Sergeant Walker's Blog: Author of Southlands Snuffys Series., page 2

Insight of mind-set.

One of the most memorable and potent of statements heard came from an NVA officer POW when asked if the North Vietnamese would eventually give up the unequal struggle against the United States superior firepower, he answered as:

“No you are the invader and if we have rice we can fight you and if we fight then we can win, to win we have to endure, you cannot kill all of us. Eventually you will leave and when you leave we will still have our land.”

The POW’s statement encapsulated the resilience, determination, and long-term perspective of the North Vietnamese forces during the Vietnam War, and it was important intelligence for us. For it showed the mind-set our forces mind-set was pitted against.

That POW officer framed the conflict as one between an invading force, the United States, and defenders of their homeland, North and South Vietnam:

He said, "If we have rice we can fight you" which emphasized the Vietnamese ability to sustain their war effort with minimal resources.

He said, "If we fight then we can win" reflecting their belief that continued resistance was their path to victory.

He said, "To win we have to endure" highlighted their strategy of outlasting our forces rather than trying to match our military might.

He said, "Eventually you will leave" showing their confidence that the United States would ultimately withdraw from Vietnam.

He said, "When you leave we will still have our land" underscoring their commitment to their country and culture, which they saw as enduring beyond the conflict.

Taken as a whole, the POW’s defiant statement encapsulated the North Vietnamese perspective on the war. It emphasized their determination to resist foreign intervention and their belief in the ultimate futility of our war effort. It reflected the asymmetric nature of the conflict and the different metrics for victory held by each side.

Southlands Snuffys

Southlands Snuffys: 2

Unequal foes.

Most of our guys wounded in a “Ball Game”, firefight, had every chance of getting medical aid quickly and so had a greater chance of surviving, and no matter how badly wounded. However, at best, a wounded VC grunt may reach his nearest jungle base or friendly village, but they were often miles from his A.O, area of operation. Many VC grunts died because they could not get treatment quickly enough, and obviously, that suited our side just fine. Also, the possibility his buddies would come to the rescue of a wounded or trapped VC grunt was almost nonexistent.

In addition, an American unit could correct its foul-ups most of the time even with unit casualties or expectants, but when the Charlie fouled-up, in the most part it was always fatal for they knew they were far inferior to us in arms, equipment, and numbers. So they compensated for this downside by the use of strategy and precise planning, and those who understood the benefit of such proper tactical thinking knew that although the VC would sometimes foul-up, they never made the same foul-up twice.

Unfortunately, some on our side considered such VC precise planning with rehearsals, and the use of “mock-ups”, tactical models, a waste of time, or proof of cowardice, even a lack of discipline and ignoring the fact our better trained used the same proven as effective tactical planning method. In addition, there was another wrong-headed way of thinking on our side by some in a leadership role. In that, they despised the VC for not standing ground, and it was due to dimwitted notions such as "The pajama boys run when they see us” or “They are afraid to fight, so they settle for shooting at us from ambush.”. Well now, as Special Forces will tell, that when small in number facing a large force it is better to piss-off rapid and possibly ambush later, than just stick around and get slaughtered.

Therefore, guerrilla and small force tactical strategy is always based on ambushes, quick attacks, and brief skirmishes, for it is virtually impossible for such forces to engage in big battles. When they do, they suffer very heavy losses, and even in small actions, guerrilla and any small numbered forces face an acute danger of subjected to annihilation when facing superior numbers and / or bombs and other air delivered ordnance, for an Air Force can reach almost any point of a battlefield within a short space of time.

Getting to know Charlie.

The Viet Cong, known to our side as Victor Charlie, as with the soldiers of the regular National Liberation Front Army, followed the strategic concepts of successful revolutionary leaders such as Mao Tse tung and the military wisdom of Sun Tzu.

The basic meaning of strategy is setting the goal of a war and elaborating on the general methods of attaining that goal. In guerrilla warfare, the fighter must first accurately analyze the enemy's operations and tactics, something that is relevant to both sides. Therefore, the VC, NLF soldiers and their commanders’ carefully studied the methods of U.S. forces and the South Vietnamese forces. In fact, NLF textbooks and training documents contained a mass of pages pertaining to the analyses of US and South Viet military strategy.

The strategic fact of, “Know the enemy and know yourself, and you will be victorious in a hundred battles" so written by the greatest military theoretician of ancient China, Sun Tzu whose teachings were enthusiastically followed by the VC is as strategically relevant today as it was in ancient times. So in that vein, the Viet Cong employed various methods to collect information about us, their enemy, but in most part it came from planted agents meaning there was in probability no military unit, camp, South Vietnamese public agency, or even Government ministry without its share of Viet Cong agents. Those planted agents together with the regular soldiers and VC, political cadres, and hundreds of thousands of sympathizers worked for the goal of annihilating their enemy, just as we did towards them.

For sure, there is no bloodier kind of war than guerrilla warfare where both sides employ all available means to achieve their objectives.

Green faces.

