Douglas J. Douma's Blog, page 9

Review of Into the Silence by Wade Davis

Into the Silence, The Great War, Mallory, and the Conquest of Everest, by Wade Davis, New York: Vintage Books, 2011, 655 pp.

A few years ago I saw a documentary on the discovery of the remains of George Mallory, a man who with his colleague Sandy Irvine had died attempting to climb Mt. Everest in 1924. The enigma of whether Mallory and Irvine made the summit before succumbing to their deaths makes for one of the greatest debates in mountaineering history.

My interest in Mallory and the early attempts on Mt. Everest was rekindled earlier this year when I acquired and read an original copy of the account of the 1933 expedition; the Attack on Everest.

To start at the beginning of the Everest saga however, I picked up Wade Davis’s Into the Silence. In this I found an excellent book.

Davis, who has the enviable if oxymoronic job title of National Geographic Explorer-in-residence, spent fourteen years researching this book. His research is almost too detailed; as if here were there one hundred years ago with these men who fought in the trenches in The Great War and then set out to conquer the world’s tallest mountain.

The chapters on World War I are excellent in themselves. And Davis does an incredible job detailing the lives and personalities of those who would go on the Everest expeditions of the 1920s. But it was the expeditions to Mt. Everest themselves that first brought me to read this volume.

The 1921 reconnaissance expedition is the most thoroughly covered. This was exploration at its best, reaching into the unknown places of Tibet where no local had ever met a European before, carrying along the way a letter of passport from the Dalai Lama. Everest, as Davis explains, had been known as the highest mountain in the world since the late 19th century. But the 1904 Younghusband expedition of the British military into Tibet (with the pretended goal of preventing a Russian invasion) and its subsequent massacre of Tibetans soured relations between Tibet and the West for years. It was only in the 1920s that the British again were allowed into the country. The 1921 expedition did extensive surveying work in the area around Mt. Everest. Also one member of the expedition focused on collecting botanical specimens. Only late in the season was an attempt on climbing the mountain made. Reaching some point over 23,000 ft elevation Mallory and his colleagues almost broke the existing altitude record before being turned back by cold and high winds on the mountains. Without the knowledge of the effects of high altitude that later climbers would have this attempt on the summit made a number of mistakes, such as camping at too high of an elevation and therefore slowly be weakened by lack of oxygen before making a push up the mountain. They had also tried climbing in the wrong season. So the next expedition would start earlier the next year.

The 1922 expedition focused their goal on summiting Everest and featured a greater number of strong climbers. The team of Mallory, Norton, and Somervell would make it to just shy of 27,000 ft elevation, easily breaking the existing altitude record. They also established the highest camp in mountaineering history to that date. Davis’s account of the harrowing retreat from the highest point reached is enthralling. I almost forgot that I was reading a book, and not actually present as a member of the climbing party itself. Supplemental oxygen was brought on this expedition, but not used by Mallory’s party. George Finch and Geoffrey Bruce did use oxygen and made it to 27,300 ft elevation where Bruce’s oxygen apparatus failed and they turned back. Oxygen proved its worth as the party with it ascended at 900 feet per hour compared to the 330 feet per hour of those without. A final attempt at the mountain was met with disaster as an avalanche killed seven porters and nearly took out the whole climbing party.

Throughout the book Davis keeps the reader informed of developments back in England and around the world. The newspapers, he writes, regularly covered the expeditions in Tibet. Following the 1922 failure, he notes, “the promise of a third expedition, a final gesture of heroic redemption—what more could the newspapers want?” (p. 455) He also details the complexity of the climbs as the weather was unpredictable, the porters often brave but not always dependable, and relationships among the Englishmen often strained.

The 1924 expedition proved to be the final of the three expeditions of the 1920s. Though perhaps better prepared than previous expeditions, weather again was a major challenge; the cold especially putting lives at risk. Norton and Somervell broke the altitude record climbing over 28,000 ft. With Somervell’s body failing and Norton nearly snow-blind they were forced to turn back. The attempt then of Mallory and Irvine that has become hiking lore then commenced. Davis notes that at “27,760 ft they rested and dropped a gas cylinder.” Presumably this is the gas cylinder found by a later expedition and determined to belong to the 1924 attempt. Then, famously, Odell, from 26,000 ft noted in his diary that given a short window of break I the clouds, “At 12:50 saw M & I on ridge nearing final base of pyramid.” And he would soon write “My eyes became fixed on one tiny black spot silhouetted on a small crest beneath a rock step in the ridge; the black spot moved. Another black spot became apparent and moved up the snow to join the other on the crest. The first then approached the great rock step and shortly emerged on top; the second did likewise.” He realized that they were far behind schedule. Davis notes, “They were unexpectedly, even dangerously, behind schedule. What might have held them back was anyone’s guess. But if they were indeed beyond the Second Step, as Odell reported, though the hour was late, they would still have had time to reach the summit, assuming they could gain roughly 650 ft in elevation in the remaining hours of daylight.” (p. 544) Only in 1999 would George Mallory’s body be found at 26,760 ft elevation, having apparently died in a fall. Sandy Irvine’s body has not yet been found.

GHC Review 18: Biblical Predestination

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Biblical Predestination by Gordon H. Clark, Nutley NJ: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1969.

[Page references in this review will be from Predestination, the combined edition of Biblical Predestination and Predestination in the Old Testament, Phillipsburg, NJ: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1987]

In Biblical Predestination Gordon Clark first works from the general to the specific. In the first three chapters he discusses some attributes of God’s sovereignty that set the stage to discuss predestination. In Chapter 1 he argues that God created all things for His glory; in Chapter 2 that God knows all things; and in Chapter 3 that God plans and acts. Of note is a defense of teleological supralapsarianism (p. 21-28), and arguments that God does not merely permit events to happen but actually causes them to happen. “God is the original cause of everything. Out of his mouth proceedeth both good and evil.” (p. 61)

Beginning then in Chapter 4, Clark directly makes his case for predestination. Romans 8:28-30, which he quotes, well summarizes the position: “And we know that all things work together for good to them that love God, to them who are called according to his purpose. For whom he did foreknow, he also did predestinate to be conformed to the image of his Son, that he might be the firstborn among many brethren. Moreover whom he did predestinate, them he also called: and whom he called, them he also justified: and whom he justified, them he also glorified.” As Clark notes, “The passage begins with the universal propositions that all things work together.” (p. 67) “God chose certain people on purpose and he works every detail of the universe for their good. The ostensible tragedy of Christ’s crucifixion was intended for their good. Nero, the papacy, Napoleon, and Stalin conspire to benefit the elect. And even the fall of a sparrow. God determines everything.” (p. 67) “There are many details in the doctrine of predestination and each should be given its due weight; but the basic, the final, the ultimate answer to all objections is the relative positions of Creator and creature. All objections presuppose that man is in some way or other independent of God and has obtained from somewhere or achieved by his own efforts some rights over against him. … The people who object to predestination have an exalted opinion of themselves and a low opinion of God” (p. 81-82)

Chapter 5 on Regeneration emphasizes that because man is dead in sin, regeneration is of the Lord. The sons of God are born, not of blood, nor of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man, but of God. (John 1:12-13)

Chapter 6 is a critique of the notion of Free Will. Descartes probably represents most who hold that the will is free in that he “bases this assertion neither on the Bible, nor on logical deduction, but on immediate experience.” (p. 112) Clark writes, “It is so obvious that the Bible contradicts the notion of free will that its acceptance by professing Christians can be explained only by the continuing ravages of sin blinding the minds of men.” (p. 114) Referencing Luther’s The Bondage of the Will, Clark writes, “It will be clearly seen that Protestantism began with a denial of free will, and that its reintroduction into Protestant churches a century later was a step back toward Romanism and justification by works.” (p. 115) “People who have not studied philosophy are the very ones who are least able to see when it is being imposed on the Bible. Thus it is, coupled with man’s sinful desire to be independent of God, that people who think they are very good Christians defend freedom of the will.” (p. 120) “In many discussions on free will, after quoting and explaining a dozen or more verses, and after having met stubborn opposition to the Reformation doctrine, I have often said, Well, then you give me the verses on which you base your idea of free will. This challenge usually produces a blank state. No verses are needed, they say. Everybody knows he is free.” (p. 121) “Usually Arminians naively base their theory on many biblical statements that say this man and that man willed to do this and that. Well, of course, the Bible clearly asserts that men will. But the question is not whether they will, or have a will, but whether God determines their will. The question is not whether a man chooses; but whether his choice had a cause or a reason. The Calvinist does not deny will or volition; he denies that volition like all the rest of creation is independent of God.” (p. 122)

An Epilogue reviewing some history of the doctrine of predestination in the church concludes the volume.

Now then, there are two particularly relevant extant letters which Clark received in the years after the publication of this book. The first is from and with permission of Gary Johnson, who would work with the Trinity Foundation in its early years, praising the volume. The second letter is from Dr. Clarence Efroymson, a Jewish professor colleague of Clark’s at Butler university.

