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GHC Review 44: The Incarnation

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The Incarnation, by Gordon H. Clark, Jefferson, MD: The Trinity Foundation, 1988, 78 pp.

The Incarnation was printed with a cover picture of a lady holding a baby. Could this be a representation of Mary and the baby Jesus? Could be. I don’t know what they looked like. So as not to conflict with Westminster Larger Catechism, Q&A 109, I have opted not to reproduce the image in this review.

I devoted Chapter 12 – “Persons, the Trinity, and The Incarnation” of The Presbyterian Philosopher to questions surrounding The Incarnation along also with Clark’s The Trinity. At the end of this review I’ll include the relevant material (minus footnotes) from that chapter.

First I wanted to note something else interesting in this volume that I do not recalling considering in previous readings. That is Clark’s denial God being infinite. (See Pages 55 to 64.) The only other place I recall Clark talking about God and “infinity” is in his theological examination in 1944. Anyways, I’m not presently understanding where he is going in this section. What does he mean by infinite? Perhaps he’s right that the Bible does not exactly ascribe the term “infinite” to God, but what is Clark’s positive argument against the idea? And how does this relate to the incarnation?

This is not the only difficulty in the book. The whole subject gets one’s mind spinning. Clark notes, “The real difficulty with the Incarnation is its real difficulty.” (p. 67) And there are a lot of difficulties packed into these short 78 pages.

For the previous review in this series see here.

 

The Incarnation (Excerpt from The Presbyterian Philosopher)

In addition to working to better understand the doctrine of the Trinity, Clark set his sights on explaining the incarnation of Christ. Debates about the nature of Jesus Christ consumed the Christian church through much of the first seven centuries following Christ’s death. Was Christ God? Was he man? Was he both? Various attempts to solve this question were rejected as heresies in the early Christian church. These heresies included docetism (that Christ’s human form was merely an illusion), Arianism (that Christ was only a man and not God), Apollinarianism (that Christ had a human body but only a divine, not human, mind), Nestorianism (that Christ was two distinct hypostases or persons: the Logos and Jesus of Nazareth), Eutychianism (that the human and divine natures of Christ were mixed into a single new nature), and Monothelitism (that Christ had both the nature of God and man, but only one will). The condemnation of these various teachings as heretical was made official through a number of church councils. The First Council of Nicea (AD 325) produced the Nicene Creed, which stated that Jesus Christ is of one and the same substance as God the Father, rejecting both docetism and Arianism. The First Council of Constantinople (AD 381) rejected Apollinarianism, the Council of Ephesus (AD 431) rejected Nestorianism, the Council of Chalcedon (AD 451) rejected Eutychianism, and the Third Council of Constantinople (AD 681) denounced Monothelitism as heretical.

Despite the credal statements produced at the ecumenical councils of the church, Clark saw that ambiguity remained regarding certain aspects of the doctrine of the incarnation. Perhaps the best explanation of the doctrine of Christ was that of the “hypostatic union” formulated at the Council of Chalcedon. This doctrine stated that Christ is one person of two natures, one human and one divine, with the natures neither confused nor divided.Clark did not disagree with this formula so much as he simply criticized it for using vague language.For Clark, there were two major issues that needed clarification. The first problem, Clark believed, was that the council never clearly defined person. Secondly, he believed Christ’s human-ness was always presented in the Bible as total. In other words, Christ does not only have the nature of a man; he is a man.

To address the first problem, i.e. the vagueness of Chalcedon on the meaning of person, Clark again utilized his definition of personas “a composite of truths,” saying, “A man is what he thinks.”To address the second problem, that Christ must be present as an actual man, he argued that in order to be “fully human” as Chalcedon stated, a human must also have a mind, for without a mind a man would not be fully human. Having a mind, Jesus was therefore a human person. Thus Clark employed his definition of person to arrive at the conclusion that Christ was two persons, one fully human, and one fully divine.

Clark specifically critiqued the position that Christ was a divine person only, and not a human person. Clark wrote,

If Jesus was not a human person, who or what suffered on the cross? The Second Person [of the Trinity] could not have suffered, for Deity is impassible. One of the heresies of the early ages … was Patripassianism. Substituting a modal trinity for the three distinct Persons, the theory requires the Father to have been crucified. But to require The Second Person, as such, to suffer is equally impossible. The Westminster Confession describes him as “a most pure spirit, invisible, without body, parts, or passions” (II, 1). If then the Second Person could not suffer, could a “nature” suffer?

Clark’s theory of Christology, using the term “person” to describe both Christ as man and Christ as God, opened him up to criticism, with some alleging that he held to the heresy of Nestorianism. This charge he anticipated in his writings. Clark wrote, “Some unfriendly critics will instantly brand the following defense of Christ’s humanity as the heresy of Nestorianism.”Yet he dismissed the critique as unable to “be sustained either logically or historically.”

David Engelsma, however, of the Protestant Reformed Churches, who was “friendly” to Clark’s views on many other topics, still saw Clark’s view as Nestorian. In a review of Clark’s book on the incarnation, Engelsma wrote, “Clark’s doctrine is the boldest, most advanced Nestorianism, suffering, fatally, from the weaknesses because of which the church rejected Nestorianism—its failure to unite the two natures of the Savior and its inability to unify the work of redemption.”Engelsma answered Clark’s question about who died on the cross, saying, “The answer is, The person of the eternal Son of God suffered and died in the human nature.”

Clark, in fact, was opposed to Nestorianism. He had just written a few years prior to The Incarnation in his commentary on Philippians (written circa 1982) a statement sounding much more like the traditional Chalcedonian view: “We must insist that Christ was not a human person somehow associated with a divine person. …we must avoid Nestorianism.”And he noted that “Nestorianism faces worse difficulties” than the orthodox doctrine.Yet in the same book, Clark noted that the Westminster Larger Catechism explained that Christ took “to himself a true body and reasonable soul.” On this basis, that Christ took both a body and a soul, Clark asked, “Does not this make him a human person?”This may indicate the early development of views Clark later articulated in The Incarnation.

