Issandr El Amrani's Blog, page 88

Awesome Google Maps mashup of Egypt's retired army generals and where they've landed

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Askar Kazeboon (The Military are Liars), the Egyptian activist group that sprang up to put the lie to the claims of the SCAF and state media after the Maspero and Mohammed Mahmoud St. massacres, have put together this amazing Google Maps-powered database of where retired military officers have landed -- highlighting the common practice of senior officers being given golden parachute that land them softly into positions of influence in the civilian bureaucracy across the country.

It's hard to explain, so just explore it: el3askarmap.kazeboon.com [Ar]. As you zoom into the map, you get more detail as to where they are.

Also on Twitter and Facebook.

Tuareg-Islamist alliance collapses in northern Mali

Above, houses from the Kidal region of northern Mali, where as you might tell good governance has not been part of the picture for a while. Paul Mutter sends in the latest on what's happening in the Sahel as international involvement increases.

Le Monde estimates that over 200,000 Malians have fled to neighboring countries in the wake of the ongoing "Tuareg rebellion," while at least 150,000 more have become international displaced persons. It is by now though, a misnomer to call this conflict a "Tuareg rebellion," as the MNLA, the Tuareg organization originally fighting to establish an autonomous homeland in northern Mali, has been driven from the cities it captured from the government. The government was driven from the north months before, and so the initiative is now in hands of the militias proclaiming Islamist goals.

Despite their superior armaments, MNLA fighters have now been driven from Gao which they had declared to be the capital of their autonomous state of "Azawad." Reporter Peter Tinti interviewed residents of Gao following the MNLA's departure from the city, offering insight into the Islamists' success:

It was clear that the MNLA made few inroads in winning popular support amongst the non-Tuareg community in #Gao (2/7) #Mali

— Peter Tinti (@petertinti) July 6, 2012

All were happy to see the MNLA (referred to as “les terroristes”) gone. Fair or not they associate MNLA w/ systemic looting (3/7) #Mali #Gao

— Peter Tinti (@petertinti) July 6, 2012

MUJWA/AQMI and Ansar al-Dine were often referred to interchangeably, under the broad moniker of “Les Mujahadin” (4/7) #Mali #Gao

— Peter Tinti (@petertinti) July 6, 2012

None of the people I talked to were enthusiastic about “les Mujahadin” or sharia, but they welcomed the modicum of order (5/7) #Mali #Gao

— Peter Tinti (@petertinti) July 6, 2012

The Islamists' "acceptance" seems to be less a matter of sincerity on the part of the "liberated" residents of Gao for "Les Mujadadin" than it is a hope that the past weeks of looting and arbitrary violence against civilians will subside. Neither the MNLA nor the Malian Army found themselves to be very popular as occupiers in the past few months because of their actions.

Indeed, success in Gao for the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJWA) - an organization involved in bombings, smuggling and kidnappings in Algeria - and Ansar al-Dine, founded by the Tuareg Islamist and former MNLA commander Iyad Ag Ghali, did not just come militarily. It also came through through the fact that the Islamists accurately read street protests over the murder of a local official and their escalation against the MNLA occupation and Tuareg separatism in general. France24 reports that MUJWA and Ansar al-Dine quickly took up places alongside the demonstrators A spokesman for Ansar al-Dine claims that the Islamists, who do count Tuaregs among their numbers, "only" moved against the MNLA in order to prevent them from further brutalizing the city's residents.

Tuaregs are now reportedly vacating northern Mali in fear of further reprisals from all parties, while MUJWA is apparently trying to win over Mali's Songhai minority. At the same, all of the Islamist militias have reportedly begun imposing their versions of Sharia law in the towns they hold: a family interviewed by Phil Paoletta reports public floggings and other harsh measures have been instituted in Timbuktu, while throughout the north, armed gangs are descending upon Sufi shrines to tear them down.

Unpopular as these actions are proving to be, an even greater dearth of popular support bedeviled the MNLA since the onset of the fighting that saw Mali's US-trained armed forces retreating before separatist Tuaregs kitted out with stolen Libyan weaponry. It was no coincidence that these columns bore the arms of the Jamahiriya - the late Colonel was a patron of Tuareg separatism in Mali in the 1980s and 1990s, when severe droughts and resentment towards Bamako's policies sparked revolts. Representatives of Tuareg tribes eventually reached a ceasefire with the government in 1998, though clashes continued to occur on and off since then and disappointment with the central government - in both the north and among the military - has festered through that time. The returning mercenaries from Libya provided the means for the conflict to be reignited.

But as the shock of its assault wore out over Mali's geographic space and ethnic divisions, the Tuareg's position deteriorated (they account for no more than a fifth of Mali's total population, and many have since moved to the cities). The MNLA has been hurting for manpower and finances. Additionally, the several-thousand strong MNLA did not represent all Tuaregs. Splits within the movement among participating Tuareg tribes, such as the Kel Adagh, had weakened the separatists before the falling out with Ansar al-Dine occurred in Timbuktu.

