Thomas E. Ricks's Blog, page 153
October 18, 2012
Some thoughts on the command lessons of Admiral Nelson's victory at Trafalgar
By "Tyrtaios" and "Jpwrel"
Best Defense royal office of Royal Navy affairs
Both of us
are interested in naval history and have visited HMS Victory in Portsmouth, England, albeit in different ways. As
a young Marine officer aboard the USS Trenton,
one of us has lunched and drank toasts to Admiral Lord Nelson at CINC NAV Home, Nelson's old
headquarters in Portsmouth, England. At this Navy function where a
leathery captain of Royal Marines recognized the young Marine as surely as a
mustang and made sure he was adequately supplied with jiggers of British Navy
rum.
The other
one of us culminated a long interest in the Royal Navy's history and its naval
architecture by also visiting and intimately inspecting HMS Victory, but in much less rousing form.
From the depths of its rarely seen original keelson to its quarterdeck and
Nelson's private quarters, he has studied this ship in detail accompanied by the
assistant curator of the National Maritime Museum.
The
question we want to pose is this: Do we still have commanders that embrace the spirit of "No captain can do very
wrong if he places his ship alongside that of the enemy," or have we
become so reliant on technology and information flow that we allow opportunity
to slip away?
"No
captain can do very wrong if he places his ship alongside that of the enemy."
And so it was on October 21, 1805, off Cape Trafalgar, near Cadiz, Spain, two
fleets engaged each other to decide who would be master of the seas, the
British or Bonaparte and his Spanish allies.
Shortly
before engaging the enemy, as the British fleet slowly approached the combined
French and Spanish line, Admiral Nelson hoisted a flag signal to his fleet that
said: "ENGLAND EXPECTS THAT EVERY MAN WILL DO HIS DUTY." From the
quarterdeck on his flagship HMS Victory,
the Royal Navy's most gifted admiral commanded a fleet of twenty-seven ships of
the line.
Although
outnumbered, by executing some unorthodox tactics that would divide his enemy
into three segments, Nelson smashed through the line of battle of the
thirty-three French and Spanish vessels. A French officer remarked
later, "This manner of engaging was contrary to the most simple prudence . . ."
And as John Terraine wrote, "That it did not produce a disaster was due
entirely to the immense superiority in seamanship, gunnery and morale of the
British fleet . . . All factors Nelson was of course fully aware of."
The
three-decker Victory that Nelson
commanded from, alongside his friend and Flag Captain Thomas Hardy, displayed
more than 100 guns, a few of them the new and devastating 68-pound cannons
mounted on the forecastle. With its crew of eight hundred, Victory bore down on
the French in light air at 3 knots. Engaging first the French flagship Bucentar to port with a raking broadside
through her stern galleries and then the French Redoubtable to starboard, Nelson ordered another signal to his
fleet, "ENGAGE THE ENEMY MORE CLOSELY."
Cannon
fire, grapeshot, musket balls, and deadly splinters of ship's wood destroyed and
maimed all in their path. Victory's
steering wheel was smashed to bits. All the while, and against the wishes of
Hardy, and wearing his finest uniform making himself a more conspicuous target,
Nelson calmly paced up and down in clear view of the enemy.
Shortly
into the battle, Nelson's personal secretary John Scott was sliced in two by a
cannon ball that blew his body parts over the side leaving just scraps of him
on deck. Nelson observed one scrap included a silver buckle torn from Scott's
shoe, and the Admiral was heard to exclaim, "This is too warm work Hardy
to last long!"
The
British pressed further to breach their enemies line of battle engaging them
with both port and starboard batteries. Both sides were raked with gunfire at
close quarters. Masts and rigging fell. Victory
and Redoubtable were so close that
their rigging entangled side by side as they exchanged point-blank gunfire.
It would
be Nelson's friend Hardy that would turn to see Nelson fall to the deck on the
exact spot where Scott was killed earlier. The gold braiding was torn from
Nelson's epaulet the Admiral having been shot through his left shoulder. The
Admiral's spine was also broken and surely he must have known he would not
survive the fight.
During a
hot sea battle in those days, it was customary to throw the mortally wounded
and the dead over the side. However, Captain Hardy ordered that Nelson be
carried below. There he died three hours later, perhaps knowing, but not
seeing, he had won a great victory at Trafalgar. Nineteen enemy ships had been
sunk or captured versus not a single British ship lost and four more of the
escaping French ships would be captured two weeks later by Adm. Collingwood, Nelson's
able successor.