Nov 22, 1976

Dear Dr. Clark,

For the past few weeks I have been deciding whether or not to write a short letter in appreciation of your fine and most excellent book Biblical Predestination. I simply cannot resist.

As a very recent convert to Calvinism, there have been many perplexing questions of natural sloth and depravity that have arisen in my mind concerning the sovereignty of God. Perhaps the most significant impression of your book have been an enlarged awareness of my own ignorance of determination and the constant need and desire for scriptural appeal to manifest the glory of our God in His complete and total sovereignty.

Dr. John W. Robbins is my neighbor and very able guide in Friday night bible studies. I am eternally grateful to my Lord for his inspiration and influence in the introduction of all your books to me.

I would like to end here by making a joyfully rash statement that Biblical Predestination ought to be required reading in all churches throughout the world.

Sincerely in Christ,

Garrett P. Johnson

 

 

And the second letter:

 

C.W. EFROYMSON

Jan 11, 1970

Dear Gordon

I have read the tract, Biblical Predestination, which you sent me, and for which I thank you. In this – as w/ everything of yours which I have read – I enjoy the directness and succinct quality of your address, and also the logic of the various arguments. That is however – or so I imagine – of little or no moment to you. But then you know that Scripture to me is in two essential respects not what it is to you.

I confess to misgiving or regarding the expression: “the unbelieving synagogues of Satan.” I haven’t a concordance (except Mandel-Korn) at hand – so can’t know whether this is a phrase used in the N.T.

But, for the rest, I am reminded once more of that talk which you gave many years ago – within a year or so of your coming to Butler – at the (I think) ΦΚΦ, or faculty dinner when the cafeteria was in the basement of Jordan Hall. You will forgive me if I say it was one of the, perhaps the most impressive talk(s) I have ever listened to. The impression lasts.

– in despite of all differences,

yours cordially,

Clarence

For the previous review in this series see here.

GHC Review 17: The Philosophy of Gordon H. Clark

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The Philosophy of Gordon H. Clark, A Festschrift, Ronald H. Nash, ed., Philadelphia: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1968, 516 pp.

This book—a festschrift for Gordon H. Clark—consists of three sections. The first section is Clark’s Wheaton Lectures. The second is “exposition and criticism” from various Christian intellectuals. The third and final part consists of Clark’s replies to most of the critics.

Though the book was published in Clark’s sixty-sixth year of life and he was nearing—or was expected to be nearing—the twilight of his career, approximately two-thirds of his published works were yet to come in later years. Thus the contributors to The Philosophy of Gordon H. Clark who critiqued aspects of Clark’s philosophy did not have the advantage we have today of being able to access a larger corpus of his writings. Some of them still certainly knew Clark’s thought well from his writings then published or from their personal acquaintance with him.

The choice of critics is interesting in itself. None of Clark’s former students (Henry, Carnell, Lindsell, Jewett, Davis etc.) are included among the critics, though certainly some of his students were critical of his philosophy. Nor was there included any of Clark’s philosophical adversaries from the Orthodox Presbyterian Church; John Murray and Cornelius Van Til among them. The critics Nash chose to contribute to this volume were theologians no doubt, but more specifically most of them were philosophers; a category that would be stretched if those previously mentioned in this paragraph were to be included. Nash, who wrote one of the critiques in this volume, and Roger Nicole were two that found much in common with Clark; at least in their theology if not philosophy. While Van Til was not chosen, R. J. Rushdoony, Gilbert B. Weaver, C. Gregg Singer, and perhaps David H. Freeman in that order had significant affinities with his thought. The remaining contributors—Merold Westphal, Arthur F. Holmes, George I. Mavrodes, H. Harold Hartzlter, John T. Stahl, and John Warwick Montgomery—are ones that I’m not familiar enough with to accurately categorize.

I’m grateful to own a copy of this book which once belonged to and is signed by Howard Long, a friend of Gordon Clark’s. Howard’s widow Genevieve, now in her nineties, graciously donated this book to me along with many others from her library. This volume is relatively rare and usually sells for over $100. But there is no need to pay so much since all of the material of this volume is reproduced in the much less expensive Clark and His Critics, Volume 7 of the The Works of Gordon Haddon Clark published by the Trinity Foundation.

PART ONE, THE WHEATON LECTURES

The Wheaton Lectures are an expanded version of three lectures Clark gave in November 1965 at Wheaton College. The lectures are “Secular Philosophy,” “The Axiom of Revelation,” and “Several Implications.” This section of the book was later printed alone as An Introduction to Christian Philosophy (1993).

The Wheaton Record promoted the lectures with the following notices:

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The program then for the event is also extant:

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Secular Philosophy. (Wheaton Lecture I)

Clark notes the primacy of epistemology to metaphysics. He writes, “But before any type of metaphysics can be accepted, another and far more crucial question must be asked and answered. After someone asserts that the universe is nothing but atoms in motion, or that the universe is an Absolute Mind, or even that planets revolve around the sun, we may properly ask, How do you know? A theory that tries to explain how knowledge is possible is called an epistemological theory. This is where we must begin.” (p. 27)

In rejecting nominalism, and perhaps accepting a form of realism, Clark writes, “On one major base some sort of theory of Ideas stands impregnable. It is the necessity of similarities and classifications. Unless we can use concepts and talk of groups of things, philosophy would be impossible. If only individual things existed, and every noun were a proper name, conversations and even thinking itself could not be carried on. Neither the medieval nominalists nor Bishop Berkeley, who tried to get along without abstract ideas, were able to explain the reason why we classify men as men and horses as horses. … All thought and speech depend on classification, and no epistemology can succeed without something like the Platonic Ideas.” (p. 28)

Yet Clark refers to Platonism as a failure. The plausibility of Plato’s theory of reminiscence vanishes when Plato leaves mathematics for politics. “The slave boy was easily able to remember the square on the diagonal, but neither the Athenians nor the Syracusans could remember justice, not even with the lengthy stimulus of the Republic.” (p. 29) Further, “Man before birth may have been omniscient, but here below the Platonic cave in which man is a prisoner actually has no opening.”

Neither was Aristotle’s empiricism successful for “he must determine the categories and ultimately defend the law of contradiction.” In this Clark concludes that “Aristotle fails to arrive at the law of contradiction by his empirical method.” (p. 30) “Aristotle’s difficulties start, not with the secondary realities, but right at the beginning with sensory individuals.” Using an example of rocks, Mt. Blanca, and the Sangre de Cristo range Clark asks, “Which then is the individual: rock, mountain, or range? The question is embarrassing for the identification of individuals cannot be made on the empirical basis Aristotle adopts.” (p. 31) [It might be interesting to note that while Dr. Clark’s son-in-law Dwight Zeller did not start Sangre de Cristo Seminary in that range (or on that mountain, or on those rocks) until the 1970s, by the 1950s Zeller and his brother Paul had begun Horn Creek, a Christian camp there. And prior to the seminary being built Dr. Clark owned undeveloped acreage at the site.]

Clark gives a brief historical survey of secular epistemology concluding that it is a failure. This failure might “induce one to try a religious or revelational theory.” (p. 37) The reader should now see that these lectures follow Clark’s general approach of showing the skeptical futility of various philosophies and then presenting the Biblical alternative and its superior merit. But first this lecture continues with sections on science, ethics, and religion.

On science Clark notes that the uniformity of nature, upon which physics depends, cannot be established by empiricism. Even if the law of uniformity is granted, it alone is of no use in obtaining the contents of physics. (p. 38) Then also, Scientific laws depend on non-observational factors, including mathematical manipulations of the observed readings of an experiment’s measurements. The equations chosen to fit the data, are just that: chosen, for an infinite number of alternative equations may fit the data equally well. The theologian then, who argues from the second law of thermodynamics that the world cannot have existed from eternity cannot, upon pain of contradiction, also claim that miracles—events contrary to the supposed uniform laws of nature—occur. For consistency, creation is to be defended from the scriptures. “If science cannot establish a mechanistic metaphysics, neither can it establish the second law of thermodynamics.” (p. 42) Science, Clark concludes, as manipulation or operationalism is astoundingly successful, but regarded as a cognitive enterprise is a failure.

The critique of secular views continues to ethics. Here too, Clark contends, secular philosophy fails. He briefly dispatches Kantianism before addressing utilitarianism. As he has written elsewhere, a major problem is that the calculations required by utilitarianism are impossible. The “still greater difficulty” in calculating the greatest good of the greatest number is establishing the normative proposition in the first place; why ought man to seek the greatest good for the greatest number? This cannot be established by observation. Referencing Hitler and Stalin, Clark writes, “The greatest good of the greatest number is a principle for tyrants.” (p. 46) Among critiques of other philosophies, Clark writes that Existentialism fails of “establishing values or norms of conduct.” (p. 53) Existentialism’s freedom of choice, he contends, “totally unrestricted, empties life of all meaning.” (p. 54) Sartre “can command us to choose, as insistently as he wants, but he can give us no idea of what to choose.” (p. 54) Secular ethics, Clark concludes, “do not justify a single norm of conduct.” (p. 54)

Finally, on religion, Clark provides a short critique of humanism, writing that it is unable on its empirical principles to establish the values of friendship, truth, and beauty that it so cherishes.

