GHC Review 17: The Philosophy of Gordon H. Clark

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The Philosophy of Gordon H. Clark, A Festschrift, Ronald H. Nash, ed., Philadelphia: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1968, 516 pp.

This book—a festschrift for Gordon H. Clark—consists of three sections. The first section is Clark’s Wheaton Lectures. The second is “exposition and criticism” from various Christian intellectuals. The third and final part consists of Clark’s replies to most of the critics.

Though the book was published in Clark’s sixty-sixth year of life and he was nearing—or was expected to be nearing—the twilight of his career, approximately two-thirds of his published works were yet to come in later years. Thus the contributors to The Philosophy of Gordon H. Clark who critiqued aspects of Clark’s philosophy did not have the advantage we have today of being able to access a larger corpus of his writings. Some of them still certainly knew Clark’s thought well from his writings then published or from their personal acquaintance with him.

The choice of critics is interesting in itself. None of Clark’s former students (Henry, Carnell, Lindsell, Jewett, Davis etc.) are included among the critics, though certainly some of his students were critical of his philosophy. Nor was there included any of Clark’s philosophical adversaries from the Orthodox Presbyterian Church; John Murray and Cornelius Van Til among them. The critics Nash chose to contribute to this volume were theologians no doubt, but more specifically most of them were philosophers; a category that would be stretched if those previously mentioned in this paragraph were to be included. Nash, who wrote one of the critiques in this volume, and Roger Nicole were two that found much in common with Clark; at least in their theology if not philosophy. While Van Til was not chosen, R. J. Rushdoony, Gilbert B. Weaver, C. Gregg Singer, and perhaps David H. Freeman in that order had significant affinities with his thought. The remaining contributors—Merold Westphal, Arthur F. Holmes, George I. Mavrodes, H. Harold Hartzlter, John T. Stahl, and John Warwick Montgomery—are ones that I’m not familiar enough with to accurately categorize.

I’m grateful to own a copy of this book which once belonged to and is signed by Howard Long, a friend of Gordon Clark’s. Howard’s widow Genevieve, now in her nineties, graciously donated this book to me along with many others from her library. This volume is relatively rare and usually sells for over $100. But there is no need to pay so much since all of the material of this volume is reproduced in the much less expensive Clark and His Critics, Volume 7 of the The Works of Gordon Haddon Clark published by the Trinity Foundation.

PART ONE, THE WHEATON LECTURES

The Wheaton Lectures are an expanded version of three lectures Clark gave in November 1965 at Wheaton College. The lectures are “Secular Philosophy,” “The Axiom of Revelation,” and “Several Implications.” This section of the book was later printed alone as An Introduction to Christian Philosophy (1993).

The Wheaton Record promoted the lectures with the following notices:

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The program then for the event is also extant:

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Secular Philosophy. (Wheaton Lecture I)

Clark notes the primacy of epistemology to metaphysics. He writes, “But before any type of metaphysics can be accepted, another and far more crucial question must be asked and answered. After someone asserts that the universe is nothing but atoms in motion, or that the universe is an Absolute Mind, or even that planets revolve around the sun, we may properly ask, How do you know? A theory that tries to explain how knowledge is possible is called an epistemological theory. This is where we must begin.” (p. 27)

In rejecting nominalism, and perhaps accepting a form of realism, Clark writes, “On one major base some sort of theory of Ideas stands impregnable. It is the necessity of similarities and classifications. Unless we can use concepts and talk of groups of things, philosophy would be impossible. If only individual things existed, and every noun were a proper name, conversations and even thinking itself could not be carried on. Neither the medieval nominalists nor Bishop Berkeley, who tried to get along without abstract ideas, were able to explain the reason why we classify men as men and horses as horses. … All thought and speech depend on classification, and no epistemology can succeed without something like the Platonic Ideas.” (p. 28)

Yet Clark refers to Platonism as a failure. The plausibility of Plato’s theory of reminiscence vanishes when Plato leaves mathematics for politics. “The slave boy was easily able to remember the square on the diagonal, but neither the Athenians nor the Syracusans could remember justice, not even with the lengthy stimulus of the Republic.” (p. 29) Further, “Man before birth may have been omniscient, but here below the Platonic cave in which man is a prisoner actually has no opening.”