The conflict's regional implications are still being calculated. Mauritania and Algeria are deploying more border units, and Mali's West African neighbors have proposed direct military intervention. Parliamentarians and protestors in Bamako are demanding that the army - still chastened from its losses and self-defeating coup against President Touré in the spring - take more proactive measures to regain government control over the north.

Finally, there is the matter of assessing how possible next steps in this conflict - further Islamist offensives, outside military intervention from ECOWAS, refugee movements, a government offensive - might affect a Sahelian food insecurity crisis warned of by aid organizations for this year. Oxfam warned in June that "[l]ow rainfall and water levels, poor harvests and lack of pasture, high food prices and a drop in remittances from migrants are all causing serious problems .... National food reserves are dangerously low, while prices of some key cereals have dramatically increased: prices of corn in the Sahel are 60-85% higher than last five year average prices." Water access issues in the north are being exacerbated by conflict-related disruptions. And between 70,000 and 100,000 refugees have gone to [Mauritania], where "700,000 people (over one-quarter of the population) in Mauritania are [already] estimated to be vulnerable to food insecurity." The World Food Program and other NGOs remain optimistic that international donors and the region's governments can remediate most of these problems, including in Mali, where Oxfam plans to provide food aid to around 350,000 people.

Libya: What's happening to Al-Mahmoudi?

From POMED: Ex Libya PM Claims Tunisian Authorities Tortured Him

In a report released by Human Rights Watch on Friday, former Libyan Prime Minister Al-Baghdadi al-Mahmoudi, recently extradited back to Libya from Tunisia, claimed that he is being treated well in Libya, but that Tunisian authorities regularly tortured him prior to his extradition. Mahmoudi said guards beat him with “sticks, boots, and a plastic whip,” and alleged that he went on a hunger strike when authorities denied him access to his lawyer. Returning to Libya has been a marked improvement, Mahmoudi said, in contrast to statements by his lawyer last week, who alleged his client suffered broken ribs and a perforated lung at the hands of Libyan authorities. Human Rights Watch, however, could not verify that Mahmoudi was able to speak freely.

Should HRW perhaps confirm this before releasing highly inflamatory information? Or at least give an indication of which story it believes is more likely to be true?

Qatar: Where's the trust?

Jenifer Fenton sent in this dispatch from Doha, looking at the results of a recent survey and asking wider questions about the future of migration and expat communities in the Gulf.

Qataris have little trust in Western expatriates, was the headline many in Qatar took away from newly published research.

On a scale from 0 to 10, with 0 representing no trust and 10 complete trust, Qataris gave Western expatriates a 3.6, the lowest trust rating of any group excluding migrant laborers. Qataris trust other nationals (rating of 8); and Arab expatriates to a lesser degree (6.1), according to the report From Fareej To Metropolis.

“What Qataris have expressed is not different from what other people have expressed in other countries... We tend to trust and like people who are like us regardless of who we are,” said Darwish Al Emadi, Director of the Social and Economic Survey Research Institute (SESRI) at Qatar University which published the report. “British trust British people more than they trust non-British.”

However, white-collar respondents displayed high trust in Qataris (7.4). Migrant workers did as well.

Al Emadi’s research also found that "The more you interact with people, the more you trust them."

Segregated Ghetto

But in Qatar there is the limited interaction between the country’s population groups, which includes nationals, white-collar workers mainly from the Arab and Western worlds, and laborers from South and Southeast Asia. The three groups live in parallel worlds divided by invisible barriers.

“Although we all live in the same community we are living in ghettos, social ghettos,” Al Emadi said. “The interaction between Qataris and all types of expats, even the Arab expats, is really just related to the work place. We hardly ever interact at the house level.”

The lack of interactions between nationals and white-collar workers seems more acute in Doha than in Dubai or Abu Dhabi in the United Arab Emirates because the segregation of housing is perhaps more pronounced. Neighborhoods in Qatar “largely define and structure social interaction,” according to the report.

The wealthier tier of expatriates lives in employer-provided or employer-supported housing likely to be villas and apartments. “Qataris tend to live in neighborhoods with detached high-fenced housing in predominately Qatari neighborhoods where extended family members tend to live.” This is their desire. About 97 percent of Qataris preferred having other Qataris as neighbors; less than one percent indicated a preference for low-paid migrant workers in their neighborhoods. Laborers live in migrant camps mainly located outside of the city center. Late last year Qatar banned labor accommodations in residential areas.

UAE Zayed University anthropologist Jane Bristol-Rhys agreed that Qatar’s neighborhoods are more segregated than many in the Emirates, but she objected to assumptions that these invisible boundaries are put there purposefully in either country.

“These places are melting pots. There are over 200 nationalities in the Emirates in addition to Emiratis. Are people going to tend to socialize in groups where they work? Yes. But Interaction is not necessarily limited to nationality groups,” according to Bristol-Rhys, who has spent almost a decade interviewing foreign workers and Emiratis about the issue.

Limited Social Arenas

There are limited, although growing, areas for social interaction outside of work. Majlis, a social meeting usually sex-segregated, is the main leisure activity of Qataris, according to the SESRI report. Unsurprisingly expatriates do not report majlis in the list of preferred social activities. Rather they are involved in schools, charities, clubs and sports.