As Clark was writing the book, he was acutely aware of the dangers of Nestorianism and was engrossed in solving the problem of the doctrine of the incarnation. He wrote to John Robbins, “[An] extremely difficult problem is the doctrine of the Incarnation. I have been working on it constantly since moving here [to Sangre de Cristo Seminary], and have some 150 handwritten pages. I can alleviate or eliminate several impossibilities in the doctrine as usually stated; but it is hard to avoid Nestorianism. I write and sleep, and sleep and write, and sometimes eat.”Later that month Clark wrote again, “My MS [manuscript] on the Incarnation may have 230 handwritten pages. It needs perhaps 25 more as a good conclusion. But there are so many complications in the subject, that putting them all together in a conclusion is really a very difficult problem.”

How then was Clark’s later view not Nestorianism, if he came to hold that there are two persons in Christ? In addition to the fact that he explicitly denied the charges of Nestorianism, Clark held that the ancient theologians, Nestorius included, never defined person, and therefore did not have a clear, unified idea of what the term meant. Since Clark had defined person in a unique way, the claim that Clark held the same view as Nestorius (or his followers) cannot be sustained. Secondly, rebutting the charges of Nestorianism in Clark’s doctrine, Gary Crampton and Kenneth Talbot have written, “It should be noted that Gordon Clark does not separate the two persons of Christ, as Nestorians do; rather, he ‘distinguishes’ between them. It is important to understand the difference between ‘separation’ and ‘distinction.’”This idea of “distinct but not separate” applies in that Clark held there are two persons, but these persons are united in one Christ.

So Clark’s view was not Nestorianism, but was it correct? Or perhaps the question is better phrased: Is Clark’s formulation an improvement upon Chalcedon? Returning to Engelsma’s objection, is Clark’s view unable to “unify the work of redemption” in his “failure to unite the two natures?” In previous works Clark wrote: “[The] Chalcedonian doctrine is necessary to support the function of Christ’s mediatorial office,”and also, “… the incarnate Jesus has two wills, one divine, and one human; and yet even with a human will, and a ‘reasonable soul,’ he is not a human person. Nestorianism, with its assertion that Christ was two persons, though plausible on the ground of this psychology, is nonetheless on the ground of the mediatorial atonement, a heresy.”Can Clark be said to have changed his views on this subject, or merely his terminology? Crampton and Talbot, holding Clark’s positions, respond, “God is impassible and cannot suffer. Orthodox Christianity maintains that Christ suffered on the cross as touching His humanity, not His divinity.”

Because The Incarnation was published posthumously, Clark was not around to see his readers’ reactions to the book, nor to continue to discuss the theology or defend his position. For many, Clark’s defense of two persons in Christ, even if not intentionally Nestorian, sounded Nestorian. This somewhat soured his reputation. Coupled with the various other controversies Clark was involved in, this has made him appear to be a controversial figure, even one whose writings some choose to avoid.

There was an inevitable tension between Clark’s desire to have a standard (the Westminster Standards along with the early church creeds) and his desire to see improved formulations of certain doctrines, such as the doctrine of the incarnation. Improving the formulation and understanding of doctrine is critical to the “always reforming” (semper reformanda) directive of the Reformed faith, but avoiding philosophical speculation is equally crucial. Readers of Clark’s work should consider for themselves whether Clark toed the line or fell into speculation over the doctrine of the incarnation.

The very last extant letter written by Clark suggests that he felt a fair amount of frustration at not being able to fully resolve the difficulties the doctrine of the incarnation presented. At the same time it also leaves room to conclude that, had someone been able to show him a position better than his own, he would have gladly entertained their arguments. In this letter, of February 1985, he wrote to John Robbins, “Maybe I am all wrong, but I won’t admit it until my critics define substance, being, subsistence, essence, etc., as well as person and nature.”As evidenced by similar positions expressed in the final published manuscript of The Incarnation, Clark continued to grapple with these questions right up until his death, just two months after the February letter.

GHC Review 43: Predestination

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Predestination, The Combined Edition of Biblical Predestination and Predestination in the Old Testament, by Gordon H. Clark, Phillipsburg, NJ: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1987, 205 pp.

As the subtitle explains, this book is a combined edition of two of Clark’s previous publications. Here are my reviews of those publications:

Review of Biblical Predestination

Review of Predestination in the Old Testament

No additional attempt at a review will be made here.

For the previous review in this series see here.

For the next review in this series see here.

GHC Review 42: The Atonement

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The Atonement, by Gordon H. Clark, Hobbs, NM: The Trinity Foundation, 1987, 2nd edition 1996, 145 pp.

This is another volume that was originally a chapter in Gordon Clark’s systematic theology. Thus its publication date is about a decade later than it was originally written.

We find here that Clark approves of the “Covenant of Redemption” (p. 11-17) He writes, “such an agreement between the Father and the Son is by no means an obscure idea buried in one or two subsidiary phrases. On the contrary, the Scripture gives ample foundation to the doctrine.” (p. 13) And he then provides support. In a couple places Clark speaks of the Covenant of Redemption as being between the Father and the Son. Elsewhere (maybe O. Palmer Robertson? I’ve heard the Holy Spirit included in this covenant as well. It seems that Clark would agree, for he notes “1 Peter 1:2 also indicates a concerted plan in which the three persons of the Trinity all have a part.” (p. 16)

Clark then has a section on the Covenant of Grace. He notes, “The covenant with Noah may properly be viewed as an early form of the covenant of grace. God explained the covenant in fuller detail to Abraham.” (p. 19) In this section Clark provides a pithy critique of the errors of dispensationalism. This section is the lengthiest in Clark’s writings to address covenant theology, yet I don’t think there is any answer there to the question of “republication.” Still this quote is worth repeating:

“The Mosaic ritual, Paul explains, was a temporary arrangement because of the sins of the Israelites. It was to cease when the Messiah should come. Even during the Mosaic administration, the Abrahamic covenant was not disannulled, set aside, invalidated, or made of no effect. The Abrahamic covenant was operative all through the alleged dispensation of law. No one was ever saved by keeping the law. No one ever kept the law. Salvation, now, then, and always has been by grace through faith alone. Hence, from the fall of Adam there has been one, just one, continuing covenant of grace.” (p. 27)

In the section on “The Incarnation” we find one of Clark’s most quoted statements: “A paradox is a charleyhorse between the ears that can be eliminated by a rational massage.” (p. 32)

There is much of interest in this volume, but I was particularly drawn to the section on “The Vicarious Sacrifice” which is a defense of Substitutionary Atonement. Ever since I met someone at L’Abri who told me they deny this doctrine, I’ve been keen to understand better the Biblical view. Clark gives plenty of Scriptural support for it. (pp. 64 and 65)

Probably most of Clark’s readers are already Calvinists. So to an extent this book is preaching to the choir. But even a Calvinist can improve his understanding of the details. For non-Calvinists, I’d recommend reading Clark’s Biblical Predestination first and then The Atonement. You probably should read his Logic as well, and I always recommend Steele and Thomas’s Five Points of Calvinism, Defined and Defended.

I did have to laugh later in the volume when I came to Clark’s comment on John Murray:

“One must be careful when reading the works of John Murray. He has a remarkable control of the English language, is in most cases quite orthodox, but is sometimes deficient in logic. In addition to the example just cited, his booklet The Free Offer of the Gospel comes to a strange conclusion.” (p. 89)

Clark explains of that booklet written by Murray and Ned Stonehouse, “The two authors have used exegesis and argument in such a way as to produce a contradiction. But they are so sure of their arguments that they are unwilling to admit that they could have possibly made a mistake. This is not intellectual modesty. When one’s thoughts lead to contradiction, the logical and humble thing to do is to go back and find where the mistake occurred.” (p. 90)

In a section on traducianism, Clark gives Scriptural argumentation for the position. He writes, “Notes too that Genesis 46:26 speaks of ‘the souls that came with Jacob into Egypt, which came out of his loins.’” And, he notes, “When Even was taken from Adam’s side, there is no mention of he creation of a second soul. Eve totally came out of Adam (1 Corinthians 11:8).” (p. 113) “The most important argument for traducianism is based on Genesis 2:2, 3. ‘God … rested from all his work.’ ‘In six days the Lord made the Heaven and the Earth … and rest the seventh day’ (Exodus 20:11). ‘God rested from all his works (apo panton ton ergon)’ (Hebrews 4:4).” Creationism (of souls) has “the difficulty of thinking that God immediately creates sinful souls.” (p. 115) Throughout this section Clark refers to Charles Hodge’s opposition to traducianism and opposition realism. While Clark is then opposed to Hodge, he notes, “I consider Charles Hodge by far the best of all American theologians.” But, says Clark, “his Scottish common sense philosophy was fortified with too much usquebaugh before he imbibed it.” (p. 118)

The penultimate chapter on “The Sovereignty of God” is the lengthiest treatment in any of Clark’s writings of the idea of “necessity.” He argues not only that the method of salvation God chose was necessary, but that “Everything is necessary.” “Every detail is a part of the all-comprehensive divine decree. God foreordains whatever comes to pass.” (p. 132) Clark finds his defense for this necessitarianism in the immutability of God. He explains, “To suppose that anything could have been otherwise is to suppose that God could have been otherwise than he is. The salvation of the elect is part of the sovereign plan by which the universe goes on. God had to create–not because there was some power external to him, but because he is God. A God who might not create, or would not have created, is simply not the Biblical God.” (p. 133)

The final chapter then is a concise defense of limited atonement.

The cover of my copy of the book (the 2nd edition) is so uninspiring that I’ve chosen in this instance to include my desk as background to a picture of it. The desk at least cannot be less inspiring.

For the previous review in this series see here.

For the next review in this series see here.

GHC Review 41: Logical Criticisms of Textual Criticism

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Logical Criticisms of Textual Criticism, by Gordon H. Clark, Jefferson, MD: The Trinity Foundation, 1986, 49 pp.

Logical Criticisms of Textual Criticism grew out of Clark’s earlier work “Desultory New Testament Curiosities.” And, as I noted in the previous review, it was originally printed as an appendix in Clark’s commentary First and Second Thessalonians.

It seems that Clark got seriously interested in textual criticism only later in life.

In July of 1983 Clark noted to Greg Reynolds in a letter:

“I am analyzing Metzger’s methods in Textual Criticism. He has many invalid inferences + he frequently contradicts himself by insisting on certain evidences in one place but rejecting the same evidence in another.”

Then on 10/17/1983 Clark wrote to John Robbins:

“Among other things I have almost finished Desultory New Testament Curiosities. Part one is a series of typical misunderstandings of various verses. Most of this is quite elementary and might be welcomed by an average communicant member. Part two is a logical analysis of the methodology of contemporary textual criticism. I try to show that in genera it is (1) subjection, (2) inconsistent, and (3) fallacious. I do not do textual [criticism] myself; I stick to a logical analysis of the methodology. The two parts are largely independent of one another. Either could be published separately as a pamphlet.”

On 12/5/1983 Clark received a letter from Roger Lambert saying:

Dear Dr. Clark

Thank you for letting me read your manuscript on textual criticism. All of my training has been in the tradition of Westcott and Hort so it is hard for me to be sympathetic to your viewpoint. I also have the disadvantage of not having read Hodge, Farstad, and company. (Bergon I have read!)

Here’s my reaction:

1. I would like for you to state your purpose more clearly at the beginning. You do so on page 14, but after reading through the article my reaction as “tu quoque”. You seem to have shown the subjectivity of Metzger, et. al. By your own subjective comments.

