Issandr El Amrani's Blog, page 83

A pre-emptive coup against a coup within a coup?

✚  No Reason to Celebrate, It's Just Another Coup

Wael Iskander offers a not unplausible explanation for yesterday's news in Egypt — what may have pushed some generals to go against Tantawi and Enan was that they felt a pre-emptive coup against a coup within a coup was necessary to prevent Tantawi & co. leading the military into an untenable situation.

So much of what has been happening has been conducted with much secrecy, that is why all we have today is analysis and speculation. However, it does seem that the likely scenario is a coup to counteract a coup as Hesham Sallam explained:

“Al-Assar, Al-Sisi and others led a coup against Tantawi and Anan in order to preempt a prospective coup attempt that could have gotten the army into uncertain political confrontations—specifically confrontations that could have led the military establishment to lose everything vis-à-vis the MB. Consistent with this theory is the fact that Al-Dostoor newspaper was confiscated yesterday after effectively making a public call for a coup--which suggests that some elements within the SCAF had been prodding their allies inside the media establishment to begin promoting the image of popular support for a coup”

It is clear to me that something was planned for 24 August 2012 and that is what was pre-empted. The Muslim Brotherhood (Morsi) had to have the support of some elements inside the army so as to come out with this decision.

There had been calls for mass protests against Morsi and the MB and the Brotherhood on the 24th, backed by some of the press and political establishment. Maybe this is what forced their hands.

Massad on Egypt and the Palestinians

✚  Egypt's nouveaux riches and the Palestinians

I find Joseph Massad wrong on most of what he writes about, and far too nativist for my taste. In this piece, while he outlines the terrible anti-Palestinian actions of the Mubarak regime, he is delusional when he argues that it was a narrow nouveau riche class that adopted anti-Palestinian postures. It's a lot more complicated than that, and while there are wonderful pro-Palestinian efforts in Egypt from the left and Islamists, there is also a very widespread suspicion of Palestinians (much of it the result of regime propaganda, of course). Some of it is part of a wider xenophobia, some of it due to a reluctance to be drawn into the Israeli/Palestinian conflict. But I feel, after over a decade in Egypt, that there is more anti-Israeli sentiment than thoughtful pro-Palestinian sentiment, at least outside the activist groups. Just look at the sorry state of the normalization debate in Egypt, as if it were the 1980s, and general ignorance of Palestinian-led movements like BDS.

And the language in this piece is really OTT.

The Morsi Maneuver: a first take

I hate to come out with a full-fledged analysis as the full picture of today’s news from Egypt is still coming out, but the importance of Morsi’s changes to the military and cancellation of the terrible June 17 Supplementary Constitutional Declaration deserves some comment. Here is my preliminary take, which I will no doubt revise in coming days and that is not exhaustive. Please leave what I’m missing out on in the comments.

I’d divide what happened today in two parts. First, what has changed in the military:

Defense Minister and SCAF head Hussein Tantawi, who will be replaced by Head of Military Intelligence AbdelLatif El-Sissi
Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces Sami Enan.
Both Tantawi and Enan have been named presidential advisors, and were recently awarded the Order of the Nile medal. It appears they will be protected from punishment for their actions during the transitional period.
The heads of every service of the Armed Forces (Air Force, Air Defenses, Navy) were also retired but were given golden parachutes (one is now head of the Suez Canal Authority, another the new Minister of Military Production, etc.) It appears they will be replaced by their deputies.
There seems to be more personnel changes and shuffles — but mostly within the logic of promotion typical of the Egyptian military (i.e. no people were suddenly dropped into the senior ranks from lower ranks or outside the senior staff).

The overall impression I get is of a change of personalities with continuity in the institution. More junior officers are taking the posts of their former superiors, and some SCAF members are shifting positions. The departure of Tantawi was inevitable considering his age and unpopularity.