The segregation between the sexes restricts inter-mingling. During a meal at a Qataris home, the men and women would normally dine separately. This is “something you are not used to and probably something that you don’t want to do,” said Al Emadi. “We don’t want to do it your way either. At the end of the day both parties don’t like to give in on what they think is the right way of interaction. So they end up having their own separate things.”

Qatari women are also restricted in their relationships with men. It would “not be comfortable, not be acceptable,” to “hang-out” with men outside of a work or a school environment, said Muna Mohammed, a young professional Qatari woman. Her two friends agreed. The three said, however, that they have more foreign friends and acquaintances than their parents or older generations do.

Social interaction between low-paid migrant workers and other groups are near non-existent. On meager salaries, they cannot afford leisure coffees, movies or even taxi rides into town. Even if they could muster-up the money, most work very long hours with few days off a month. Bachelors are also banned from Qatar’s malls on certain days because of “family-only days” policies.

However Bristol-Rhys said it is not clear that a great number of these migrant workers, who often come from small villages, even want to socialize with other groups.

Qataris and migrant workers, who are from different countries but whose circumstances are relatively similar, are fairly homogenous group; while the third social group of “professional” workers contains many subgroups from different cultural and socio-economic backgrounds.

Often there is limited interaction between these subgroups, between Arab and Western expatriates, according to Al Emadi. "We...tend to interact with people who are like us. Who speak our language, who behave like us, have more of our values and so on."

Bristol-Rhys is not sure she agreed that we like people who are like us and said there are other contributing factors that may increase isolation. “Some people are not good cultural travelers. Even though they may have a job working here (UAE), it may not suit their personality to want to get to know another language or culture or even to interact.”

A Minority In Their Country

Because of rapid growth and development Qatar and the other Gulf countries have a large migrant population. Some 1.8 million people live in Qatar, but only a few hundred thousand are citizens. The country has the highest global ration of migrants to citizens, according to the World Bank. The UAE ranks third. All of the Gulf countries are in the [top 30] (http://siteresources.worldbank.org/IN...).

Twenty-five percent of respondents answered yes to “Are there too many expats in the UAE?” in a recent (unscientific) poll on The National's website (screenshot).

Debates about “too many foreigners,” “price of modernizing” and “preservation of national culture” are of course nothing new. Khalid Al Ameri, an Emirati commentator, wrote:

You can only imagine how strange it must be for people who have a hard time integrating into their own society. It would be frustrating for anyone, in his or her home country, to see the presence of indigenous culture dwindle.

It is also true that Qatar and the UAE need foreign workers to develop their countries. There are simply not enough nationals to do it. “We don’t have the knowledge, we don’t have the numbers,” Qatar University's Al Emadi said. It would be difficult to operate a single sector in the country without migrant workers. “If we wanted to run the hospital by ourselves, just Qataris, we probably could not do it. We don’t have enough nurses. We don’t have enough doctors.”

Lowly-paid migrant workers are not exclusive to the developing Gulf countries. “It seems like every country in the world has a population they don’t want to talk about that does the dirty work,” Bristol-Rhys said. There were successive waves of migrant groups to the United States who did the “crap” jobs no one else wanted to do - the Irish, the Jews and of course not forgetting enslaved blacks. “This is not uniquely a Gulf problem it just seems so just because of the sheer magnitude of it - because these (migrant) populations seriously outnumber the citizens.”

There is the argument that migrants to the U.S. and Europe can eventually become citizens of the nations in which they work, and this is something unlikely to happen in the Gulf anytime soon - if ever.

Path to citizenship?

If Qatar were to open up a greater path to citizenship, which is severely restricted and almost 100 percent hereditary, Qatari nationals feel they would become a minority with minority rights in their own country, Al Emadi said. Now Qataris are clearly the minority, but they are the ones with the greatest rights.

But migration to Gulf countries is done for different reasons than to the U.S. or Europe. “Are we beginning with the premise that all expatriates want to have Qatari or Emirati passport?,” Bristol-Rhys asked. Most people move to these countries to improve their lives at home, to put their children through schools, to buy a home or to fatten their pension funds. “Everyone who comes here knows this is not a place for immigration. This is not a place you would migrate to become a citizen."

State Dept. finally admits inconsistency

Via Mondoweiss: State Dep't says it is 'not consistent' on human rights violations involving Israel and neighbors

This is a classic — the AP's tenacious State Dept correspondent Matt Lee (really, no ones asks the tough questions like he does again and again) gets the State Dept. spokesperson to say that the US is ready to say HRW reports are credible when it comes to Syria but will not call them credible if they're about Israel.

MS. NULAND: Matt, as you have made clear again and again in this room, we are not always consistent.

That's the nut quote but read the whole exchange. 

The current State Dept. motto, on their website at least, is "Diplomacy in action". Maybe they should change that to "Not always consistent".

In Translation: Sheikh Yasser Borhami on Morsi and Shariʿa

In this week's In Translation article — provided by the hive mind at Industry Arabic, which you should immediately hire for all your translation purposes — we hear the views of Sheikh Yasser Borhami, who heads the Da'wa Salafiya movement of Alexandria and is in effect the spiritual head of the Nour Party.

