Thomas E. Ricks's Blog, page 158

17

The Navy
fired the commanding officer of its training center in San Diego. That makes 17 for the year, according to the
official scorekeeper.
The issue was hazing.

And for
good measure, the XO
of a destroyer
got the heave-ho, too. 

I'm ambivalent about the new Iraq vet novel 'Billy Lynn's Long Halftime Walk'

[image error]

Over the weekend I read Ben Fountain's Billy Lynn's Long Halftime Walk, a
well-written novel about an imaginary "hero squad" brought home from Iraq to
bolster the war effort. It is well-done. The author is a strong writer, with a
sharp eye. He gets off some good lines about military life. "Part of being a
soldier is accepting that your body does not belong to you." The entire story
takes place during the game between the Cowboys
and Bears in Dallas on Thanksgiving Day 2004. In the book, unlike in
real life, the Cowboys lose.  

The
book gets military life right, I think, but its account of Army life circa late
2004 won't surprise anyone who has been paying attention. And if you want to
know what it is like to be a hero vet returning from Iraq, there are good memoirs out
there that will tell you flat out, no-holds-barred. You could start with Brian
Castner's The Long Walk -- an interestingly similar title.

Where
Fountain's terrific effort of imagination is impressive is capturing
American culture right at that tipping point where the country was coming to
grips with what a disastrous move it was to invade Iraq. For that slice of
queasy excess and the attempt to refuse to entertain doubt, the book reads to
me like what Jonathan Franzen, one of my favorite novelists, would be producing
if he were grappling with the central issues of our time and culture, instead
of obsessing
on pet cats killing wild birds.

Another problem with PowerPoint

Looking
at this photo, I realized another problem with PowerPoint: During briefings
based on it, leaders don't look at each other, they look at a screen.

I
suspect this is especially damaging to developing effective relationships with
foreigners. People need to look each other in the eye. It's like the first step
in developing a basis for trust. 

Rebecca's war dog of the week: Postcard series: Practice, practice, practice makes perfect

By Rebecca Frankel

Best Defense chief canine correspondent

Staff Sgt. Miguel Rodriguez, 2nd Security
Forces Squadron canine handler, watches as military working dog Zzeki
checks around seats during an explosives detection exercise in the base
theatre on Barksdale Air Force Base, La. on Sept. 19. Zzeki, along with
the other MWDs and their handlers, conduct various training exercises 2
to 3 times a week to polish their skills in case of an incident on base
or in preparation for deployments.

Rebecca
Frankel, on leave from her FP desk, is currently
writing a book about military working dogs, to be published by Free Press.

 

How unhappy are today's junior sergeants? And how worrisome is this?

Well, they're not as happy as everyone
else in the Army, according to the Center for Army Leadership's 2011 annual survey of Army leaders. (It was released in May but I just
got around to reading it last weekend.)  

There is quite a lot of good news in
the report, which analyzes the responses of 16,800 soldiers. For example,
two-thirds of Army leaders hold favorable views of their superiors and peers as
leaders. I don't think the average civilian company would score as well.

But again and again, junior NCOs (that
is, sergeants and staff sergeants) report being less satisfied than other
groups (that is, senior NCOs, warrant officers, junior officers, and senior officers).
About half of active-duty junior sergeants say that the Army asks for more than
it gives. Forty percent report that, "There is a discipline problem in my unit
or organization." (Of course, as the report notes, if the system is working,
they are the people who should be handling most disciplinary issues.)

My question: I remember that cracking
the NCO corps was one of the signs of the Army's distress in the mid-1970s. I
don't think we are anywhere near that now. But are we heading that way? If so,
at what point do we start worrying?    

Another Marine colonel: Time to get NATO more active on the Syrian situation

By Butch Bracknell

Best Defense office of Syrian intervention

The Syrian regime is struggling to contain yet another
manifestation of the Arab Spring with brutality and inhumanity unparalleled
since the freedom phenomenon began in Tunisia last April. The international media has documented the
slaughter of thousands of rebels and protected civilians, waging war
indiscriminately and through inhumane and unlawful means against internal populations
whose crime against the regime is a desire for freedom from
authoritarianism. Tens of thousands of
refugees and displaced persons have streamed across the borders into Turkey,
Lebanon, and Jordan, and humanitarian catastrophe lurks, with a threat to
victimize tens of thousands and spill across Syria's borders regionally. America's NATO ally Turkey has, of course,
shouldered the brunt of the load because it represents a safe haven with the
most regional capacity to absorb the huddled masses escaping the fire of war.