The really surprising thing is that for months there had been reports of positioning within the military-intelligence nexus for the succession battle for post-Tantawy. Leading candidates were Sami Enan, recently fired Head of General Intelligence Mourad Mowafy and to a lesser extent El-Sissi. There were also inconsistent speculation (from well-informed sources with direct SCAF access) about the relationship between El-Sissi and Mowafi. El-Sissi’s appointment is consistent with the idea that he long was one of the most powerful (but less obviously so) members of SCAF, and Enan’s departure is quite striking.

This continuity suggests to me that we are dealing with a reconfigured SCAF that is nonetheless a powerful entity that still has powers parallel to the presidency and other civilian institutions. It is not, as the initial reaction to today’s news largely was, a victory by Morsi over the military. Rather, it is a reconfiguration of the relationship.

Even so, it does appear the presidency comes out reinforced. This is the second part of the major changes announced today. Morsi also declared though a four-article decree that:

the June 17 Supplemental Constitutional Declaration is annulled;
the president has assumed the powers outlined in Article 56 of the Constitutional Declaration, i.e. the powers previously held by SCAF
the president will, through a national consultation, appoint a new Constituent Assembly within 15 days if the president does not complete its task. A new constituent assembly would prepare a new constitution within three months, be referred to a national referendum within 30 days of completion, and once adopted would be followed by new parliamentary elections within two months.

It’s hard to think of a way to avoid this considering the lack of alternatives and the mess Egypt is in, but Morsi has effectively, on paper, dictatorial powers. It will largely come down to how he uses them, especially as the last thing Egypt needs is a government unable to make decisions and address urgent problems simply because the parliament is not in place.

The appointment of Mahmoud Mekky, a senior judge, as vice-president closes the hole left by the delay in appointing any vice-president. The choice is not a bad one and may help Morsi in his fight with the senior ranks of the judiciary. Of course many will still wait for the Christian and female VPs he promised to appoint (and it would have been smarter to make moves in those directions at the same time.)

Overall, I think this is a very welcome move. But it does not necessarily change much aside from break the deadlock over the constitutional declaration. These moves will be seen by many opponents of the Brotherhood as a power grab, and the fact that Morsi has amassed considerable power (again, on paper) is indeed cause for concern. The power to appoint a new constitutional assembly is particularly key, if he ends up using it, I certainly hope it will be to appoint something acceptable to non-Islamists rather than impose the one Islamists wanted earlier this year (unfortunately, the MB’s sense of electoral entitlement makes me pessimistic here). How Morsi navigates this in the next few weeks will be crucial, as well as how secular parties and movements react, particularly considering their unwillingness to work with the MB in recent weeks. Some of these just want to sabotage Morsi and see the MB fail. Some openly called for a military coup against him.

I’m not in Egypt at the moment so it’s tough for me to get a sense of what the mood is, but I would not be surprised if public opinion backs not so much Morsi but the sense of things finally moving forward again. But I am really unable to say whether, apart from breaking the deadlock, it will be a positive development in the long term. The possibility of a new MB-military understanding is still there, and it’s what appears to be underpinning today’s news. In other words, Egypt got rid of military leaders who outstayed their welcome, but may instead get a more subtle military leadership that is better able to work out an understanding with a Muslim Brotherhood that seems attached to a majoritarian idea of democracy, and of course remains generally illiberal. But at least, it gets rid of what was an untennable form of direct military rule and empowers an elected civilian president. Let's hope he uses his new powers wisely. 

Links 5-12 August 2012

Not many as much of this week was spent offline. Note also that this week I also implemented short posts (in the linked list style found on tech blogs) where I make a few remarks on links. From now on there will be a mix of these links-posts and a weekly or so linkdump. Perhaps next time I will also add a "this week on the blog" catch-up list to these link dumps. And remember everything below (and more) is first linked to on Twitter.


BBC News - Egypt leader Mursi orders army chief Tantawi to resign
the game is on.
Two earthquakes kill hundreds in Iran - FT


ÉGYPTE • Comment j’ai réussi à me libérer des Frères musulmans | Courrier international
Comment j’ai réussi à me libérer des Frères musulmans #Egypt

Egyptian prank show exposes anti-Israeli sentiment - CNN.com
Funny but sad. But funny.