Borhami and Da'wa Salafiya have emerged as the most important voices of the Salafi movement in Egypt, and the most willing to engage in electoral politics. Borhami is one of Egypt's most influential preachers, and his decision to back the Nour Party marked the first major foray by Salafists onto the national political scene. In a recent Brookings paper on the Egyptian Salafi movement, Stephane Lacroix writes:

The Nour Party was founded by an informal religious organization called the “Salafi Da‘wa” (al- Da‘wa al-Salafiyya), whose leadership is based in Alexandria. The origins of the Salafi Da‘wa date back to the late 1970s, when its founders – students at the faculty of medicine at Alexandria University – broke away from the Islamist student groups known as al-Gama‘at al-Islamiyya (“Islamic groups”). Among them was Yasir Burhami, currently the dominant figure in the organization. The Salafi Da‘wa’s stance against violence and refus- al to engage in formal politics made it relatively acceptable to the Mubarak regime. To be sure, the group did at times endure repression; its leaders were kept under close surveillance and were forbidden from traveling outside Alexandria. However, the Salafi Da‘wa often benefited from the covert support of the regime apparatus, which tried to use Salafis to undermine the Muslim Brotherhood’s influence. 

Borhami is not involved in the day to day running of the party, but exerts a dominant influence on its key decisions  — such as backing Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh rather than Mohammed Morsi in the first round of the presidential elections, insisting on a constitution that gives priority to Shariʿa, or refusing electoral alliances with secular parties. The interview that appears below made some noise because of Borhami's insistence on new wording for the future constitution's reference to Shariʿa, which would favor a Salafist interpretation of Shariʿa and its influence on shaping legislation. 

Borhami tells al-Shorouk: We’ve agreed with the Muslim Brotherhood to strike the word “principles” from the article on Shariʿa in the constitution

By Mustafa Hashim, al-Shorouk, 30 June 2012

Q: What is your take on the fact that the Administrative Court has postponed the hearing on challenges to the Constituent Assembly until September?

A: It is a good opportunity for the Constituent Assembly to hurry up and finish writing the Constitution before the appeal can be reviewed again…I think it is a good decision and a beneficial judgment.

Q: Is it possible to both reach an agreement with political actors as well as complete the constitution before this date?

A: Everyone wants to finish drafting the Constitution before September. Specifically, the 1971 Constitution is good overall, except for some of the articles in some sections that are in need of review. Also, almost all political actors agreed on the powers given to the president. But there are some articles about which immediate agreement is necessary. And they will be agreed upon if the members of the assembly submit themselves unto God – may He be worshipped and exalted – and to expressing the will of the nation, which they represent.

Q: The Muslim Brotherhood announced that they do not intend to change the constitutional article on Islamic Shariʿa. Do you disagree with them?

A: We insist that the article be drafted on the basis that “Islamic Shariʿa is the principal source of legislation” rather than on the principles of Shariʿa.[1] We will not give up on this matter. The Muslim Brotherhood has assured us that they agree with us regarding the formulation of the phrase “Islamic Shariʿa” without “principles.” What is so upsetting about Islamic Shariʿa? Does Shariʿa bother anyone? We have not stated our views on Shariʿa, but we do say that we want the Shariʿa that God has sent down to us. Is anyone afraid of Shariʿa, the Shariʿa that achieves justice, welfare, and wisdom? This is a very peculiar matter. How can one say that people are afraid of Shariʿa?[2]

Q: You want to omit the word “principles.” What is the problem regarding the term?

A: We don’t have a problem with the word “principles”, but the Constitutional Court’s previous interpretation of the word states that it means what is “absolutely immutable and significant.” This empties the constitutional article of both its content and its truth, because there is no verse [of Revelation] or [Divine] utterance that does not allow for various disagreements both in terms of wording or jurisprudence. This word – principles – was intended to void the article entirely. Someone once said that it was a decorative article. And that’s exactly what it was under the former regime. We will not accept or tolerate this. In our mind, this amounts to a betrayal of Shariʿa and the will of the nation. What won the Brotherhood and the Nour Party the majority in parliament and the presidency is their confirmed desire to apply Shariʿa.

Q: What would be the way out if there were to be any intellectual disagreement over a particular issue?

A: We believe that al-Azhar is the final authority in resolving disputes.

Q: Do you care to comment on the election of Dr. Mohammed Morsi to the office of President of the Republic ?

A: Dr. Mohammed Morsi is the first civilian president to be elected since the time of Muhammad Ali. The latter was chosen by the ulema who represented the nation. That was one of the Islamic and democratic ways for representing the nation. This is nothing new, for in some countries parliament elects the president.[3]

Q: Have you been in contact with Dr. Mursi after his election to the Office of President in order to agree on how to form the government?

A: I called him to congratulate him, but we did not talk about anything having to do with forming the government. Right now he is exploring relations with supportive political actors. No doubt, he has to take the opportunity to think and work out solutions to unresolved issues with other political actors. Of course, we are keen to be in touch with him, which shall happen soon, God willing.

Q: What are your expectations concerning the Nour Party’s representation in the new government?

