Natylie Baldwin's Blog, page 5

The Cradle: Warsaw seeks NATO backing for Ukraine no-fly zone

The Cradle, 9/15/25

On 15 September, Polish Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski called on NATO countries to impose a no-fly zone over Ukraine following a reported Russian drone incursion into Poland last week.

In an interview with the Frankfurter Allgemeiner newspaper, Sikorski stated that Warsaw would need the support of other European allies to implement the plan.

“We as NATO and the EU could be capable of doing this, but it is not a decision that Poland can make alone; it can only be made with its allies,” he said.

“Protection for our population — for example, from falling debris — would naturally be greater if we could combat drones and other flying objects beyond our national territory … If Ukraine were to ask us to shoot them down over its territory, that would be advantageous for us. If you ask me personally, we should consider it,” he added.

Last week, multiple Russian drones crossed into Poland, prompting NATO to scramble fighter jets to shoot them down.

Russia said it did not target Poland. Belarus, Russia’s ally, said the drones entered Polish airspace by accident after they were jammed.

European leaders claim the drone incursions are a deliberate provocation by Russia.

Following the incursion, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky urged his allies to build a “joint air defense system and create an effective air shield over Europe.”

The US and its partners in NATO have previously rejected requests by Ukraine for a no-fly zone, citing the risk of a direct military encounter with nuclear-armed Russia.

“The incident raised serious questions about the alliance’s readiness to counter the relatively cheap, highly maneuverable but devastatingly destructive unmanned aerial vehicles that have redefined modern warfare since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022,” the Washington Post wrote on Monday.

Officials in Warsaw said that Russian drones had penetrated Polish airspace 19 times, most likely as decoys to distract air defenses.

On Saturday, Romania scrambled fighter jets after a Russian drone breached its airspace during an attack on neighboring Ukraine.

Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said Monday that European nations are determined to block political and diplomatic efforts to end the war.

“NATO is de facto at war with Russia. This is obvious and needs no proof. NATO provides direct and indirect support to the Kyiv regime,” Peskov added.

To agree to a peace deal, Moscow has demanded that Kiev relinquish territory in eastern Ukraine now occupied by Russia. The Kremlin insists that limits be imposed on Ukraine’s military and assurances that Ukraine will not gain membership in NATO.

One former Ukrainian official told the Washington Post on 12 September that the Russian drone incursion into Poland could cause Europe to limit support for Ukraine, rather than expand it.

Air defense batteries and missiles are already in short supply, and European countries may feel they need to keep these items for their own defense, rather than transfer them to Ukraine.

The former official said the first thought as drones entered Polish airspace was, “They will not even give us what they already promised.”

Russian drone and missile attacks have not only increased in number in recent months, but they have also become more sophisticated.

Russia now launches swarms of several hundred drones at once, with some being armed and others serving as decoys. Some are equipped with jet engines to allow them to fly faster and follow ballistic missile trajectories.

Russia Matters: Analysts: Russia’s Ukraine War Salvos Triple in Size, Drone Use Surges Nearly Ninefold

Russia Matters, 9/15/25

On Sept. 6–7, 2025,  Russia   launched   its  largest aerial assault of the war against Ukraine, firing between 805 and 823 projectiles—including over 800 Shahed drones and up to 13 missiles—across the country. Ukrainian air defenses intercepted at least 747 drones and several cruise missiles, marking their highest recorded single-night shootdown. Despite the significant interception rate, strikes caused up to five deaths, destroying residential buildings and, for the first time, damaged Kyiv’s Cabinet of Ministers. A Russian Iskander ballistic missile was confirmed in the Kyiv attack. Russia’s Defense Ministry denied striking civilian targets, despite mounting evidence.In the period of Aug. 12–Sept. 9, Russian forces gained 160 square miles of Ukrainian territory, which marks a 34% decrease from the 241 square miles these forces gained in the period of July 15–Aug. 12, 2025, according to the Sept. 10, 2025, issue of the Russia-Ukraine War Report Card. As of Sept. 9, 2025, Russian forces occupied 44,943 square miles of Ukrainian territory, which constitutes 19% of Ukraine’s territory (an area roughly equivalent to the U.S. state of Ohio), according to the card.  Russian forces have also reduced the rate of casualties they suffer while advancing by 31%, according to ISW’s analysis of the Ukrainian General Staff’s estimates. The rate went from 99 casualties per square kilometer gained from January through April 2025 to 68 casualties per kilometer gained from May through August 2025. Russia has also seen its losses of tanks decline recently. Oryx estimates that the past summer saw Russia lose 83 tanks in Ukraine, down from 252–274 tanks in the same periods of 2022–2024.

***

For Putin, bargaining and bombing aren’t mutually exclusive

By Jennifer Kavanagh, Responsible Statecraft, 9/9/25

In the early hours of Sunday morning, Russia launched its largest air attack on Ukraine to date, including over 800 drones and 13 ballistic missiles. Cities across the country came under fire, and a government building in Kyiv was damaged.

Officials in Europe and the United States were quick to condemn the attacks as evidence that Vladimir Putin is not serious about ending Russia’s nearly four-year conflict with Ukraine. They are right. Putin is not yet ready to stop fighting. And why would he be? After all, his army has the upper hand on the battlefield while Ukraine struggles with manpower shortages and materiel deficiencies.

Putin may, however, be ready to start bargaining over what the end to the war might look like, and signaled as much at last week’s Shanghai Cooperation Organization meeting in China. “It seems to me that if common sense prevails, it will be possible to agree on an acceptable solution to end this conflict,” he told reporters in Beijing.

