Sergeant Walker's Blog: Author of Southlands Snuffys Series.

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Sergeant Walker - Southlands Snuffys,

Anecdotes and observations of the South Vietnam War

Hidden figures.

The VC was as careful about camouflage as they were in preparing attack or defense plans and turned camouflage into an art; from simple things like always walking in the shade on open trails to having their uniforms fitted with hooks for fastening branches, fauna, and other means of concealment.

When on long marches any natural camouflage they changed regularly and came from the flora in their immediate area of operation. In fields of bushes, the VC covered their bodies with a cone-shaped rush mat that was similar to our issue ghillie suit but had an opening for the head, and someone passing within a few yards would be unable to see them.

For ambushes on highways or roads bordered with little or no shrubbery, the VC prepared artificial bushes, which they planted before an attack. Their method for hiding in rice fields, swamps, or canals was a simple one, they used hollow rush stalks to breathe under water. A VC grunt could remain below water for a surprising amount of time in that way without discovery.

They concealed weapons in hollowed out tree trunks and large depots in jungle clearings that could not be seen from the air; such depots were covered with leaves and other fauna that were replaced almost daily due to the foliage withering quickly in the intense heat, and similar methods were used in building the Ho Chi Minh Trail.

One-time observer planes suddenly discovered a new stretch of road running from the Sekong River to the jungle village of Chavane. That area they flew over daily, but no one had seen even the slightest sign of construction and people never spotted in that region. On completion of the road the camouflaging fauna was cleared away and the pilots suddenly discovered a jungle “red ball” supply road that was ten yards wide in some places.

Chucks ability to camouflage was for sure impressive, and something that made our sides attempts to defeat the enemy all the much harder.

Chucks Guile

On a search and destroy mission as our guys descended through dense jungle into a narrow ravine they suddenly came under enemy fire.

On the opposite side of the ravine, about 100 yards or so away, they spotted earthen excavations and a bunker concealed in thick undergrowth; the firing had come from the bunker and so a four-man team was sent forth to take the position.

Although constantly under fire, they reached the bunker and threw a grenade into it. After the grenade exploded, the team entered the bunker convinced they had killed the firers. Suddenly there was shooting from within, and two of the team who entered stumbled out wounded and the shooting inside the bunker stopped. When a larger force finally penetrated the bunker, they found the bodies of the other team members and an intricate system of fortifications.

What was originally assumed the real bunker was not for the real one was on top of it and connected to it by a tunnel, its entrance could not be seen from outside. As the team approached the lower bunker, the VC had climbed to the top bunker and safe from the grenade explosion. Then, as the team entered the lower bunker, Charlie fired on them and fled to safety through an escape tunnel. There had been only two or three VC, but they had held up the whole search and destroy force for more than two hours and had inflicted casualties.

That “ball game” was a hard-learned lesson in the VC’s use of guile and ingenuity in preparing defensive positions. It was an experience that underscored the challenges faced by our forces in combating an enemy adept at using the terrain and employing deceptive tactics.when preparing their defense plans.

Technological forces versus the hard-corps.

General Vo Nouyen Giap :- “The war in South Vietnam is the model for the National Liberation Movement of our time. If it succeeds in defeating the special war being tested by the American imperialists then their kind of war can be defeated through ought the world.”

Against the VC their enemy, our side, employed a modern war machine, in the air, on land, and at sea, so the VC had to learn to use all means to defend themselves, and nothing was beyond consideration in their fight against our high-tech military.

Therefore, Viet Cong fighters soon learned how to turn the most unlikely of items into an effective weapon and to use them ruthlessly. In essence, they were in the minds of their leaders automatons of the revolution, and completely dedicate to the war they served and unconditionally subordinated themselves to the idea and strategy of guerrilla warfare. It made no difference where they fought, whether in jungles, paddy fields, mountains, or as village officials or members of a terrorist cell in the cities. Their commitment to self-sacrifice was absolute and an example thereof being it was not unusual for a VC member cyclist in Saigon to be blown into fragments along with their target and passersby, the disintegrated rider a willing victim of his own act of terrorism.

In addition, Victor Charlie had developed their guerrilla tactics to a fine point by drawing on the experiences of the North Vietnamese and the Chinese revolutions, but their combat groups were more effective and dangerous than their North Vietnamese or Chinese cohorts, and were constantly learning and evolving tactics in knowing they could not expect help if things went adrift. Therefore, they had to do everything with a specific goal in mind and so even their one / two man operations were pre-planned down the smallest of detail.