After the
battle, HMS Victory put into Gibraltar for repairs where legend has it that
Nelson's body was placed in a large cask of brandy, although some say rum, to
preserve it for the long voyage back to England, whereupon arrival back in
England, the cask was opened and Nelson's preserved body removed. And it is here that the legend is further
embellished in that the brandy was seen to be almost gone. Had the jack tar
sailors, probably under the winking watchful eyes of enlisted Royal Marines
drilled a small hole at the base of the cask through which they drained the
brandy, and with that drank the blood of their Admiral?
October 17, 2012
What Iran is up to in Iraq: An assessment of its long-range shaping operations
I asked
an American friend in Baghdad what Iran is up to there. This is his response:
Iranian activities in Iraq must be viewed in the context of regional considerations and multiple lines of effort.
Clearly Iran has been setting itself up to be a resurgent force and regional power broker for some time, and Iraq is a critical piece of the game board, yet just one piece. Iran stands in opposition to the Gulf States, Saudi Arabia, Israel of course, and the west in general. They stand with the Assad regime in Syria, Nasrallah/Hezbollah in Lebanon, and their global allies in China, Venezuela, and North Korea. The players that they stand neither with nor against, but a little bit of both, include the Turks who they're with on energy and Kurds but against on Syria, the Pakistanis who they stand with in regard to Talibs and Afghanistan and against with Sunni extremists, Shiite Yemenis who oppose Saudis, AQAP, and the Yemeni government, the north African emerging states, to include Egypt, and others.
What we see are not clearly defined operations with named objectives, rather a series of shaping initiatives intended to strengthen allies, develop transportation routes and mechanisms, and undermine the credibility of opposition governments. The end-state is a Persian/Farsi/Shiite Islamic state that is stronger than the other states in a region that is opposed to western powers, presence, and influence. They are shaping a series of lesser engagements that don't rise to the level of justifying western military intervention, but dispose of regimes they are opposed to, beginning with Bahrain and ending with Israel with Lebanon falling to Hezbollah while they were sleeping.
Near term, they cannot allow Syria to fall and are assisting in every possible way. Of concern is that should the Assad regime appear to be near collapse, a diversionary engagement will be directed against Israel by Iranian allies. As a sword can serve more than one purpose, these same antagonists will strike Israel in response to any Israeli or western action taken against Iranian nuclear facilities. While the world watches the right hand engaged in Syria, they miss the left hand working to organize kinetic opposition in Bahrain, Kuwait, and other Gulf States with sizable Shiite populations, which the Saudis, Qataris, and Emiratis will not abide. And then there is Iraq.
While we Americans espouse a "whole-of-government" approach to strategic objectives abroad, the Iranians actually practice it in Iraq. Diplomatically, they have a robust embassy in Baghdad and very active consulates in Erbil, Basrah, and Karbala. They are building upon the P5+1 conference, with the Iraqi Ambassador to Iran stating in August that they were ready to host another round in Baghdad. Iranian Defense Minister Ahmad Vahidi just concluded successful security cooperation talks in Baghdad. Economically, Najaf hotels are mostly owned by Iranian investors who spend more religious tourism money there than they do in Karbala. Iranians export electricity, finished goods, and smuggled oil into Iraq in exchange for hard currency.
On the religious front, there is a full-court PR campaign, to include radio and billboards, to replace Ayatollah Sistani with Ayatollah Shahroudi, an Iranian with a much more aggressive position on clerics and government than the even-tempered Sistani. Through a variety of agencies, Iran continues to fund Husseinyahs and affiliated social service organizations throughout Iraq. They have the remnants of the Badr Corps firmly ensconced in virtually all Iraqi security organizations ensuring that Sunni organizations are targeted, but they are not. Iranian proxies, such as Assaib Ahl Al-Haq (AAH) and Kitaib Hezbollah are being carefully reconciled with Baghdad while retaining arms to threaten those that stand in opposition. They continually dance with the Sadrists in the form of the Promised Day Brigade and lesser affiliates, seeking influence as opposed to outright control. Politicians and prominent civil servants or other civilians generally know better than to speak out against Iran.
Iran is very active, but they are not omnipotent and work within their limitations. They understand that they have just as many foes as they do friends -- thus they are patient. Iran does not seek to dominate the Gulf Region or Middle East today, rather they seek to improve their hand for the coming conflict of tomorrow. By all accounts, they're building a fairly strong hand to play -- perhaps we should consider improving our hand as well.
