Issandr El Amrani's Blog, page 85

Links 1-4 August 2012

Still on holiday mode...

Adam Curtis Blog: IF YOU TAKE MY ADVICE - I'D REPRESS THEM
Curtis on the British origins of repression in Bahrain

The Kurds: Hedging their Syrian bets | The Economist


An elusive quest for consensus | Egypt Independent
Michael Hanna

MEI Editor's Blog: Multiple Takes on Syria


Washington's Seamless Transition in Syria is an Illusion -- and Bad Policy
Aronson: "The regime and its opponents are locked into a race to the bottom"

The Case for Expanding Assistance to the Syrian Opposition | RAND
RAND reason #2 for US intervention in Syria.

Al Qaeda's War for Syria | RAND
RAND reason #1 for US intervention.

How the urbanism of small cities helped shape the Arab uprisings | The Global Urbanist
Pussy Riot: The Punk Band That Isn't And The Concert That Wasn't
Fascinating.

Fight club: A concise guide to the controversies over Egypt's new constitution - Ahram Online
Bassem Sabry.

The Mirage State of Egypt - Daily News Egypt
Sandmonkey - good piece on absence of governance.

Hague judges give go-ahead for Hariri trial - FT.com
Rather irrelevant now.

Egypt court defers constitution decision - FT.com


Syria’s top UK diplomat quits - FT.com


Inside Aleppo: Rebels repulse Syrian tanks, civilians dodge shells (+video) - CSMonitor.com
Scott Peterson in Aleppo.

كشف تحولات نجيب ساويرس | المصري اليوم، أخبار اليوم من مصر
Alaa Aswani takes down Sawiris - in a paper partly owned by Sawiris.

Alexander Cockburn and the Lobby

Interesting tidbit in this obit of Alexander Cockburn by Charles Glass — Crusading reporter and polemicist who was unafraid to espouse unpopular causes - The Independent:

"Ridgeway wrote: 'Rupert Murdoch, when he owned the Voice, was said to gag on some of Alex's pointed epithets, but he never did anything about it. He actually had us both to lunch and offered us a column.' Murdoch's tolerance did not extend to defending Cockburn when the Boston Phoenix disclosed that he had received a grant of $10,000 from the Institute of Arab Studies to research a book on Israel's 1982 invasion of Lebanon. Although other journalists had accepted grants from the American Enterprise Institute and similar organisations without attracting protests, He was forced to leave the Voice amid complaints from Zionists. The editors of the Wall Street Journal, unlike those at the ostensibly liberal Voice, went on publishing the column he had been writing since 1980 (until 1990) and defended him in an editorial headlined 'Alexflap.'"

Talk about the pot calling the kettle black. Also this bit about Elliott Abrams, whose career defending Jewish supremacism spans so many decades:

If he attacked the strong, he defended those whom respectable journalists shunned: hunters, gun owners, Scientologists, Edward Said, Norman Finkelstein, the people of Palestine and East Timor and the disaffected, unemployed men who ended up in armed militias. He also defended Noam Chomsky and the editor of Index on Censorship, George Theiner, from attacks by Elliot Abrams, then Reagan's Assistant Secretary of State, who condemned Theiner for publishing Chomsky at all in 1986.

Cockburn responded: "It is not often that one can find so bizarre a case: Abrams superintending a campaign of mass murder in Central America while finding the time to write to a tiny magazine 3,000 miles away about the folly of efforts to discuss censorship in the coverage of Israel in the press of that country's chief sponsor." His criticisms of Israeli occupation policies earned him accusations of anti-Semitism, which he countered in his essay "My Life as an 'Anti-Semite'" (a title no doubt inspired by Grigor von Rezzori's classic Memoirs of an Anti-Semite).

Crackdown on Islamists in the UAE

Jenifer Fenton writes in about the mass arrests of Islamists in the UAE, whose spiraling campaign against the Muslim Brotherhood regionally and domestic dissidents (Islamists from Islah and others, including non-Islamists) at home continues apace. One question I have about these arrests is, how do they play out in the inter-family politics of the Emirates? Notable in all this is the public absence of the Nahyan family, often thought to be the most anti-Islamist, and of course the most powerful in the UAE. The ruler of Sharjah, who might be thought to be in a position where he has to make more public concessions to Islamists (and social conservatives more generally) within his own emirate, has taken the lead in justifying the crackdown — albeit in that typically paternalistic/tribalist manner of the Gulf.

At least 50 people are now detained in the United Arab Emirates.  The arrests amount to one of the biggest crackdown on Islamists in years, after mounting nervousness by the authorities in the wake of the Arab uprisings.

Many, but not all, of those held are members of the Reform and Social Guidance Association (al-Islah), which calls for reform but also for “adhering to Islamic principles”.  

Al-Islah was founded many years ago with the approval of the late ruler of Dubai, Sheikh Rashid bin Saeed Al Maktoum. The stated purpose of the group was to be a religious and educational body. The government feels that it has moved away from these goals and has developed a political agenda.

On July 15, Salem Saeed Kubaish, the Abu Dhabi Attorney General, ordered the arrest of a group of people “for establishing and managing an organization with the aim of committing crimes that harm state security,” according to the state news agency WAM. The group is accused of  “opposing the constitution and the basic principles of the UAE ruling system, in addition to having links and affiliations to organizations with foreign agendas.”

Amnesty International has voiced their concerns that the detained men “are thought to be at risk of torture or other ill-treatment.”