The Axiom of Revelation. (Wheaton Lecture II)

This second lecture, on the Axiom of Revelation, is in my opinion Dr. Clark’s single most important writing. Nothing more clearly displays his own philosophy. Regarding this lecture I agree with Mary Crumpacker’s article “Clark’s Axiom, Something New?” (Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society 32, no. 2 (1989) 355-65) that it does not signify a change in Clark’s thinking, but presents in clearer detail what he had essentially been proposing all along; or at least since A Christian View of Men and Things in 1952.

Clark’s first conclusion, summarizing the previous lecture, is that “no construction in philosophy is possible without some sort of presupposition or a priori equipment.” Then, second, he concludes also, “secular philosophy has failed.” Therefore, he moves on to “A Suggested Axiom.”

As I consider this lecture to be of considerable value, the following quotes from it will be of some length.

“Now, a third conclusion, or at least an hypothesis for consideration may be proposed. It is that revelation should be accepted as our axiom, seeing that other presuppositions have failed.” (p. 59) “That revelation should be accepted without proofs or reasons, undeduced from something admittedly true, seems odd when first proposed. It will not seem so odd, however, when the nature of axioms is kept in mind. Axiom whatever they may be and in whatever subject they are used, are never deduced from more original principles. They are always tested in another way.” (p. 59)

“If a philosopher ponders the basic principles of Aristotle, Kant, or even Sartre, he will do so only by considering how well the author succeeds in solving his problems. If the problems are such as confront us all, and if the basic proposals succeed fairly well, a philosopher is inclined to give his assent to them. He cannot be strict logic be compelled to assent; he makes a voluntary choice, induced by the successful solutions of the problem. So too it should be with Christian revelation as an axiom. We must ask, Does revelation make knowledge possible? Does revelation establish values and ethical norms? Does revelation give a theory of politics? And are all these consistent with one another? We can judge the acceptability of an axiom only by its success in producing a system. Axioms, because they are axioms, cannot be deduced from or proved by previous theorems.” (p. 59-60)

“Those who dislike systematic philosophy, or system in general, for example, Kierkegaard, Sartre, and the Pietists, should be pressed to prove the virtue of disjointed truths. Can philosophy of time be disregarded in eschatology? Does behaviorism have bearing on religion and politics? Is it possible to speak about zoology without suggesting views on creation? Or, vice versa, can we assert creation without implying something about zoology? No, truth is not thus disjointed. It is systematic. And by the systems they produce, axioms must be judged.” (p. 60)

“Though not impossible, it is difficult to extort knowledge of a human being if he does not want to make a self-disclosure. A fortiori the notion that God can be known only through revelation seems to be essential to the very concept of God. Try to extort knowledge of God from an unwilling God is impossible if God is the supreme omnipotent Being. Therefore if we profess a God who is infinitely superior to man, we should not be surprised by the necessity of a revelation, if we are to know him. Or, to put the matter in other words, we are confronted with an alternative: we can either deny God and accept atheism, or we shall have to try revelation.” (p. 60)

“Natural theology means that the existence of God can be demonstrated from an observation of the world. Taking revelation in this sense as an axiom is no different from taking the world as an axiom. This understanding of revelation simply returns us to empiricism, beset as it is with all difficulties listed in the first lecture.” (p. 61)

“Acceptance of revelation as a presupposition does not require a denial of the a priori. … As a matter of fact, the doctrine of the image of God in man, a doctrine learned from Scripture, is an assertion of an a priori or innate equipment.” (p. 61-62)

“A systematic philosophy must take care of epistemology. Knowledge must be accounted for. It may be that the a priori forms cannot be listed: it may be that botany or some other subject remains obscure; but knowledge of some sort must be provided. Hence the postulate her proposed is not revelation as natural theology, not revelation as ineffable mysticism, not an inexpressible confrontation, but a verbal and rational communication of truths, the revelation of Scripture.” (p. 62)

“It is necessary to consider logic first, rather than botany or history, because the denial of the law of contradiction, or even the failure to establish it as a universal truth, was the downfall of secular philosophy.” (p. 64) “Christians generally, even uneducated Christians, understand that water, milk, alcohol, and gasoline freeze at different temperatures because God created them that way. … It was God’s eternal purpose to have such liquids, and therefore we can say that the particulars of nature were determined before there was any nature. Similarly in all other varieties of truth, God must be accounted sovereign. It is his decree that makes one proposition true and another false. Whether the proposition be physical, psychological, moral or theological, it is God who made it that way. A proposition is true because God thinks it so.” (p. 65-66)

After quoting the Bible and Charnock’s Existence and Attributes of God, Clark writes, “God’s knowledge depends on his will and on nothing external to him. Thus we may repeat with Philo that God is not to be ranked under the idea of unity, or of goodness, or of truth; but rather unity, goodness, and truth are to be ranked under the decree of God. It is hoped that these remarks on the relation between God and truth will be seen as pertinent to the discussion of logic.” (p. 66-67)

Quoting John 1:1 then, Clark famously if not controversially gives his translation as “In the beginning was Logic, and Logic was with God, and Logic was God. … In logic was life and the life was the light of men.” (p. 67)

“Not only do the followers of St. Bernard entertain suspicions about logic, but even more systematic theologians are way of any proposal that would make an abstract principle superior to God. The present argument, in consonance with both Philo and Charnock does not do so. The law of contradiction is not to be taken as an axiom prior to or independent of God. The law is God thinking.” (p. 67) “As there is no temporal priority, so also there is no logical or analytical priority.” (p. 68) “logic, the law of contradiction, is neither prior to nor subsequent to God’s activity.” (p. 68) “God and logic are one and the same first principle.” (p. 68)

“Scripture, the written words of the Bible, is the mind of God. What is said in Scripture is God’s thought.” (p. 69) [Because God is logical, so too are His words in the Scripture] “We maintain that the Bible expresses the mind of God. Conceptually it is the mind of God, or, more accurately, a part of God’s mind. For this reason the Apostle Paul, referring to the revelation given him, and in fact given to the Corinthians through him, is able to say, “We have the mind of Christ.” (p. 70) “As might be expected, if God has spoken, he has spoken logically. The Scripture therefore should and does exhibit logical organization.” (p. 70)

“The Scripture teaches that God created man in his own image. Although the first chapter of Genesis does not say explicitly what that image is, it implies that the image distinguishes man from the animals. From Colossians 3:10 we may infer that the image consists chiefly in knowledge, rationality, or logic. … Therefore the contention is that knowledge and rationality are the basic constituents of God’s image in man.” (p. 72-73)

“The Fall seriously damaged God’s image in man in all its parts. The intellect became depraved as well as the will. This is the doctrine of total depravity: no part or function of man is free from the effect of sin.” (p. 75) “While no act of will can be moral in the unregenerate man, it does not follow that no intellectual argument can be valid. True enough, fallen man is deceived by fallacious thinking, and he makes mistakes in arithmetic. But even the most hardened sinner sometimes constructs valid syllogisms and sometimes gets his bank account correctly balanced.” (p. 75) “Morally his [fallen man’s] every act is sinful … Therefore, in order not to assert that the image of God has been completely annihilated stress must be laid on its component of logic and reason.” (p. 75-76)

To avoid irrationalism, “we must insist that truth is the same for God and man. Naturally, we may not know the truth about some matters. But if we know anything at all, what we must know must be identical with what God knows. God knows all truth, and unless we know something God knows, our ideas are untrue. It is absolutely essential therefore to insist that there is an area of coincidence between God’s mind and our mind.” (p. 77)

“Religion, or to speak clearly, the Christian religion is not an affair of the emotions, at least no more so than politics and economics are, but fundamentally an acceptance of an intelligible message. The acceptance of this message is offered as a first principle, an axiom or postulate on which a superstructure of knowledge can be erected. Secular philosophy, with as well as without presuppositions, was shown to be impossible. Therefore, to put it as modestly as possible, the postulate of verbal revelation is at least worth trying.” (p. 87)

“The thousands of Biblical propositions need not be construed as an immense set of axioms. The peculiarity is in the opposite direction. What annoys Euclid and Spinoza is that this theology can operate on a single axiom. The single axiom is: The Bible is the Word of God. But though single, it is fruitful because this is embedded in it the law of contradiction, plus the nature of God, as argued above, plus the thousands of propositions thus declared true. On this latter point the form of deduction can be maintained. From the one axiom it follows syllogistically that such and such a sentence in Scripture is true because it is the Word of God.” (p. 88)

Several Implications (Wheaton Lecture III)

From Clark’s axiom or postulate this third lecture then seeks to provide some positive views on various subjects: history, politics, ethics, and theology or religion. Thus the failure of secular philosophy in these areas can be seen in stark contrast the success of revelation.