Against this type of folk with a locked-in mindset of if required a never-ending war stood our technologically advantaged guys. History records not only the outcome, but in addition military lessons to be learned.

Chucks best buddy.

To the VC grunt his most prized possession and important piece of equipment was his personal weapon, his gun.

Those VC grunts would rather die than lose a weapon for they knew how hard it was to capture weapons, how valuable and irreplaceable every gun was to their liberation effort. Our statisticians in Saigon calculated that it took two months on average for an infantry weapon to reach the South from the North down the Ho Chi Minh Trail, and it required five men to transport just one such weapon over this long distance to the battlefields.

In training, repeatedly a Viet Cong grunt was told that there was no greater shame than losing his gun. Their training manual said: "The Liberation Army soldier may lose everything he possesses but not his gun." After a battle, they were under a strict order that they must retrieve all munitions, as it was every VC grunts duty. In a case where a comrade died, they made all effort in the picking up of his gun. In fact, many, if not most VC, tied their weapon to their arms or bodies with cord or wire so as not to lose them.

Near to all on our side knew exactly how important their gun was to the VC grunt, and often the number of abandoned weapons and not the number of enemy casualties measured the success of a “Ball Game, action. For when the VC left any weapons behind our guys knew just how badly they had hurt their opponents, and it did not matter if they found a lot or a little VC dead bodies, or even none, on the battlefield, the abandoned weapons count took precedence, and especially when they captured a large number of automatic weapons.

In aiming for accurate official statistics, MACV, Military Assistance Command Vietnam, collected the number of enemy weapons taken, and the number of enemy killed, wounded or captured as listed in individual action reports. This collected data on captured enemy weapons alongside casualty figures provided a more comprehensive picture of engagement results.

The VC's obsession with weapons had several significant effects on their morale and discipline, the key points are:

Heightened sense of responsibility:

The extreme importance placed on weapons made VC fighters feel a deep sense of duty to protect and retain their guns at all costs. This increased their discipline around weapon handling and security.

Motivation to fight:

In knowing how valuable and irreplaceable each weapon was motivated the VC to fight harder and take greater risks to avoid capture or loss of their weapons.

Unit cohesion:

The shared understanding of weapon importance and the collective effort required to transport and maintain weapons strengthened bonds between the VC grunts.

Psychological impact:

The intense focus on weapons provided a tangible representation of the VC's cause, boosting morale by giving the VC a physical connection to their mission.

Discipline in combat:

The strict orders to retrieve all munitions and weapons after battles, even from fallen comrades, instilled a sense of discipline that extended beyond normal combat duties.

Pride and shame:

Retaining one's weapon was a source of pride, while losing it was considered deeply shameful. This motivated the VC grunts to maintain discipline even in difficult circumstances.

Resource consciousness:

The scarcity of weapons made VC grunts acutely aware of resource limitations, potentially increasing overall discipline in using and conserving supplies.

Resilience:

The difficulty in obtaining weapons increased the VC's determination and resilience in the face of adversity, knowing each weapon represented a significant investment of effort.

In summary, while the obsession with weapons clearly had positive effects on VC morale and discipline, it is worth noting that it also created additional stress for the VC grunts, in knowing the severe consequences of weapon loss. However, overall, the weapon fixation was a net positive for VC morale and discipline, contributing to their ability to sustain a prolonged insurgency despite material disadvantages.

A minimalist life.

Just as it was for our side in the war, the extreme conditions under which the Viet Cong forces lived and fought required suitable and practical equipment. Every “standard” VC fighter and every soldier of the better-trained “regular” Viet Cong Army was equipped to exist for days or weeks in the jungle without supplies. The VC equipment was indeed primitive, reduced to the very bare necessities, but it served its purpose.

Their rations included local food, rice, fish, and such, captured, stolen, and recovered canned goods, the recovered due to our side’s newbies bailing out of their gear items of C rations they simply did not like, in a lack of appreciation for at times resource scarcity. The VC first-aid kit included scavenged US medical drugs, and for a painkiller a little cocaine. All not held in a sophisticated backpack but in a “knapsack”, quite often just a crude cloth sack tied to the body with a cord. For off-ground sleeping, a hammock and nylon sheets to protect from the rain and dampness.

In essence, the VC fighters were equipped to operate when required independently in the jungle for extended periods, often with minimal supplies at times being just a little sticky rice and a little flask of fish sauce. Their gear was basic but functional, and designed solely for the harsh jungle environment.

There are several key aspects of VC equipment and survival tactics to highlight:

Equipment and Supplies:

Their gear was certainly minimalist but was practical, and allowed for mobility and survival in challenging terrain. The use of hammocks and nylon sheets showed an understanding of jungle conditions and the need to stay dry and off the ground.