Let’s hope that U.S. President Donald Trump is paying attention. Though his face-to-face with Putin in Alaska failed to achieve the desired results, Trump can still jumpstart flagging efforts to end the war in Ukraine. But to do so, he will need to ignore voices calling for more sanctions or military pressure to be put on Russia.

Instead, he should double down on diplomacy by initiating serious working level discussions between Washington, Moscow, and Kyiv that can begin to hash out the terms of a settlement. This move may be unpopular, but real negotiations have to start sometime, and waiting won’t make peace easier to reach.

Each year since it began, Putin has spoken about the war in Ukraine at the annual summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, a multilateral group that includes China, Russia, and India among other states. His remarks have typically emphasized three main themes. First, he has countered the narrative that Russia is the aggressor in Ukraine, blaming the United States and Europe for meddling in Ukraine’s elections and pushing NATO’s boundaries closer to Russia’s borders.

Second, he has criticized the sanctions imposed on Russia by the West. Finally, he has thanked fellow SCO members for their support and efforts to work toward peace.

This year seemed different. Though his prepared remarks reiterated well-worn criticisms of NATO expansion and appreciation for Russia’s partners, in sideline conversations and answers to press questions he went further, expressing optimism about the war’s trajectory, observing that there might be a “light at the end of the tunnel,” and discussing Russia’s conditions for peace — those that are non-negotiable and those where some compromise might be reached.

There are clear limits to what Putin will agree to. Yet the positions Putin has outlined recently — in China, Alaska, and in-between — are not quite as maximalist as they were a year ago. There appears to be some bargaining space on key issues that could pave a pathway to peace if the Trump administration plays its cards right.

For example, while in China, Putin made clear once again that Ukraine’s membership in NATO is a redline for Russia, but also confirmed that Moscow does not object to Ukraine’s entrance into the EU (of course, only other EU member states can offer Kyiv membership in the economic and political union).

Putin also seemed open to discussing some kind of security guarantee for Ukraine, though it was unclear what this would entail. Putin may still be focused on the model proposed in Istanbul in which a group of countries including Russia, would guarantee Ukraine’s security. This is a non-starter for Kyiv, just as Putin is likely to veto Europe’s “reassurance force” plan.

But it’s possible that in the context of serious negotiations Putin might be open to other security arrangements for Ukraine, for example some types of Western military assistance during peacetime, Ukraine’s long-term defense industrial cooperation with Europe, or promises of additional U.S. military aid and intelligence sharing in case Russia attacks Ukraine again. Elsewhere, Moscow has signaled some flexibility on Russia’s “demilitarization” demand suggesting it would not object to a defensively armed Ukrainian military force.

Putin appears somewhat less willing to give ground on territory. Still, he noted in China that Russia would be willing to work with the United States (or even Ukraine) to oversee the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant. He continues to seek full control of Donetsk but appears satisfied freezing the lines of contact in Zaporizhzhia and Kherson.

Europe and Ukraine may not like Putin’s opening bid, but ignoring what flexibility has emerged in Russia’s terms in recent months risks missing a real chance for peace. Putin’s seeming escalation in the skies over Ukraine and his willingness to begin serious negotiations are not mutually exclusive. In fact, if he is serious about talking, eeking out whatever military gains he can now would be a rational way to increase bargaining leverage.

In any case, delaying diplomacy and continuing to struggle on the battlefield until Putin puts down his weapons is likely to make things worse, not better, for Ukraine. The most favorable settlement available to Ukraine was the one it might have negotiated in April 2022 or November 2022. With its military currently on the ropes, the next best option is the one negotiated today. If Putin is indeed open to talking, even if just at the working level and if fighting continues at the same time, it is in Ukraine’s best interest to get on board.

Ultimately, it is Kyiv and Moscow who must reach an agreement but in addition to eschewing new sanctions and other futile tactics to force Putin into a ceasefire, the Trump administration can help push things along in three ways.

First, Washington can serve as convener, bringing teams from Moscow and Kyiv together and facilitating private dialogue between the two sides. In this role, Trump will have to avoid the temptation to insert himself directly while the necessarily slow process plays out. After all, Kyiv and Moscow have shown that given time and space they can reach a mutually agreeable endpoint. They almost succeeded in Istanbul in 2022 and can do so again.

Second, the United States can help bridge the demands made by each side, offering Ukraine carrots to make concessions easier and Russia incentives to reduce the demands on Ukraine. For example, promising Ukraine time-limited military assistance after a settlement or building strategic stockpiles of air defense and other munitions that Kyiv would receive in the event of renewed war would be sustainable ways to reassure Ukraine of its future security without compromising U.S. interests.

In the case of Russia, the Trump administration might offer to open discussions about the U.S. role in Europe’s long-term security architecture in return for more flexibility from Moscow on Ukraine’s own military capabilities. The Trump administration has already signaled an interest in pulling back from its role in Europe, so reductions in U.S. commitments on NATO’s eastern flank could be a win-win — achieving an administration priority while addressing Putin’s “root causes.” The promise of sanctions relief or other types of bilateral cooperation might also convince Russia to lessen what it requests from Ukraine.

Finally, the Trump administration can regulate European involvement in negotiations, acting as a buffer against what has been the continent’s unhelpful interference. So far, European leaders have encouraged Zelensky to stick to unreasonable goals, set unrealistic expectations, and criticized what progress has occurred. The latest “reassurance force” charade is more of the same, an exercise in fantasy that extends the war rather than ending it.

The United States continues to have significant leverage over Europe, and the Trump administration should not be afraid to use it to keep Brussels from scuttling future diplomacy. Trump should communicate to his European counterparts that meddling in ongoing talks is unwelcome and will come with consequences for the transatlantic relationship. At the same time, he can engage with Europe at a later point on how they can support Ukraine after an agreement is reached.