Clark then has a lengthy discussion of the views of the Dutch philosopher Herman Dooyeweerd; his fifteen “law-spheres” and “cosmic time.” Generally he finds Dooyeweerd often unintelligible and in the end inadequate. [This is the first Clark writes on Dooyeweerd, but additional articles on him come from Clark’s pen in the next few years after this volume.] Clark then moves on to “illustrate how the axiom of revelation can in a few instances be used to produce some concrete results.” (p. 102)

“Revelation then explains the significance of history. Without revelation there is no possibility of developing significance.” (p. 105) “The postulate of written or Scriptural revelation certifies events and gives their explanation. Explanations developed on any other ground are fanciful. Thus the postulate has this advantage.” (p. 107)

“A theory of civil power established by divine decree and promulgated by revelation avoids, as the secular theories cannot, the twin evils of totalitarianism and anarchy.” (p. 112)

On ethics, “The secular theories failed because there is no valid argument by which one can start from observable phenomena and reach and conclusion concerning obligation. When, however, the establishment of normative laws is placed in the hands of God, these secular attempts are seen to be as unnecessary as they are impossible.” (p. 113)

The final section on religion critiques irrationalism and argues in favor of the intelligible message of Christianity, the Good News.

Clark then summarizes the main thrust of his lectures: “Secular philosophy with our without presuppositions has been shown to be a failure. The verbal revelation of the Bible solves the problems of epistemology, history, ethics, and religion. It distinguishes truth from error. It preserves intelligibility. It banishes mysticism, emotionalism, and despair. And by it we receive the Reason of God, that is, God himself.” (p. 122)

Following Clark’s lectures, there was significant pushback from those philosophers in attendance. A Wheaton Record article commented “Intense dialogue resulted at last weekend’s philosophy conference as philosophers vigorously reacted to the rationalistic thought of Butler’s university’s Dr. Gordon Clark.”

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It may be valuable to address the comments in the Wheaton Record of those philosophers who attended the Wheaton Lectures, but for the present the purpose here of reviewing The Philosophy of Gordon H. Clark must continue.

TO BE CONTINUED … with PART TWO, EXPOSITION AND CRITICISM and PART THREE, REPLIES TO CRITICS

GHC Review 16: Peter Speaks Today

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Peter Speaks Today, A Devotional Commentary on First Peter, by Gordon H. Clark, Philadelphia: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1967, 159 pp.

This is the first of a number Biblical commentaries written by Gordon Clark. In time his published commentaries would cover 1 Peter, 2 Peter, 1 Corinthians, Colossians, 1 John, 1 Timothy, 2 Timothy, Titus, Ephesians, and Philippians. One might notice that these are all on epistles; he never wrote a commentary specifically on an Old Testament book or New Testament Gospel.

Writing a commentary on First Peter seems to have been a project Clark had long worked on or at least thought of working on. Twenty-five years before publication of this volume he noted in a letter, “I could continue my commentary on First Peter.” (Gordon H. Clark to Robert Strong, May 9, 1942) Also that year Edwin Rian of Westminster Theological Seminary wrote to Clark saying “I believe we can use your expositions of I Peter as soon as [Floyd] Hamilton has finished on Ephesians.” (Edwin Rian to Gordon H. Clark, Nov. 16, 1942) It is unknown to me what happened to that project, but perhaps it isn’t too much speculation to think it was the basis, at least in thought if not words, of the later commentary.

Throughout Peter Speaks Today Clark references the King James Version. In the preface however he critiques it, writing, “Let us admit that the King James Version suffers both because the best manuscripts had not been discovered, and because various grammatical mistakes were made.” That grammatical mistakes were made in the KJV must surely be agreed to by all but the more ardent KJV-only proponents. That “better manuscripts have been discovered” does not necessarily mean that Clark here supports the eclectic approach to textual criticism. These “better manuscripts” in his mind might just be copies of the Majority Text similar to but superior to the Textus Receptus underlying the King James Version’s original translation. Supporting this we might note that later in life Clark would in fact promote the Majority Text of the Greek New Testament.

Since I’ve longed despised the attempts of some persons to end conversations by saying “Well, that works in theory,” I’m glad to see Clark’s comment in the Introduction saying, “Practical people should not disparage theory. They cannot get along without it. For practical applications must always be applications of some theory: and it makes a world of difference what theory is applied.” (p. viii.) Clark then notes that while Peter has theory and doctrine, it is practical. It is because 1 Peter is practical and applicable to all times that Clark calls his commentary Peter Speaks Today.

In this book Clark comments on various topics including: obedience, the Trinity, Arminianism, assurance of salvation, antinomianism, second causes, the various aspects of salvation, the unity of the Scriptures, adoption, the image of God, holiness, God as not a respecter of persons, the primacy of theology to ethics, the atonement, saving faith, verbal inspiration, election, civil government, the right to work (p. 102), marriage, the proper mode of baptism, church government, and ordination by all elders (p. 151).

Clark returns also to his point from the introduction, saying, “It is most unusual in the Scripture to find an exhortation to right conduct without a doctrine given as a reason. The popular distinction between what is doctrinal or theoretical on the one hand and what is practical on the other is not so sharply drawn in the Bible as it is in the minds of some people. Fundamentally, the distinction is not drawn at all. As has been said, obedience is both mental and internal as well as external and overt. And mental obedience, believe in the truth and authority of what is taught normally leads to right conduct.” (p. 95)

On page 119 Clark writes of a Christian college where “an attempt was made by part of the faculty to remove Theism from the curriculum.” He continues, “The uncompromising president, who stood so staunchly against al forms of unbelief, had just been fired; and now those who had engineered his dismissal wanted to remove the course he had taught.” Knowing the history, the identity of this college and its president is easily discernible; Clark is speaking of Wheaton College and its former president J. Oliver Buswell.

When Clark comes to 1 Peter 3:18-22 and the “spirits in prison” he spends consider time explaining this challenging passage. For the church newspaper The Witness, Clark wrote an article on this passage back in 1951.

Another five years after the publication of this volume comes Clark’s commentary on II Peter. Then, in 1980, these two commentaries are published together in a single volume, 1 and 2 Peter.

For the previous review in this series see here.

GHC Review 15: What Do Presbyterians Believe?

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What Do Presbyterians Believe? The Westminster Confession Yesterday and Today, by Gordon H. Clark, Phillipsburg, NJ: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1965, 2001, 284 pp.

This book is a revision and expansion of Gordon Clark’s earlier What Presbyterians Believe.

In the preface to the 1965 edition Clark critiques the United Presbyterian Church in the United States of America (the name of that joint body of the PCUSA and the UPCNA from 1958 to 1983) for their moves to officially reject the Westminster Confession of Faith. He writes, “the subscription now proposed, and in its first official text accepted by a five-to-one vote, does not commit the minister to any definite theological position, not even to the vague meaningless phraseology of the new creed itself.” He then asks and answers, “What then do Presbyterians believe? Well, if the present proposal passes all the legal steps of the procedure, it can be said that the United Presbyterian Church in the United States of American will not believe anything. Just nothing at all.”

Following the 1967 UPCUSA decision to relegate the Westminster Confession to a book of confessions—all equally unauthoritative—Clark wrote to the Editor of the Layman’s Committee of that church with a similar argument but a stronger conclusion:

“With the 1967 Assembly the new confession was adopted and the ordination vows changed. These vows result in the fact that the new confession is not a confession at all, for no one confesses it. You cannot now try anyone for heresy because there is no such thing as heresy in your church. The vows do not commit a minister to any doctrine. Your church therefore believes nothing. It is therefore not a church at all.” – Gordon H. Clark to James L. Cochran, Aug. 27, 1973. In Clark and His Correspondents: Selected Letters of Gordon H. Clark, eds. Douglas J. Douma and Tom W. Juodaitis, Trinity Foundation, 2017, 189-190.

So then, as Clark continues in the preface, “But if it is asked What do Presbyterians believe, the answer will always be, the Bible and its most excellent summary, the Westminster Confession.” This book then is a commentary on that confession. The changes from the earlier edition of another title are too many to list.

Rather than summarizing this book I just want to note a couple things. One, I’ve found it particularly useful as a reference guide for some of Clark’s theological—rather than more philosophical—thought. Then, I’ve noticed in recent years a resurgence of interest in the Westminster Confession and the Assembly which wrote it. Valuable books on the subject are The Practice of Confessional Subscription by David W. Hall, The Theology of the Westminster Standards by J. V. Fesko, and (so I believe, but have not yet read) Chad Van Dixhoorn’s Confessing the Faith: A Readers Guide to the Westminster Confession of Faith.

For the previous review in this series see here.

GHC Review 14: The Philosophy of Science and Belief in God

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The Philosophy of Science and Belief in God, by Gordon H. Clark, Nutley, NJ: The Craig Press, 1964, 2nd edition 1987, 121 pp.

On the cover of the 2nd edition of Gordon Clark’s The Philosophy of Science and Belief in God is a picture of the Space Shuttle Challenger. The editor of the book, John Robbins, then notes, “An event 73 seconds after lift-off destroyed both crew and vehicle.” This failure in modern science (or engineering) provides an apt metaphor for Gordon Clark’s view of the failure (and inevitable failure) of science to produce any knowledge. Robbins’s choice of cover surely was not accidental.