America, of course, will not occasion the possibility of
armed intervention at this stage of the presidential and congressional election
cycle. Moreover, even after November,
the U.N. Security Council assuredly will not authorize action in Syria after
the Libyan debacle. The Russians believe
they were duped into authorizing intervention into Libya, and subscribe to the
"Fool me once..." school of international affairs. Absent an American or NATO embracing of the
controversial Responsibility to Protect doctrine to authorize an armed
intervention in Syria, the alliance's hands are tied at present. 

Even so, inaction is not justified in light of the
suffering. The current state of western
unpopularity in the Arab world, manifesting itself in worldwide protests, is
not likely to improve if America and her allies are seen to stand idly by and
do nothing as Arab innocents die in the streets of Aleppo, even if their deaths
are at the hands of other Arabs. So what
can the alliance do? Find a middle way.

One possible first step toward NATO taking decisive action
in this crisis is to ask Turkey for permission to set up a command and control
structure in Turkey aboard an American or Turkish airbase. The task force's initial mission set should
extend to intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance of the conflict in
Syria, and humanitarian assistance/disaster relief. Bringing NATO resources to bear by
constructing and maintaining refugee camps in Turkey and protecting the
refugees for the duration of the Syrian conflict will be seen as a signal of
the alliance's resolve and usefulness, and will refocus the world's attention
on the atrocities in Syria, heightening pressure on Assad to resolve the
conflict and seek reconciliation, or to resign in disgrace.

Second, providing humanitarian relief will speak volumes to
the Arab world about Western values of compassion and our collective obligation
to humanity. Moreover, standing up NATO
capabilities at Turkey's request would reinforce NATO's resolve to act
collectively and to support a member state that doubtless would be receptive to
the alliance's help.

Finally, having a command and control structure in place
would be useful if conditions in Syria evolve to the point that armed
intervention to stop the slaughter becomes viable and unavoidable. Eventually, Russia may feel the pressure to
abstain from a Security Council vote authorizing intervention, rather than risk
cementing its reputation as an obstructionist state to the international order
or appearing impotent and irrelevant. Even
absent an explicit Security Council authorization, Western allies may, in fact,
embrace the moral obligation to intervene summarized by the Responsibility to
Protect doctrine.

Armed intervention in Syria is not unavoidable, but inaction
by NATO should be. There are many
competencies the alliance can operationalize to mitigate human suffering in the
region which could provide a foothold capability as mission sets evolve. Finally, NATO's action to mitigate Arab
suffering in Syria could help tamp down the fury against the West and send
productive communicative ripples through the Arab world. As many commentators have observed, NATO's
future relies on its ability to actually accomplish missions that add value to
the sum total of international security. Skeptical voters in cash-strapped Western
democracies rightly should require return on their investment. If the alliance neglects to act in
circumstances where turning a blind eye constitutes organizational failure,
eventually it may fail to exist. 

Butch Bracknell is
a Marine lieutenant colonel on active duty and former international security
fellow at the Atlantic Council of the United States. The opinions expressed
herein are personal to the author and do not represent the position of the
United States government or of Red Sox ownership.

One Marine colonel: Time to give diplomacy one more chance in Syria

By Gary Anderson

Best Defense office of Syrian non-intervention

Syria's situation today is essentially the same as the one
in El Salvador in 1991 -- and that is not necessarily a bad thing.

In El Salvador, the rebels had gained control of significant
portion of the country, and were even operating openly in the major cities. As
in Syria today, both sides in El Salvador had committed atrocities among
noncombatants, although in both cases the government had created the most by
using paramilitary death squads. In both cases, the opposing sides had reached
a stalemate with only bloody attrition on the horizon. Why do I say that this
is not necessarily a bad thing? Because the civil war in El Salvador turned out
all right. An American brokered series of negotiations led to a coalition
government which in turn resulted in fair elections. El Salvador today is a
democracy, albeit an imperfect one. Contrast that with the carnage of Lebanon
or even Iraq where America intervened militarily. Regime modification, rather
than the carnage and anarchy of regime change, is still possible if we give
diplomacy a chance.