Egypt Tightens Grip on Sinai - NYTimes.com


Israeli soldiers preemptively arrest African migrants in Egyptian territory | Egypt Independent
Little sign of battle in Egypt's Sinai region | Reuters
BBC News - Morocco: Should pre-marital sex be legal?

BBC News - Morocco: Should pre-marital sex be legal?

In Egypt's Sinai desert, Islamic militants gaining new foothold - The Washington Post
Worth re-reading @londonoe's prescient July dispatch from Sinai: #Egypt

الإدارية توقف بث برنامج توفيق عكاشة على قناة الفراعين | البديل
The administrative court order to stop Okasha's channel :

Morsy supports new committee to oversee state, private media | Egypt Independent
Brother Knows Best - By Steven A. Cook | Foreign Policy


Editorial: Morsi’s Sinai front : EgyptMonocle
Rania Malky

How Muslims Really Think About Islam - By Marc Lynch
"Muslims older than 35 are significantly more religious than those under 35"

UK approves £5m to supply Syrian rebels - FT
makes it official.

Iraq oil production overtakes Iran - FT
Tehran is in trouble.

Time to reject the language of Coptic victimhood | Egypt Independent
Paul Sedra

Crime Wave Engulfs Syria As Its Cities Reel From War - NYT


Iran Hosts Its Own Meetings on Syria Conflict - NYT


Op-Eds - French / En Tunisie, l’urgence est économique et sociale
Tunisie: un fondateur du parti Ennahda au pouvoir agressé par un extrémiste - Libération
Syrian president's brother leads the regime's fight for survival
On Maher Assad.
Mali Militias Poorly Armed, but Zealous to Oust Islamists - NYTimes.com
Poor Mali.

Beware of an Old Man in a Hurry « The Moorish Wanderer
Economic warning signs in Morocco.

Egypt Presidential Election Maps: Upper Egypt Districts Part Two
More wonderful electoral maps from Eric Schewe.

Syria’s prime minister defects to Jordan - FT.com


The Oil Drum | Tech Talk - Saudi Arabia Then and Now


Muslim Brotherhood establishes militia inside Syria - Telegraph


Pour en finir avec l'adjectif « musulman » (ou « islamique »)
Alain Gresh on French and European Islamophobia.

Breaking the Arab News - By Sultan Al Qassemi | Foreign Policy


Review of “Goodbye Mubarak” « CONNECTED in CAIRO
Film on late Mubarak era.

Government forces pound rebel stronghold in Aleppo - FT.com


Reuters Blogs Hacked With Fake Story About Syrian Rebels


Egypt demands release of Guantanamo detainee - The Washington Post


Renaissance man: Gehad El Haddad works as the Islamist project’s pragmatist | Egypt Independent
Good profile of Gehad, who exemplies Shater's boys.

Morocco Reforms: Criminalizing Dissent


Breaking the Arab News - By Sultan Al Qassemi | Foreign Policy

The rise of Salafism in Syria

✚ "we’re even willing to say we’re al-Qaeda to annoy the regime"

Roula Khalaf and Abigail Fielding-Smith reporting for the FT from Beirut:

Syria’s rebels are also driven by religion in their relentless 17-month campaign to bring down Bashar al-Assad, first through peaceful protests and now through a military struggle. Abu Berri says he became a committed Salafi, the ultraconservative Sunni sect, after spending nine years in conservative Saudi Arabia.

Many of his peers, he says, are becoming Salafi even if they have little understanding of this brand of puritanical Islam. The charismatic leader of a Homs brigade, Abdelrazzaq Tlas, traded his moustache for a beard, he notes. “They grow beards to defy the regime,” he says. “In fact, we’re even willing to say we’re al-Qaeda to annoy the regime.”

This kind of comment goes to heart of the trouble in identifying who's a jihadist in Syria, and what that exactly means, as discussed here the other day. Worth reading the whole thing.

Turkey's nightmare - in Syria

✚ Turkey's nightmare

Today's editorial in the FT:

Turkey is watching its deepest fears become reality on its southern border. As Kurdish forces take control of towns across north-east Syria, Ankara faces the possibility of an autonomous Kurdish area emerging, in loose federation with adjacent Iraqi Kurdistan.