With his military forces advancing on the battlefield, Putin is unlikely to stop fighting in the immediate term. Still, he seems ready to at least think about the end of the war and to talk about the terms of a settlement. If Trump is serious about achieving peace, he shouldn’t let this window of opportunity pass.

Dr. Jennifer Kavanagh is a senior fellow and director of military analysis at Defense Priorities. Previously, Dr. Kavanagh was a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and a senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation. She is also an adjunct professor at Georgetown University.

Scott Horton & John Weeks: Blitzkrieg Blowback: Nazi Warlord Primed To Lead Post-War Ukraine

By Scott Horton & John Weeks, Antiwar.com, 9/1/25

On February 19, 2021, almost exactly one year before Russia would invade Ukraine, President Joe Biden addressed the Virtual Munich Security Conference. He said:

“We’re at an inflection point between those who argue that, given all the challenges we face — from the fourth industrial revolution to a global pandemic — that autocracy is the best way forward, they argue, and those who understand that democracy is essential — essential to meeting those challenges.”

The struggle between democracy and autocracy became a central theme and talking point of the administration, with Biden repeatedly extolling the United States as the “arsenal of democracy.”

On February 24, 2022, when Russia escalated its conflict with Ukraine (which began in 2014) by rolling more than 100,000 troops into the country, their president, Vladimir Putin, said:

“The purpose of this operation is to protect people who, for eight years now, have been facing humiliation and genocide perpetrated by the Kiev regime. To this end, we will seek to demilitarize and denazify Ukraine, as well as bring to trial those who perpetrated numerous bloody crimes against civilians, including against citizens of the Russian Federation.”

Now, after more than three years of war, during which time DC has backed Ukraine with hundreds of billions of dollars, sophisticated weapons, intelligence sharing, targeting assistance and a parallel economic war on Russia, and Russia has inflicted hundreds of thousands Ukrainian casualties, an autocratic Nazi is poised to become the next president (or fascist dictator) of Ukraine.

Andriy Biletsky was imprisoned in a Ukrainian jail as the “Revolution of Dignity” (aka the Western-backed Maidan Coup) played out on the streets of Kiev in late 2013 and early 2014.

Biletsky, a partisan of “Social Nationalism” and “all the ancient Ukrainian Aryan values,” was accused of participating in a terrorist plot to blow up a statue of Vladimir Lenin in Boryspil.

On February 21, 2014, Ukrainian President Victor Yanukovych fled the country, on February 22 his government collapsed and on February 24 a new coup-interim junta was created under Acting President Oleksandr Turchynov and Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk. One of the new government’s first actions, that very day, was to pardon what it called “political prisoners” held by the deposed regime. On February 25, 2014, Biletsky walked out of prison and inherited the coup.

Biletsky founded the Azov Battalion out of his Patriot of Ukraine gang and fellow travelers from Right Sector, the coalition Nazi militia that had accomplished the street putsch weeks before, and quickly established himself as a man willing to lead men into battle against any and all perceived enemies, including Ukrainian civilians. Such enemy civilians immediately presented themselves in Ukraine’s east and south. Anti-coup protestors refused to recognize the new regime’s legitimacy and attempted to assert greater sovereignty for their regions. In response, and on orders from the United States, Kiev launched an “Anti-Terrorist Operation” against the Donbas. Many regular Ukrainian soldiers refused to wage war on their countrymen, with some even defecting to the rebels’ side. Biletsky and Azov, however, plunged into the close quarters, urban combat with alacrity.

Known as “White Leader” or “White Chief” by his men, Biletsky has become the Empire’s new version of a “moderate rebel,” an anti-democratic, Nazi warlord who DC is desperate to spin as a freedom fighter committed to Western values. All the hype in the world cannot change the reality on the ground revealed by his rhetoric and behavior.

In 2007, Biletsky was the leader of Patriot of Ukraine, a direct heir of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), which was the “institutional epicenter” of Ukrainian collusion with the Nazis during World War II. He gave a speech entitled “Ukrainian Racial Social Nationalism.” In the speech Biletsky declared:

“The historical mission of our Nation, in this turning point, [is to lead] the White peoples of the whole world into the last crusade for its existence against the Semitic-led untermenschen.”

He argued that Ukrainian nation must become “a single biological organism that will consist of New People – physically, intellectually and spiritually developed persons. From the mass of individuals should appear Nation, and from the weak modern man – the Superman. Social-Nationalism relies on a number of fundamental principles that clearly distinguish it from other right-wing movements. This is a kind of triad: sociality, Racial, Great power.”

This kind of rhetoric could get an American citizen put in time out on X, or a Western European time in the penitentiary, but Biletsky has become a darling of Western governments and weapons manufacturers. He recruits young militants, neo-Nazis and men of the very-far right from across Europe. He baptized his new battalion with fire and blood in the eastern city of Mariupol, killing dissidents and seizing the city from pro-Russian forces in June 2014. In August, 2014, Biletsky was promoted to lieutenant colonel of police. In September, Azov was made an official regiment of the National Guard and Biletsky was promoted to commander.

Ten years later and Azov currently has two sections, the “The 12th Special Forces Brigade Azov” within the National Guard and “The Third Army Corps,” which Biletsky leads. The Third Army Corps has seen extensive combat and is responsible for holding down approximately 10 percent of the frontline. Biletsky, Grégory Priolon writes for Intelligence Online, “now appears in Azov’s communications without official uniform or insignia, but with a visual consistency that establishes his role: that of a warlord turned symbol.”

Judging by recent attempts to rehabilitate this Nazi and his friends in the London Times, and other outlets, it is clear that Biletsky has political ambitions beyond military service after the war.