In the case of El Salvador, the United States had backed the
repressive government for a decade during the Cold War in fear of losing El
Salvador to the communist bloc because the government seemed like the lesser of
two evils. That changed with the fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the
Cold war. At that point, the Salvadorian Junta decided to take American diplomatic
advice and negotiate with the rebels. The window of opportunity opened in
briefly, and both sides took it in hopes of avoiding more meaningless
bloodshed. That fleeting window may be open in Syria today; but unlike 1991, we
are not diplomatically engaged to be able to exploit it. By insisting on the
total destruction of the Assad regime, we have abrogated any chance that we
could take a meaningful role in encouraging a negotiated settlement of the
conflict due to humanitarian concerns. 

The real humanitarian disaster would come with a total
government collapse and rebel victory because there are "at risk" minorities in
the path of the mostly Sunni revolution. The Christians and the Shiite Alawites risk the fate of Iraq's Sunnis
and Christians in the wake of the decapitation of the Sunni dominated Saddam
Hussein regime. Like Iraq's Sunni minority, the Alawite minority in Syria will
likely be targets of a revenge seeking Sunni majority. Realists in the Assad
government, such as the recently departed Prime Minister, are probably now
looking for an emergency landing and negotiations may be their only alternate
runway.

As much as I hate to admit it, the Russians are probably
right in trying to prevent an outright rebel victory. They see the unintended
consequences more clearly than our neo-hawks who are urging military
intervention. As always, the Russian reasoning is cold blooded and cynical, but
those of us who are veterans of Lebanon, Somalia, Iraq, and Afghanistan know
the horror that can ensue when governance breaks down completely. The best
chance for a negotiated end to the civil war would be an
American-Russian-Turkish sponsored cease fire and peace conference. The
Russians have leverage with the Assad government, but the rebels know that
American and Turkish economic and diplomatic support is needed for any
reasonable attempt to build a post-Assad government that has real legitimacy
beyond the Sunni neighbors in the region.

What might a Salvador-like solution look like? First, it
would require a cease fire that would freeze the opponents in place. Second, it
would call for an eventual reorganization of the security forces with rebel
units integrated into the army and paramilitaries disbanded; it would avoid the
total disintegration of the security forces that led to the ethnic cleansing
and near genocide that plagued post Saddam Iraq. Third, it would require
internationally monitored elections. Assad himself would undoubtedly have to
go, but the remaining leadership of the Alawite faction could throw him under
the bus gently with an exile in Iran or South Lebanon. The realists in the
Assad regime might make that sacrifice to avoid the kind of anarchy that would
come with a breakdown of governance.

There is an argument that we should do something in Syria,
if only to have some leverage in what comes after; there is a certain amount of
sense in that argument. However, before that something becomes drone strikes or
a no fly zone, we ought to give diplomacy one more chance. El Salvador avoided
the kind of bloodletting that we saw in Afghanistan and Iraq after regime
decapitation. If the United States backs off on the demand for total regime
change, we open our nation can have a critical role in a negotiated settlement.
The only thing that gets wasted in trying diplomacy is words.

Gary Anderson is a
retired Marine Corps Colonel. He has served as a U.N. Observer in Lebanon and as
a liaison officer in Somalia. Most recently, he has been a governance advisor
in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Reading lists: The West Point history dept. selects its top 10 military classics

You know those guys at West Point, always making top 10 lists!

 The Top Ten Military Classics

Clausewitz, Carl von. On War. 1832. Ed. and trans. by Michael Howard and Peter Paret.
Indexed ed. Princeton, New Jersey:
Princeton University Press, 1984.

Corbett, Julian Stafford. Some Principles of Maritime Strategy. Reprint, New York: AMS Press,
1976 (originally published by
Conway Press Ltd., 1911; 1st Reprint by U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1972).

Delbruck, Hans. History of the Art of War Within the Framework of Political History.  Original German edition, 4 vols,
1900-1920.  Vols. 1-4 trans. by Colonel
Walter J. Renfroe, Jr. Westport,
Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1975-82.

Douhet, Giulio. The Command of the Air. 1921.
USAF Warrior Studies. Richard Kohn and Joseph P. Harahan, eds. Trans. by Dino Ferrari. Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1983, paperback,
(Ayer Company published an edition in 1972 which was a reprint of the 1942
edition originally translated by Dino Ferrari).

Du Picq, Ardant. Battle Studies. In Roots of Strategy, Book 2, Harrisburg,
Pennsylvania:  Stackpole Books, 1987,
paperback (previously published by The Military Service Publishing Co., 1946,
and by the U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, as part of
the "Art of War," colloquium, undated).

Jomini, Antoine Henri. The Art of War. 1838. Trans.by G.H. Mendell and W.P. Craighill.
Reprint, Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1971.