The VC showed adaptability and resourcefulness by scavenging and repurposing equipment and supplies left behind or discarded by our forces and those of our allies. This demonstrated a remarkable ability to make use of limited resources.

Comparison to American Forces:

The VC's ability to operate with minimal equipment provided advantages in mobility and stealth compared to our more heavily equipped units shows a contrast between the VC's stripped-down, practical approach and our at times over-equipped Grunts.

Adaptability:

The VC was quick to adapt to our tactics, finding new ways to camouflage themselves and their operations when faced with challenges such as defoliation.

Low-tech but effective logistics:

The VC had a complex, well-organized logistics system coordinated by the Central Office of South Vietnam (COSVN), which allowed them to distribute supplies efficiently despite their low-tech approach.

Guerrilla tactics, high motivation, and willingness to endure hardship:

By avoiding large-scale confrontations and using hit-and-run tactics, the VC were able to conserve their resources and sustain their forces over long periods. The psychological preparedness of VC fighters and their willingness to endure harsh jungle conditions with minimal comforts indicated a high motivation and dedication to their cause, and their ability to survive for extended periods in the jungle certainly contributed to their effectiveness as a guerrilla force.

In summary, all of these factors combined allowed the Viet Cong to operate effectively in the jungle for extended periods, despite the technological and resource advantages of our forces and that of our allies.

The VC's pragmatic approach to equipping their forces, their resourcefulness in using captured or discarded materials, and their adaptation to the challenging jungle environment. This approach allowed them to maintain a presence in areas where more conventionally equipped forces tended to struggle, contributing to their effectiveness as a guerrilla force during the war.

Sacrificial elements.

The enemy’s General Giap battle mantra said, "Confuse the enemy, keep him in the dark about your real intentions, divert him. Sometimes what seems to be a victory isn't really a victory, and sometimes a defeat isn't really a defeat." There is a good deal of dialectic in such a formulation, but our opposing forces measured victory and defeat by different standards than we.

In essence, battlefield personal sacrifice was encouraged; defeat was embraced as a victory, especially if it meant successfully diverting our forces from an operation such as transferring units, or if in withdrawal or advance, or to disrupt major attack plans. This highlights some key aspects of General Vo Nguyen Giap's military strategy and philosophy during the Vietnam War:

Emphasis on deception and misdirection: Giap advocated confusing the enemy and concealing true intentions to gain tactical and strategic advantages.

Redefining victory and defeat: Giap viewed battles and operations through a different lens than traditional Western military thinking. What appeared to be a tactical defeat could serve a larger strategic purpose.

The willingness to accept casualties: The North Vietnamese were prepared to sustain heavy losses if it achieved broader objectives.
The use of disruption as a goal: Even if an operation did not achieve a clear "victory," it could be considered successful if it disrupted our allies plans, and ours, or diverted resources.

Long-term perspective: Giap focused on the overall war effort rather than individual engagements, recognizing that short-term setbacks could lead to long-term gains.
Asymmetric warfare tactics: As the weaker force technologically, Giap used unconventional strategies to offset our allies’ advantages and ours.

Psychological warfare: By reframing defeats as strategic successes, Giap aimed to maintain morale and commitment to the war effort.
This approach presented significant challenges for our and our allies’ forces, as it made it difficult to assess progress and define clear metrics for success in the conflict. It exemplifies how differing cultural and strategic perspectives can shape military doctrine and decision-making.

While General Giaps approach did sometimes involve accepting tactical defeats or heavy losses to achieve strategic aims, it is not quite the same as a Pyrrhic victory, as a Pyrrhic victory specifically refers to a victory that comes at such a great cost that it effectively negates the benefits of winning. Giap's philosophy was more about reframing the entire concept of victory and defeat, rather than winning at too high a cost. The North Vietnamese were willing to sustain heavy losses, but saw those losses as worthwhile sacrifices toward their ultimate goal of reunification, not as Pyrrhic victories.

Pseudo-civilians.

Seventeen VC dead lay on top of each other ten or twenty yards from the M60 machine gun pits, and about twenty dead in front of the rifle slits. Two hours after the attack the bodies of the attackers were still where they had fallen, the spent US brass was piled into a sort of “cairn”, and that was to make it clear they had run straight into heavy American gunfire.

About three hours after that the search of a village for surviving VC from the “Ball Game” found it abandoned, not a soul in sight. Bloody bandages were found in one hut and in another the bodies of four VC, in a third there was a VC “expectant”, a dying man. It was obvious the VC had attended to their wounded and left their dead and dying before swiftly moving on.