Azov has embraced the role of ideological actor and political force within Ukrainian society. Given its popularity and its killing power, it probably has two options to take control of the central government: elections or a bloody coup.

Regardless of whether Ukraine’s war with Russia ends soon or grinds on, having a Nazi ascend to power in Ukraine would be humiliating (and possibly dangerous) for America and absolutely intolerable for Russia. It could provoke them to restart or expand the war to conquer or simply crush the entire nation. As is typical of government, DC and Moscow’s interventions have created massive problems that will in time be invoked to justify more interventions for years to come.

On the other hand, the other day some assassin just ran up on Biletsky’s Svoboda Party counterpart Andriy Parubiy and put the dirty s.o.b. right out of his misery.

Sometimes these things do have a way of taking care of themselves.

Russia Matters: NATO Downs Russian Drones in Poland in First Direct Engagement, Exposing Gaps in Alliance Defenses

I was on vacation last week and am now battling the flu, so I’m gradually trying to get caught up on the news. – Natylie

Russia Matters, 9/12/25

NATO fighter jets have shot down Russian drones over Polish airspace for the first time, after what Warsaw described as an “unprecedented violation” of its territory, which prompted the alliance to hold emergency consultations per the NATO treaty’s Article 4. The intrusion exposed what some Western officials and analysts described as serious gaps in NATO’s eastern air defenses, with alliance jets downing only four of the estimated 19–23 drones.1 Western analysts, such as former SACEUR Ben Hodges, believe the attack was a deliberate rehearsal to test NATO’s systems.2 If Vladimir Putin’s intention was, indeed, to test NATO’s air defenses, the Russian president “would be most pleased with the result,” according to Financial Times. Test or not, the incident brought Europe “the closest we have been to open conflict since World War II,” according to Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk. Donald Trump suggested the incursion “could have been a mistake,” but Tusk dismissed this3 while Polish President Karol Nawrocki called the incident “an unprecedented moment in the history of NATO and Poland.”4 While Russian warplanes have long tested NATO’s responses by flying near or even into the airspace of alliance members, forcing them to scramble jets, the Sept. 10 incident was the first time the U.S.-led bloc has engaged directly with the Russian armed forces since their full-scale invasion of Ukraine, according to WSJ. By contrast, Russia’s Defense Ministry played down the incident, insisting its drones did not intentionally cross into Poland and claiming that electronic jamming caused the breach. If Belarus’s Defense Ministry is truthful in its claim that it “warned” Poland about “unknown aerial vehicles” approaching their borders, then it raises questions about the ability of the leader of NATO’s eastern flank,5 which Poland is, to cope with a hypothetical air war with Russia on its own.6On Sept. 6–7, 2025,  Russia   launched   its  largest aerial assault of the war against Ukraine, firing between 805 and 823 projectiles—including over 800 Shahed drones and up to 13 missiles—across the country. Ukrainian air defenses intercepted at least 747 drones and several cruise missiles, marking their highest recorded single-night shootdown. Despite the significant interception rate, strikes caused up to five deaths, destroying residential buildings and, for the first time, damaged Kyiv’s Cabinet of Ministers. A Russian Iskander ballistic missile was confirmed in the Kyiv attack. Russia’s Defense Ministry denied striking civilian targets, despite mounting evidence.In the period of Aug. 12–Sept. 9, Russian forces gained 160 square miles of Ukrainian territory, which marks a 34% decrease from the 241 square miles these forces gained in the period of July 15–Aug. 12, 2025, according to the Sept. 10, 2025, issue of the Russia-Ukraine War Report Card. As of Sept. 9, 2025, Russian forces occupied 44,943 square miles of Ukrainian territory, which constitutes 19% of Ukraine’s territory (an area roughly equivalent to the U.S. state of Ohio), according to the card.  Russian forces have also reduced the rate of casualties they suffer while advancing by 31%, according to ISW’s analysis of the Ukrainian General Staff’s estimates. The rate went from 99 casualties per square kilometer gained from January through April 2025 to 68 casualties per kilometer gained from May through August 2025. Russia has also seen its losses of tanks decline recently. Oryx estimates that the past summer saw Russia lose 83 tanks in Ukraine, down from 252–274 tanks in the same periods of 2022–2024.

***

Russian drones over Poland no reason to panic and start a war

By Anatol Lieven, Responsible Statecraft, 9/10/25

It seems unlikely that the handful of Russian drones that entered Polish air space did so accidentally.

There have been previous incidents, but they involved individual drones very close to the Ukrainian border. Yesterday there were over a dozen, according to reports, with debris landing in several cities, including hitting one house, after NATO was scrambled to shoot them down.

It is appropriate therefore that under Article 4 of the NATO Treaty, NATO members consulted over this and responded.

This was however not an “attack.” None of the drones hit a significant target, or seem to have been intended to do so. The Russian move was most likely intended as a warning to the European “coalition of the willing” to abandon its hopes of establishing a “reassurance force” in Ukraine, and add weight to President Putin’s statement that such a force would automatically be subject to Russian attack.

It was probably also a warning to the U.S. not to provide air cover or a “backstop” for such a force.

We should remember that during the Cold War, there were a number of far more serious violations of air space by both sides, some of them leading to NATO planes being shot down and American and British airmen killed. These incidents led not to threats of war, but careful attempts to de-escalate tensions and develop ways to avoid such clashes.

There are two ways of looking at this, and they are not mutually exclusive. On the one hand, it was undoubtedly a provocative act by Russia, which has provided the opportunity for more hysterical outbursts by Western hawks about alleged Russian plans to attack NATO, more calls for increased aid to Ukraine, and more allegations that “Russia does not want peace” (it does, but — just like Ukraine — on terms that meet its basic conditions).

