Thomas E. Ricks's Blog, page 154

'The Yellow Birds': A heart-breaking story of fighting in Iraq -- and then coming home

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By Brian Castner

Best Defense book review department

What is the defining image of America's just-concluded war
in Iraq? Not the defining weapon, major battle or significant speech. Rather,
what is the image every writer and film-maker will feel compelled to use to sum
up the stuff of the place, to distill the essence and personality of the war in
a single glance? World War I has the screaming horses and clouds of chlorine in
the trenches. The western front of World War II evokes a cloud of bomber
formation across the sky. Vietnam, the circle of bare-chested soldiers, smoking
cigarettes (or more) in the deep jungle. The towers of black smoke from an oil
well fire in the First Gulf War.  What
comes next?

There are several images that have already appeared in a
delayed (though now sudden) wave of books and films. The civilian-clothed
veteran searching a U.S. interstate for IEDs and reaching for a rifle that is no
longer there. A dead body hiding an IED. Orange and white taxis. A native
interpreter wearing a ski-mask to hide his features. The palm groves and
orchards that hug the Tigris and Euphrates.

In the National Book Award-nominated The Yellow Birds, essentially a
string of such well-drawn images, Kevin Powers makes an eloquent case for those
and more, specifically these two that are harder to shake:

--First, the ubiquitous dust that impregnates every crack
and every piece of equipment and every thought in Iraq. Layers of dust, 'moon
dust' we often called it, dust storms and clouds, swimming pool-sized pits of
it and a film of talcum powder that stuck to every available surface via the
magic of static electricity. This book is so full of dust that I was amazed I
couldn't turn the book over, grab it by the binding, and shake some out.

--Second, and more haunting by far, the songs and screams of
the Iraqis themselves. Four times in the book we hear the Muslim call to
prayer or the mourning wails of the women after battle. Each time, the ghostly
intrusive sound is a harbinger or coda to the worst of the horrors The Yellow Birds has to offer. And in
this image, Powers creates a perfect analogy for the war itself. Hide behind
the walls of your FOB, behind your machine gun on the highlands overlooking the
village, and you can still hear the muezzin's voice from the minarets. Iraqis
live publicly in the street. Emotion is public for men and women, whether a
pious call to prayer or mourning the dead, public grief as the bodies are
recovered and wrapped in white and paraded through the streets for everyone to
view and mourn. The mothers and wives and sisters unselfconsciously wail in their
grief, and you can't escape it. "I was not sure if it really came from the
women around the campfires, if they pulled their hair crying out in mourning or
not, but I heard it and even now it seems wrong not to listen," Private Bartle,
the main character, tells us. It seeps under your skin. And so will the war;
you will bring it home.

It is no spoiler to reveal that it is only Bartle who brings
every experience home.  The novel follows
him, his younger friend Murphy, and their tough platoon sergeant, Sterling.
Bartle mistakenly promises Murphy's mother that he will come home safe, a
charge we know from the outset that Bartle cannot fulfill. Told in a
back-and-forth style, jumping between war and home, the tension for the reader
comes in only incrementally understanding both how Murphy dies and how Bartle
deals with it.

The title of the book references a chant sung by soldiers
while running in formation during physical training. "A yellow bird / With a
yellow bill / Was perched upon / My window sill. I lured him in / With a piece
of bread / And then I smashed / His f___ing head." I sang that one myself, and
others, equally brutal in retrospect. The songs, at the time, are fun: "I went
to the market / Where all the women shop / I pulled out my machete / And I
began to chop." Singing these chants do more than desensitize the soldier. They
make a game of what is coming.

But in truth war is no game, and the only birds smashed in
the head in this book are the soldiers themselves, the narrator and Murphy and
even the hard-nosed Sterling. Being damaged goods, Bartle is an untrustworthy
guide for even his own memory and knowledge of Murphy's tragedy. His post-war
ruminations dimly focus on the "why" of Murphy's death, and here he can provide
no clear answer either. Sitting in his jail cell at the end of the book, Bartle
uses chalk marks to try to recreate a timeline of what happened to him.
"Eventually, I realized the marks could not be assembled into any kind of
pattern," he tells us. During the firefight that opens the book, Bartle and
Murphy and Sterling cover only one small sector of the village. They have
control over very little, their view of the war will be small, no national
policy issues will be solved in Powers' novel. Bartle focuses only on Murphy,
and even here he feels ultimately helpless.   

I wish I knew more of Powers' actual war-time experience,
and how much resides in this book. In a joint interview the two of us did for
Connecticut Public Radio, Powers said that he wrote fiction because he needed the
space to first make sense of the war, and then put it down in a new way that
provided separation between him and it. I wonder if he also felt it was the
only way to tell the truth, because the heart-breaking story of Bartle and
Murphy and Sterling is so ordinary, if it wasn't fiction no one would believe
it.