Hidden inside the huts lay piles of uniforms, the black and gray-green of the VC “regulars”, NLF regular army. In addition, there were weapons, helmets, and sacks of rice and other rations. The enemy grunts had discarded their uniforms, put on civilian clothing and simply disappeared. The pile of uniforms indicated almost an entire company of VC had slipped away.

The village was set on fire to flush out hidden enemy fighters and deny the VC further resources and shelter, but to search for the escapees now pseudo-civilians was futile.

The above illustrates several aspects of the Vietnam War:

The VC's ability to quickly treat casualties and evacuate after battle.

Their tactic of blending in with civilians to avoid capture.

The difficulty our forces faced in distinguishing combatants from civilians.

The challenges of fighting an enemy that could easily disappear into the local population.

Family connections.

As the War progressed Viet Cong attacks became more intense in response to increased U.S. and South Vietnamese military operations. With the more intense fighting, it was inevitable the VC casualties, and ours, increased.

As incredible as it may seem, at extreme risk and showing their desperation and dedication to deep family ties, at times women and small children would run through barrages of exploding artillery shells, into the middle of heavy machine-gun fire, onto an actual active battlefield, to carry off the dead and wounded VC grunts. These folks were the mothers, wives, and children of VC grunts recovering their wounded or dead, sons, husbands, and fathers. There was certainly a psychological impact on any of our guys witnessing such extreme measures taken by Vietnamese civilians to care for their loved ones.

This highlights the complex, and often heartbreaking, nature of the Vietnam War, where traditional boundaries between the battlefield and homefront were often nonexistent. It also underscores the strong family and community bonds to found within Vietnamese society, even in the face of such extreme danger.

In all wars there are blurred lines between combatants and civilians, however in guerrilla warfare, the difficulty in distinguishing between civilians and combatants in that type of conflict is far more acute.

Chuck’s armory.

Basic Viet Cong units were equipped primarily with Chinese, Russian, and Czech weapons. They also had French submachine-guns of the latest make and East German arms, and some units were equipped with Mauser carbines, SiG 44 assault rifles, and other pistols, rifles, and machine guns of the former WW2 German Wehrmacht and the simple to use anti-tank rockets the Panzerfaust all from Red Army WW2 booty and sent to South Vietnam via China.

The VC continued to use captured weapons, especially our machine gun the M60, but the weapon they coveted most, as we did over the less than reliable M16, was the AR-15 Colt, which, despite it being 5.6mm caliber had an extraordinary rate of fire and impact. In addition, Viet Cong “regular” units were also equipped with 60mm. and 80mm. mortars, and even larger calibers, light and medium artillery, antitank rockets, bazookas, and anti-aircraft guns.

The obvious advantage of receiving supplied weaponry was that the VC did not have to worry about their previous dependence on stolen or battlefield recovered South Viet government and American equipment and having to use the enemy's ammunition.

When the VC lacked conventional weapons, they manufacture their own crude but to varying degrees effective weapons. They produced a weapon best described as a slingshot gun. It had a barrel of beaten metal and loaded with nails, bits of metal, cuts of bamboo, and stones. Release was by way of a flintlock style mechanism, and the "round" could catapult quite some distance. At short distances the slingshot gun "round", while not normally fatal, could inflict grievous wounds. Some VC groups fought with arrow slingshot guns, which also had a devastating effect, or used catapults that hurled bundles of spears; these were not particularly accurate, but when a spear hit someone, the wound received often proved fatal.

In addition to this “armory”, there was a homemade "mortar," with a wooden ramrod in its barrel. At the bottom of the rod, there was an explosive delivery charge, in essence a kind of improved Molotov cocktail than a conventional mortar as it had a bottle filled with gasoline or other highly inflammable liquid attached to the ramrod. Initial ignition was by gasoline soaked wadding ignited prior to firing. The mortar’s “round” could travel a considerable distance. There were a multitude of other designed “fugasses”, improvised weapons, both mechanical and explosive, some being very effective whist others not so, but overall they got the designed for job done. The job being to maim, kill, an enemy, or to instill fear and / or panic in that enemy.

The above highlights the VC's adaptability and resourcefulness in acquiring and creating weapons, and demonstrates the VC's ingenuity in adapting to their circumstances by utilizing available resources to maintain a fighting force against our technological superiority. It also helps to remove the much-vaunted urban myth that our guys were up against just a bunch of peasant farmers, when in fact it was a difficult deadly fight against a dedicated and resourceful enemy.