On the other hand, the immediate European response is a reminder of the extent of European (though not Polish) military weakness, and that any European force in Ukraine would be utterly dependent on US support and guarantees.

Thus while the British defense secretary John Healey responded by warning of a “new era of threat” and promising to defend Poland, he also revealed that Britain has only 300 troops in Poland; its previous contingent of precisely six Typhoon fighter jets were withdrawn in July, and its Sky Sabre air defense system in Poland was removed last year for maintenance and has not yet returned.

So when Healey told the “E5” group (the UK, France, Germany, Italy and Poland) that he had asked the British armed forces “to look at options to bolster NATO’s air defence over Poland,” those options would seem extremely limited, and would also probably require reducing military supplies to Ukraine.

Amidst wild ravings from Poland and some British commentators (including calls for an “Article 5 response” – i.e. war), former NATO Deputy Commander General Sir Adrian Bradshaw struck a sensible note, which the U.S. and European governments would do well to follow:

“The point of the consultations is to do things which lower the tension and lower the potential for a slide into conflict, which none of us want. And it’s reasonable to assume that even Mr. Putin doesn’t want a conflict between the whole of NATO and Russia, because it would be disastrous for all of us. So we need to bear that in mind, but be seen to act with resolve…[I]f we don’t want to escalate in the military domain, then we must do so in the economic, political and diplomatic domains.”

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The Reported Russian Drone Incursions Into Poland Might Have Been Due To NATO Jamming

By Andrew Korybko, Substack, 9/11/25

It’s unlikely that Russia would risk rallying the West around a no-fly zone over Ukraine by staging a deliberate provocation against Poland or even just carrying out a recon mission in NATO airspace.

Poland claimed to have shot down several Russian drones on Wednesday morning that reportedly crossed into its airspace during the latest large-scale strikes against Ukraine. This occurred amidst the ongoing Polish, Lithuanian, and NATO drills involving 30,000 Polish troops and just ahead of the upcoming Russian-Belarusian Zapad 2025 drills. Some therefore suspect that this was either a deliberate provocation by Russia or a botched recon mission, but it might have just been due to NATO jamming.

It was recently argued that “There Might Be More To The Von Der Leyen-GPS-Russia Hoax Than Scoring Cheap Infowar Points” after the dramatic claim that Russia supposedly jammed her plane while it attempted to land in Bulgaria was debunked by Sofia itself and Western media. The alternative theory put forth was that this false narrative was meant to justify aggressive signals jamming in Kaliningrad, though this could also be directed towards Belarus given its hosting of the upcoming Zapad 2025 drills.

Such interference might have thus caused Russian drones to veer off course into Poland during the latest large-scale strikes against Ukraine. Aggressive signals jamming could also precede implementation of reported plans for imposing a no-fly zone over at least part of Ukraine in connection with the West’s security guarantees for that country. Although nowhere as foolproof as patrols over Ukrainian airspace and authorizing NATO-based Patriots to protect its skies, it would carry much less of an escalation risk.

Moreover, if NATO expected that its speculative signals jamming – possibly ramped up after the von der Leyen-GPS-Russia hoax, which might have been timed to coincide with the upcoming Zapad 2025 drills – would cause Russian drones to veer off course, then this might be part of a preplanned escalation. The objective could be to rally support for the abovementioned no-fly zone proposal or even begin the gradual process of implementing it on the pretext of “proactive defense” in light of this incident.

Over 3,5 years into the special operation, Russia would have by now presumably gamed out everything that could realistically follow the scenario of several of its drones crossing into Poland, with policymakers thus likely being aware that this could be exploited to advance the no-fly zone plot. The aforesaid insight accordingly reduces the odds that this was a deliberate provocation or a botched recon mission, either of which would have probably been carried out in force to make the cost-benefit tradeoff more worthwhile.

This is a similar logic as what was recently shared in this analysis here arguing that Russia probably didn’t deliberately target the Cabinet of Ministers building in Kiev so as to avoid fueling the no-fly zone plot. While that particular incident might have been randomly caused by drone debris, the latest one could have been planned to a much greater degree if NATO jamming was indeed responsible as conjectured. It remains to be seen, however, whether Poland will participate in any no-fly zone over Ukraine as a result.

Former President Andrzej Duda recently revealed that Zelensky tried to manipulate Poland into war with Russia over November 2022’s Przewodow incident, which he refused to fall for, while his successor Karol Nawrocki pledged ahead of the second round not to deploy troops to Ukraine. This policy continuity, which aligns with Poles getting fed up with Ukrainian refugees and this neighboring conflict, could foil NATO’s plans to manipulate Poland into this even though it might still agree to ramp up signals jamming.

The Real CIA Vol. 1: 693 Pages of Secret Crimes (The Family Jewels)

Link to YouTube video here.

Geoffrey Roberts: Generosity as Calcaluation: What Stalin told the Finns in October 1945 (A Finnish Lesson for Russian Peacemakers)

from Geoffrey Roberts:

When Stalin told a delegation from the Finland-USSR society that he proposed to give Finland more time to pay its reparations to the Soviet Union, the Finns said that would be generous.

Stalin replied:

“It’s calculation, not generosity – a generosity of calculation. When we treat others well, they are nice to us. Our generosity makes up for the policy of Tsarist autocracy. Its policy towards Finland, Romania and Bulgaria made their peoples enemies of Russia. We want neighbouring countries and peoples to have a good attitude towards us.”