Brian Castner is an Iraq veteran, a  former
Explosive Ordnance Disposal officer, and the author of The
Long Walk: A Story of War and the Life That Follows.

Last night's VP debate had 4 winners

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I was
impressed with last night's debate. This blog has criticized VP Biden quite a lot, so I have to begin by saying I
have never seen him so focussed. He only drifted off into blather territory a couple of times. He also scored solid points on foreign policy
issues such as Iran. I sit here a bit stunned that Biden did so much better than President Obama did
in his own first debate.

I'd
never heard Ryan speak more than a sentence or two until last night. I thought
he handled himself well. I didn't expect him to be strong on foreign policy,
and indeed he hemmed and hawed some, but he didn't commit any major gaffes.

I do
think both he and Biden bobbled the question posed by Martha Raddatz from a
soldier who reported unhappiness with the tone of the election. I thought Ryan,
by getting into military spending in his answer, failed to grasp the question.
It was not about the state of the military, it was more about having an
election process a soldier can be proud of defending. By the same token, I
thought Biden was off base when he rattled on about how the topmost, sacred
duty of our leaders is to take care of the military. Rather, the topmost,
sacred duty of our leaders is to defend the Constitution.

The
third winner was Martha Raddatz, who showed how to moderate one of these
things. She should replace Jim Lehrer at NewsHour.

The
biggest winner was the American people, who saw what a good debate looks like,
and heard real differences explored.   

Rebecca's War Dog of the Week: Night missions in Yuma

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By Rebecca Frankel

Best Defense Chief Canine Correspondent

A fall postcard:

Lance Cpl. Sam Enriquez, a military working dog handler with 3rd Law Enforcement Battalion, and his K-9 partner Kally, take part in night operations training during the Inter-service Advanced Skills K-9 course at the U.S. Army's Yuma Proving Ground. Enriquez and 18 other military police K-9 handlers from the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps took part in the advanced pre-deployment course. Since the rigors and dangers of combat don't end when the sun sets, neither does the training the teams go through."

Rebecca Frankel, on leave from her FP desk, is currently writing a book about military working dogs, to be published by Free Press in the fall of 2013.

One of the most worrisome things I've seen about the soldier's load: Undermanned units carrying more weight

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This is
from a detailed 82nd Airborne briefing that
involved weighing soldiers wearing their basic loads:

Force cap has reduced the size of
the infantry platoon. The overall weight carried by the individual would be
lower, but due to being force capped most rifle squads are running at 7 men.
Machinegun teams are either 2 or 3 men. This leaves most platoons around 28
personal instead of the 40 they would usually have.

Navy plan to generate solar power at crumbling Pearl Harbor runway criticized

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Personally, I don't get the criticism.
Two of the greatest vulnerabilities of our nation are debt held by foreign
nations and  dependence on foreign oil.
And the U.S. military is one of the greatest consumers of energy in the
country, if not the single greatest. This project would cut the Navy's energy
costs. I do not see how adding this
project to the island (which already has a brig) would dishonor the dead.  

Super-sizing the soldier: Is obesity going to pose a huge recruiting problem?

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By Jim
Gourley

Best
Defense department of physical fitness and national security

Obesity and weight-related
health conditions have become a prevalent concern to American policy in the
last decade. National military
leadership was also exposed to obesity's potential risks to national security
with the release of the report "Too Fat to Fight" by Mission Readiness in 2010. The group's primary message is that a
burgeoning population of overweight American children will drastically reduce
an already diminished pool of viable candidates for military service in the next ten years. However, these reports indicate only the most
general aspects of the problem and focus on projections of future
implications. When the scope of the
American obesity epidemic is examined specifically within the context of its
impact on the armed forces, data shows clearly that the threat is not imminent,
but existential.

At present, 62 percent of active duty
military members over the age of 20 have a body mass index that falls into
either the overweight or obese category. For personnel under the age of 20, the number stands at 35 percent. That is actually an improvement from a 2005
rate of 46 percent. These statistics are often
challenged due to the disputable methods of calculating Body Mass Index
(BMI). However, the 2011 Annual Summary of the Armed Forces Health Survey Center cites
21,185 medical diagnoses for overweight, obesity and hyperalimentation
(overeating). Research also dispels
service culture stigmas. No service is
immune to overweight issues. Comparing the relative percentages of overweight/obese service members, the Navy is the fattest service at
62.7 percent, followed by the Army at 61 percent, the Air Force at 58.8 percent. The Marines register the fittest at 55.1 percent,
still substantially more than half overweight. Closer examination shows that more than 12 percent of active duty service
members in each service are obese. The
Marines break the trend more significantly in this category with a 6.1 percent obesity
rate.