Neither was Aristotle’s empiricism successful for “he must determine the categories and ultimately defend the law of contradiction.” In this Clark concludes that “Aristotle fails to arrive at the law of contradiction by his empirical method.” (p. 30) “Aristotle’s difficulties start, not with the secondary realities, but right at the beginning with sensory individuals.” Using an example of rocks, Mt. Blanca, and the Sangre de Cristo range Clark asks, “Which then is the individual: rock, mountain, or range? The question is embarrassing for the identification of individuals cannot be made on the empirical basis Aristotle adopts.” (p. 31) [It might be interesting to note that while Dr. Clark’s son-in-law Dwight Zeller did not start Sangre de Cristo Seminary in that range (or on that mountain, or on those rocks) until the 1970s, by the 1950s Zeller and his brother Paul had begun Horn Creek, a Christian camp there. And prior to the seminary being built Dr. Clark owned undeveloped acreage at the site.]

Clark gives a brief historical survey of secular epistemology concluding that it is a failure. This failure might “induce one to try a religious or revelational theory.” (p. 37) The reader should now see that these lectures follow Clark’s general approach of showing the skeptical futility of various philosophies and then presenting the Biblical alternative and its superior merit. But first this lecture continues with sections on science, ethics, and religion.

On science Clark notes that the uniformity of nature, upon which physics depends, cannot be established by empiricism. Even if the law of uniformity is granted, it alone is of no use in obtaining the contents of physics. (p. 38) Then also, Scientific laws depend on non-observational factors, including mathematical manipulations of the observed readings of an experiment’s measurements. The equations chosen to fit the data, are just that: chosen, for an infinite number of alternative equations may fit the data equally well. The theologian then, who argues from the second law of thermodynamics that the world cannot have existed from eternity cannot, upon pain of contradiction, also claim that miracles—events contrary to the supposed uniform laws of nature—occur. For consistency, creation is to be defended from the scriptures. “If science cannot establish a mechanistic metaphysics, neither can it establish the second law of thermodynamics.” (p. 42) Science, Clark concludes, as manipulation or operationalism is astoundingly successful, but regarded as a cognitive enterprise is a failure.

The critique of secular views continues to ethics. Here too, Clark contends, secular philosophy fails. He briefly dispatches Kantianism before addressing utilitarianism. As he has written elsewhere, a major problem is that the calculations required by utilitarianism are impossible. The “still greater difficulty” in calculating the greatest good of the greatest number is establishing the normative proposition in the first place; why ought man to seek the greatest good for the greatest number? This cannot be established by observation. Referencing Hitler and Stalin, Clark writes, “The greatest good of the greatest number is a principle for tyrants.” (p. 46) Among critiques of other philosophies, Clark writes that Existentialism fails of “establishing values or norms of conduct.” (p. 53) Existentialism’s freedom of choice, he contends, “totally unrestricted, empties life of all meaning.” (p. 54) Sartre “can command us to choose, as insistently as he wants, but he can give us no idea of what to choose.” (p. 54) Secular ethics, Clark concludes, “do not justify a single norm of conduct.” (p. 54)

Finally, on religion, Clark provides a short critique of humanism, writing that it is unable on its empirical principles to establish the values of friendship, truth, and beauty that it so cherishes.

The Axiom of Revelation. (Wheaton Lecture II)

This second lecture, on the Axiom of Revelation, is in my opinion Dr. Clark’s single most important writing. Nothing more clearly displays his own philosophy. Regarding this lecture I agree with Mary Crumpacker’s article “Clark’s Axiom, Something New?” (Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society 32, no. 2 (1989) 355-65) that it does not signify a change in Clark’s thinking, but presents in clearer detail what he had essentially been proposing all along; or at least since A Christian View of Men and Things in 1952.

Clark’s first conclusion, summarizing the previous lecture, is that “no construction in philosophy is possible without some sort of presupposition or a priori equipment.” Then, second, he concludes also, “secular philosophy has failed.” Therefore, he moves on to “A Suggested Axiom.”

As I consider this lecture to be of considerable value, the following quotes from it will be of some length.

“Now, a third conclusion, or at least an hypothesis for consideration may be proposed. It is that revelation should be accepted as our axiom, seeing that other presuppositions have failed.” (p. 59) “That revelation should be accepted without proofs or reasons, undeduced from something admittedly true, seems odd when first proposed. It will not seem so odd, however, when the nature of axioms is kept in mind. Axiom whatever they may be and in whatever subject they are used, are never deduced from more original principles. They are always tested in another way.” (p. 59)

“If a philosopher ponders the basic principles of Aristotle, Kant, or even Sartre, he will do so only by considering how well the author succeeds in solving his problems. If the problems are such as confront us all, and if the basic proposals succeed fairly well, a philosopher is inclined to give his assent to them. He cannot be strict logic be compelled to assent; he makes a voluntary choice, induced by the successful solutions of the problem. So too it should be with Christian revelation as an axiom. We must ask, Does revelation make knowledge possible? Does revelation establish values and ethical norms? Does revelation give a theory of politics? And are all these consistent with one another? We can judge the acceptability of an axiom only by its success in producing a system. Axioms, because they are axioms, cannot be deduced from or proved by previous theorems.” (p. 59-60)