One quiet day in the Boonie towards noon, I had a chance to look over some reported as VC prisoners taken during a Special Forces night operation. What surprised me, instead of tied and blindfolded they were still standing about in batches of twos and threes looking shaken and miserable as well they might be after being pounced upon by what Charlie dubbed “Green Faced Men”, but not one had been in any way harmed nor mistreated, other than sporting a little bruising and scratches. When asking the meaning of this, a Special Forces dude said with a grin they were in fact their own Montagnards. He went on to say they had been taken by the VC during a “Sat Cong”, kill communists mission, then quickly recovered thanks to a swiftly put together night operation before the VC had a chance to do the unspeakable to them and buoyantly thankful they were, although now looking shaken and miserable with aftershock.

Coca Cola, coke and Mufti.

Saigon, back in the day, the 1960’s-1970’s, could be within reason compared to 1950’s Havana by measuring decadence. Not that anyone on a furlough after “boonie time” gave a damn about decadence, hell; it was the main reason for going there, looking for a blowout after seeing buddies blown up, and it sure catered for all tastes. On Tu Do in addition to the Sporting club there was available the infamous Bluebird another sleazy pit haunted by porno sellers and dudes touting junk. Inside the Bars and Cafes sat the “mamasan” selling massages and quickies, outside were the street cruising mobile pimps, the Honda riding “Saigon Cowboys” and their “flatbackers”. However, not all was lost for pursuit of clean living, for there were sophisticated nightclubs such as the Tu Do Nightclub, where one could take in a floorshow and / or, have a five-star meal equal to any available "Back in the World". Standard Cafes and Bars where to drink a chilled Coca Cola, have a milkshake, or order a hamburger and fries. On the other hand, one could buy knocked out nick-knacks as souvenirs, or have “Mufti” clothing made as quickly as it took to sample any of Tu Do streets life’s little pleasures.

Enemy mine.

One time late in the day two VC deserters , Hồi Chánh Viên , managed to get through the perimeter defences unscathed. They said an attack would be made on us with the assault force creeping forward in the night. Further, a heavy mortar barrage was to be placed after which a large VC force would overwhelm us. According to them, dawn was to be the time. Once notified the “Higher-Higher” were so impressed by the intel they ordered an immediate pre-emptive artillery strike which went howling over our heads. Keeping our heads down in case of “shorts” we watched the spectacle but shrapnel blow-back soon made us opt for listening rather than watching, anyway the noise was appalling. At daybreak there was a feeble reply by surviving VC in the way of a few mortar rounds and one dude who stood up defiantly blasting off a scatter of AK rounds, but a long burst of M60 rounds scattered him. In recognition and reward for their intelligence gift, the two deserters were sent off to join the “Kit Carson Scout” program, the Chieu Hoi program.

A gift from Lady Luck.

The South Viets located a distance off to our left flank during one particularly impressive sunset were heavily attacked. They claimed later that on that sunset and the morning of the day after they had killed hundreds of VC, an outrageous exaggeration for sure, so a few of us were sent off to investigate. Yeah, sure enough, a fight had ensued from a frontal attack but of the claimed “hundreds killed”, all we found was a scatter of corpses and one lone VC with no weapon still sheltering in a little dip in the ground. He was of the country bumpkin type found all over the rural provinces and was in poor shape physically, so our Corpsman game him some help and off he went for interrogation. That dude was lucky for sure in that he had no weapon, and survived the standard practice of sweeping the ground after an attack with heavy gunfire, a practice that meant few still lurking enemy survived it, wounded or not.

A raw life.

A short furlough in the company of any Special Forces as a “familiar” to downtown Saigon meant visiting the “Sporting Bar” on Tu Do street, a raunchy hole of wildness and craziness with topless “flatbackers”, opium-painted joints, racks of booze and “33’s”, Ba me Ba beer. As it was a reserved spot for the Special Forces dudes such a visit allowed one to go strutting the stuff wearing camouflaged gear, wear a “steel pot” as an alternative cover, and tote an automatic weapon in complete disregard for the Saigon S.O’s, standing orders. Any uninvited appearing in the Sporting Bar became with swiftness converted to the departed, outside on Tu Do minus breaches, underwear, and with a bare-ass. Those Special Forces dudes fought hard and so were entitled to live hard. Most of the time they went marauding out in the boonie dressed up as a tree of bush hunting Chucks “higher-higher”, and sometimes they died doing it.



Southlands Snuffys

The wonderful and weird.

Once when on furlough in Saigon and knowing we were soon to see action again, and as life in war has an uncertain lease, we stayed off the booze and opted instead to feast on the finest dinner we could find, and we sure did feast royally. Interestingly, after paying for the meal among the change was a Roman coin that bore the head of the Emperor Hadrian. It was one of life’s memorable weird moments, but a few days later I lost it when digging out a rifle pit.

Southlands Snuffys: 2

Life’s anecdotes and observations.

It is arguable that the Vietnam War should not have been undertaken at all by the United States, seeing that the fate of the South Vietnamese lay more with the Communist North than anyone else. Therefore, I need not discuss the point for it is history and this is not an analyzing of history, but merely a personal record of a hard time in the life within a damn hard, and now and again deadly, school.



Southlands Snuffys