A: We will work on applying our vision before the elections for the formation of the new government, which will be a coalition government of national unity in which all political actors will be represented in the same proportions that they held in Parliament. Even if Parliament were dissolved, the people gave us that share. This is the first parliament to truly be elected. Therefore, the previous proportions will be relied upon when the new government is formed.

Q: But many political actors rejected this proposal even when the People’s Assembly was still in place.

A: I think the coming government will represent all the political actors, considering the fact that the coming government will be a technocratic one.

Q: Which ministries to you want to work in?

A: We are ready with technocratic ministers who can fill a number of different positions. But I do not want to mention [particular] ministerial portfolios or the names of our candidates. What I think is important is that the matter be based on mutual understanding.

Q: Will Nour be represented in Dr. Morsi’s presidential team?

A: We know that partners from the electoral campaign and the former Parliament will have a role to play in Dr. Mohammed Morsi’s presidential team. Actually, he will determine and choose who will be his advisors. But he has not discussed this issue with us yet.

Q: Word has gotten out that the post of Prime Minister has been offered to Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei. What is your opinion?

A: I think that Dr. ElBaradei is not the right man for the job right now. We hope that the government with be a technocratic government. ElBaradei is a political man who played a part in Iraq that we object to.[4] We also object to his position regarding the Nubians. Specifically, he wants to make the case an international one, despite the fact that the Nubians themselves do not want to make their case an international one in the first place, nor have they ever thought of it. In general, we are working with all political actors on the ground.

Q: What demands do you have for President Morsi?

A: Actually, I have appeals more than demands because I know that everyone will be demanding something from him and I don’t want to add to the people’s demands: a decent life and restoring Egypt to a position that befits its place in the world. Also, he has exerted much effort to work with all national political actors. My appeal is that Islamic Shariʿa be re-introduced, as well as reform and [facilitating] national concord.

Q: What are the pressing issues in your opinion?

A: Restoring security and economic reform, as well as restoring the spirit of harmony between all segments of Egyptian society; restoring the spirit of cooperation, not tyranny; and restoring the spirit of cooperation, not discord.

Q: What advice do you have for Mohammed Morsi?

A: I would say that he who upsets the people for the sake of pleasing God, then both God and the people will be satisfied with him. And he who angers God for the sake of satisfying the people, then both God and the people will be displeased and angry with him.

Q: Will your previous support of Aboul Fotouh in the first round of elections affect your relationship with the Brotherhood and your representation in the government?

A: What made us have influence in the Egyptian street during the second round was thanks to our initial support for Aboul Fotouh in the first round. This is what God wanted for Dr. Mohammed Morsi. Even if we had supported Morsi from the beginning, we would have lost the street just like the Brotherhood did in the first round. And our support of Aboul Fotouh gave us more credibility than the Muslim Brotherhood. I met many people during the first round who said to me that they were going to choose Mohammed Morsi because we, [the Nour Party, i.e. Salafists] did not choose him.

Q: It has been said that America put pressure on the Military Council to give the victory to Mursi. What is your opinion?

A: I don’t know anything about that. I don’t believe everything that is said in the papers. But really, what are America’s interests in putting pressure on SCAF to have Morsi take the Presidency?

Q: Shafiq’s supporters say that the Military Council is in cahoots with the Brotherhood. Your comments?

A: I was surprised when Shafiq said that he accepted the results. The speech he delivered after they announced the results was a display of good form. I hope that the same kind of spirit will also be passed onto his supporters. There has to be a winner. And I would like to emphasize that, at the moment, responsibility is difficult. As for me, I congratulate Dr. Shafiq and offer my condolences to Dr. Mohamed Mursi. Concerning what has befallen Shafiq, I say to him that “we belong to God and to Him do we return.”

Q: Some believe that under the Islamists, Egypt will become a religious state like Iran.

A: The phrase “religious state” is essentially a Western term and it is derived from “theocratic state”, which is a state that Islam vehemently opposes for God – may He be honored and glorified – as it is said in His Book: “and let not some of us take others to be Lords apart from God.” The notion of Divine Right to rule, or that one should consider what the ruler or spiritual leader of the state says as having the same status as the Qur’an or Sunnah, is not extant in Islam. This is extant in Shiite thought and not in Sunni thought. The Shi’ites say that the Imams are infallible. Hence, rule under the Guardianship of the Islamic Jurists (Wilayat al-Faqih) is equivalent to the rule of infallible Imams. For this reason, no one has the right to object to the rule of the spiritual leader of the Iranian Revolution. As for Sunni Islam, the just ruling Caliph is not infallible. Thus, rulers can be faulted and they can also be opposed for the sake of maintaining the form of the state. Moreover, anyone who talks of a religious state is either ignorant of the truth of Islamic Shariʿa or his understanding of Shariʿa is misinformed. Therefore, I declare that Egypt – ruled by the Constitution and the Law – will not be like Iran.

Q: Some people are calling for full diplomatic relations be re-established with Iran. Do you agree with this argument?