“Those who dislike systematic philosophy, or system in general, for example, Kierkegaard, Sartre, and the Pietists, should be pressed to prove the virtue of disjointed truths. Can philosophy of time be disregarded in eschatology? Does behaviorism have bearing on religion and politics? Is it possible to speak about zoology without suggesting views on creation? Or, vice versa, can we assert creation without implying something about zoology? No, truth is not thus disjointed. It is systematic. And by the systems they produce, axioms must be judged.” (p. 60)

“Though not impossible, it is difficult to extort knowledge of a human being if he does not want to make a self-disclosure. A fortiori the notion that God can be known only through revelation seems to be essential to the very concept of God. Try to extort knowledge of God from an unwilling God is impossible if God is the supreme omnipotent Being. Therefore if we profess a God who is infinitely superior to man, we should not be surprised by the necessity of a revelation, if we are to know him. Or, to put the matter in other words, we are confronted with an alternative: we can either deny God and accept atheism, or we shall have to try revelation.” (p. 60)

“Natural theology means that the existence of God can be demonstrated from an observation of the world. Taking revelation in this sense as an axiom is no different from taking the world as an axiom. This understanding of revelation simply returns us to empiricism, beset as it is with all difficulties listed in the first lecture.” (p. 61)

“Acceptance of revelation as a presupposition does not require a denial of the a priori. … As a matter of fact, the doctrine of the image of God in man, a doctrine learned from Scripture, is an assertion of an a priori or innate equipment.” (p. 61-62)

“A systematic philosophy must take care of epistemology. Knowledge must be accounted for. It may be that the a priori forms cannot be listed: it may be that botany or some other subject remains obscure; but knowledge of some sort must be provided. Hence the postulate her proposed is not revelation as natural theology, not revelation as ineffable mysticism, not an inexpressible confrontation, but a verbal and rational communication of truths, the revelation of Scripture.” (p. 62)

“It is necessary to consider logic first, rather than botany or history, because the denial of the law of contradiction, or even the failure to establish it as a universal truth, was the downfall of secular philosophy.” (p. 64) “Christians generally, even uneducated Christians, understand that water, milk, alcohol, and gasoline freeze at different temperatures because God created them that way. … It was God’s eternal purpose to have such liquids, and therefore we can say that the particulars of nature were determined before there was any nature. Similarly in all other varieties of truth, God must be accounted sovereign. It is his decree that makes one proposition true and another false. Whether the proposition be physical, psychological, moral or theological, it is God who made it that way. A proposition is true because God thinks it so.” (p. 65-66)

After quoting the Bible and Charnock’s Existence and Attributes of God, Clark writes, “God’s knowledge depends on his will and on nothing external to him. Thus we may repeat with Philo that God is not to be ranked under the idea of unity, or of goodness, or of truth; but rather unity, goodness, and truth are to be ranked under the decree of God. It is hoped that these remarks on the relation between God and truth will be seen as pertinent to the discussion of logic.” (p. 66-67)

Quoting John 1:1 then, Clark famously if not controversially gives his translation as “In the beginning was Logic, and Logic was with God, and Logic was God. … In logic was life and the life was the light of men.” (p. 67)

“Not only do the followers of St. Bernard entertain suspicions about logic, but even more systematic theologians are way of any proposal that would make an abstract principle superior to God. The present argument, in consonance with both Philo and Charnock does not do so. The law of contradiction is not to be taken as an axiom prior to or independent of God. The law is God thinking.” (p. 67) “As there is no temporal priority, so also there is no logical or analytical priority.” (p. 68) “logic, the law of contradiction, is neither prior to nor subsequent to God’s activity.” (p. 68) “God and logic are one and the same first principle.” (p. 68)

“Scripture, the written words of the Bible, is the mind of God. What is said in Scripture is God’s thought.” (p. 69) [Because God is logical, so too are His words in the Scripture] “We maintain that the Bible expresses the mind of God. Conceptually it is the mind of God, or, more accurately, a part of God’s mind. For this reason the Apostle Paul, referring to the revelation given him, and in fact given to the Corinthians through him, is able to say, “We have the mind of Christ.” (p. 70) “As might be expected, if God has spoken, he has spoken logically. The Scripture therefore should and does exhibit logical organization.” (p. 70)