The round-up the next day included two prominent human rights lawyers, Mohammed al-Roken and Mohammed Mansoori. Al-Roken had been defending high profile activists in the Emirates including the “UAE 5” — as the five people who were found guilty in 2011 of “publicly insulting” the country’s leadership and were subsequently were pardoned are known. Al-Roken also fought in court for the “UAE 7”, a group of seven men who were stripped of their UAE nationality. It is not believed he is a member of al Islah.

An Omani, a bidoon (stateless) and an Emirati journalist are also among those detained.

Rights groups have said the arrests are a suppression of dissenting voices in the UAE. “The only conspiracy that Emiratis should worry about is that of the government to stamp out any and every semblance of dissent,” said Sarah Leah Whitson, Middle East Director at Human Rights Watch, in a press release. “Just how many Emiratis does the government intend to jail for expressing political opinions?”

Al-Islah is said to have ideological affinities with the Muslim Brotherhood, although the two groups are not officially linked (it would be illegal under UAE law for the group to have direct affiliation with the Brotherhood). The Emirates does not allow political bodies affiliated with, or ones that take instructions from external, organizations. However, the government believes links between al-Islah and the Muslim Brotherhood are strong. And perhaps as many as 20,000 people living in the Emirates are believed by the authorities to be associated with the Islamist group.   As prominent Emirati commentator Sultan al-Qassemi has noted, political Islamists have raised suspicions in the UAE due to concern that they are attempting "to take advantage of the rise of Islamist parties across the Middle East in order to advance their own agendas. As elsewhere, these Emirati Islamists are allying themselves with liberals and non-liberals alike demanding reform as they plan for the post-reform period in which liberals would ultimately be sidelined.”   For the UAE, home to more than 200 nationalities including many non-Muslims, promoting a “fundamentalist interpretation of Islam in the UAE’s political arena represents a direct challenge to the philosophy of inter-faith harmony and tolerance that is fundamental to the nature of the state,” said one official close to government thinking. The UAE will not allow religion to be used as a political tool or allow for groups that are responsive to politico-religious guidance from abroad “or seek to promote allegiance to external authority, whether religious or otherwise,” he added. 

However, as noted, some of those targeted were not Islamists like Ahmed Abdul Khaleq — one of the UAE5. Abdul Khaleq, a stateless resident or bidoon, was stripped of his right to reside in the UAE and deported to Thailand in mid-July. The chairman of al-Islah, Sultan bin Kayed al-Qassemi, who is also the cousin of the ruler of the northern emirate Ras al Khaimah, is among those held. His case may be more complicated as his detention may also have been at the request of other tribe or family members who felt he was engaging in activities that could cause dishonor. It is possible that al Qassemi was taken into “protective custody” by the head of the tribe, in this case the Ruler, because he did not adhere to the family’s wishes. 

Sheikh Sultan Bin Mohammad Al Qassemi the Ruler of Sharjah recently said, “We have a duty to protect this country through advice, and when a son commits a mistake, you advise him… If the state has taken measures, it is out of interest to protect those sons. Even those who are in jail, they are dear to us… We are not causing him harm but we are dealing with the matter because the person committed a mistake. And hopefully they will become good people in the future.” [More on Sheikh Sultan’s speech here.]

On Sunday, al-Islah issued a statement on its website urging for the release of the prisoners, adding that the party “has sought to support (the UAE) since its foundation… then we see that they incorrectly accuse Islah figures of harming state security!?” The activists were all “known for being patriotic,” al Islah added.

But in the UAE, patriotism may not be up for interpretation. 

Romney's stupid pandering to the lobby

Romney outrages Palestinians by saying Jewish culture helps make Israel more successful  - NY Daily News:

"JERUSALEM - Mitt Romney told Jewish donors Monday that their culture is part of what has allowed them to be more economically successful than the nearby Palestinians, outraging Palestinian leaders who called his comments racist and out of touch.

``As you come here and you see the GDP per capita, for instance, in Israel which is about $21,000 dollars, and compare that with the GDP per capita just across the areas managed by the Palestinian Authority, which is more like $10,000 per capita, you notice such a dramatically stark difference in economic vitality,'' the Republican presidential candidate told about 40 wealthy donors who breakfasted around a U-shaped table at the luxurious King David Hotel.

The reaction of Palestinian leaders to Romney's comments was swift and pointed.

``What is this man doing here?'' said Saeb Erekat, a top Palestinian official. ``Yesterday, he destroyed negotiations by saying Jerusalem is the capital of Israel, and today he is saying Israeli culture is more advanced than Palestinian culture. Isn't this racism?''"

That's like wondering why blacks are poorer than whites in 1870 America. Or 1990 South Africa.

Why is an American presidential candidate making such obviously stupid comments? Because he's pandering to the Israel lobby, that's why. And that's why his opponent will not call him out on his offensive stupidity, either.

Update: Steve Walt expands on this.

On jihadists and Syria

There very well be jihadists who swear allegiance to al-Qaeda in Syria, but I do not like the way this NYT story starts:

CAIRO — It is the sort of image that has become a staple of the Syrian revolution, a video of masked men calling themselves the Free Syrian Army and brandishing AK-47s — with one unsettling difference. In the background hang two flags of Al Qaeda, white Arabic writing on a black field.

“We are now forming suicide cells to make jihad in the name of God,” said a speaker in the video using the classical Arabic favored by Al Qaeda.