“Это не великодушие, а расчет, великодушие по расчету. Когда мы к другому хорошо относимся, и они к нам хорошо относятся…Своим великодушием мы рассчитываемся за политику царского самодержавия. Царское самодержавие своей политикой по отношению к Финляндии, Румынии, Болгарии вызвало вражду народов этих стран к России. Мы хотим, чтобы соседние страны и народы к нам хорошо относились”.

Reference courtesy Vladimir Pechatnov.

Geoffrey Roberts

Member of the Royal Irish Academy

Emeritus Professor of History, University College Cork

www.geoffreyroberts.net

Resenting Liberalism’s Death Rattle By Nate Bear

By Nate Bear, Substack, 8/28/25

I am republishing this essay with Nate Bear’s permission. Nate is very passionate in describing the Gaza genocide and what it means for the future of liberalism. To quote Nate Bear: “Gaza should, and I believe will, mark the end of liberalism.” I just ordered a book by Philip Pilkington titled: “The Collapse of Global Liberalism: And the Emergence of the Post-Liberal World Order.” I have not had time to read the book, but the idea that 500 years of “liberalism” is ending cannot be discounted. What will or should replace liberalism is the question. There are several appealing aspects of “liberalism”, including freedom of speech and association, due process, equal justice under law, and the rule of law, but these concepts are increasingly under assault as wealth and power, not majority rule, dominate what’s left of our “democracy”. Let me know what you think of Nate Bear’s essay and ideas. – Sylvia Demarest

The September deadline set by France, the UK, Australia and Canada for Israel to stop its genocide and commit to a two-state solution is fast approaching. And looming alongside this deadline is a final crisis of legitimacy for western liberalism.

Firstly, let’s just reflect on how utterly absurd these conditions are: we’ll recognise your right to your own independent state ONLY IF YOUR HOLOCAUSTERS KEEP HOLOCAUSTING YOU. They are making the creation of an entity which, legally, according to the 1948 partition agreement should have existed for the last seventy seven years anyway, contingent on more slaughter.

The pitiful centrist impulse to triangulate every issue has never been more pathetically, tragically and infuriatingly on show. The belief that you can carrot-and-stick your way to a liberal sweet-spot solution on every issue, even an actual holocaust, is such an odious reflex.

Gaza should, and I believe will, mark the end of liberalism. You can’t support an openly declared final solution, announce two years later that recognition for the victims is literally contingent on the final solution proceeding, while continuing to trade on the same old lines about human rights, equality, justice.

Gaza has shown it all up as a sham. The events of the last nearly two years have driven a stake through the dank, rotten heart of this liberal ideology.

The truth is that (neo) liberalism encases supremacist attitudes in pro-social language and symbols despite being, today, an inherently and aggressively anti-social, racist and violent ideology. I don’t particularly want to get into history, definitions and changing use here. You can argue that classical liberal thinkers like Thomas Paine or John Locke would be horrified by genocide, permanent war and the surveillance state.

But what is inarguable is that liberalism in the twentieth century, particularly the second half of the twentieth century, has been dominated by violent centre-right and centre-left liberals. These groupings and their acolytes broadly agree on free markets, freedom of suffrage (what they call democracy), some forms of social justice and equal rights, and they agree on a geopolitical story of the world. They both identify the same good guys and the same bad guys and also believe in the need to forever expand the military and surveillance state to defeat the bad guys. And both these parties, from those in western Europe to those in North America, believe that to do this, killing lots and lots of people is frequently justified.

No one with any understanding of recent history could deny this.

Over the last eighty years, liberals of the centre-right and centre-left, Democrats and Republicans, Labour and Conservative parties, have dropped nuclear bombs on Japanese cities, sanctioned the murder of one million civilians in Indonesia, and from Vietnam to Korea to Libya to Iraq have invaded, raped and pillaged.

And while Gaza is of a piece with recent liberal history, I don’t think we can see it as simply another mass murderous episode in western imperialism. Because what has emerged over the past two years is something unique.

Gaza breaks what was already an ultra violent mould.

Never in the modern era have we seen two million people be cut off from the outside world, trapped, unable to leave, starved and systematically murdered while made homeless and living in tents. Never in the modern era have we seen everything be taken from a people, every university, bakery, school, cafe, office, park, restaurant. Every standing home. We’ve not seen a state destroy so much infrastructure that it has ended the ability of an entire society to function as such. No running water, no sewage systems, no grid electricity. Almost everything in Gaza has been turned to dust and rubble. Never have we seen a starving people trapped in a tiny patch of eviscerated land and watched as their holocausters baited them with food, only to gun them down for fun. Guns supplied by our governments, with our money. Never have we seen so many doctors, nurses and journalists torn apart by jets from the sky while holding nothing but the tools of their work, their stethoscopes and cameras. Jets supplied by our governments with our money. Never have we seen people with Down’s Syndrome ripped apart by attack dogs or teenagers assassinated by drones while in wheelchairs.

No, this is heinous and new, even by western imperialism’s barbarous standards.

You have to go back to ancient Greece or the crusades and the sacking of cities to find something comparable.

The fact that the resistance continues to inflict casualties on the invaders under these conditions is a marvel of the human spirit and should be celebrated as such.

And we certainly haven’t seen violence, war crimes and unspeakable atrocities on this scale captured so frequently on camera in such fine-grained graphic detail.

On top of this, every single stage of this genocide was openly declared by Israel. Israeli politicians said there were no civilians in Gaza, that everyone was guilty, that they’d starve them, burn them and destroy everything. They said the goal was to drive them out of Gaza, to ethnically cleanse Gaza. They said it brazenly, week after week. And then they did it. And they did it with the support of liberals. Trump has overseen eight months of genocide. Biden and Harris oversaw fifteen months. The Conservative party oversaw nine months of genocide. Starmer’s Labour Party has supported Israel through thirteen months of slaughter. The liberals in Australia and Canada don’t even have the excuse that it started on someone else’s watch. They’ve backed this genocide from the start.