“The Scripture teaches that God created man in his own image. Although the first chapter of Genesis does not say explicitly what that image is, it implies that the image distinguishes man from the animals. From Colossians 3:10 we may infer that the image consists chiefly in knowledge, rationality, or logic. … Therefore the contention is that knowledge and rationality are the basic constituents of God’s image in man.” (p. 72-73)

“The Fall seriously damaged God’s image in man in all its parts. The intellect became depraved as well as the will. This is the doctrine of total depravity: no part or function of man is free from the effect of sin.” (p. 75) “While no act of will can be moral in the unregenerate man, it does not follow that no intellectual argument can be valid. True enough, fallen man is deceived by fallacious thinking, and he makes mistakes in arithmetic. But even the most hardened sinner sometimes constructs valid syllogisms and sometimes gets his bank account correctly balanced.” (p. 75) “Morally his [fallen man’s] every act is sinful … Therefore, in order not to assert that the image of God has been completely annihilated stress must be laid on its component of logic and reason.” (p. 75-76)

To avoid irrationalism, “we must insist that truth is the same for God and man. Naturally, we may not know the truth about some matters. But if we know anything at all, what we must know must be identical with what God knows. God knows all truth, and unless we know something God knows, our ideas are untrue. It is absolutely essential therefore to insist that there is an area of coincidence between God’s mind and our mind.” (p. 77)

“Religion, or to speak clearly, the Christian religion is not an affair of the emotions, at least no more so than politics and economics are, but fundamentally an acceptance of an intelligible message. The acceptance of this message is offered as a first principle, an axiom or postulate on which a superstructure of knowledge can be erected. Secular philosophy, with as well as without presuppositions, was shown to be impossible. Therefore, to put it as modestly as possible, the postulate of verbal revelation is at least worth trying.” (p. 87)

“The thousands of Biblical propositions need not be construed as an immense set of axioms. The peculiarity is in the opposite direction. What annoys Euclid and Spinoza is that this theology can operate on a single axiom. The single axiom is: The Bible is the Word of God. But though single, it is fruitful because this is embedded in it the law of contradiction, plus the nature of God, as argued above, plus the thousands of propositions thus declared true. On this latter point the form of deduction can be maintained. From the one axiom it follows syllogistically that such and such a sentence in Scripture is true because it is the Word of God.” (p. 88)

Several Implications (Wheaton Lecture III)

From Clark’s axiom or postulate this third lecture then seeks to provide some positive views on various subjects: history, politics, ethics, and theology or religion. Thus the failure of secular philosophy in these areas can be seen in stark contrast the success of revelation.

Clark then has a lengthy discussion of the views of the Dutch philosopher Herman Dooyeweerd; his fifteen “law-spheres” and “cosmic time.” Generally he finds Dooyeweerd often unintelligible and in the end inadequate. [This is the first Clark writes on Dooyeweerd, but additional articles on him come from Clark’s pen in the next few years after this volume.] Clark then moves on to “illustrate how the axiom of revelation can in a few instances be used to produce some concrete results.” (p. 102)

“Revelation then explains the significance of history. Without revelation there is no possibility of developing significance.” (p. 105) “The postulate of written or Scriptural revelation certifies events and gives their explanation. Explanations developed on any other ground are fanciful. Thus the postulate has this advantage.” (p. 107)

“A theory of civil power established by divine decree and promulgated by revelation avoids, as the secular theories cannot, the twin evils of totalitarianism and anarchy.” (p. 112)

On ethics, “The secular theories failed because there is no valid argument by which one can start from observable phenomena and reach and conclusion concerning obligation. When, however, the establishment of normative laws is placed in the hands of God, these secular attempts are seen to be as unnecessary as they are impossible.” (p. 113)

The final section on religion critiques irrationalism and argues in favor of the intelligible message of Christianity, the Good News.

Clark then summarizes the main thrust of his lectures: “Secular philosophy with our without presuppositions has been shown to be a failure. The verbal revelation of the Bible solves the problems of epistemology, history, ethics, and religion. It distinguishes truth from error. It preserves intelligibility. It banishes mysticism, emotionalism, and despair. And by it we receive the Reason of God, that is, God himself.” (p. 122)

Following Clark’s lectures, there was significant pushback from those philosophers in attendance. A Wheaton Record article commented “Intense dialogue resulted at last weekend’s philosophy conference as philosophers vigorously reacted to the rationalistic thought of Butler’s university’s Dr. Gordon Clark.”

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It may be valuable to address the comments in the Wheaton Record of those philosophers who attended the Wheaton Lectures, but for the present the purpose here of reviewing The Philosophy of Gordon H. Clark must continue.

TO BE CONTINUED … with PART TWO, EXPOSITION AND CRITICISM and PART THREE, REPLIES TO CRITICS