Machiavelli, Niccolo.  The Art
of War.  1521. Trans. by Ellis
Farneworth.  Revised with an introduction
by Neal Wood.  New York, NY: Da Capo
Press, 1965, 1990 repr.

Mahan, Alfred Thayer. The Influence of Sea Power Upon History 1660-1783. 1890. Reprint,
New York: Hill and Wang, 1957.
Paperback, New York: Dover Books, 1987.

Sun Tzu. The
Art of War.  4th century B.C. Trans.
with an introduction by Samuel B. Griffith. 
New York:  Oxford University
Press, 1963 (also available in Roots of Strategy,
R.H. Phillips, ed., Stackpole, 1987, paperback).

Thucydides.  The
Peloponnesian War.  Revised
Edition.  Trans. by Edward Crawley. New
York:  Modern Library, 1982. 

We're all going to be veterans, we hope

By Maj. Jaron Wharton

Best Defense department of future veterans

It was not too long ago that
commanders held "retention breakfasts." The successes of units that met previously
agreed upon goals were rewarded with t-shirts, coffee mugs, and the like. Conversely, failing to meet targets reflected
poorly on units and their commanders. I
always felt the drive to make numbers was a little odd and was mainly targeted
at achieving a number versus retaining soldiers with the right stuff. Since the Army had to annually recruit a
force almost half the size of the entire Marine Corps, it did make some sense.

This process was largely
abandoned during two conflicts, and with the help of large retention bonuses,
retention challenges were overcome with relative ease.

Enter the post-conflict peace
dividend.

Almost as rapidly as the
Army's troop strength grew from pre-September 11th levels of 480,000 to
570,000, it must now trim down 80,000 troops. This will assuredly exacerbate the veterans' unemployment rate among
Iraq and Afghanistan veterans, and though it has been shrinking of late,
remains hovering above the national average at 8.9 percent (it was 13.3 percent
in June). The national unemployment rate
remains over eight percent. This has revealed a hidden, strategic risk behind the drawdown as the
Army will continue to pay unemployment insurance and sap the budget.

This dilemma has revealed a
new, full spectrum along which the Army must fight -- akin to the spectrum
ranging from stable peace to general war. On the extreme left is where a soldier decides to get out and on the far
right is where the private sector commits to hire veterans. All across this spectrum is where the Army
can affect the lives of its newest veterans and tamp the burden we tend to
place on the shoulders of the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA).

The passing of the Veterans
Opportunity to Work (VOW) to
Hire Heroes Act requires each
service, the VA, and the Department of Labor to take a fresh look at how they
deliver transition services to service members. As a whole, our nation has taken efforts to embrace returning and
transitioning service members and actively seeks to reintegrate them into
society. However, the first step in
ensuring that our veterans are integrated must start earlier -- when they are in
the service. The enduring requirement for
commanders to counsel soldiers within their reenlistment window largely does
not happen and is not incentivized. We
must find a way to encourage commanders at all levels to assist soldiers
exiting service honorably much like we used to focus on retention.

Not only should we open up
bases to prospective hirers; we must collectively change our mindset. Too often units write off those whose
honorable service is either ending or has ended, often manifesting itself in diluted
evaluations for departing officers or emotionally writing off departing
soldiers. This potentially sends
soldiers away disgruntled and contributes to the untold percentage of soldiers
who intend to get out and start college...in mid-April...and without any admissions
or pre-testing requirements fulfilled.

Meeting these challenges will
not only require a dedicated time commitment but creative solutions. Solutions might include tracking unemployment
rates by unit for soldiers' first year upon exit; contracting brigade career
coaches; or forging public-private partnerships between Divisions and state
chambers of commerce. Perhaps a
macro-level solution is not ripe and a pilot program targeting a specific division may better capture best practices.

One thing that all soldiers
have in common is that there will come a day when they will exit the service
and assistance will be needed as much as it is deserved. It would be prudent to promote a shift to a
mindset that "we're all going to be veterans here" sooner than
later. This is the right thing to do, but
also cost effective in the long run.

Major Jaron S. Wharton, a
former White House fellow at the Department of Commerce, is an active-duty
infantry officer in the U.S. Army and served in Afghanistan (2002 and 2010) and
Iraq (2003-06). The views expressed in this article are his own and do not
reflect the official policy or positions of the U.S. government.

What's happening with the killings in Saudi Arabia's eastern province?

Something. And it isn't just me who thinks so.