Then a few weeks ago, when this dishonest threat to recognise Palestine was made, Israel’s finance minister said they’d step up the holocaust in response and make sure there was nothing left to recognise. Knowing they wouldn’t be stopped, they proceeded to do just that, with zero reaction from the complicit liberal cowards in London, Ontario, Canberra and Paris.

Liberalism doesn’t have a future after this. Not an energised one, at least. Gaza signals the final crisis of legitimacy for liberalism and its supposed international order. Spiritually, it’s over. It will take time for pro-genocide liberals to face the consequences, time for their political groupings to be defeated and made irrelevant. International institutions ruled by liberals will not evaporate over night. But no one will now take their orders from liberals. No one will be lectured to about democracy, human rights, and freedom. The global multilateral institutions run by pro-genocide western liberals will find it increasingly difficult to maintain their legitimacy in the post-Gaza holocaust era. The global south has been watching, and through the expansion of BRICS and the formalisation of new agreements, is now organising. Domestically, as we saw in the US last November, liberal bases in the west will no longer come out in sufficient numbers to keep reanimating the corpse of liberal technocratic management.

The centre could never hold. Among the dead of Gaza lies the liberal project, the only deserved victim of this genocide.

We are left then with two possible futures: a radically pro-social and communitarian one, focused on justice and equity for all, or an authoritarian cesspit of racism, war, and eugenics, administered by the tools of the outsourced surveillance state. We know these are the choices, because we’ve already seen it play out. Trump’s victory was in fact the first sign that Gaza heralded these binary futures. The causes of Harris’s loss were contested by liberals, but the polls in the weeks after were clear: her support for genocide was a priority issue for enough people who otherwise would have voted for her, and Trump snuck through.

Without viable pro-social, anti-imperial alternatives, expect this pattern of pro-genocide liberals losing to proto-fascists to be repeated throughout the west.

The answer in the face of these frightening dynamics is, obviously, not to run back to the genocidal warmongering liberals who landed us here.

The answer is to help shape those radical alternatives.

The stakes couldn’t be clearer, the lines sharper than ever.

Lt. Col. Daniel Davis: The US Is Unprepared for the Next War

Lt. Col. (Ret.) Daniel Davis, Military.com, 8/25/25

Earlier this year, speaking at a press conference in Qatar, President Donald Trump categorically declared that “nobody can beat us.” He continued, “We have the strongest military in the world, by far. Not China, not Russia, not anybody!”

We do have a strong military, but we are woefully unprepared to fight a modern war. That’s because, despite all of the major technological advances in warfighting in recent years, manpower is still absolutely critical, and understanding how those boots on the ground interact with emerging drone warfare is still in its infancy in the U.S. military.

Ground warfare has evolved over the past three and a half years since Russia invaded Ukraine. I’ve spent considerable time studying this conflict from strategic, operational and tactical angles, and I’ve conducted multiple interviews with combatants on both the Russian and Ukrainian sides. The picture that emerges explains not only why Russia’s progress is slow and Ukraine is gradually losing ground, but also why the U.S. would face serious challenges if forced into a similar fight today.

Some have argued that Russia has failed to completely conquer Ukraine because Russian generals and soldiers are of poor quality. That conclusion ignores the genuinely game-changing nature of drones on the conduct of land warfare.

There isn’t one category or type of drone that is game-changing by itself, but rather the categories of drones and the ways they can be employed in concert with other drones and legacy platforms and soldiers. There are primarily four main classes of drones: first-person view (FPV) drones that fly explosive charges directly into vehicles or soldiers, bomber drones that fly over a target and release bombs, missile-carrying drones, and reconnaissance drones.

Despite endless talk about game-changing weapons, only the widespread deployment of drones has truly altered the nature of this war. Armored vehicles remain essential for transporting infantry to the front, but they can’t move in large numbers without suffering catastrophic losses. Traditional armored charges – such as the type I participated in during Desert Storm’s Battle of 73 Easting – are deadly in today’s battlefield conditions. Russia has increasingly turned to motorcycles to improve frontline mobility – not because they offer protection, but because their speed and maneuverability improve their chances of defeating drone attacks. No armored vehicle can dodge an FPV or fiber optic-guided drone, but a motorcycle might.

As a result, every inch of ground in modern war is contested: by various types of drones, artillery strikes, missiles, rockets, air attacks, armored vehicle cannons, and infantry attacks. Both sides in the Russia-Ukraine War have suffered high vehicle losses. Fighters from both Russia and Ukraine have told me that stepping out of a trench – for any reason, even to eat or relieve themselves – is extraordinarily dangerous.

Any movement above ground can be spotted and targeted by drones within minutes. Reconnaissance drones scan likely targets and guide attack drones to strike. Others simply loiter above the battlefield, waiting for an opportunity.

This is why manpower is still the decisive factor: Drones and air attacks can be devastating, but it takes boots on the ground to either take territory or hold it. This is where Russia’s biggest advantages have come into play in this war of attrition. Russia has millions more men of military age to draw from than Ukraine, and Moscow has chosen to limit its manpower losses and play up its firepower advantages.

Rather than launching costly frontal assaults, Russian forces now frequently flank Ukrainian positions and cities, saturating them first with artillery and glide bombs, then using drones to pin down defenders, and only then send in the infantry to seize territory.