A: Iran is one of many states with which we must work together. But we must confirm whether it is a missionary state that seeks to spread the Shi’ite sect. If the Iranians agree not to cross certain red lines both inside and outside Egypt, then I have no objection to building good relations with them. We [Nour] do not have problems with building relations with all the states of the world, even with non-Islamic states, as well as an Islamic state like Iran.

Q: What are the red lines that Iran should not cross?

A: They should not appear to be trying to spread the Shi’ite sect within Egypt. And they should help preserve social and political stability for countries in the Gulf, as well as Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria; they should stop interfering with, violating, and suppressing the will of the people. After all, what’s happening in Syria should not be tolerated.

Q: What is your opinion regarding the supplementary Constitutional Declaration?

A: This is seriously painful matter. It contravenes the popular referendum of March 19, 2011. It renders the Constituent Assembly an unelected body and its work is limited thanks to the right to object given to a great number of [political] entities, such as the President of the Republic, the Military Council, the Prime Minister, and the Supreme Court.

Therefore, we are with the people in peaceful objection and peaceful demonstrations against this decision. We share in wanting to inform the Military Council of our objection to the supplementary Constitutional Declaration and we demand that they have the Constitutional Declaration be submitted for review.

Q: Are you also protesting in Tahrir Square?

A: Some of the Salafi youth are participating in a sit-in in the Square, but the Salafi Da’wa will be present there on a recurrent basis.

Q: What is your opinion on the decision to dissolve the People’s Assembly?

A: The wording of the Supreme Constitutional Court’s decision is not based on constitutional law, rather its interpretation – insofar as it required the dissolution of Assembly – is what requires review. This interpretation cannot be found in the wording of the decision, but rather in the court’s reasons for the judgment. And the decision to dissolve the Assembly has already been appealed and we are waiting for the decision in 10 days. We hope to have a different interpretation of the wording of the court’s decision, which will facilitate the re-election of one-third of the seats that are individual seats and prevent the dissolution of the Assembly in its entirety. For example, if one-third of the Assembly members were to die in an earthquake, does the entire Assembly become void? It is odd that one-third of Parliament should invalidate the entire Assembly.

Q: What is your opinion about how the Military Council implemented the ruling and dissolved Parliament?

A: The Military Council was hasty in its decision to dissolve the People’s Assembly on its own. This is not one of its designated powers put forth in the Constitutional Declaration, which the people voted on in a referendum. The people chose their representatives and no one has the right to dissolve the People’s Assembly.

Q: If the ruling ends up dissolving the Assembly, will you reconsider your slate of candidates for the elections?

A: If it is proven that the performance of some of our representatives in the Assembly was not good, then we will reconsider them.

Q: What is your opinion about the performance of the Nour Party’s parliamentary bloc?

A: The problem is that we are always making comparisons based on the absolute and the ideal. This has always made the comparison like a microscope that magnifies mistakes. It should be known that any comparison should be relative. If we compared the current People’s Assembly with the People’s Assembly under Mubarak, then we would realize that there was never a People’s Assembly to begin with under the former tyrannical regime. What I mean is the comparison between what is found at hand and what is not. In the end, the People’s Assembly is an experiment that needs to be evaluated in light of the negative aspects.

Q: What is your opinion about how the National Defense Council has been formed?

A: I believe that there should have been other civilian members involved in its formation, such as an authorized representative each from the People’s Assembly and the Shura Council, as well as the chairmans of the Defense Committee and of National Security Committee from the People’s Assembly, in order to strike a balance that serves the general welfare. We are adamant that the Armed Forces should continue to perform their role as protectors of the country. But, at the same time, there must be relatively greater room that allows for consultation, and the Military Council’s decisions should not be made alone.

Q: Do you support the law on organizing demonstrations in the coming period?

A: I support peaceful demonstrations but not sit-ins that stop traffic. I think that the present law is sufficient, but it must be applied. Anyone has the right to express his opinion, but at the same time this should not interfere with the welfare of other citizens and it should not be violent.

Q: What is your vision for the re-organization of the police force?

A: The police force needs qualified men who understand the nature of the new stage we are living in, who protect citizens’ rights, and who at the same time do their work with the utmost competence. This is a matter that needs to be applied gradually. But what we need right now is to cooperate for the sake of restoring the police to their natural place in society: a place based on respect for the law and for the people.

Q: What is your opinion about some of the officers growing out their beards?

A: I am certain that bearded officers are noble men, of whom society and the police force are in need at this moment. The decision to fire them should be submitted for review, especially since a beard does not prevent a police officer from performing his work at all. To the contrary, at this stage the beard will help win the average man’s trust in the men of the police force. We hope that the situation will change in this new stage.