The increase of girth in the
military progressed at a linear rate between 1995 and 2005, but has remained
fairly consistent since then. However,
emerging data indicates that the overweight population may rise further in the
next ten years if the military is to meet recruiting goals. A new study by the Trust for America's Health
predicts that more than half of Americans in 39 states will be obese by
2030. This is disturbing enough, but it
becomes even more troubling for the armed forces when individual state
recruitment trends are compared to their childhood obesity rates. All ten
states that contributed the most military inductees in 2010 have childhood
obesity rates greater than 15 percent. Three of
them (including Texas, which was second in total recruitment with over 15,000
new military members) exhibit rates between 20-25 percent. The preponderance of our young military
members come from the most ponderous states.

The problem is not simply one
of cosmetics or intangible metrics of combat performance. The costs of an unfit military carry a
real-dollar value. A 2007 joint study by
The Lewin Group and TRICARE management activity estimated that the Defense
Department spends $1.1 billion annually on medical care for obesity and
overweight conditions. This study
included dependents and retirees who qualified for TRICARE Prime coverage. More restricted to the active duty component
are the costs to manpower. The AFHSC
report tallied 245 "bed days" for medical treatment directly linked
to weight issues, and 4,555 service members were involuntarily separated for
failing to meet weight standards in 2008. The recruiting and initial entry training costs alone represent a loss
of $225 million. Adding in specific
military job training, logistics, equipment and the cost of lost duty days
brings the annual price tag of overweight service members to about $1.5
billion. That exceeds the military's
budget for Predator drones in 2010. The
military still fails to grasp the true scale of the problem so long as comorbidities of
overweight and obesity remain unexamined. There were more than 42,000 service members
affected by hypertension and another 5,700 by diabetes in 2011. Hypertension alone ranks in the top thirty
conditions affecting active duty service members. Also overlooked is the expense of XXL chemical warfare
suits and development of other
plus-sized uniform items.

The military's response to the
problem has been mixed. The Army
provided waivers to 1,500 new recruits who failed to meet weight standards in
2007. The program remains in place but
the numbers of waivers issued in subsequent years have not been published. The Navy had a similar program until
2010. The Air Force never offered such a
program and the Marines actually tightened standards in the 2009-2011 time period. Trends suggest that weight standards are on a
sliding scale driven largely by manpower requirements and retention problems in
a wartime military.

Therein lies the greatest
problem. It seems all but certain that
American society will continue gaining weight over the next decade. In this regard, the military may be a kind of
canary in the cave given its emphasized dependence on physical fitness for
mission success. However, without an
established position on the matter of physical fitness standards and given the
likelihood that leaders at every level will themselves be at an unhealthy
weight, it is possible that the military will experience substantial increases
in operating costs and diminished capability in the next decade.

Jim Gourley is a Best Defense jolly good fellow.

Proceedings article calls out the Navy's hypocrisy about sex between shipmates

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The October issue of Proceedings
has a strongly argued article by Kevin Eyer, a retired cruiser skipper, saying
that the Navy is being hugely hypocritical about the amount of sexual activity
going on inside its ranks.

"The truth is that men and women are having sex with one
another, regularly, and in blatant disregard of regulations," Eyer writes.
"Cavorting with the foreign populace has been replaced by cavorting with
shipmates." Yet the Navy turns a blind eye to this, he says, except when it
involves the top people aboard a shipper -- the commanding officer, the executive
officer, and the command master chief. When those people join the dance, they tend to
get their heads placed on pikes.

Aside from those poor guys, he concludes, "A new sort of
[heterosexual] 'Don't Ask, Don't Tell' approach has become the de facto law of
the land."

Eyer doesn't offer much in the way of a solution. He
asserts that "Fraternization is bad for combat effectiveness." That might be
true in the context of the contemporary American military, but I don't think it
can be elevated to a general principle. After all, the Spartans fought pretty well, and
as I understand it they encouraged sexual relations between their equivalent of
senior NCOs and younger soldiers.   

What would happen if we made sexual
relations between sailors acceptable as long as it did not occur on board? That
is, make de facto the Navy's de jure.  

Budget crunched: The facts of Romney’s proposed $2 trillion defense increase

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By Travis Sharp

Best Defense senior number cruncher

During last week's debate,
President Obama said several times that Governor Romney would increase defense
spending by $2 trillion. Romney didn't protest. Obama's claim is accurate, but
the underlying issue goes far beyond arithmetic. It is really about strategic
risk and national priorities. The candidates' differing visions for defense
spending represent the most significant contrast on national security policy in
the 2012 election.