Letters between Gordon Clark and the editors at Christianity Today show how little Clark himself was impressed with space travel. David Kucharsky wrote to Clark and others on Aug. 14, 1958 asking:

“The eyes of the world of science are turned more and more to the prospect of a shot to the moon. At the moment, the word here in Washington is that such an attempt my come any day now. Is there a moral, even a spiritual side, from which this concentration of interest may be viewed? What may be said to be the religious and ethical implications of a successful shot to the moon (or even an unsuccessful attempt)? What does it indicate about man as created … as fallen? Where may it lead us (away from God, nearer to God)? Can you give us fifty (50) words of pithy comment for the 160,000 clergymen and lay leaders who read each issue of CHRISTIANITY TODAY? We are asking 25 distinguished Christian leaders in the world of theology and philosophy for their comment, and will be most grateful for your reply at your earliest convenience, for we plan to correlate these comments in the earliest possible issue.”

On Aug. 15, 1958, Clark simply responded:

“Dear Mr. Kucharsky, Aside from the military implications, it seems to require some stretching of the imagination to see any new religious or moral significance in the attempt to ‘shoot the moon.’ Yours sincerely, Gordon H. Clark”

Carl Henry then got into the mix writing to Clark in an undated letter:

“Gene Kucharsky, our news editor, tells me that he recently asked for fifty words of commentary on the projected U.S. shot to the moon. Your own comment was a bit facetious, indicating that you could find no special significance in the event. That may be, and perhaps you want to leave it that way. But I thought I should indicate that we have gotten some mighty good quotes from most of the folk that have been approached, and that Karl Barth, among others, has sent in a pointed comment.”

Finally, on Sept. 15, 1958 Clark wrote back to Henry:

“Dear Carl, My previous remarks on shooting the moon were not exactly facetious; but here is another statement and you may choose which to use. … I appreciate the publicity you furnish me in this way, and your many other favors, but honestly I believe this moon business is rather silly. … The attempt to “shoot the moon” has no more religious significance that any other great scientific advance. To suppose so is on a level with interpreting the Apocalypse by the morning newspaper. God’s first command to Adam contained the injunction to subdue nature. Shooting the moon therefore is a divinely appointed task. Unfortunately, however, the ungodly are generally reputed to have obeyed this commandment more successfully than devout Christians have.”

Moving on then to the book at hand, we find that in the foreword John Robbins favorably quotes Bertrand Russell giving a skeptical statement on science:

“All inductive arguments in the last resort reduce themselves to the following form: ‘If this is true, that is true: now that is true, therefore this is true.’ This argument is, of course, formally fallacious. Suppose I were to say: ‘If bread is a stone and stones are nourishing, then this bread will nourish men; now this bread does nourish me; therefore it is a stone, and stones are nourishing.’ If I were to advance such an argument, I should certainly be thought foolish, yet it would not be fundamentally different from the argument upon which all scientific laws are based.” (p. xi)

To identify the fallacy, induction “affirms the consequent.” That Clark held this as well is seen his A Christian View of Men and Things where he writes,

“A closer examination of the logic of verification should be made. In the example above, the first veterinarian probably argued: If bacteria cause milk fever, Lugol solution will cure; the disinfectant does cure it; therefore, I have verified the hypothesis that bacteria cause milk fever. This argument, as would be explained in a course on deductive logic, is a fallacy. Its invalidity may perhaps be more clearly seen in an artificial example: if a student doggedly works through Plato’s Republic in Greek, he will know the Greek language; this student knows Greek; therefore, he has read Plato’s Republic. This is the fallacy of asserting the consequent, and it is invalid whenever used. But it is precisely this fallacy that is used in every case of scientific verification.” (p. 211)

Similarly in the present book, Clark writes,

“The given hypothesis implies certain definite results; the experiment actually gives these results; therefore, the hypothesis is verified and can be called a law. Obviously, this argument is the fallacy of asserting the consequent; and since all verification must commit this fallacy, it follows that no law or hypothesis can ever be logically demonstrated.” (p. 71)

Something better must be found for knowledge.

Robbins writes, “Christianity, of course, is not dependent upon induction, experimentations, observation, or experience; its method is revelation and rigorous deduction from the revealed propositions, for it is only through revelation that truth can be obtained.” (p. xi) “Science is false, and must always be false. Scripture is true and must always be true.” (p. xii)

Introduction

This study “traces the history of science from older theistic construction to more recent anti-religious positions.” In this Clark wants to “attempt to say what science is: an attempt in other words, to sketch a philosophy of science.” (p. xv) “This monograph will divide the history of science into three chapters, corresponding to three scientific eras characterized largely by their divergent views as to how a body moves.” (p. xvi)

1. Antiquity and Motion

The first aim of this chapter is to bring the difficulties of motion to light. Motion is usually taken for granted, but what is motion? “It presents some peculiar puzzles.” (p. 1)

The first of these puzzles which Clark presents are Zeno’s paradoxes. How can an object move from one point to another when there are an infinite number of points to cross over between any two points? Infinity cannot be exhausted. But perhaps, as Clark notes, “there are many examples where the collective all has qualities quite different from the distributive each.” (p. 5) Perhaps Zeno was mistaken “because he insisted that a moving body must pass every point, when as a matter fo fact, it need only pass all of them.” (p. 6) Clark however does not commit himself to this solution.

Next is “the Heraclitean Flux.” For Heraclitus “all things flow.” Nothing remains at rest; everything changes. But “If all things change, if nothing remains at rest, what follows?” (p. 7.) “The possibility of intelligible speech presupposes the existence of entities that remain unchanged for some finite time; and conversely a theory of universal change makes speech and knowledge impossible.” (p. 8) “If a thing is changing, it does not exist; or, to generalize, if everything is changing, nothing exists.” (p. 9) “Universal change implies universal non-existence. And this implies that the changing is unreal and reality is unchanging. Why, this sounds like Zeno all over again!” (p. 9)

Then there is a section on Aristotelianism. So that knowledge might be possible Aristotle concludes that something must exist that does not change. In every case of motion something must remain unchanged during the change. “Motion then presupposes an unchanged substratum.” (p. 10) Clark notes that “some Christian theologians, surprisingly enough, have advanced a theory called continuous creation.” (p. 11) That he calls it surprising indicates that Clark did not accept such a theory; there being only one creation in the Scriptures which then, as the Westminster Larger Catechism states of the creatures at least, God preserves and governs. For Democritus motion is assumed; it is an ultimate brute fact. While he sought to explain each motion, Aristotle believed it possible to explain motion in general. He rejects mechanism and defends teleology. “One may indeed suppose that natural objects, such as trees and rocks, are at least as self-evident as motion. In fact, since motion is always the motion of some such objects, since therefore the objects are logically prior to the motion, why is it not better to begin with them than with it?” (p. 12) “Nature, for Aristotle, is a principle of rest and motion, immanent in these bodies per se.” (p. 13) Aristotle defines motion as “the actuality of the potential qua potential.” “Potentiality is a source of motion.” His definition is fraught with circularity. “Aristotle defined motion in terms of potentiality, and … he is defining potentiality in terms of motion.” (p. 16) “Circularity, therefore, has not been avoided, and we still do not know what motion is.” (p. 16)

2. Newtonian Science

In a paradigm shift Sir Isaac Newton mechanistic theory overtook Aristotle teleological one. But “What did he think of the nature and purpose of science?” (p. 27)

The heliocentric model of Copernicus was mathematically simpler, but no more accurate, than the former theory of epicycles. But what makes the planets move? Is “gravity” any better an answer than the occult qualities of the medievalism? “It was inconceivable to Newton that one body could affect another body without physical contact.” (p. 33) “Newton’s final word on the subject was that he did not know what the cause of gravity is.” (p. 33) “What is meant by scientific explanation?” (p. 34) “If we ask a person why a stone, when dropped, falls to the ground and he replies, ‘Oh, that is because of gravity,’ has he explained anything at all?” (p. 35) “This law as applied to freely falling bodies is that the body falls with an acceleration of thirty-two feet per second per second. Now, to substitute the law itself for its name, the question, ‘Why does a stone fall? is answered by saying that it falls because it falls with an acceleration of thirty-two feet per second per second. But how does a statement of the rate of the fall explain what makes the stone drop in the first place, and how does the rate, ever so carefully measured explain what makes the stone fall constantly faster? Does it not become clear upon reflection that the law of gravitation is not an explanation? It explains neither the fall of the stone nor the revolution of the planets.” (p. 35-36) Here, philosophy comes in to the picture. “A statement of fact is not an explanation. It is the very thing that needs to be explained. Viewed in this light, Science explains nothing.” (p. 36) “The necessity of non-scientific or non-experimental principles becomes all the clearer.” (p. 38)

“Perhaps the main difference,” Clark writes, between Aristotle and modern scientists, “is that modern scientists experiment on principle whereas the ancients only observed, or at most experimented on a very small scale without any definite plan. Today’s scientist does not sit and wait for some natural event to happen by chance. He deliberately does something.” (p. 40) “In ancient physics mathematics was largely unused; but mathematics is the soul, or should one materialistically say the ‘main-spring,’ of modern science.” (p. 41) “Nothing contrary to mathematics could possibly occur.” (p. 42) This is the theory of mechanism. Man becomes a machine, souls are not needed, and neither is God. Mechanism “is a method which depends on quantitative measurement and disregards qualities.” (p. 48) “… red and blue, sweet and sour, loud and soft, hot and cold do not really exist.” (p. 49) “Instead of being actually in the bodies, red and sweet and hot are merely reactions that occur in the mind of a sensitive organism.” (p. 49)

Reaching a section of criticism the reader finds Clark arguing “the processes of science as actually carried on in the laboratories do not justify the conclusion that the laws of mechanics describe how nature works. Newtonian laws never were discoveries pure and simple. Contrary to Carlson, these laws do not exclude all non-observational and non-experimental authority. At best, scientific law is a construction rather than a discovery, and the construction depends on factors never seen under a microscope, never weighted in a balance, never handled or manipulated.” (p. 57) Clark then provides examples. Mechanism proves to be a choice rather than a discovery.