The video, posted on YouTube, is one more bit of evidence that Al Qaeda and other Islamic extremists are doing their best to hijack the Syrian revolution, with a growing although still limited success that has American intelligence officials publicly concerned, and Iraqi officials next door openly alarmed.

The black flag is not al-Qaeda's own — it is the historical flag of Jihad and has a long tradition in Islamic history (Update: Will McCants informs me this is the al-Qaeda version of the black flag, in use by various jihadist groups since the 1990s) . Likewise, classical Arabic is not just favored by al-Qaeda — it's also favored by many television stations and indeed books in the Arab world. This gives the worst possible impression of the groups, while bizarrely taking the focus off the most worrying aspect of what's being described: the adoption of suicide bombings as a tactic (which, of course, is not unique to jihadists). So I'm not sure from what is being described here what evidence there is to link al-Qaeda to these Syrian fighters — I would expect evidence that the US government takes seriously to include something like the presence of a known al-Qaeda member in the cell, not some basic visual cues.

The NYT article has something much more interesting in this quote:

Iraqi officials said the extremists operating in Syria are in many cases the very same militants striking across their country. “We are 100 percent sure from security coordination with Syrian authorities that the wanted names that we have are the same wanted names that the Syrian authorities have, especially within the last three months,” Izzat al-Shahbandar — a close aide to the Iraqi prime minister, Nuri Kamal al-Maliki — said in an interview on Tuesday. “Al Qaeda that is operating in Iraq is the same as that which is operating in Syria,” he said.

One Qaeda operative, a 56-year-old known as Abu Thuha who lives in the Hawija district near Kirkuk in Iraq, spoke to an Iraqi reporter for The New York Times on Tuesday. “We have experience now fighting the Americans, and more experience now with the Syrian revolution,” he said. “Our big hope is to form a Syrian-Iraqi Islamic state for all Muslims, and then announce our war against Iran and Israel, and free Palestine.”

Assuming this is true (and it sounds plausible enough) it seems that the jihadists in Syria could in part be the same ones as those in Iraq. Which may simply mean that they have moved over, not that there are new jihadists in Syria. Because not all of the foreign fighters who come to Syria should necessarily be considered members of al-Qaeda (even in regional intelligence services will no doubt treat them as such, as this Egyptian paramedic's experience suggests) — just like all those Europeans who volunteered to fight in the Spanish civil war were not necessarily communists.

Some have taken the hyping of the al-Qaeda in Syria to new heights — particularly among those opposed to intervention in Syria, and of course among supporters of the Assad regime. (Update: more at Ibn Kafka's on the stupid left on Syria) Are there jihadists in Syria? No doubt. But to talk of the opposition as mostly jihadist seems completely ridiculous, and out of touch with the largely localized nature of the Syrian insurgency (in that like Libya there seems to be many local militias driven by local reasons, even if there may be crossover with Islamists including jihadists) and the competing opposition leaderships that have established themselves abroad. The reporting coming out of Syria itself is pretty clear on the diversity of the Syrian rebellion, even if it has a strong Sunni Muslim component. One suspects the focus on the jihadists stems from the reality that it's far easier to monitor the chest-thumping of jihadi websites than to do actual reporting in Syria.

A few Syria links:

MEI Editor's Blog: Syria's Kurds Going Their Own Way; Turkey Concerned
Syria Comment » Archives » The Kurdish Flag Flies over Parts of Syria as Aleppo Ignites
Pretty much every story in Le Monde's Syria coverage has been great in the last week, with multiple on-the-ground reporters including some embedded with the Aleppo rebels and Free Syrian Army. In particular, check out this map of Aleppo:

Click to embiggen

Also see Le Monde's reporting on the possibility that the 18 July attack that killed several top regime officials having been carried out by the regime itself to get rid of possible internal coup-makers.
Jordan: Thousands of Syrians Seek Refuge · Global Voices
Accounting for Jihadist Elements in the Syrian Conflict - TIME
Exclusive: Secret Turkish nerve center leads aid to Syria rebels — important revelation by Reuters:

DOHA/DUBAI (Reuters) - Turkey has set up a secret base with allies Saudi Arabia and Qatar to direct vital military and communications aid to Syria's rebels from a city near the border, Gulf sources have told Reuters.

News of the clandestine Middle East-run "nerve centre" working to topple Syrian President Bashar al-Assad underlines the extent to which Western powers - who played a key role in unseating Muammar Gaddafi in Libya - have avoided military involvement so far in Syria.

"It's the Turks who are militarily controlling it. Turkey is the main co-ordinator/facilitator. Think of a triangle, with Turkey at the top and Saudi Arabia and Qatar at the bottom," said a Doha-based source.

"The Americans are very hands-off on this. U.S. intel(ligence) are working through middlemen. Middlemen are controlling access to weapons and routes."

Links 18-30 July 2012

The blog will be on holiday mode for the next month or so — due to the arrival a week ago of our son, who is keeping is busy and rapt with wonder, and that we are actually on a break. Here are the links of the last two weeks, with a big gap in the last week in particular.

Civilians at Hurghada Airport fill-in for security officers on strike - Ahram Online
This country is nuts.

Tunisia: Hardline Islam Threatens Democracy Gains | TIME.com
On Salafis.

The Prince and the Revolution -WINEP
Good stuff on Bandar.

In My Mother's Arms - Witness - Al Jazeera English
Documentary on orphans in Iraq.