Why I think Obama lost last night
I think President Obama lost the debate
last night, not because he screwed up, but because the whole debate was so damn
boring. I'm an Obama fan, and I turned it off at 9:37 to go read a book, which
turned out to be a better use of my time.
Political
journalists will go on and on today about the debate, but remember,
they had to watch the whole thing, and got paid to do that and also to yak
about it. I think that skews their judgment -- they lacked the reasonable option
the rest of us had, of just turning it off.
Guantanamo captive criticizes LeBron James in classified document
The Miami
Herald reports
that last June, an Afghan prisoner at Guantanamo Bay sent a note to his lawyer
stating that, "LeBron James is very bad man. He shuld [sic] apologise to the city
of Cleveland." Under Gitmo rules, this assertion by Muhammed Rahim was
classified for two months.
October 16, 2012
American companies and the U.S. military: A comparison of size in the 19th century
I've been reading a terrific short history of The Company, which argues that the
corporation -- not the state, religion or political party -- is the basic unit of
modern society, and in fact the biggest change in centuries the way society
organizes itself.
The first big modern companies were American railroads,
which came out of nowhere in the 19th century, they write. Their
presence was revolutionary: "In 1891, the army, navy and marines employed a
total of 39,492 people. The Pennsylvania Railroad employed over 110,000."
Railroads also played a major role in knitting together the nation, they say.
Companies also reflected national characteristics. In part
because guilds had a more durable presence in German society, companies
preserved the system of apprenticeships -- which, they write, "helps explain the
German fascination with training." Factory foremen had more influence on
operations. This carried over into the military, they say: "the Germany army
gave far more power to non-commissioned officers."
Arizona National Guard: An expose of abuses, including paintballing homeless
The Arizona
Republic turned over the rock at the Arizona National Guard and a bunch of bad things crawled out. Among them are the usual offenses
like "sexual abuse, enlistment
improprieties, forgery, firearms violations, embezzlement, and assaults."
But this sick stuff really caught my
attention:
"Bum hunts" -- Thirty to 35 times in 2007-08, Sgt. 1st
Class Michael Amerson, a former "Recruiter of the Year," drove new cadets and
prospective enlistees through Phoenix's Sunnyslope community in search of
homeless people.
Military
investigators were told that Amerson wore his National Guard uniform and drove
a government vehicle marked with recruiting insignia as he and other soldiers --
some still minors -- shot transients with paintballs or got them to perform
humiliating song-and-dance routines in return for money. During some of these
so-called "bum hunts," female recruits said, they were ordered to flash their
breasts at transients. Homeless women, conversely, were offered food, money or
drinks for showing their breasts.
Amerson,
during military interviews, denied paintball assaults but admitted to some
wrongdoing. He was demoted to private and given an other-than-honorable
discharge. Amerson declined to be interviewed for this story except to say that
allegations against him were untrue.
Don't say farewell to containment quite yet
By Al Mauroni
Best Defense guest columnist
In a recent article in The Diplomat, Professor William Martel says
that the strategy of containment is dead. He suggests that containment was
useful for dealing with past adversaries with certain political ideologies
hostile to our own, but not today's adversaries. He suggests that global trade
and commerce has made containment an impossible choice, and that Russia, Iran,
and China cannot be "contained" as the Soviet Union was during the Cold War.
I'm not so sure I want to write off containment as part of
the national security strategy quite yet.
Let's take a look at two recent examples of containment.
First there was the strategy to contain Iraq between 1993 and 2002. After the
end of the Persian Gulf War, it was in the U.S. government's interest to
contain Saddam Hussein's regime without invading and occupying that country.
Through a combination of diplomatic initiatives (such as U.N. security
resolutions), economic sanctions, overflights of the north and south regions,
and a continued military presence in the Gulf region, the U.S. government
effectively stopped Iraq from pursuing its goals to annex Kuwait, suppress the
Kurdish and Shi'ite populations, and develop a WMD program. In hindsight, it
does not appear that Hussein's regime had any practical capability to do
anything hostile to U.S. interests that would have warranted an invasion and
overthrow of his government.
Today we have a similar discussion about Iran, in particular
whether the tools of government power -- diplomacy, intelligence, military, and
economic -- have adequate capability to contain that country's ambitions to grow
as a regional power. There are constant discussions within the U.N. Security
Council on organizing multi-lateral coalitions against Iran's nuclear power
program and support to violent extremist organizations. Iran's economy has
taken heavy hits as a result of organized sanctions, and it is surrounded by
U.S. military bases in the Gulf States. Where, exactly, is containment failing?