3. The Twentieth Century

Scientists in the twentieth century are “more willing to admit that science does not discover absolute truth.” (p. 63) “The revolution in science is not a mere addition of newly discovered laws to the laws previously discovered, but rather is a rejection of the earlier laws and their replacement with different laws.” (p. 63-64) Straight-line motion does not exist as there is no fixed point in the universe to compare the motion to. Science is shown to be in a self-contradictory state in believing light to once be a particle and then a wave; two theories that cannot both be true. “Science changes with ever-increasing rapidity.” “What is needed now is not so much a new science, but a new philosophy of science. And attempts in this direction are not lacking.” (p. 72)

Following sections on operationalism and skepticism, Clark concludes “Science then must not be regarded as cognitive, but rather as an attempt to utilize nature for our needs and wants.” (p. 93)

Postscript: The Limits and Use of Science

This section, reprinted from a 1978 essay, is an addition to the book in the 2nd edition. It essentially repeats material and positions already stated in the chapters of the book.

Of biographical interest, here Clark notes “the law against elderly people with arthritis in their fingers that prevents them getting indocin in easily opened bottles.” It was this drug, indocin, which ultimately led to Clark’s death as it destroyed his liver over many years of use.

While the original cover of the book is show above, these also have been used:

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For the previous review in this series see here.

For the next review in this series see here.

GHC Review 13: William James

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William James, by Gordon H. Clark, Philadelphia: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1963, 47 pp.

This book, writes Gordon Clark, was “designed to help the defense and development of Christian theism.” As such it is one of many critiques he wrote against some particular philosophy. In that category we might also include his Dewey and Karl Barth’s Theological Method, and portions of Religion, Reason, and Revelation, Philosophy of Science and Belief in God, Historiography Secular and Religious, and Behaviorism and Christianity among other volumes.

The original of William James was a short book, only 47 pages, written for the Modern Thinkers series of the International Library of Philosophy and Theology. Later it was printed with Clark’s Dewey in a combined volume. [Page references in this summary review will be from this 2nd edition, printed as William James and John Dewey (Trinity Foundation, 1995).]

Clark’s professor Edgar A. Singer (1873–1955) had studied under William James (1842–1910) at Harvard, and in fact was briefly an instructor in his psychology laboratory. James once called Singer his “best all around student” in his thirty years of teaching. Singer seems to have supported James’s philosophy of pragmatism at the University of Pennsylvania where he became the head of the philosophy department as well as Clark’s dissertation advisor. In writing against the philosophy of William James then, Clark shows a definite disagreement with his mentor Singer.

Before reading Clark’s book on William James it might be helpful to read the encyclopedia entries Clark wrote on William James and on his philosophy of pragmatism. There is also a section on James in Thales to Dewey, pages 500-508, where he is categorized among the contemporary irrationalists.

Even with these prerequisites, this book is a difficult read. Various philosophical topics come and go and unless the reader has previous knowledge of William James it is unlikely that he will follow the argument. Of all of Clark’s books, this might be the least likely to be recommended. A summary will here be attempted, but perhaps quite inadequately given my own difficulties in understanding the material.

1. Introduction

Clark notes that James’s style is intensely interesting. Of his many writings, the focus of the critique will be on James’s A Pluralistic Universe and his Pragmatism. In addition to criticism, “possibly there could emerge something more positive also.” (p. 4)

2. The Philosophic Background

James reacted against both the absolute idealism of Hegel and against mechanistic scientism. In common those two views are both forms of monism. “The one says that all is spirit; the others holds that atoms alone are real.” (p. 6) James instead looked to pluralism. The best description of this position comes from the next chapter where Clark writes of James, “He asserts that some things are utterly unrelated to and independent of some other things.” (p. 14)

3. A Pluralistic Universe

“James defines his terms: ‘Empiricism means the habit of explaining wholes by parts, and rationalism the habit of explaining parts by wholes.’” (p. 8) For James no other method of explanation than empiricism is open to us. Only parts are available to us, never the whole. James uses the term intimacy in relation to morality, but does not well define it. Clark writes, “James continues to base his pluralism on the vague principle of intimacy.” (p. 12) Clark argues that James’s philosophy hit an impasse (that James himself was aware of) which forced James to abandon either “psychology without a soul” or to abandon logic itself. Ultimately James found himself compelled to give up logic. James says that he did so, “fairly, squarely, and irrevocably.” (p. 21) Throughout the whole chapter Clark emphasizes James’s hatred of Christianity and consequent unwillingness to consider its proposals as a philosophic solution.

4. Pragmatism

James asserts that any concept means its practical consequences. All beliefs are really rules for action. Pragmatism, Clark notes, is basically a theory of morality. Like Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Durkheim, Dewey, and Ayer, James opposes the law of contradiction. As such his view, like theirs, is left without rational foundation. “No reason exists for agreeing with them.” (p. 44) “James’s position, so it would seem—and pragmatism as a whole wherever accepted—has no base other than personal preference.” (p. 48) “He has no criterion for distinguishing good from evil.” (p. 48) With thus nothing to recommend it, surely Christian theism is preferable to pragmatism.

For the previous review in this series see here.

Sermon on Romans 6:1-13 – “Walk in Newness of Life”

Sermon on Romans 6:1-13 – “Walk in Newness of Life

November 25, 2018 at Dillingham Presbyterian Church

I. Review

In chapter 5 Paul had argued that we are to be assured of our salvation in Jesus Christ, and that the forgiveness we have in Christ is far greater than the sin we have in and with Adam.

Paul is so positive here—so encouraging—that he feels the need to immediately—in our passage from Chapter 6—he feels the need to immediately quash an error that some might have in their minds after having heard his gospel.

Paul had taught in Romans 5:20, “Now, the law came in to increase the trespass, but where sin increased, grace abounded all the more.” (REPEAT: “where sin increased, grace abounded all the more.”)

Having preached this great news of the Gospel—that however bad you have sinned, there is forgiveness in Christ—having taught this in many places, from city to city, Paul knew what the common response would be from those who oppose him. And they would respond, “Are you saying that I should sin more so that God can more show how gracious He is?”

II. Deductions/Inferences

Addressing this error, Paul asks rhetorically, “Are we to continue in sin that grace may abound?” [REPEAT: Are we to continue in sin that grace may abound?”]

That is, should we sin more so that there will be more grace? Should we keep on sinning since God will forgive us anyways?!

And he answers: By no means!

The statement of Paul’s opponents is a terrible error. And it is by this error that even today some have thought that having once said a prayer to Jesus as God that they need not continue to live for Him. They might say, “If I’m saved by Grace, then I can live my life however I want to!”

But, as is Paul’s contention, we are not saved in order to be then left alone in a world of sin, but rather our salvation continues to a sanctification, a walking in the newness of life.

Paul is not the only Scriptural writer who confronts this antinomian error. Jude, verse 4, explains that he (Jude) was also writing against this error. Jude says that certain ungodly people “pervert the grace of our God into sensuality.” [REPEAT: certain ungodly people “pervert the grace of our God into sensuality.”] This is the same problem Paul is addressing.

Paul asks rhetorically, “Are we to continue in sin that grace may abound?”

By no means!

This is a perversion. It is an invalid deduction, a false inference.

A. Invalid inferences

By invalid inferences many errors arise in theology and indeed in all subjects of life.

Consider:

If it is good to help those in need, should we favor policies that cause everyone to be needy, so that there will then be more opportunities to do good?!

Or, consider:

If it is healthy each day to drink a gallon of a water, is it healthier to each day drink 25 gallons of water?

Of course not. These are invalid inferences.

Likewise, Paul is arguing against an invalid inference. God forgives sins, but this is not an invitation to sin more!

Invalid inferences are the root cause also of many theological problems.