Unexceptional: Algeria’s Apparent Contradictions at Fifty - Sada
Algiers' main square closed under false pretenses...

Tunisian economy makes tentative recovery
Tunisia could get US FTA.

Muslim Brotherhood's rise in Egypt could push Hamas to lay down its arms - Haaretz
Nonsense in which Haaretz takes its news from Rose al-Youssef.

Kidnapped paramedic: “It was general intelligence who abducted me” - Daily News Egypt


A simplistic sectarian lens magnifies extremist agenda - The National
Hokayem.

U.S. presented Netanyahu with contingency plan for Iran strike | Haaretz
An open conspiracy.

Burma's monks call for Muslim community to be shunned - Asia - World - The Independent


The blatancy of apartheid | Mondoweiss
Phil Weiss writes from Jerusalem on the blatancy of Israeli apartheid

Former U.S. officials say CIA considers Israel to be Mideast's biggest spy threat - Israel News | Haaretz Daily Newspaper
Preparing for Assad's Exit | Marc Lynch
Good points made here.

Salafi nominee for religious endowments minister denies Shater behind nomination | Egypt Independent
My 50 Minutes with Manaf
Bassad Haddad reminds us who Manaf Tlass is.

Les gauches arabes déchirées par la crise en #Syrie 
The identity of Al-Azhar and its doctrine - Opinion - Ahram Online
Ibrahim El-Houdaiby

Abul-Naga: I won't serve in PM Qandil's government - Politics - Egypt - Ahram Online
Fayza Abul-Naga: I won't serve in PM Qandil's government

Still unclear how new constitution will address army | Egypt Independent
Islamist alliance for upcoming parliamentary elections collapses | Egypt Independent
Salafist alliance for upcoming parliamentary elections dissolved 

THE DAILY STAR :: Syria embodies the end of colonialism
Rami Khouri.

Free citizen journalists in Sudan | Sudan Watch
On detention of #simsimt

Blast rocks Egypt's gas pipeline to Israel, Jordan | Reuters
Gas shipments had resumed!

Yo Mama So Zionist | YouTube


Morsy answers questions of citizens in daily radio program | Egypt Independent


Time for Hezbollah to Quit Lebanese Government | Al Akhbar English
By the paper's editor.

Pipelines bypassing Hormuz open - FT.com


Daily chart: A map of sloth | The Economist
Saudi Arabia leads.

Court postpones judge change decision in Constituent Assembly case | Egypt Independent
Les biens des militaires égyptiens cartographiés | Reflets
Wednesday's papers: The Brothers and Hillary | Egypt Independent
Egypt’s top intelligence body makes bid for public support as it faces Brotherhood president - The Washington Post

Cook: Tales of Omar Suleiman

Tales of Omar Suleiman - By Steven A. Cook | Foreign Policy:

The last time I saw Omar Pasha was on Jan. 24, 2011 -- on the eve of the Egyptian revolution. I was with a group of foreign-policy experts, business leaders, and philanthropists and we met in an auditorium at the GIS headquarters. It was hard not to notice the freaky, yoga studio-like music that was playing over the sound system. When Suleiman arrived, he sat alone on a dais and spoke into a microphone, even though the delegation numbered only about 25 people seated in the second row of the auditorium, behind a gaggle of GIS courtiers. During the meeting, we learned that the United States had supplied Egypt with the technology to turn off the Internet -- something the Egyptians would employ in earnest, though not terribly effectively, less than 24 hours later.

By Jan. 24, Tunisian President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali had already fallen and a wave of self-immolations in Egypt had led to widespread speculation about whether the revolution was headed east. Naturally, therefore, someone in our delegation asked Suleiman whether the Tunisian revolt could happen in his country. But even at this late hour, he was as contemptuous of change as he had been six years ago, when he slammed his first down on the Washington conference table. "No," he responded. "The police have a strategy and the president is strong." Even at the time, the hubris was astonishing.

One of my big regrets, never meeting Omar Pasha. I do have some insight accrued over years of keeping notes on him and talking to people who dealt with him — mostly foreigner diplomats and spies and some Egyptian ones too. The takeaway is that he was actually fairly mediocre behind all the bluster and powersuits and Cuban cigars, and there is no better illustration of this than his handling of the Hamas issue in Gaza. Suleiman's declared policy of ultimately crushing Hamas failed all the way, to the extent that people who dealt with him on this issue would joke about the "three-point plan" (engage, contain, crush) he would systematically trot out. Suleiman (unlike some of his predecessors when Egypt was at war with Israel) was ultimately the product of a system that only sought to maintain itself, showed little initiative or daring in foreign policy, and — being so concerned with status-quo and so-called "stability" — appeared to mostly keep busy by keeping everyone going around in circles (exhibit A: Egypt's handling of Palestinian reconciliation talks).

I find it pretty outrageous he was given a state funeral and am surprised people did not try to disrupt it. One day, US archives of Suleiman's handywork, especially on the rendition program, might be open and we'll find out the full extent of complicity in his shenanigans. 

The events in Syria and the intervention debate

By the Guardian's inimitable Steve Bell

After today’s amazing events in Damascus — the bombing that decapitated at least three senior regime figures, the fighting inside of Damascus itself, rumors of regime splits, defections and escapes — it is little wonder that the debate over what the international community should do has flared up once again. For the interventionists, it appears to have been an occasion for misplaced snark.