2. Most of your arguments against the critics are not based on logic so much as on alternative hypotheses. Some of your hypotheses are reasonable, but certainly not compelling.

3. I am glad you think neither the KJV nor the TR represent the original text per se.

4. What is wrong with “dynamic equivalence”? Have Hodges, et cet. Explained your position. I rather like it (DE) and don’t think lev or kardia are well-translated by “heart” in many of their occurrences.

5. Am I not right in assuming from your epistemology that the whole discussion is “opinion” anyway?

Affectionately yours,

Roger Lambert

P.S. I’m sorry that I could not deal with individual details. I feel too much pressure to grade term papers.

On 3/31/1984 Clark wrote to Greg Reynolds:

“You mention textual criticism. I hope my treatise on the subject will be published. Hill’s book is not too good, mainly because he goes into other matters about which he knows very little. But Pickering is excellent! The New King James has followed Hodges + Farstadt’s Majority Text. This is not the Textus Receptus because the T.R. was based on less than 20 MSS. This text is based on maybe a hundred Byzantine MSS. Its critical apparatus is hard to decipher, but with the information in the Aland-Metzger notes, there is sufficient information.”

Finally, of relevant letters on the subject at hand, Clark received a letter from Theodore Letis:

Theodore P. Letis

Westminster Theological Seminary

Philadelphia, Pa. 19118

August 24, 1984

Professor Gordon H. Clark

The Trinity Review

Sangre de Cristo Seminary

Westcliffe, CO 81252

Dear Professor Clark:

While I have learned a great deal about you since embracing the Reformation Faith of Historical Protestantism and since arriving here at Westminster, because of my prior exposure to Professor Van Til’s approach to apologetics, I never really thought I would have an occasion to write you (I have your work Language Truth and Revelation as well as Reason Religion and Revelation and your history of Philosophy and have read portions of all of them). However, after having read your three part essay on Textual Criticism I am pleased as can be to call you an ally. Moreover, I saw clearly in your argument the value of logic in this field. You scored a point that I have been stressing for years and that is that students who have not necessarily been initiated into the mysteries of Text Criticism should nevertheless see it as their responsibility to subject this discipline to a close scrutiny to make certain that a naturalistic methodology is not giving the rest of the church the marching orders as to what is Scripture and what is not. I, too, have to admit that I am not text critic. Nevertheless, as an aspiring church historian I have felt the call to document an intellectual history of the discipline, either for a Th.M thesis or for a doctoral dissertation.

Allow me to offer some comments on your essay.

As a tutoral student of the late Dr. Edward F. Hills, whom I also consider my mentor to some extent, I learned a great deal about the history of the discipline within the modern era, since Dr. Hills studied under such men as Kirsopp Lake and Cadbury at Harvard while doing his doctoral work. Furthermore, so far as I can tell, he is the only Reformed Theologian in this century ever to gain the status of a text critic proper, and thus possess the requisite attainments to offer a modern integration of historic Reformed theology with the discipline (an area that Warfield failed miserably at, having fallen under the spell of Westcott and Hort). Hence, I have learned to take greater stock in the research, arguments and conclusions of Dr. Hills over the Baptist, dispensational Dallas school approach to the so-called “Majority Text.” This is not just a convenient dismissing of Hodge, Pickering, Farstad, Sturz, Robinson and Martin, because they have all contributed in unseating W&H. Rather, because of their orientation, in addition to their lack of recognized status in the field, it was obvious to me that they would not gain any ground in text critical circles, which is what they really had in mind, a turn-around in the discipline, based on naturalistic arguments alone. The enclose essay will better demonstrate what I am trying to say.

Your expose was masterful. The practical examples illustrated the problem as clearly as could be expected I only hope the seminary students that read this will really consider what you have shown. So many of them are infirmed by the intimidating influence that the name Bruch [Bruce] Metzger invokes (and well it should he has well earned the place as the most accomplished N.T. text critic in American in the 20th century). As the situation presently stands, to go against the modern consensus in this field, no matter how impressive the evidence or the arguments, on stands self-condemned for being so ill-informed as to oppose the established school. Hence, Pickering, van Bruggen and others are dismissed out of hand. This is most frustrating.

In your first part you mention 3000 discrepancies in the Gospels alone. By this did you mean “variants?” It is not clear what you intend here.

Concerning the number of patristic citations in this field, you speak in terms of “hundreds.” There are more like hundreds of thousands.

You refer to Burgon as a Bishop. He was a bit out of step with his own time to have ever merited such a title. His was a Dean but no bishop (Westcott was).

In mentioning Hills work as an “earlier” work it may leave the impression that it is no longer available. I have taken the liberty to send you a copy of the recent 4th edition (1984) which does not differ from the 3rd edition but for the cover and new Preface.

I quite agree with your judgment that the “excursion into the philosophy of science” is somewhat irrelevant to the topic. But Dr. Hills was a bit of an exile after turning from defending the Alexandrian text to defending the Byzantine text, giving up the notion of making an influence form within academia. Hence he attempted to show an historic, Reformation approach to the other sciences that eventually took over both textual criticism and Biblical Studies in general after the Enlightenment. Hence, his work is a mini-curriculum.

Again I want to stressed [stress] that you essay was most exciting to read and offered me a great deal of encouragement. It was well done and I know the time that you put into it.

Enclosed, please find a few essays that I have written since arriving here at Westminster. They will soon be published in a work that I am presently co-editing, to be titled: The Majority Text: Essays and Reviews in the Continuing Debate. If you have the time to read them over and offer some remarks I am sure that I would benefit from this. I suggest that you read them in order: Beza, Owen, Lewis, Introduction.

I look forward to hearing from you.