To the Turkish establishment, this is an existential threat: an embryonic Kurdish state is bound to embolden Turkey’s 13m-plus Kurdish population in demands for regional autonomy, and could try to claim chunks of Turkish territory. Worse, a powerful element in a new coalition of Syria’s Kurdish groups is the PYD – an ally of the rebel Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), which has waged a 27-year struggle against the Turkish state. The PKK is now exploiting the situation, launching massed attacks, not the usual scattered raids, on army posts in Turkey’s south-east.

And there are reports that Assad is evacuating the Kurdish areas of Syria to give militants there a free rein.

Last Days Of The Pharaoh

✚ Last Days of the Pharoah

Bradley Hope writes:

I have just published a Kindle Single with Amazon.com, an E-book that is available through Amazon's cloud reader or on the Kindle/IPad/etc. The piece explores the last days of Mubarak's rule in Egypt through the eyes of some of the government officials that were in close contact with the former president. One of the most compelling voices is Hossam Badrawi, who was the last secretary general of the National Democratic Party and met Mubarak several times in the final week of his regime.

Others, like Mubarak's long-time make-up artist Mohammed Ashoub, simply reveal a side of the president that was hard to know being on the outside.

I just started reading it, and it has some great material on what was going on in the inner circle around Mubarak during the 18 days. At $1.99 it's a steal if you have a Kindle - or just use the Kindle App to read it on your computer as its short.

Syria: 20,000 dead, 65,000 arrested or missing, 2m displaced

✚ Syria: 20,000 dead, 65,000 arrested or missing, 2m displaced

From Mediapart:

Dix-sept mois après le début de la révolution syrienne et neuf mois après sa militarisation face à la répression du régime Assad, on compte près de 20 000 morts, 65 000 détenus et disparus, des dizaines de milliers de blessés, et deux millions de déplacés, dont 300 000 qui ont fui le pays vers la Turquie, le Liban, l’Irak, la Jordanie, l’Égypte et d’autres destinations arabes et européennes, selon les comités de coordination locaux et plusieurs organisations de droits de l’Homme. Le régime perd le contrôle de plusieurs régions, subit des défections et perd toute autorité politique et symbolique. Mais résiste encore par la puissance de feu des forces armées lui restant fidèles.

This year's Ramadan serial commentary

It's an annual MENA tradition I look forward to — analysis of the major Ramadan soap operas, TV serial, and overall programming choices on Arab national and satellite television. Here's a few links:

Al-Ahram Weekly | Front Page | Something wrong with the wires
L’écho des feuilletons arabes sur CPA | Culture et politique arabes
Al-Ahram Weekly | Culture | The Fourth Serial

The to Yves Gonzalez-Quinjano's wonderful site, Cultures et Politiques Arabes, is a full archive of his pieces on Ramadan serials over the last six or seven years — great stuff. I really like his recent piece on the serial about Omar Ibn Khattab's life in the context of the regional Sunni-Shia pseudo-confrontation. In English on the site, stats about this megaproduction:

The Largest Arabic Drama Production in History : 1970 swords, 650 spears, 1500 horses, 3800 camels, 4000 arrows, 400 bows, 170 sheilds, 15 drums, 14200 meters of fabric , 137 statues, 39 costume designers & tailors, 1600 pieces of potery, 10000 silver coins, 7550 slippers, 322 actors and actresses, 10,000 extras in the ba.lefield, 299 technicians from 10 countries
The Old City of Makkah and its areas were reconstructed across 12,000 sq meters, 29 in-studio sets, 89 outdoor shooting locations
322 days of filming & post-production
= 463.680 minutes
= 72.820.800 seconds (source : http://butheina.wordpress.com)

As Yves notes, it's a fascinating evolution of the Wahhabi-led fight for the domination of mass cultural production that their propaganda (as this clearly is) now eschews the traditional fundamentalist distaste for physical representations of companions of the Prophet and of the Rightly-Guided Caliphs.