In the 1971 constitution and the current, interim, Constitutional Declaration, Article 2 states that “The principles of Islamic law are the chief source of legislation.” Salafists and some Muslim Brothers basically advocate dropping “principles”, which would make for a much more direct and literal interpretation of Shariʿa.  ↩

Borhami’s take — “why would anyone object to Shariʿa?” — is rather typical of Islamists and Salafists in particular. Many Egyptian secularists do object, however, because they are afraid that this will lead to the implementation of Saudi-style interpretations of Shariʿa, rather than “principles” derived from Shariʿa as interpreted by Islamic scholars, and also because it ignores the large part of Egyptian law that is derived from European tradition or entirely secular in nature.  ↩

Of course, Mohammed Ali was not “elected” in any meaningful sense — he seized power by massacring all other Mamluks that had been ruling Egypt at the time.  ↩

A reference to ElBaradei’s role while director of the International Atomic Energy Agency on the alleged Iraqi nuclear weapons program. In fact, ElBaradei opposed the war and did not agree to language the US demanded at the time in describing the Saddam Hussein’s regime nuclear capacity.  ↩

Great info-map of Sahel dynamics

I found this map a few weeks ago, at Monde Diplo I believe, and have had it on my desktop for a while. Great illustration of a complex situation.

Update: Here's the source of the map.

Is the PA afraid of third intifada?

Amira Hass in Haaretz:

But handing out jobs in the security apparatus to thousands of young people without any educational or professional future, the solution the PA came up with in the 1990s and one to which they are clinging to today, does not really wipe out cumulative sociopolitical resentments, especially in the refugee camps. The economic gaps are now more apparent than ever, even when released prisoners are getting entitlements that are higher than ever.

The authority carried out a wave of arrests in May (which included Mu'ayyed and Zakaria ) and turned yesterday's heroes into today's criminal problem. At the same time it was glorifying the Palestinian prisoners who were on a hunger strike in Israeli prisons. Many of them are not only relatives and friends of those recently arrested by the Palestinian Authority, but like them, they too turned the gun, the symbol of machismo, into both capital and cult.

Thus the leadership of the PA is again sending out mixed messages and broadcasting dishonesty. The brutality of the arrests, no matter what the suspicions, shows that the PA is afraid of the social resentments, and as a preventive measure, is suppressing anyone it thinks may be a potential representative or leader. Or, as Alia Amer, the mother of Ziad and Mu'ayyed, says, "All the talk on TV [against the detainees] is meant to justify the positions of senior authority personnel."

Links 24-30 June 2012

Slow week as I was traveling and then recovering from traveling.

arabious
New tumblog on Middle East art and more.

Constitutions as Peace Treaties: A Cautionary Tale for the Arab Spring - ARD


WPR Article | In Saudi Arabia, Need for Stability Makes Continuity Likely
Nathan Field on KSA post-Nayef.

The "hareem" of the new Egyptian Constitution | Egypt Independent


How the Army Won Egypt’s Election - NYTimes.com
Disagree with, but do read Josh Stacher's take.

Saudi Professor Faces Charges After Fighting for Free Speech - Al-Monitor


Morsi, SCAF and the revolutionary left « 3arabawy


Stephens: Who Lost Egypt? - WSJ.com
Terrible oped in so many ways.

Silent Complicity: The International Community and Algeria’s Democratic Façade
Brian Entelis (PDF)

Ajamindustry
Bassam Haddad on Fouad Ajami.

Morsi Meter - مرسي ميتر
Not only a great idea, but elegant too.

Egypt's Morsi to take presidential oath of office before Constitutional Court - Ahram Online


An Egyptian Everywoman in the Presidential Palace - NYTimes.com
Nice profile.

Morsi's uncertain powers to be tested by Egypt's experiment - The National
My latest column.

Syria: A Russian Perspective - Sada
It's about the world order, stupid - v. interesting.

Abbasseya detainees call on Morsy to pardon military prisoners | Egypt Independent


Business in Beirut: Levantine laggard | The Economist


In Egypt, There Will Be No Unity Without Compromise - Room for Debate - NYTimes.com


Mohamed Morsi Will Have His Hands Full Uniting a Deeply Divided Egypt - The Daily Beast
Tarek Masoud.

“Please God. Please make it stop.” | natasha smith
Awful account of an Egyptian mass-sexual assault. Pure nightmarish horror movie stuff.

Morsi Must Rise to Challenge Of Inspiring a Divided Egypt - Al-Monitor
Bassem Sabry.

La grande corruption règne en maître au Maroc
Benchemsi.

Covering Up - By Ahmed Al Omran | Foreign Policy
On top female Saudi official's veil.

.: CairoGossip :.
Galabiya party to "celebrate" Morsi at Amici bar. #facepalm

Nayef’s demise: Relief for the Brothers? | Egypt Independent
Sultan Q.

Mubarak's sons in shock at Morsi victory: MENA - Ahram Online
Too funny.

 

Powers continue jockeying over influence in Syria

The New York Times reports that the CIA has been on the ground in Turkey vetting armed opposition groups in Syria. The anonymous sources cited by the Times say that the US itself is not providing weapons to the rebels, in keeping with its earlier declarations to not directly arm them, but is apparently tracking weapons going into Syria and “advising” allies in the region as to which groups should get what weapons. Reports on alleged Western intelligence gathering operations along Syria’s borders several months ago were denied then, but the Times asserts that the CIA presence has been on the ground “for several weeks” at least.

The promise of weapons sales to the rebels has been advanced as a cost-effective way for the US and its allies to direct the course of the Syrian uprising’s armed resistance to the Assad regime. With arms comes influence - or so Washington, Doha and Riyadh hope - and the armed opposition has been hard-pressed to provision itself.