Take this exchange between Shadi Hamid and Jeffrey Goldberg:

.@shadihamid Don't you understand? Outside intervention would cause the Syria conflict to become violent.

— Jeffrey Goldberg (@Goldberg3000) July 18, 2012

This misses the point — earnestly or not — that the case against intervention in Syria is not about how violent the conflict would get. It is about not getting involved about something that will be inevitable violent and bloody and could be further complicated by intervention. The survey statistics that came out today about how Americans feel about intervention in Syria, for instance, show contradictory data: on the one hand a majority of Americans are for imposing a no-fly zone, but on the other a majority is against carrying out the attacks on Syrian air defense systems that would be a necessary precondition to imposing a no-fly zone. It’s obvious that most respondents do not necessary make that link, but pro-intervention people like to spin it that in fact Americans would back an intervention. But you can just as easily, and in fact more plausibly, spin it the other way around: if they knew that it would involve an attack on Syrian military installations, Americans would not back a no-fly zone. After all, the strong trend in that survey is one of opposition to military intervention in Syria.

Taking things a step further, neocon editorialist Max Boot — who appears to have never heard of a country he didn’t want to invade — makes the case that early reports that the bombing was a suicide bombing (which is contested by the Free Syrian Army, remains unproven, and in any case either way the bombing is still an act of terrorism by any international standard) is another argument for intervention:

So now in Syria there is a great danger that America’s hesitancy to get involved on the rebel side has ceded the momentum to jihadist suicide bombers. They by no means represent the mainstream of Syrian opposition. But they will increasingly gain the upper hand, quite possibly with Saudi and Qatari help, unless the U.S. does more to help the secularists and moderates. And that, in turn, means the Obama administration will have to stop waiting for the blessing of the UN and Moscow before getting more involved. Only greater American-led intervention can end the fighting and stop Syria’s descent into greater barbarism.

Likewise, Michael Weiss, of the neocon British Henry Jackson society, appears to inadvertently make a case against armed intervention:

As for continued diplomacy, British Foreign Secretary William Hague condemned the bombing and U.N. envoy Kofi Annan asked the Security Council to delay a vote on a resolution calling for sanctions against Syria. He might have done so via carrier pigeon to underscore just how behind the times the international response is to this crisis. The United States, Britain, France one side, and Russia and China on the other, are in a pitched war of words over a country that exists only in their collective imagination, where a “political solution” is still thinkable and we’re only one stray comma away from the Chapter VII resolution that will bring lasting peace and stability.

This is either supreme fantasy or deep cynicism underwriting what is in fact a consensus that no one has the desire or will to sort out Syria. Rebels I spoke with recently in Istanbul – they were there to attend a bomb-making seminar – told me that even if Assad were to renounce power, they’d fight on because the institutions of state terror, including the 27 torture dungeons recently anatomized by Human Rights Watch, would inevitably remain in place. No one abroad seems to want to listen to them. Maybe now they will.

So if the rebels will continue their fight to achieve their own aims no matter what is done, perhaps it is best to get out of the way. Weiss is right when he says there is “a consensus that no one has the desire or will to sort out Syria” — that consensus is evident among NATO member states including the US as well as much of the neighborhood (if they are so keen on intervention, why don’t the Qataris or Saudis do it themselves with all the armaments they’ve been buying over the last decade?) No one wants to pay the potential price, not after Iraq.

Finally, David Ignatius mixes apples and oranges on when he argues:

The most urgent question for CIA officers is how potent are al-Qaeda and its affiliates in the Syrian opposition. The answer seems to be that, while al-Qaeda is a factor, other opposition groups are promising the United States that they will root it out — once they have disposed of the Assad regime. That’s somewhat reassuring, similar to the alliance Gen. David Petraeus formed in Iraq with Sunni militias against al-Qaeda.

Not so reassuring: in Iraq al-Qaeda had some support among Sunnis because the invasion changed the sectarian balance and Sunnis could plausibly argue that Shias had sold out the independence of Iraq to the US to get rid of Saddam. In Syria, if al-Qaeda (or more accurately, jihadists who use the al-Qaeda label) is involved in attacks such as today’s, they’ll be heroes to all those are rejoicing about the death of key regime figures. Big difference.

The truth is that commentators rush out their opinions based on their preconceived notions before they know the full facts. What if it turns out that today’s attack was indeed carried out by one of the better-organized, better-funded elements of the opposition that perhaps had an inside reach into the regime (via recent defectors…), and this had nothing to do with al-Qaeda (indeed the regime itself may have invented the Jihadist group that took credit for the attack, for all we know.)

The important thing is that the Syrian opposition appears to have struck a major blow to the regime today, perhaps even a near-fatal one precisely because it is so unexpected. We do not know if they are ready for the blowback that is likely to come, or what else comes next. In the meantime it is petty to belittle the “political solution” that will be needed eventually (when both sides are ready or the rebels have won decisively) because one of an abstract enthusiasm for liberal interventionism that the international community is clearly not interested in.

Syria: The end of the beginning?

Paul Mutter sends in a round-up of today's momentous news from Syria.

The "Free Syrian Army" has claimed responsibility for a stunning attack on the Assad regime's inner circle in Damascus. The heretofore unknown organization "Liwa al-Islam" claimed one of its suicide bombers had been responsible, but spokespeople from the FSA countered that they had infiltrated the secure compound where the meeting was held month prior to today and planted bombs there with this meeting in mind. The regime asserts that it was a suicide bombing by "hireling tools that are implementing foreign plots."