For example, from the Biblical truth that we are responsible for our sins, some have invalidly inferred that man, in this present life, is able not to sin. I like to say “responsibility does not mean ability.” [REPEAT: responsibility does not mean ability.”]

Others have erred in thinking that because God alone causes the conversion of sinners, that man should not even preach!

These are terrible errors, caused by invalid inferences.

Because such errors of invalid inference are so commonly made, some have desired that no attempts at deduction be allowed at all. That is, they would prefer that we stick strictly to the text of the Scripture for all of our theological knowledge.

B. Valid Inferences

But, we should not, to use that proverbial saying, “throw the baby out with the bath water.”

Just because invalid inferences occur from time to time, this does not mean that all inferences are invalid.

We should reject the invalid, while we accept the valid.

The Westminster Confession of Faith tells us:

“The whole counsel of God concerning all things necessary for his own glory, man’s salvation, faith and life, is (1) either expressly set down in Scripture, or (2) by good and necessary consequence may be deduced from Scripture.”

That is, the confession tells us that we are not limited in our knowledge to only those exact things which the Scriptures tell us, but we can combine, arrange, and compare what the Scriptures tell us in order to understand more of God’s revelation to us. So long as this is done properly.

Jesus himself made such inferences. He saw and explained a proper implication of the Scriptures when he was talking with the Sadducees about the Resurrection.

Recall that it was the Sadducees who did not believe there would be a resurrection. The Pharisees believed in the resurrection, but the Sadducees did not.

And the Sadducees tried to trick Jesus. They came to him and asked:

“Teacher, Moses wrote for us that if a man’s brother dies, having a wife but no children, the man must take the widow and raise up offspring for his brother. 29 Now there were seven brothers. The first took a wife, and died without children. 30 And the second 31 and the third took her, and likewise all seven left no children and died. 32 Afterward the woman also died. 33 In the resurrection, therefore, whose wife will the woman be? For the seven had her as wife.” [Luke 20:28-33 ESV]

Jesus answered by inferring a solution from multiple Scriptural passages. He answered,

“The sons of this age marry and are given in marriage, 35 but those who are considered worthy to attain to that age and to the resurrection from the dead neither marry nor are given in marriage, 36 for they cannot die anymore, because they are equal to angels and are sons of God, being sons of the resurrection. 37 But that the dead are raised, even Moses showed, in the passage about the bush, where he calls the Lord the God of Abraham and the God of Isaac and the God of Jacob. 38 Now he is not God of the dead, but of the living, for all live to him.” [Luke 20:34-38 ESV]

This is Jesus’ inference: Because God is the God of Abraham and of Isaac and of Jacob, and because God is a God of the Living, therefore Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob—men who once died—are now alive! And if they have gone from death to life, then there is a resurrection.

Jesus’ conclusion is true. And he has shown the error of the Sadducees. There is indeed a resurrection. And in this example Jesus has shown that we can, by good and necessary consequence, properly deduce certain truths from Biblical truths.

C. Back to Paul

But not all inferences are valid. To the rhetorical question, “Are we to continue in sin that grace may abound?” Paul answers, “By no means!” But he does not merely negate the invalid conclusion, he argues against it. He asks in turn:

(1) How can we who died to sin still live in it?

and

(2) Do you not know that all of us who have been baptized into Christ Jesus were baptized into his death?

He uses the very means of expression that Jesus himself used: “Do you not know?” [REPEAT: Do you not know?] Have you not read the Scriptures?

When we then look at the broader context of this passage ( Romans 6:1-13) we see that the central doctrine is Union with Christ. [Repeat: Union with Christ.]

Regarding this union, Paul tells us that:

(1) the believer has been baptized into Jesus Christ,

(2) has been baptized into his death,

(3) buried with him by that baptism into death,

(4) but also raised to a new life with him in resurrection.

Each of these are a union. Baptized into Jesus Christ, baptized into his death, buried with him by that baptism, and raised to a new life with him.

Along the whole line the believer is united to Christ.

And it is this doctrine of the union with Christ by which Paul proves the error of those who would say we should sin more. How can we sin more when we have been brought into a new life through union with Christ? If anything, we should sin less.

III. Union with Christ.

Let’s look more at this doctrine of union with Christ.

Now, in the first five chapters of Romans, Paul focuses on the doctrine of justification. Here in chapter 6, a major change occurs; the focus changes from justification to sanctification. But, both justification and sanctification can be put under the heading of “Union with Christ.”

A. Luther –justification.

Martin Luther so focused on justification that some have thought he overlooked sanctification. For Luther justification was rightly the most important teaching of Scripture. And he wanted to make sure that no doctrine of works snuck into the equation. He wanted to keep the discussion on the point of God’s grace to us in justification, and he quite limited any discussion on sanctification and the good works that are to flow out of the Christian life. Because of this, I even once saw a Lutheran—with self-deprecating or ironic humor—wear a t-shirt with the message printed on it: “Weak on sanctification.” Luther, of course, did not totally ignore sanctification. But at times it might seem lost in his strong emphasis on justification.

B. Calvin – Union with Christ – justification leading to sanctification.

John Calvin, on the other hand, had a different central focus in his theology. For Calvin the central doctrine was not so much justification, but Union with Christ. It is then from our Union with Christ that both justification and sanctification are understood.

We’ve seen this idea of Union with Christ already in previous passages in Romans. Recall that in chapter five, there was the doctrine of federal headship. And as Jesus is our federal head, our representative, we are united to him.

In the Gospels, Jesus had taught we are the sheep and he is the shepherd. Even more closely our union with Christ is described as “He is the vine, we are the branches” and “He is the head of the body (of us believers in) the church.” We are united with Christ.

From our union with Christ, we know that: where He goes, we go.

So Paul says we

(1) We are united to him in baptism (vs. 3, 4)

(2) We are united in His death.

(3) And so we are also united in His resurrection.

(4) And we are united in life.

This seems to be the pattern, the literary technique Paul uses in the passage: 14 times in these verse he uses the words “die, dead, or death” and another 7 times he uses the words “life, live, lives, or alive.”

The point is that in our union with Christ we are united to him in both His death and His new life. And that should give us great hope, because as Paul says “we shall certainly be united with him in a resurrection like his.” For Paul it is certain; salvation is assured.

C. Dead to sin and alive in Christ

So Paul says “consider yourself dead to sin and alive to God in Jesus Christ.”

But what does this mean? “Dead to sin.” What does it mean to be dead to sin?

John Calvin explains that to be dead to sin means to be delivered from its power as a master, to be delivered from the servitude or bondage to sin.

The Christian life then is not one in which we are completely perfect and without sin, but rather it is a struggle against sin rather; not a desire for it. Paul, in the next chapter, Romans 7:14 admits that he does not understand his own actions; that he still sins. He says “I do not do what I want, but I do the very thing I hate.” Paul, the apostle, the great Christian leader remained a sinner even after being justified in Jesus Christ. You too, even though you have been justified by Jesus Christ remain a sinner.

Our sanctification is never complete in this life. We will always be “working it out with fear and trembling.” This is not to glory in our sin, but to give you assurance that even though you sin and continue to sin, you are united with Christ and will, like Paul, certainly have a resurrection to life just as Christ did.

D. Present yourself as one as those who have been brought from death to life

And so Paul says also “present yourselves to God as those who have been brought from death to life.”

The transition is in Jesus Christ. You were dead to sin; you are now alive. So do not go back to sinning, to death, that grace may abound, but realize that you have been brought from death to life, and live accordingly. Walk in a newness of life. Have joy in what Christ has done for you, for your salvation, and live a sanctifying life not to merit salvation but to praise God for the salvation you assuredly have.

Our union with Christ has brought us from death to life. [REPEAT: Our union with Christ has brought us from death to life.] Therefore, do not live as one who is dead, but live as one who has a newness of life.

III. Walk in Newness of Life

So I’ve talked about the importance of valid inference, and the doctrine of the Union with Christ. But there is a third point which is the central direction of the passage. That is, Paul’s admonition to “Walk in newness of life.”

This is a result of the union we have with christ. We are to walk in newness of life leading to our sanctification.Whereas justification is an instantaneous declaration of pardon, sanctification is a process of being made holy. Justification is a one time occurrence, but sanctification is something to be worked out with fear and trembling. It is a continuous walking in the newness of life, being guided by the Holy Spirit who works in us both to will and to do.

This is our purpose now that we have been united with Christ. Let us walk in newness of life.

2 Corinthians 5:17 reads: “If any man is in Christ, he is a new creation. The old has passed away; behold, the new has come.”

And so I must ask. And you must consider:

Is this a characteristic of your life? Are you a slave to sin, or a slave to Jesus Christ and his righteousness? Are you walking in newness of life, or are you held captive by the sin of this world?

If you are united to Christ then you should be walking in newness of life.

But what exactly does this mean? What does it mean to walk in newness of life?

I’ll try to answer that in the second of two practical applications.

APPLICATION # 1. Expect Objections to this teaching.