Even with these promises, armed groups in Syria, who are frequently at odds with one another, have relied and continue to rely on materials produced by Syrian expatriates, captured battlefield detritus or purchased from black marketeers. With the exception of equipment seized from a battlefield or brought over by defecting soldiers, the regime can still bring much greater firepower to bear, which manifests itself in the form of besieging and shelling neighborhoods concealing (or thought to be concealing) insurgents fighting the Syrian Army. As such, some factions of the anti-Assad movement continue to call for direct foreign military intervention, notably from the Turkish Army.

Ankara, for its part, denies it is helping arm the rebels, and even the recent shootdown of a Turkish fighter jet in Syrian airspace is unlikely to result in directly military action by NATO. Indeed, Turkey’s reluctance to “get involved” more proactively remains a major stumbling block for interventionists. (Ed. note: is it Turkey that is holding back NATO, or the reverse?)

The Times report paints a picture of a more engaged American intelligence effort in Syria, one that critics of both intervention and non-intervention say has been lacking since 2011. The perception of expanded US handling has been buttressed by recent reports in The Wall Street Journal and TIME that the US is assisting activists on the ground report on atrocities ascribed to the Syrian Army and pro-regime militias accused of committing civilian massacres in the conflict.[1]

As has been the case with reports on US efforts in Yemen, it is not clear whether the government sources speaking for these reports are engaging in unsanctioned leaks, or are going to the press with the White House’s acknowledgment. Despite years of talk about regime change in Syria and past US support for Syrian dissent groups in Istanbul and London, the Syrian uprising - like those in Egypt, Yemen, Libya, Tunisia and Bahrain - clearly caught the Obama Administration (and Syria’s neighbors) by surprise. The White House has been scrambling to implement something it’s “leading from behind” model for Libya in building an international consensus to take more decisive action, though denies Russian claims that through NATO, it intends to directly intervene in Syria.

Recently, there have been several spats between Washington and Moscow, which is Assad’s main arms supplier. The UK Foreign Office managed to fire a warning shot across Moscow’s bow over the Syrian crisis when The Standard Club withdrew insurance for the MV Alaed, a Russian freighter carrying repaired Syrian attack helicopters and “air defense systems” to Syria. This act of “lawfare” forced the Alaed to turn back to port. Shortly before this incident, US Secretary of State Hilary Clinton raised Cain over the use of Russian-made helicopter gunships by the Syrian military. One of the outcomes of this diplomatic protest, though, has been some embarrassing revelations about US-Russia defense sector links.

These moves were plainly aimed at signaling to Russia that it needs to exercise more influence on Assad in ways favorable to the West’s demands, or to back away from the dictator. A CNN report that the US military has revised/prepared contingency war plans for Syria is also part of this messaging - as is the Iranian media pushback in the form of announcing war games to be conducted in Syria by the Russians (these reports have been denied by Russia and do not seem credible).

More concretely, Russia has dispatched three amphibious landing craft to its naval base in the Port of Tartus, increasing their security presence there. Significantly, this force is thought to include heavy weapons and advanced anti-air systems. Russia’s mistrust of Washington’s efforts to address the conflict stems from fears that Syria will turn into Libya again, where the Russians and Chinese essentially allowed the UN Security Council and NATO to invoke a “responsibility to protect” that turned into a coordinated effort to oust the late Colonel Qadhafi from power. Russia’s stated principles are closely linked to its national interests. Arms, allies and naval basing rights matter too, analyst Dmitri Trenin notes, but “Moscow is concerned that allowing the United States to use force at will and without any external constraints might lead to foreign interventions close to Russian borders, or even within those borders.” So even absent the Libyan card, for Russia, there are few prices short of war the Kremlin will not pay to avoid the humiliation of “losing Syria,” it’s sole remaining Arab ally in the region.

So while the arming of rebel groups under US auspices is ostensibly aimed at redressing this imbalance of firepower, so far, no policy has been articulated in public as to whether this aid is supposed to help take down Assad with extreme prejudice, or compel him to broker a ceasefire and exeunt, even though members of the Syrian opposition have now repeatedly rejected a “Yemeni solution.” Assad, for his part, shows no signs of backing down despite combat fatigue, desertions and attacks within the heart of Damascus itself.

The US is still not willing to take that bet for Syria, though, at least not yet. Moscow shows no signs of backing down. Syrian activist Haytham Manna recently told The Guardian that “foreign influence and arms have split Syria’s civil movement.” The continued failure of Kofi Annan’s ceasefire plan, and the efforts of the Syrian Army or the rebels to maintain secure zones for civilians, show that this split may be irreconcilable, even if foreign powers press harder on Assad by all means short of open war.

While media activists have specific agendas and incentive to spin events, such activists have been politicized from the start in this conflict, with or without US dollars or cameras. Another complication is that the conflict has seen the deaths of Syrian media activists who were not associated with one particular armed camp or another, such as Bassel Shehadeh, who was killed by the Syrian Army in Homs this May. Ideally, third party sourcing to evaluate competing claims would be easier to come by. But even when such reports appear, the coverage quickly turns into a debate over the credibility of each outlet’s narratives.  ↩