In the love of Christ,

Theodore P. Letis

P.S. I have a multi-media presentation where I try to bring this most important subject to the churches. To date of [I] have delivered these lectures in over 50 churches of every majory [sic] Protestant denomination. Perhaps the students at the seminary could benefit from such a lecture series. I am enclosing a program that will give you an idea of the content.

All of these sources have been referenced to benefit the reader of this post who has a considerable interest in textual criticism and Clark’s views on the subject. Now, having noted all of this, something of the book itself should be noted.

Clark argues that modern Bible translations often seem to make changes merely for the sake of change and these are not usually improvements. Yet, a number of comments show that he was by no means a King James Only proponent. He writes, for example, “One should not conclude from this that all the modern changes are bad. In some, even in many places, the Revised Standard Version is better English and more accurate in translation than the King James.” (p. 6)

Clark notes some writings by Jakob van Bruggen, Edward Hills, Zane Hodges, and Arthur Farstad, but argues that “perhaps the best production for immediate reading is Wilbur N. Pickering’s The Identity of the New Testament Text.”(p. 11)

Arguing against the textual critics’ preference of “weight” over number, Clark writes, “If a score or two score manuscripts have a single ancestor, it implies that a score or two score copyists believe that ancestor to be faithful to the autographs.” (p. 15) He continues, “But if a manuscript has not a numerous progeny, as is the case with B’s [Codex Vaticanus’s] ancestor, one may suspect that the early scribes doubted its value.” (p. 15)

Regarding the Pericope de Adultera (John 7:53 – 8:11) Clark writes, “It is doubtful that the original contained the verses because it is unlikely that so many scribes would have deleted it. On the other hand, if it was not in the original, how can one explain so many manuscripts that include it? … Just perchance the Apostle John himself wrote a second edition of his Gospel, adding the paragraph.” (p 39)

The majority of Logical Criticisms of Textual Criticism consists in the discussion of example verses. Clark shows that the ratings (A, B, C, or D) are often poorly chosen.

It is also of interest to note that Clark seems to argue in passing for the early date (pre-70 AD) for the writing of Revelation. (p. 47)

The reader may be disappointed not to find Clark’s own theories further elaborated upon, but must settled for his final statement: “If we want to get closer to the very words of God, we must pay attention to the Hodges, Farstad, and Pickering, and The New King James Version.” (p. 49)

What seems to be missing from this volume is any comment as to God’s promise to preserve his word through the ages. This, I believe, is the strongest argument for the Majority Text.

For the previous review in this series see here.

GHC Review 40: First and Second Thessalonians

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First and Second Thessalonians, by Gordon H. Clark, Jefferson, MD: The Trinity Foundation, 1986, 152 pp.

In the commentary First and Second Thessalonians Gordon Clark places significant emphasis on textual criticism. In fact, the book includes an appendix on “Logical Criticisms of Textual Criticism.” Though this material is printed also as a stand-alone volume Logical Criticisms of Textual Criticism it probably came out first in this appendix. While both books were published in 1986, the foreword to First and Second Thessalonians is dated March 7, 1986 while the foreword to Logical Criticisms of Textual Criticism is dated two months later, May 15, 1986. Even though this section came out first in the commentary I’ll review it as its own book rather than covering here.

There doesn’t seem to be any particular reason for choosing this commentary to address textual criticism. Clark notes, in fact, that there are few textual critical questions in these epistles. Perhaps the only noted reason for mentioning the subject is for Clark to point out that he “proceeds on the assumption that the early Christians were right” and so generally follows in this commentary the majority text.

The book itself was one of the last that Dr. Clark wrote; written sometime during 1984. He wrote to Greg Reynolds in response to a letter of June 18, 1984 saying, “Finally, back in [Georgia]. Where the weather is hot and muggy. I am thinking of moving permanently to Colorado. Had a nice trip home: Santa Fe, Albuquerque, El Paso, Big Bend (3 days) and home. Starting to write a commentary on I and II Thess. About 125 finished; left it out there and will resume when I move.” Letters show that the appendix on textual criticism was actually written in 1983, before the commentary.

Anyways, a few items from the book itself should be noted.

Clark refers to Romans as Paul’s “greatest epistle.” (p. 21)

He argues also that “The Auburn Affirmation ought to have been called The Auburn Negation” since “none of the signers believe the Bible to be inerrant.” (p. 34)

He has further comments on his view of the doctrine of man. (p. 50) And against trichotomy. (p. 69-70)

He argues against pacifism. (p. 64)

He believes Revelation 13:18 is referring to Nero. (p. 88) And that “Babylon” there is Rome. (p. 89)

He argues that the devil and his angels perform some miracles. (p. 94)

Generally I found this to be a pretty good commentary, and probably even more interesting than some of the others. There is less overlap of material than some of his other commentaries have with his other writings. It is a nice, though mostly overlooked contribution to Clark’s thought.

For the previous review in this series see here.

GHC Review 39: Clark Speaks from the Grave

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Clark Speaks from the Grave, by Gordon H. Clark, Jefferson, MD: The Trinity Foundation, 1986, 77 pp.

Clark Speaks from the Grave is a book written in second person narration containing responses from Clark to some of his critics: Vern Poythress, Robert Reymond, Gordon Lewis, and John Warwick Montgomery. As I’ve mentioned in another post, though this book was published posthumously, Clark knew of the book’s title before he passed away.

Clark chastises Poythress for not well-defining the terms he uses. He argues, “The principal and deliberate rejection of accuracy in words entails a rejection of the law of contradiction in statements, with a resulting rejection of the distinction between truth and falsity in general.” (p. 13-14) The law of contradiction, which Poythress calls “platitudinous” is for Clark an absolute necessity. Clark suggests Poythress’s view leads to the same rejection of the Confession that occurred in the PCUSA.

Clark contentions against Robert Reymond I’ve previously written about here. I might just add one more interesting note from the present volume: “In reviewing the several apologetes who oppose Clark, one gets the impression that some are subconsciously Kantian.” (p. 22) By this I take it that Clark believes these apologetes are combining empirical and a priori theories of knowledge.