Professor Martel suggests that Iran is too tied up in "an economic and
technological web of global connectedness" for containment to work. Is that why
Iran's government is developing intranets for its people and military forces,
effectively taking them off the global information grid?
Why does the U.S. government (and other governments) support
a containment strategy against certain militant or authoritarian regimes that
have hostile ideologies or agendas to our own? It is because that going to war
with a country based on emotional rationale that "well we just don't like them
and they won't change to be like us" really isn't a good reason. It is also a
very expensive way to challenge hostile regimes (see U.S. involvement in
Afghanistan and Iraq, 2002 to 2012). At the least, it's a principle of war --
economy of force -- that allows the U.S. government to selectively decide where
to apply its scarce resources and personnel. At the best, containment is a
time-honored approach to smart warfighting strategy. As Sun Tzu said, "To fight
and conquer in all your battles is not supreme excellence; supreme excellence
consists in breaking the enemy's resistance without fighting."
Al Mauroni is a senior
policy analyst with the U.S. Air Force, and has more than 25 years experience
addressing counter-WMD policy and defense program issues. The views expressed
in this paper represent the personal views of the author and are not
necessarily the views of the Department of Defense or of the Department of the
Air Force.
October 15, 2012
Six questions a veteran of Iraq and Af’stan would like to ask the candidates in tomorrow’s presidential debate
By Andrew Person
Best Defense department of veterans & politics
To Romney:
1. You've said on numerous occasions
that you would oppose any tax increases. But you've also supported a two
trillion dollar increase in defense spending. Democrats on Capitol Hill have
said they will not agree to waive the mandatory defense cuts set for the end of
the year without increases in revenue. If faced with a choice between increased
taxes and cuts to defense spending, which would you choose?
2. During the primary campaign,
you took the position that the US should not negotiate with the Taliban but
instead "we should defeat the Taliban." Neither you nor any of your
five healthy strong sons have ever served a day in the military. Do you think
taking such a position during the primary, a position that if applied as policy
would necessarily involve more troops losing lives and limbs, is easier since
you have no direct experience with the pain military families have suffered as
a result of this war?
3. The mother of the former Navy
Seal killed in Bengazi on September 11th asked you to stop using her son's
death for political purposes on the campaign trail. Did you apologize to her?
To Obama:
1. In most respects our war in
Afghanistan seems to be a strategic failure, despite some clear tactical
victories around the country. In your view, do the military advisors who
advocated a surge/counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan still have
credibility? Would you rely on their advice in a second term?
2. Under your Administration the
US spent more in real terms on military spending than at any time since WWII.
Yet in many respects the Pentagon and the defense industry have squandered the
investments through failed program development, cost overruns, etc. During a
second term, what steps would you take to hold the defense industry accountable
and use American tax dollars more effectively?
3. You supported a health reform
bill that specified what level of profits a health insurance company can make.
Would you consider a similar requirement for the defense industry?
J. Andrew Person
served as a U.S. Army officer and paratrooper from
2001-2006, including year-long tours in Iraq and Afghanistan. He studied
foreign policy at Georgetown University and spent five years working on Capitol
Hill. He is now a fellow with the Truman National Security Project and is
attending law school at the University of Montana in Missoula.
Tom on book tour: Some initial dates
Me and the band are going on the road next month in support
of my
new book. Here are some
initial dates:
Washington, DC
Politics & Prose
Oct. 30
New York City
Barnes & Noble (82nd and Broadway)
Nov. 1
Washington, DC
CNAS event (sign up here)
and reception
Nov. 8
San Francisco
Marine Memorial Club
Nov. 14
Marin County/Corte
Madera
Book Passage
Nov. 15
Seattle
Nov. 16
Seattle Public Library
Chicago
Nov. 27
Union League Club
Washington DC
Dec. 3
The Hill Center, Capitol Hill
Richmond, Va.
George C. Marshall Foundation dinner
Dec. 4
Washington, DC
Army-Navy Club
Feb. 5
Many more events to come, including talks at Fort
Leavenworth (I think Nov. 29) the Army War College (Jan. 23), and the Army's
Military History Institute (March 23).
Pay as you go for your wars
This poster reminded me of a thought I've seen bouncing a
lot in recent years: Why don't we pay for our wars as we fight them? Raise
taxes, sell bonds, etc.
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