark, Norway, France, and the Low Countries, and had given notice to the Italians only after the
fact.  Mussolini was determined that Hitler’s latest stunt would be reciprocated with his own move against Greece.  Mussolini stated, “Hitler faces me with a fait accompli.  This time I am going to pay him back in his own coin. He will find out from the papers that I have occupied Greece. In this way, the equilibrium will be re-established.”

On October 13, 1940 and succeeding days, Mussolini finalized with his top military commanders the immediate implementation of the invasion plan for Greece, codenamed “Contingency G”, with Italian forces setting out from Albania.  A modification was made, where an initial force of six Italian divisions would attack the Epirus region, to be followed by the arrival of more Italian troops.  The combined forces would advance to Athens and beyond, and capture the whole of Greece.  The modified plan was opposed by General Pietro Badoglio, the Italian Chief of Staff, who insisted that the original plan be carried out: a full-scale twenty-division invasion of Greece with Athens as the immediate objective.  Other factors cited by military officers who were opposed to immediate invasion were the need for more preparation time, the recent demobilization of 600,000 troops, and the inadequacy of Albanian ports to meet the expected large volume of men and war supplies that would be brought in from Italy.

But Mussolini would not be dissuaded.  His decision to invade was greatly influenced by three officials: Foreign Minister Count Galeazzo Ciano (who was also Mussolini’s son-in-law), who stated that most Greeks detested their government and would not resist an Italian invasion; the Italian Governor-General of Albania Francesco Jacomoni, who told Mussolini that Albanians would support an Italian invasion in return for Epirus being annexed to Albania; and the commander of Italian forces in Albania General Sebastiano Prasca, who assured
Mussolini that Italian troops in Albania were sufficient to capture Epirus within two weeks.  These three men were motivated by the potential rewards to their careers that an Italian victory would have; for example, General Prasca, like most Italian officers, coveted being conferred the rank of “Field Marshall”. 
Mussolini’s order for the invasion had the following objectives, “Offensive in Epirus, observation and pressure on Salonika, and in a second phase, march on Athens”.

On October 18, 1940, Mussolini asked King Boris II of Bulgaria to participate in a joint attack on Greece, but the monarch declined, since under
the Balkan Pact of 1934, other Balkan countries would intervene for Greece in a Bulgarian-Greek war.  Deciding that its border with Bulgaria was secure from attack, the Greek government transferred half of its forces defending the Bulgarian border to Albania; as well, all Greek reserves were deployed to the Albanian front.  With these moves, by the start of the war, Greek forces in Albania outnumbered the attacking Italian Army.  Greece also fortified its Albanian frontier.  And because of Mussolini’s increased rhetoric and threats of attack, by the time of the invasion, the Italians had lost the element of surprise.