Defense Minister Daoud Rajha and Deputy Chief of Staff Asef Shawkat were reportedly killed, along with one of Assad's top aides. Former Defense Minister Hasan Turkmani was also reportedly killed. Hisham Bekhtyar, head of the General Security Directorate, and the Interior Minister Mohammad al-Shaar were said to be injured as well (rumors additional top officials' deaths are swirling around, as are ones that Bashar al-Assad himself was caught in the blast).

What the regime must be really worried about now is that if members of the FSA did carry out the attack as they claim, then it strongly suggests that there were defectors inside the regime's inner circle who made the bombing happen. The Wall Street Journal reports that the FSA is claiming unnamed members of the Republican Guard Division as accomplices (the Guard is led by Assad's brother, Maher).

Assad's clique is no stranger to such internal paranoia - they came to power in a coup, the Muslim Brotherhood targeted Ba'athist Party members in the 70s and 80s, and Bashar's father stood down an abortive 1984 coup by his brother Rifaat - but the increase in ranking defections this summer, most notably of Manaf Tlass, a general whose father was Syria's Defense Minister from 1972 to 2002. He is now believed to be hiding in France after defecting earlier this month.

This attack is significant from the rebels' and the regime's perspective because of the casualty list and where it occurred. The message is that Assad's inner circle is not safe, and that inner circle is what keeps Assad himself in power (of course, larger factors, like "Alawite preference" and Russian backing, keep the inner circle in power).

Rula Amin of Al Jazeera reports that there is "[a]nxiety in Damascus as people anticipate a strong govt reaction against the armed rebels on the ground." Syrian activists report that heavy weapons and Alawite militias have been deployed inside Damascus, and that the Syrian Army is withdrawing forces from the Golan to reinforce Damascus. Demonstrations are taking place in Damascene neighborhoods, as are firefights, and access in and out of the city has reportedly been severely restricted.

There is indeed reason to fear that this attack will lead to reprisals. In the regime's collective mind, this simply cannot go unanswered. A major new military push against the rebels, if it occurred, could be damaging to them if in their recent push towards Damascus they are stretching their forces too thin.

A reoccupation of areas outside Damascus by the Syrian Army and the paramilitary shabbiha would harm the rebels in the short term, and be deadly for civilians judged to have been helping the rebels. But if they are able to continue holding their gains, such heavy-handedness will benefit the armed opposition in the same way that the depredations of anti-partisan brigades in other wars have undermined an occupying army's position. Even if the partisans' movement among the civilian population brings down the hammer on noncombatants, it is precisely because the violence of the "counterinsurgency" strategy pursued - in the Syrian village of Tremesh, for instance - that the partisans' legitimacy grows in these communities.

Eventually, when such forces become strong enough, it is possible that they can hold back the anti-partisan brigades and protect their operational areas better - in Syria's case, especially so if defections increase. If this were to happen on a wider scale following the assassinations and fighting in Damascus, the regime would be severely embarrassed. What the regime would do then is difficult to determine. There is talk of a regime retreat to the coastal plain if the army becomes too strained to hold onto the Sunni-dominated inland. Others hope that a decisive moment is coming in Damascus, while less optimistic observers believe this is not a turning point but another indicator that Syria is in for a long, ever-worsening internal conflict along the lines of the 1976-82 conflict.

In Translation: The Revolutionary Youth Coalition's final report

We're really fortunate to bring to you a long translation of an important document today — one made possible by the upstanding chaps at Industry Arabic, who provide great Arabic translation services and more. If you or your business have need of top-notch translation from Arabic into another language, please give them a try and help them keep on helping us.

The Revolutionary Youth Coalition was the most important umbrella group to emerge out of the protest movement of January 25. It continued to be the main reference and contact point for "youth" for several interlocutors in the months that followed Mubarak's overthrow, holding meetings with state representatives and often representing protestors at national conferences and elsewhere. On July 8, the Coalition announced its dissolution and published the document below —  an examination of its actions, mistakes and successes in the last sixteen months. As the writers note, such self-examination is rare in Egyptian politics, particularly as it has descended into a circus in the last few months. It makes for poignant reading, and I've added a few notes for clarification.

An Account of the Actions of the Coalition of Revolutionary Youth

From the Coalition of Revolutionary Youth Facebook page, July 8, 2012.

We believe that every experience should either continue or end according to facts on the ground and logical reasoning. And — even though it is not standard operating procedure in Egypt — we believe it is necessary that every group and/or political entity submit a transparent and clear account that outlines what the organization has done over time, be it good or bad.

Under exceptional circumstances, like that of the great Egyptian people’s Revolution, we contend that it is our duty to publish this account for the Egyptian public, for they placed their trust in the Coalition of Revolutionary Youth, as well as for those who criticized the organization. This account is also dedicated to the best of Egypt’s youth – the activists and believers in the goals and values of this revolution and similar revolutionary movements – as well as for that sector of the Egyptian elite who did what they could in service to this nation. This is for the admirable victims of this revolution who paid the greatest price and who continue to do so for the sake of this revolution; and this is also for the souls of the revolutionary martyrs who continue to fall – up to today – in anticipation of the day when this nation will achieve freedom and dignity, the day when each Egyptian will receive his demands for “Bread, Freedom, and Social Justice.”