DOD's 2013 base budget excluding war funds is $525
billion, which equals 3.3 percent of GDP. Under Obama's plan, it will continue
to grow modestly in future years. Romney has
said that he wants to reverse the Obama-era cuts, return to
the 2010 plan crafted by Robert Gates, and set the goal of spending 4 percent
of GDP on defense. Those three objectives are different, so he'll have some
wiggle room should he become president.

Let's compare Romney's third objective to Obama's plan.
We'll run two scenarios for Romney. Under "Ramp Up," he increases defense
spending by 0.1 percent of GDP per year until it reaches 4 percent and keeps it
there. Under "Immediate," he increases defense spending to 4 percent of GDP
immediately and keeps it there.

The table compares the Obama and Romney plans. The data
are derived from OMB and CBO and denominated in billions. (I first did this
calculation at the request of CNN Money in May. The resulting article has
received some attention. The New York
Times ran a signed
editorial on the issue in August).

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Tables
notes: * OMB ( pg. 240 ; reflects technical correction from footnote 2). ** CBO ( pg. 57 ).

From
2013 to 2022, the difference between Obama and Romney "Ramp Up" is $2.063
trillion. The difference between Obama and Romney "Immediate" is $2.316
trillion.

Why is there such a big difference between Obama and
Romney? Because GDP tends to get bigger over the long run, so indexing defense
spending to GDP will cause the defense budget to grow -- sometimes rapidly -- in
perpetuity. Don't just take my word for it. Cato's Chris Preble ran
this excursion and got similar results. AEI's Tom Donnelly said an
earlier iteration of this analysis presented
"obvious, but undeniably true, facts." This chart illustrates the differences
between Obama's and Romney's plans and puts them in historical context.

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Readers should note a few things. First, cost estimates
are not an exact science. Second, defense spending today is relatively low in
historical terms when measured as a percentage of GDP. Third, inflation
continually saps DOD's buying power, so defense spending increases are not as
mighty as they appear. Fourth, the "4 percent for defense" plan has percolated
among policymakers like Robert Gates and within think tanks for years. Fifth,
the transmission mechanism that moved the plan from defense policy ether to
Romney platform was presumably Senator Jim Talent, a top Romney defense advisor
(and SecDef frontrunner, rumor has it) who has been hot on
the plan for years. (Those interested in a deeper discussion of
the recent evolution and potential weaknesses of the "defense spending and GDP"
approach might read my 2008
essay in Parameters).

The candidates fundamentally disagree about how much it
will cost for the U.S. military to maintain its global preeminence, and about
how much preeminence is enough. Romney's plan would reduce strategic risk by buying
more ground forces, fighter aircraft, naval ships,
satellites, and all the rest. As I argue in a new
essay, the Obama administration has struggled to communicate
effectively about the risks of budget cuts. It has exaggerated some risks in
order to deter sequestration, but it has also downplayed some risks to reassure
allies and the American public in an election year. The ambiguity has allowed
Romney to draw a contrast. His plan wouldn't eliminate risk completely because
that's impossible. But it does force policymakers to ponder whether they want
to spend more to reduce risk.

In the broadest sense, Romney's plan is affordable if the
necessary political decisions are made. Policymakers chose the current mix of
taxes, entitlements, and discretionary spending. They can make different
choices in the future. Romney hasn't explained how exactly he would pay for $2
trillion in additional defense spending. His plan doesn't look realistic under
the current status quo, and Obama is justified in calling him out on it. But
the debate shouldn't only be about the arithmetic of the status quo. It should
be about choosing America's role in the world and deciding which candidate has
the leadership ability to bring that choice to fruition.

Travis
Sharp is a non-resident fellow at the Center
for a New American Security and a
graduate student at Princeton University's Woodrow Wilson
School.

Tom’s review of Kurt Eichenwald’s '500 Days' in yesterday’s New York Times

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Here it is.

My favorite moment in the book
is this.

--

"After Bush told Jacques Chirac that biblical prophecies were being
fulfilled and specifically that 'Gog and Magog are at work in the Middle East,'
the French president decided, in Eichenwald's words, that 'France was not going
to fight a war based on an American president's interpretation of the Bible.'"

An unusual intelligence reading list

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As
the blog entry notes,
everyone does intelligence reading lists. (Including, three years ago, Best
Defense.)  But I like
the list offered by "Sources and Methods" because it purposely focuses on
unusual picks. 

Meantime,
one of the regular readers (and commenters) on this blog suggests that we
compile a reading list for aliens about human life on Earth. What would be the
top 10 books on that list?

(HT
to DM)