And like a lot of major political developments in the region lately (support for the Libyan and Syrian uprisings, the covert war against Iran, the tacit alliance with Israel, support for Salafists across the region, etc.) this too is a Qatari-Saudi production.

On the attacks in Sinai

The attack that took place yesterday on a checkpoint on Egypt's border with Gaza and Israel is a serious escalation of armed activity in the Sinai Peninsula, with a wide range of consequences on the young presidency of Mohammed Morsi, Egypt's relationship with both Israel and the Hamas government in Gaza, as well as the question of who controls Egypt's foreign and national security policy: the president, the intelligence services, the military, the ministry of foreign affairs, or all of the above (up till now, on diplomacy at least, Egypt had a dual foreign policy: one run by the presidency, another by SCAF/Intelligence — it was not going to last without some confrontation.)

This post serves as my initial notes on the incident.

WHAT HAPPENED:

Just around sunset on Sunday, as soldiers prepared to sit for iftar, three 4x4 vehicles (Toyota Land Cruisers, commonly used in the area) raided two checkpoints manned by Border Guards and Central Security Forces at Massoura, just south of the Rafah border crossing between Egypt and the Sinai Peninsula. Sixteen officers and conscripts were killed in the ensuing firefight and five more wounded, while an unconfirmed eight assailants were killed. The firefight took place using automatic weapons, mortars and RPGs. Two lightly armored personnel carriers were stolen by the attackers, which then headed to the Karm Abu Salem crossing (a tripartite crossing between Egypt, Israel and Gaza through which most humanitarian goods go through under Israeli supervision). According to the Israelis, the first vehicle was made to explode as a diversion while the second vehicle headed into Israel. It was destroyed by an Israeli Apache helicopter after opening fire on Israeli border patrols. Egyptian troops also followed the attackers to the border and engaged with them there, reportedly arresting some of them.

CONSEQUENCES:

North Sinai has been placed in a state of emergency, with the military reinforcing its positions at the border. The Rafah crossing has been closed indefinitely, with angry residents of Egyptian Rafah also taking part in sealing the border. Attack helicopters have been dispatched to the border area (I'm not sure about this, but this may be the first time Egypt takes full advantage of a 2011 agreement with the Israelis to increase deployment along the border — previously, the Egyptian military did not use the full options they had under the agreement.)
The checkpoints along the Suez Canal have been reinforced and are subject to extra controls, as are those inside the two Sinai governorates. There are ongoing searches in both Israel and Egypt for accomplices, Egyptian Rafah is encircled by the army, and reports that Israel has also shelled Gaza soon after the attack.
SCAF and President Morsi, meeting last night after the attack, have both vowed to find the culprits and avenge the fallen, with Morsi adding that there is "no room in Egypt for this type of aggression and criminality." The Armed Forces say they will pursue the attackers "inside Egypt and abroad." Morsi also visited Rafah on Monday night.
Security sources have leaked to the press that the perpetrators came from Sinai-based groups as well as well as Gaza-based groups.
Political parties and revolutionary movements from across the political spectrum have denounced the attacks and expressed their solidarity with the army.
Israel is said to have warned of attacks in the last few days, while jihadist videos of military exercises in Sinai had circulated online. Minister of Defense Ehud Barak addressed the Knesset today, the NYT reports:

“I think that the risk of a very large terrorist attack was averted,” Mr. Barak told Parliament’s Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee on Monday morning, “and this was a very important operational success in the battle that is raging there and maybe a proper wake-up call for the Egyptians to take matters into their own hands on their side in a stronger manner.”

Hamas has strongly condemned the attack as a "heinous crime" while some Hamas figures suggested it was carried out by Israel to sow discord between Egypt and Palestinians. The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood's own website has expressed suspicion that Mossad is behind the attack, according to Reuters. Israeli Ambassador to the US Michael Oren has blamed Iran, even though his own government said al-Qaeda was responsible (and since Oren retracted his comments.)

WHAT NEXT?