Establishment:

The establishment [of the Coalition] was comprised of groups that coordinated with one another before the Revolution and the Coalition’s formation was announced under the name the Revolutionary Youth Coalition in [Tahrir] Square on February 1 [2011]. Its first press conference was held on February 4 with the following organizations at the time of the announcement: the Campaign for Supporting ElBaradei, the April 6 Movement, the Youth Movement for Justice and Freedom, the Youth of the Democratic Front Party, the Muslim Brotherhood Youth, in addition to the following independent individuals: Nasser Abdel Hameed, Sally Toma, and Abdel Rahman Fares. Thereafter, other groups were added, such as the Progressive Youth Union and the Campaign for Supporting Hamdeen Sabahi.

The State:

The Military Council: The Coalition of Revolutionary Youth met with a number of members of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces twice. The first session took place in the final days of February, during which conversations focused on two papers the Coalition presented. These two documents had been prepared in detail with a group of nationally respected figures. The first document included [a request] for the resignation of the government of Air Marshal Ahmed Shafik, the abolishment of the Emergency Law, and the dissolution of the State Security Investigation Service; the rest of the demands were associated with democratic transformation. A second socio-economic document included a plan for a timetable for implementing special procedures concerning wages and other demands made by Egypt’s laborers, farmers, and the poor.

The second session was a joint session that brought together the Coalition and the Revolutionary Youth Union with Major General Mahmoud Hijazi. This took place in March. The discussions were haphazard. The most important point was the decision to review the two preceding documents of the previous meeting, in addition to: the discussion about breaking up the journalists’ sit-in in front of Maspero [the state television building], doubts that the virginity-test affair “had not yet been confirmed”, and other issues concerning poor and slow performance and management.

The meetings then ended entirely and definitively after the pre-dawn attack on protesters [in Tahrir Square] on April 9, 2011.

The Government of Dr. Essam Sharaf

Contact with Dr. Essam Sharaf’s government was first undertaken after Dr. Sharaf himself called the Coalition to have a meeting, in which he proposed to the Coalition the same two documents previously mentioned. After a lengthy presentation, he both emphatically welcomed [the ideas] and promised to work [with the Coalition] on implementing the contents of the two documents.

The Coalition was presented with the option of choosing a number of its members for work inside the Cabinet of Ministers as advisors to the Prime Minister in order to create a direct line of communication between him and the revolutionary forces. The Coalition rejected this entirely, confirming that it would become a political supporter of this government only if it sincerely desired to achieve the goals of the Revolution. This in turn compelled the Cabinet of Ministers to rely on other young Egyptians for this endeavor.

A number of Coalition Youth participated in the Council of National Justice, under the Cabinet of Ministers, which was responsible for trying to find radical solutions to the issue of sectarianism and discrimination that developed following [the burning of the Two Martyrs] Church in the village of Sol. The Council’s duty was to draft a legal bill on the standard role of religious practice, as well as the creation of a unit for early warning, especially concerning confessional problems and other similar instances.[1]

A number of Coalition youth also participated in the council responsible for the fund for martyrs and injured persons at a time when the idea had not yet been implemented. All of the participating youth members thereafter definitively refrained from attending the two councils after a number of sessions ended without achieving any of the desired or anticipated goals.

After it became clear to all that this government was weak and without any real power, Dr. Essam Sharaf met with some Coalition members before Friday July 8[2], after a long break at his home. They clearly and candidly demanded from him the resignation [of the government] and that people return to [Tahrir] Square. Dr. Essam Sharaf did not respond. The Coalition then announced in the Square on July 8 that Dr. Essam Sharaf’s government needed to be deposed and that a revolutionary government, endowed with plenary powers, be forcibly established by the will of the Square.

The General Intelligence Services:

The Coalition held one meeting with General Murad Muwafi and a number of members of the Intelligence Agency at the beginning of September. A majority of members attended, but the Justice and Freedom Movement[3] abstained. This is the same period in which the Intelligence Agency held a long series of meetings with a number of civil rights activists, public and political figures, as well as revolutionary movements. A number of respected and well-known public and political figures were also in attendance. On the following day, in order to maintain transparency, the Coalition announced to all media outlets that the meeting was held, as well as the details of everything that had been discussed. This was in accordance with the Coalition’s practice of declaring each of its meetings with the Military Council, as well as with the Government. (We published the draft of the two meetings with them in all newspapers and in press conferences.)

Evaluating the [Coalition’s] Relationship with the Government:

In a number of long conversations about the issue of communication, we faced much criticism representing a broad set of disapproval, ranging from the opinion that continuous and intensive communication was important and that it is wrong to interrupt communication even if there were differences, to the opinion that any and all communication would be a grave mistake. Between these two positions, there were some who believed that nothing is certain in politics and that cooperation must be pursued according to each case and situation.

Relations with the Revolutionary Forces

The Coalition appeared as though it were an umbrella coordinating body representing some of the youth organizations that helped the Egyptians in their grand revolution. On February 1, the establishment of the Coalition was announced, but due to some latent fear of attempts to sabotage the new organization, the Coalition closed down shop. This was an unjustifiable and serious mistake. Attempts at expansion undertaken by the Justice and Freedom Movement and independents actors from the Coalition were unsuccessful, though some small organizations were added to it. We believe that this had soured contact with other respectable revolutionary groups. Afterwards, attempts at rectifying this mistake were undertaken for the sake of the general welfare, through this dispatch of a representative of the Coalition to the Alliance of Movements and Parties.