When it comes to the third critic, Gordon Lewis, Clark notes that he “stated Clark’s position better than any other critic.” (p. 31) Yet even Lewis makes some mistakes. Lewis’s criticisms of Clark generally fall into the category of misunderstandings of his views, not therefore rising to the level of actual criticisms. An important quote in this chapter is the following: “The term certainty appears often in religious writings. Usually it is a useless word. People are certain about so many things. Many people used to be certain about the potency of some witch’s brew. General McClellan was certain that Lincoln was a bad president. One should take caution when anyone begins talking about certainty.” (p. 45)

The fourth critic is John Warwick Montgomery who Clark contends “depends on the facts of history as facts” but “seems to have no notion of what a fact is.” (p. 52) Because of this there is a “consequent inability of a reader to guess what Montgomery is talking about.” (p. 56) Montgomery’s other error, contends Clark, is that he “thinks he can discover significance in the observable facts themselves.” (p. 56-57) Clark follows with important comments on the Is-ought problem which Montgomery fails to surmount.

The final chapter is on “The Problem of Individuation.” Here Clark contends that many of the objections against his view are fallacies of begging the question, assuming what needs to be proved. And in the conclusion section of the book Clark sums up the whole endeavor in pointing out the necessity of clear definitions.

This volume should probably only be read after gaining a solid grasp of the dialogue which occured previously between the men in view.

For the previous review in this series see here.

Note: The cover picture is of Horn Peak in the Sangre de Cristo mountains and the Wet Mountain Valley where Dr. Clark was buried.

Review of Problems in the Prayer Life

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Problems in the Prayer Life, From a Pastor’s Question Box, by J. Oliver Buswell, Jr., Chicago, IL: Moody Press, 1928, 127 pp.

This book came out in 1928, just two years into J. Oliver Buswell Jr.’s tenure as President of Wheaton College (1926 – 1940). It is, in fact, Buswell’s first book; written before he joined up with J. Gresham Machen’s reforming movement in the Presbyterian church, before he was a founding member of the Bible Presbyterian Church, and before he met and hired Gordon Clark. In a letter to Clark, Buswell admitted of his earlier days, “I think I told you that my own theological training was largely negative. I had to spend much of my time and energy defending my simple evangelical faith and answering the attacks of unbelief in Minnesota and Chicago. I never had the privilege of studying under sound and scholarly teachers. I have, however, tried to compensate for this deficiency and have found Hodge most helpful.” (JOB to GHC, Nov. 25, 1935) Even so, by 1928 Buswell’s theological views must have been mostly solidified.

Buswell is seen to be more Calvinistic than, for example, Francis Schaeffer. He writes, for example, “A lost soul has no power within himself to turn from sin” (p. 27) and that the human side of prayer is “entirely dependent on God.” (p. 11) But I can’t help but think that Buswell isn’t the most consistent of Calvinists, for he writes “Acknowledging sin, turning from sin, and accepting the Lord Jesus Christ as our Savior, we must merely allow Him to work in us both the willing and the doing of His good pleasure.” (p. 34) Buswell’s view thus seems to be similar to views like that of the Lutheran C. F. W. Walther who holds that salvation is default and only our resistance thwarts God’s desire. But this is all wrong. God overpowers all our resistance through the Holy Spirit given to believers. God’s grace is irresistible; He is not waiting for us to allow the Spirit to work in us.

As to the subject of the book itself—on prayer—Buswell has numerous beneficial insights even if his writing is not always the most logically ordered or easy to read. He notes that there are Scriptural examples of prayer being directed to Jesus Christ, not merely to God the Father. (p. 14) The clearest is Acts 7:59 – “While they were stoning him, Stephen prayed, ‘Lord Jesus, receive my spirit.” I particularly like Buswell’s quote: “My testimony as a pastor, and as an army chaplain, is that, though one may be saved in the last moment of his life, men usually die as they have lived.” (p. 38) And this one, “We are to have faith in Him, not faith in faith! Faith in our own faith accomplishes nothing but our own undoing. Faith in God saves.” (p. 62) Buswell also challenges the reader (in multiple places) to keep track of their petitions to God so that they can see later how He has granted them. And he has a section on “intercession” – the praying for others, which is a topic I have not specifically read about elsewhere that I can recall.

One other thing of interest is Buswell’s mention (in at least two places) of Professor Elsie Storrs Dow who was then head of the department of English at Wheaton College. Dow (1859 – 1944) was a figure I came across in my research into Gordon Clark’s biography. She was a long-time professor at Wheaton; teaching there for 46 years.

I don’t recommend that you run out and buy this 90-year old volume, but its not a bad read.

GHC Review 38: The Trinity

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The Trinity, by Gordon H. Clark, Jefferson, MD: The Trinity Foundation, 1985, 2nd edition 1990, 153 pp.

The Trinity, like The Biblical Doctrine of Man recently reviewed, was originally a chapter in Gordon Clark’s unpublished First Lessons in Theology. It is another book of considerable substance as Clark works out, in his own way, an attempt to better understand the doctrine of the Trinity.