This deadly Sinai attack in many respects makes no sense: what exactly were the perpetrators trying to accomplish? Attacking a checkpoint, stealing Egyptian army and security vehicles and making a run for Israel to attack border guards there? If this was their plan, while it may have been deadly it would have hardly achieved any substantial objective — either as a terrorist attack (there have been reports of much more damaging attacks on Israeli civilians by persons going through Sinai in the past) or as an act of defiance. But one cannot know what those people think, especially when we don't know who they are or what they represent (to my knowledge, no group has taken credit.) Terrorists are not necessarily smart.

But let us consider the context:

A Muslim Brotherhood president in Egypt has vowed to further open the Rafah border and tighten relations with Hamas-controlled Gaza. Morsi is also reported to be considering a trip to Iran at the end of the month, a first for an Egyptian president in 30 years. There is a desire to end the blockade in Gaza and normalize Hamas' status. Hamas has given Egypt — or its allies there, the Muslim Brothers — peace and quiet on the eastern front for over a year to ensure that their positions are not weakened.
Palestinian reconciliation is not really making any progress, and the Palestinian Authority is worried about the new Egyptian president. Radical groups in Gaza that are being held back by Hamas, which does not want to upset the Egyptians, are angry about Hamas' pressure on them and its hegemonic control of the Gaza Strip. They may have ties with nascent radical groups in Sinai (masquerading as "al-Qaeda in the Sinai Peninsula" and see Muslim Brotherhood type groups as traitors. In the meantime there have been reports that Hamas is considering officially abandoning violence in its conflict with Israel.
Inside Egypt, a nascent tug-of-war over who controls policy towards the Palestinians and Israel is starting between the presidency and the intelligence services. The question of national security is still in the army's hands, and attacks such as these can be very effective wedge issues against an Egyptian-Hamas rapprochement (see for instance the 2009 raid by Gazans on the Rafah border.) The attack has effectively ended efforts to open up the Rafah crossing (eventually towards trade of goods, not just people traffic) for some time to come.
And then there are the micro-local politics: the economy of the border area has been criminalized by the blockade of Gaza, with smuggling gangs bringing massive disruption and wealth to the Bedouin tribes that dominate the region in the context of a depressed economy. The tunnels they control are necessary as long as the blockade lasts, and no doubt those who run them are worried that a more open official border will make them irrelevant.

No wonder all sorts of conspiracy theories are afloat. To me, they are beside the point.

What is most worrying is the lack of law and order, and presence of the state, in Sinai since the January 2011 uprising — and the continuing absence of policies to deal with the neglect of this region for the last 30 years. I wrote about this last September and continue to believe that Egypt needs to act to reimpose itself strongly in the area: through a zero-tolerance for criminal gangs and armed groups, Bedouin or foreign, and through a genuine policy of development, job-creation and integration of Sinai into the national economy. It's not easy, it's long-overdue, and it needs to start sooner than later even if strong-arm tactics that will probably be involved may cause more trouble in the short-term. What there should not be is more tolerance for tribal custom, forgiving the recent increase in crimes such as kidnappings (not only is kidnapping a serious crime, but one of these will inevitably turn ugly sooner or later), and more meetings with tribal elders that have led to very little tangible progress.

Yes, the inhabitants of Sinai have suffered from being relegated to second-class citizens and a policy of what can only be termed deliberate under-development for years. For this they should be compensated, as for the terrible abuse by police of the last decade in particular. But the approach cannot be one of finding some compromise with local actors. It has to be that they are Egyptians like any other Egyptians, and do not get dispensation on certain things (smuggling, owning weapons without a license, etc.) because they are Bedouin.

I agree with the tweets put out by Ezzedine Fishere earlier today — he's very much an expert on the issue. Egypt needs a comprehensive Sinai policy alongside a clear policy towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict that makes clear its commitment to justice for Palestinians, Palestinian reconciliation, and refusal to be dragged into a confrontation with Israel or Hamas.

Ending the blockade of Gaza, pushing for Palestinian reconciliation, restoring order in Sinai and addressing its inhabitants' grievances: this is what has to be done to avoid a repeat of this. One fears that Egypt, being so politically divided, is hardly in a position to take up this challenge.