The People’s Assembly Elections

Differences in opinion arose over elections. Specifically, some from within the Coalition called for boycotting the elections, which resulted in some of the youth abstaining from running the elections and others from participating at all. In general, participation in parliamentary elections was not ideal, insofar as the Coalition at the time was not able to enter the elections as a group. Some of its members preferred to enter the elections on the Egyptian Bloc list, and some others on the Revolution Continues Alliance list; some entered the elections running for independent seats. This was not conducive to creating a situation whereby everyone that might have been nominated for the list of a single electoral alliance could have run in the elections.

Presidential Elections

Since the beginning, there has been a group from within the Coalition – the Egyptian Current Party[4] – that has supported Dr. Aboul Fotouh and has also greatly helped his campaign at the national level. There is another group that did not decide to support any particular candidate, but it did try to help achieve setting up a presidential team that grouped together all the revolutionary candidates. This was undertaken with the help of a number of public figures. Also, a number of other initiatives cooperated, like the Council of 100. But neither these attempts nor the sessions held with the five [major] candidates – both directly and indirectly – were helpful in achieving the desired goal.

Therefore, the situation has continued in this manner. As a result some of the members have chosen to boycott the elections, whereas some other members have continued to support Dr. Aboul Fotouh. The rest have declared their support for Hamdeen Sabahi. Of course, this came at a later time, after which the idea of a presidential project had failed. As for the second round, the majority of Coalition members have decided to boycott the elections, but members of the Egyptian Current Party and the April 6 Movement have decided to support Dr. Mohamed Mursi.

The Intelligence Services and the Million Man Protests

The Coalition participated in the popular diplomacy initiative, which was involved in the Nile River Waters case. A number of the Coalition’s members traveled as part of a delegation of public figures to Uganda and Ethiopia.
The Coalition participated in the call for some of the important Million Man Protests, starting with the Million Man Protest calling for politically purging the government immediately after the Revolution.
Some members of the Coalition participated in some of the campaigns, like the Kazeboon (Liars) Campaign against SCAF.

Letters:

A Letter to the Revolutionary Youth

We are aware that we have erred, that we have at times appeared to be monopolizing dialogue in the name of the Revolution. And we are aware that there are many among you who are better than us in both word and deed, and that there are many of you more suited to contributing to this great Revolution. And we are aware that there are many among you who have paid a price far greater than we have paid. But it is fate that has deemed us to be at this place at this time. We are also aware of the fact that you all hold many reservations concerning some of our practices and our meetings. God knows that in our appearance, in our dialogue, and in the meetings we have held, we have only ever worked for the sake of the Revolution and never for anything else.

A Letter to the Egyptian People

We only hope that you will graciously accept what we have done and forgive us for not fulfilling your expectations and wishes. We hope that you will at least acknowledge the pressure and the confusion we have faced, for this experience has not been easy and the complications involved are beyond most people’s imaginations. There is a whole universe of issues that lies beneath the surface. But every moment we see you in the street and see what you achieved in the parliamentary and presidential elections, this has all served to confirm our faith in the idea of the Revolution. Change is the greatest common variable now and it follows that the responsibility falls on all our shoulders to make this change real.

A Letter to Mr. Hamdeen Sabahi, Dr. Aboul Fotouh and Dr. ElBaradei:

We were not able to approach this [next] step until you all announced that there is a radiant energy emanating from within the formation of a broad national front that can guide the opposition in Egypt over the coming period. We believe that this is perhaps the best and most appropriate thing for the period to come. Everyone should be able to participate in this front; it should be truly representative and reflect the national interests, and it should be a way for accomplishing the goals of the Revolution; similarly it should serve as a reference upon which the Egyptian people can depend.

Finally, since a number of months the Coalition has not played a positive role that has pleased its members or the population at large. But only in name has dialogue continued in the media. We consider this to be an error. Similarly, we do not want to preserve the organization superficially only so that the name itself gains some gravity. Respect for the Revolution requires self-evaluation and criticism. In this context, we have decided to dissolve the Revolutionary Youth Coalition, on the condition that its constituent groups continue to practice their natural role practically. In another context, it could be appropriate for each group to join a broad national front when it is established – God willing – at which time it is also natural that some Coalition members would join as well.

Observations:

Regarding Timing: The decision had been made more than once several months ago to undertake this step, but each time the quick succession of events in Egypt prevented it from happening; it appeared as though the surprises that occurred during the transition period would not end. The idea of announcing to the media the formation of a broad national front after the presidential elections helped.

Regarding the Revolution’s Path: The decision to dissolve the Coalition suggests that the Revolution’s path necessitates different and myriad means, as well as different frameworks, in order to realize its goals in the future. This is especially true if one takes recent developments into consideration.

Regarding Joint Action: The Coalition was composed of organizations that were completely ideologically different, ranging from the far right to the far left. The Coalition was successful many times at reaching a consensus with major participants and in solving disputes democratically. But there were a number of changes that necessitated a new alignment, whereby it could be possible to reach a decision under a different framework. This is due to the fact that the experiment of joint and group action was successful in achieving broad common goals relatively often.

None of this has happened.  ↩

The “Friday of Determination”, which was the largest protest in Tahrir Square since February 11.  ↩

Youth movement of the Muslim Brotherhood.  ↩

Muslim Brotherhood dissidents.  ↩