I previously spent some time thinking about Dr. Clark’s theory and wrote this two-part article on the subject:

https://douglasdouma.wordpress.com/2017/10/04/the-trinity-part-12-various-interpretations/

https://douglasdouma.wordpress.com/2017/10/07/the-trinity-part-22-unity/

Since I’ve there interacted with Clark’s views from The Trinity, I’ll skip such a review of the volume here. Yet some excellent quotes—relevant to Clark’s philosophy broadly and not just in regards to the Trinity—should not be skipped over:

“Calvin’s term auto-theos is more intelligible than and preferable to homoousios. The real reason for hesitating on the latter word is that it is a meaningless pseudo-concept. Ousia doubtless means ‘reality.’ But not only are trees and rocks ‘real,’ dreams are ‘real’ too. They are real dreams. The number three is real. Everything is real, and thus the term has no meaning.” (p. 67-68)

“Charles Hodge, I think I may say, is the greatest theologian America has so far produced.” (p. 68)

“When we think one of God’s thoughts after him, his knowledge and our knowledge coincide at that point.” (p. 75)

“Induction is a logical fallacy.” (p. 93)

“Theologians who are no empiricists, Shedd for example, have no place for abstract idea. Calvin also, if we stress the first chapter of the Institutes cannot admit the possibility of abstract ideas. The present treatise, strongly anti-empirical, denies the possibility of abstraction in its traditional meaning.” (p. 101)

“Accordingly the proposal is that a man is a congeries, a system, sometimes an agglomeration of miscellany, but at any rate a collection of thoughts. A man is what he thinks: and no two men are precisely the same combination.” (p. 106)

“Several romantically inclined students, and a few professors as well, have complained that ‘this makes your wife merely a set of propositions.’ Well, so it does. This suits me, for I am a set of propositions too.” (p. 106)

“Augustinianism differs from Platonism. Plato had ideas. Augustine has truths or propositions. In reading what Augustine wrote, most people fail to note what he did not write: namely, they fail to note that he has no theory of abstraction. Instead of abstract ideas, he has truths. The present treatise follows Augustine on this point: There are no such things as abstraction and abstract ideas.” (p. 108)

“To a necessitarian like Augustus Toplady, or the present writer …” (p. 117)

For the previous review in this series see here.

GHC Review 37: Logic

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Logic, by Gordon H. Clark, Unicoi, TN: The Trinity Foundation, 1985, 3rd edition 1998, 125 pp.

Logic—proper reasoning—is a central component of Gordon H. Clark’s philosophy. His interest in logic goes back to at least his days at the University of Pennsylvania where he studied under Henry Bradford Smith, an author of four logic textbooks. Clark’s main contribution to the field of Logic is his refutation of Russell/Boolean symbolic logic, found in various forms a number of his later books. (including chapter 8 of the present book) Though Clark wrote to Carl Henry in 1958 saying he had decided not to write a textbook on logic, by 1979 (as noted in a letter to Howard Long) Clark had finished typing the manuscript of a “text book on Logic for high schools.” With delays in publishing the book didn’t come out until the year of Clark’s death. His correspondence shows that he at least was able to see the galley proofs of the final manuscript, if not the book itself before his death.

That Clark could go from writing books on philosophy to biblical commentaries and then a book on logic shows his versatility and wide expertise. But his writings are not haphazardly chosen. Rather, they are designed all to fit together in explaining a Biblical philosophy, and for this philosophy logic is just as important if not more so than any other topic on which Clark writes.

Rather than a short review, a more detailed summary is in order for this book. The following will be a list of important things to learn about logic from this book:

“An argument is a series of reasons which one uses to prove the truth of what one wishes to assert.” (p. 1)

“Logic is the study of the methods by which the conclusion is proved beyond all doubt. Given the truth of the premises the conclusion must be truth. In technical language, logic is the science of necessary inference. From such and such premises the conclusion necessarily follows.” (p. 1)

“Such an argument, one in which a part is omitted or taken for granted is called an enthymeme.” (p. 3)

“There are two kinds of ambiguity. When a single word has two meanings, we call it equivocation. When the double meaning attaches to a phrase, we call it amphibology.” (p. 7)

“Univocal means to have one meaning.” (p. 11)

The fallacy of composition– an informal logical fallacy in which the characteristics of the part is attributed to the whole. (p. 12)

“Petitio principii; in English, begging the question. Essentially this means that one of the premises from which the conclusion is deduced is the conclusion itself, somewhat disguised in form. Now it must be noticed that this type of argument is actually valid. The conclusion follows from the premises by strict logic. It has to, for the premise the conclusion itself, and any proposition implies itself. But as a proof by which to convince anyone else, the argument is useless.” (p. 14)

“Ad hominem argument. The fallacy consists in appealing to the character, the situation, the beliefs or prejudices of the person to be convinced, instead of using premises that deal with the subject under discussion.” (p. 15)

“Another and quite common fallacy is called post hoc ergo propter hoc. The translation is ‘After this, therefore because of this.’” (p. 17)

“A valid argument cannot contain any term in its conclusion that has not already occurred in the premises.” (p. 20)

“This is called a connotative definition, because it lists the necessary and sufficient qualifications.” (p. 21)

“A denotative definition explicitly mentions every individual—person, place, or thing—in the class.” (p. 21)

“In one sense there can be no debate about definition. An author may say: This is what I mean by the word ___. The reader then must take the word in that sense. There is, however, a possibility of debate as to whether the author’s definition is close enough to English usage to avoid serious misunderstanding.” (p. 25)

“An ostensive definition consists of pointing at the object.” (p. 25) “However, it is hard to point one’s finger at the square root of minus one. Or the number three, for that matter. Similarly no one has ever seen a line or a triangle. And even in the case of visible objects, Augustine’s De Magistro (The Teacher), shows that ostensive definitions are impossible.” (p. 26)

“All a is b. The letter astands for any subject, and the letter bstands for any predicate. All a is bis the first form in formal logic.” (p. 27)

There are four forms of declarative sentences: All a is b, No a is b, Some a is b, and Some a is not b.