First, lets look at an application from this passage from the objections themselves.

The application is this: If you preach what Paul preaches, you should expect to hear the objections he heard. [REPEAT: If you preach what Paul preaches, you should expect to hear the objections he heard.]

The objections Paul addresses are objections that just cannot or will not be raised against false doctrine. Nobody says to the Roman Catholic, or the proponent of Federal Vision theology, no one says to them, “Should we then sin so that grace may abound?” because they do not teach Sola Gratia, salvation by God’s grace alone. This objection only makes sense in the context of sovereign grace.

Nor, could one say to the proponent of these views that which was said to Paul in Romans 9:19 – “You will say to me then, ‘Why does he still find fault? For who can resist his will?’”

This objection too is only only are possibly against the teaching of salvation by God’s grace, without any effort of man.

This confirms what we have always taught. Salvation is a gift of God. So expect opposition when you contend for that point. And expect the same objections that Paul heard.

APPLICATION # 2. Answering How do I walk in newness of life?

Now to the final application: If you are united to Christ then you should be walking in newness of life. But what exactly does this mean? What does it mean to walk in newness of life?

Later in the passage Paul explains what this looks like. He says: “ present yourselves to God as those who have been brought from death to life, and your members to God as instruments for righteousness.”

First, Present yourself to God. Do not try to impress your fellow man. Don’t do the right thing only when others are watching. But present yourself to God—who sees everything—as those who have been brought from death to life.

And as one who has been brought from death to life, you should be happy for sure, but also you should live not in deadly sin but in outflowing love.

Then finally, Paul then says to present “your members [the members of your body] as instruments for righteousness.”

God gave you all of the parts of your body. You are to use them for righteousness.

Consider your Eyes — What are you watching? What should you be watching?

Consider your Ears – What are you listening to? What should you be listening to? Do you listen to others? A great teacher of mine would always say: “Listen with your Eyes, Ears, and Brain.”

Consider your Arms. Are you landing blows on other people? Figurative blows, and not physical ones I hope!

And consider your Feet – Where are you going? What places should you avoid going to? Where are you not going enough? Walk in newness of life. If you are standing still, you’re not walking. If you are not producing Christian fruit, are you really a Christian tree as you suppose?

Do not use your bodily parts for wickedness but for good. Struggle against sin. Do not give in, for you have a new life in Christ. Let us walk in that newness of life, praising the Lord and giving Him the glory. Amen.

GHC Review 12: Karl Barth’s Theological Method

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Karl Barth’s Theological Method, by Gordon H. Clark, Philadelphia: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1963, 2nd edition 1997, 277 pp.

Having written extensively on this book in the article “Gordon Clark Among Reformed Critics of Karl Barth” (See here) no further review shall here be attempted. My article on Clark and Barth is also available in two parts in the Trinity Review: 1 and 2.

For the previous review in this series see here.

GHC Review 11: Religion, Reason, and Revelation

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Religion, Reason, and Revelation, by Gordon H. Clark, Philadelphia: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1961, 2nd edition 1995, 264 pp.

Religion, Reason, and Revelation was the book—so I was once told by Linda Robbins—that brought her husband, the late John Robbins, to support and defend the philosophy of Gordon H. Clark. And this, she informed me, was after Robbins had read a large number of books from other reformed authors.

This book is one of Clark’s best, and should be among the first of his books to be recommended.

Chapter 1: Is Christianity a Religion?

This chapter shows the importance of clearly defining one’s terms whether in theology or any other subject. To answer the question “Is Christianity a Religion?” one has to know clearly what Christianity is, and what religion is. Answering the question proves to be difficult. The attempt displays a number of key features of Clark’s philosophy including the importance and inevitability of presuppositions.

It is this chapter which Clark presented in three lectures at Gordon-Conwell Seminary in 1981. Those lectures are available to listen to at the Trinity Foundation here: 1, 2, and 3. Transcripts of the same lectures are available at the Gordon H. Clark Foundation here: 1, 2, and 3. Further, I wrote a summary of the chapter here.

Chapter 2: Faith and Reason

Here Clark delineates 4 approaches to the relationship of faith and reason:

1. “Reason and Faith” – Roman Catholicism

This view begins with a proof of the existence of God, moves to the probability of special revelation, and then to the reasonableness of the Scriptures. Reason here is that which is demonstrable and empirical, while faith is of truths supernaturally revealed. Clark argues that the cosmological argument for the existence of God, best argued by Thomas Aquinas, is a fallacy. “It is not possible to begin with sensory experience and proceed by the formal laws of logic to God’s existence as a conclusion.” (p. 36) Clark gives a number of reasons to reject Aquinas’s argument. For one, he argues, it is circular because motion is used in the explanation of the concepts of potentiality and actuality and these concepts are used to define motion. And the argument is invalid because Aquinas uses the word exists in two different senses.

2. “Reason without Faith” – Modern philosophy from Hegel to Descartes

For the rationalists reason means logic. For the empiricists reason means sensation. But these philosophies, along with those of Kant and Hegel, have failed to justify knowledge. In despair, one is lead to the next category which abandons reason.

3. “Faith without Reasons” – Mysticism, neo-orthodoxy, Nietzsche, and instrumentalism.

Dionysius the Areopagite, a fifth century Christian Neoplatonist placed a realm above reason. In this realm knowledge is impossible because the unity of the Neoplatonic One prevents even the dualism of subject and predicate, elements basic to knowledge. Clark then includes the Zwickau Prophets and even some twentieth century fundamentalism as advocates to a certain extent of faith without reason. Neo-orthodoxy, Karl Marx, and Soren Kierkegaard, each having roots in post-Hegelianism also fit the bill. For Nietzsche there is even “no such thing as mind.” (p. 79) With the failure of secular philosophies, Clark concludes, “Only by accepting rationally comprehensible information on God’s authority can we hope to have a sound philosophy and a true religion.” (p. 87)

4. “Faith and Reason” – Christianity

On this view “reason and faith are not antithetical but harmonious” and “faith will be given an intellectual content.” (p. 87) In this section Clark, for the first time in his published books, explains his view of faith. “Exegesis will reveal that faith, Christian faith, is not to be distinguished from belief.” (p. 99) [For more on that subject see here and here.] The main current of Christianity, with its emphasis on creeds, has always been intellectualistic. (p. 103) “Reason may well be defined as logic. … When a Christian theologian is deducing consequences from Scriptural premises, he is reasoning—he is using his reason. … With this conception of reason there no longer remains any conflict between reason and faith.” (p. 110) Revelation is needed as the basis of a rational worldview. (p. 111)

Chapter 3: Inspiration and Language

The focus of this chapter is to defend verbal inspiration, innate logic, and literal language. Regarding biblical inerrancy Clark argues thatwe must look at what the Bible has to say about itself, and thatit has a clear doctrine of inerrancy. He writes, “This doctrine of inspiration is not something tenuously deduced from two or three isolated verses. On the contrary, it is the explicit, the repeated, the constant, the emphatic declaration of the Bible in all its parts.” (p. 115)

Then rather than an evolutionary view of the origin of language, Clark contends for a Biblical view. Here men, created in the image of God, have “the innate ability to think and speak.” (p. 135) “Augustine teaches that the presence of Christ the Logos endows all men with certain speculative or philosophic ideas as well. Communication therefore becomes possible because all men have these same ideas.” (p. 135) “The ideas of a special and peculiar theological language essentially different from language used in other subjects is, I believe, completely untenable.” (p. 137)

Linguistic theories that contend all is metaphor are mistaken as metaphor must ultimately rely on literal language.

Clark’s later books Language and Theology (1980) and God’s Hammer (1982) expand upon the topics of this chapter. Despite these writings, I believe Clark’s view of language is not discussed as often as other elements of his philosophy. Such would make a good topic for a thesis.

Chapter 4: Revelation and Morality

“Can humanism, having rejected revelation, provide a logical ground for any moral laws whatever? Can naturalism furnish a rational basis for any of the decisions of life?” (p. 152) Clark contends, “a rational life is impossible without being based upon a divine revelation.” (p. 152) He then looks at utilitarianism and Dewey and instrumentalism before positing his own theory of Christian ethics. In what has become the refrain in Clark’s writings, we might summarize the conclusion as “to avoid skepticism, we must appeal to revelation.”

Chapter 5: God and Evil

Finally, we come to the fifth and final chapter of this volume. This chapter (an expansion of Clark’s 1932 essay “Determinism and Responsibility”) was later broken off as its own book in 1996 as God and Evil, The Problem Solved. Both the essay and the chapter/book are of great importance in Clark’s system. The basic idea is that responsibility does not necessitate ability. Man is responsible for his sins even if he could not do otherwise. By defining the terms properly (the importance of which was emphasized in chapter 1) the problem of evil is found not to be a problem at all. The straightforward Calvinistic solution is shown to be superior to free will theodicies. This final chapter deserves to be read and re-read a number of times.

While the cover of the book shown above was the original design, other covers have been used in later printings including these:

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For the previous review in this series see here.

For the next review in this series see here.