“There is a difference between propositions and declarative sentences. … A proposition is defined as the meaning of a declarative sentence.” (p. 28)

“Only declarative sentences are true or false; and it is this common character that is important for propositions.” (p. 28)

“In order that logic be as simple as possible, it does not uses the verbs of ordinary conversation. Instead of saying, All the track men run well, logic says All trackmen are good-runners. Instead of saying, No dogs eat hay, logic says, No dogs are vegetarians. The only verb in logic is the verb to be, the copula, is or are.” (p. 28)

Immediate inferences have one premise, one conclusion, and no middle term. (p. 32)

An inference is valid, whenever the formof the conclusion is true every time the formsof the premises are. (p. 33)

A – All

E – No

I – Some

O – Some is not

A and I are affirmative forms

E and O are negative forms

A(ab) means All a is b

E(ab) means No a is b

I(ab) means Some a is b

O(ab) means Some a is not b

“The validity of an argument does not guarantee the truth of any of its propositions.” (p. 37)

“A distributed term is one modified by the adjective all or no. An undistributed term is one that is not so modified.” (p. 38)

“An affirmative form is one that does not distribute its predicate.” (p. 38)

“A negative form is one that distributes its predicate.” (p. 39)

“A universal form is one that distributes its subject. A and E are universal.” (p. 41)

“A particular form is one that does not distribute its subject. I and O are particular.” (p. 41)

“Two forms, or two propositions, are contradictory if they cannot both be true and cannot both be false.” (p. 43)

“Two forms are contrary if they cannot both be true but may both be false.” (p. 43)

“Subalterns are two forms that may both be true and may both be false. A and I are subalterns. E and O are subalterns.” (p. 44)

“Subcontrariesare forms that cannot both be false, but can both be true. O and I are subcontraries.” (p. 44)

“Syllogisms have two premises; those with just one are called immediate inferences.” (p. 46)

There are sixteen immediate inferences: AA, EA, IA, OA, AE, EE, IE, OE, AI, EI, II, OI, AO, EO, IO, and OO. “All a is bimplies All a is b” etc. (p. 46)

< is the symbol for implication

A(ab) < A(ab) reads “All a is b implies All a is b”

Six immediate inferences are valid. (p. 47)

There are 32 moods (individual cases) of immediate inference. (p. 51)

“At the present time there is a large body of minister and theologians who reject logic. They are willing to use valid arguments for a few steps, but then they say faith curbs logic. In other words, if several verses in the Bible (supposing them to be true even though these men say much of the Bible is false), if these verses validly imply a conclusion, the conclusion may be false. This view and those who promulgate it are irrational. Validity is the characteristic of an argument by which the conclusion must be true whenever the premises are. These men say, the conclusion must be true, that is, the argument satisfies the laws of logic, but nevertheless it is false. It is true, but it is false. Crazy, isn’t it? Well, crazy or insane, in politer language it is called irrational.” – p. 54

“A syllogism is an inference with two premises and three terms, the latter so arranged that one term from each premise is also in the conclusion, and one term is in both premises but not in the conclusion.” (p. 55)

There are five rules, easily remembers, by which the validity of any syllogistic argument may be tested almost instantaneously:

1. Two negative premises do not imply a conclusion.

2. Two affirmative premises do not imply a negative conclusion.

3. An affirmative and negative premise do not imply an affirmative conclusion.

4. Two premises in both of which the middle term is undistributed do not imply a conclusion.

5. Two premises in which a given term is undistributed do not imply a conclusion in which that term is distributed. (p. 74)

“If immediate inference has one premise, and the syllogism has two, there are others that have three or more. They are call sorites. As a matter of fat, they are not systematically important, for they are only a string of syllogisms condensed and tacked together.” (p. 86)

Modus ponens:

x imples y

x is true

therefore y is true

Modus tollens:

x implies y

y is false

therefore x is false

Asserting the consequent (fallacy:

x implies y

y is true

therefore x is true

Denying the antecedent (fallacy):

x implies y

x is false

therefore y is false

Disjunctive hypothetical syllogism (where + means “or”):

x + y

x is false

therefore y is true

Finally, the book has a postscript on “God and Logic” (first published in the Trinity Review, November-December 1980) which is a must read to understand the ultimate purpose of logic and of learning logic.

What I believe to be the original cover is shown above. The version I own has this cover:

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For the previous review in this series see here.

GHC Review 36: Ephesians

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Ephesians, by Gordon H. Clark, Jefferson, MD: The Trinity Foundation, 1985, 213 pp.

Though this commentary was published in 1985 (the year Clark died), he actually wrote the book in 1981, as evidenced in his correspondence from that year. The delay in publication stems from the fact that Clark had sent the manuscript to a couple publishers (Mott Media, and Presbyterian and Reformed) both of whom ended up not publishing it. By 1984 Clark had sent the manuscript to John Robbins who published it as a Trinity Foundation volume the next year.

This commentary, like others of Gordon Clark but perhaps even more so, frequently delves into the Greek grammar of the epistle. This is valuable if one is referencing and trying to understand a particular verse, but makes for difficult reading if one attempts to read the book straight through.

A few notable notes will be noted:

A comment on textual criticism:

“It is not true that the oldest manuscripts are always the best. If the original X were copied in A.D. 110, and this copy were copied in A.D. 120, and so on to A.D. 200, there would be ten generations between the original and the final copy. Each step would incorporate an error or two. But suppose another copy was made directly from X in A.D. 210. This manuscript would be later than A.D. 200, but it would be only one step away from the original, not ten steps; and would therefore be better than the more ancient copy.” (p. 3)

A comment relevant to theonomy:

“One Puritan writer includes in this nullification the civil laws of the ancient Jewish state—contemporary theonomists are not Puritan.” (p. 85)

An argument for cessationism:

“Since now the foundation has been laid, prophecy can be said to have ceased by the end of the first century. The foundation was finished; the process of building continues, but as there can be no second corner-stone, so there can be no other apostles and prophets.” (p. 92, in reference to Ephesians 2:20 – “having been established on the foundation of the apostles and prophets, Christ Jesus being its cornerstone)

And, while there are a number of other interesting comments in the book, perhaps one final one related to metaphysics is particular notable:

“The New Testament, on the contrary, and the Old as well, teach that the real world is not so much trees and rocks as it is soul, minds, and spirits.” (p. 205)

For the previous review in this series see here.