This has sobering implications for the United States and NATO. We do not know how to fight this kind of war. Only recently has the Pentagon begun taking drone warfare seriously – something that should have happened after the 2020 Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict. Better late than never, perhaps, but the deeper problem is cultural and doctrinal. We still think in terms of maneuver warfare, “shock and awe,” and rapid dominance. Those concepts no longer apply in peer-on-peer conflicts like this one.

Russia needed nearly two years to discard its outdated views on modern war. It adapted. We haven’t. Earlier this month, the Ukrainian military even mocked the U.S. Army’s newly updated field manual for the “Tank Platoon,” saying flat-out that our doctrines are detached from current battlefield realities.

Today’s U.S. armed ofrces no doubt have skills, quality personnel, and good equipment. But we are far behind in understanding how to fight modern wars. It took both Russia and Ukraine the better part of a year and a half to fully recognize how all the classes of drones have changed the nature of war. Both sides paid an exorbitant price in blood to learn those lessons.

The U.S. Army has studied the conflict and just last month published a compendium on examining the changing nature of war. That’s useful and good. But intellectual knowledge alone won’t help you in the next fight. We’ve got to make profound and fundamental changes now to have a chance to avoid disaster when next we fight on the ground. If the Pentagon was taking this seriously, leaders wouldn’t have merely published a report. They would be urgently changing our fighting doctrine, systems of equipment, types of ordnance and the like to enable and equip our troops to successfully wage war in this new world of conflict.

Yet there is little evidence they’ve done any of those things.

History is filled with the wreckage of once-powerful armies that failed to change with the times and suffered avoidable defeats in subsequent wars. If we are to avoid that sad tradition, major changes must be made, immediately and with urgency. Otherwise, we will pay in blood later for what we should have done today.

Tarik Cyril Amar: Russia is learning. The West is running in circles

By Tarik Cyril Amar, RT, 8/25/25

In some important ways that Western information warriors love to miss, Russia and the West are quite similar. Like the West, Russia has a typically modern state, even if today it functions much better than its Western counterparts.

Russia’s economy is capitalist like almost everywhere else on the planet now, even if the Russian state – because it functions better – has reasserted control over the rich, while the West, sick with neoliberalism, lets them dominate and damage national interests. This is one reason, incidentally, why Russia has withstood unprecedentedly savage Western economic warfare and has a far more effective military-industrial complex than the West.

Finally, while Russia spans Europe and Asia, it is also a major force within that specific cultural tradition whose origins we associate with Europe, or more broadly, the West, from novels to classical conservatories.

Yet, in other respects, there are principal differences between Russia and the West. Please forget, for a moment, about the usual suspects (Russian Orthodoxy versus the rest, for instance, or the usual speculations about space, climate, and mentality). Instead, let’s be concrete and very contemporary: Let’s ask what differences matter most to the issue of finding (or not) a valid peace for the Ukraine conflict. Then two things emerge, one obvious and the other a little less so.

What is easy to spot is that Russia is united and the West is not. In part, this is simply due to the fact that Moscow rules over one country, while Washington, the de facto capital of the West as a geopolitical entity, rules – and exploits ever more crudely – a complicated outer empire of formally independent nation-states that are de facto its clients, satellites, and vassals.

While the US exerts a great deal of brute power over its domain, in reality, the latter is as potentially fissiparous as every empire before. If you think that the mere assertion of unity and control is the same as reality, ask the Soviets about their luck with that idea. Except you can’t, because one day they were there and the next – as if by foul magic – they were not.

What is harder to notice – but never to be unseen once you do – is that the political establishments of Russia and the West now have fundamentally different patterns of learning.

In short, Russia’s is normal in that it has a learning curve, and one with a nice upward bend: That is why its opponents find it impossible to massively deceive it, as occurred in the late 1980s and much of the 1990s.

The current learning pattern of Western, especially the European elites, on the other hand, is highly unusual: it forms, in effect, a flat, closed circle. On that trajectory, things sort of move, but they never really change.

The current state of the attempts to end the Ukraine conflict via negotiation and compromise perfectly illustrates this difference. Indeed, both Russia and the West are displaying their respective learning or for the West, really, non-learning patterns in exemplary fashion.

On Russia’s side, the hard lessons of systematic Western bad faith – from no-NATO-expansion promises to Minsk II – have been fully absorbed. As a result, Moscow, even while open to talks and a solution by realistic agreement, does not make the mistake of being swayed by emotions, hopes, and momentary vibes (the “Alaska vibe,” for instance), as happened to Russia (and before that, the Soviet Union) around the time of the end of the Cold War, with extremely painful consequences.

Specifically, that means that the Russian leadership has made it clear that – after the Alaska summit as much as before – it will not make concessions on key aims. For instance, Moscow will not accept the idea of Ukraine getting NATO membership, even under another label. Likewise it will not tolerate troops from NATO countries in postwar Ukraine, and it will not give up on securing the rights of Russian speakers in Ukraine. Rather silly attempts to pressure the Kremlin into premature meetings with Ukraine’s past-expiration-date leader Vladimir Zelensky have also gone nowhere.

There are observers in the West who are immune to Western propaganda and assess Russia in a fair manner. Some of them have recently been worrying that Moscow might walk into Western traps, as happened at the end of the Cold War or in 2015 when Russia accepted the Minsk II agreement, which the West and Ukraine then abused. Yet the Russian leadership shows no sign of being in any danger of doing so this time.

The West, however, is stuck in its ways. At least as a whole, it has not yet learned a thing, it seems, from the ferocious crash of both its long-term post-Cold War strategy of expansion by cheating and its recent attempt to eliminate Russia as a great power through a proxy war using Ukraine. NATO kaput, really, but NATO isn’t noticing.

The most obvious sign that the West has not yet learned its lesson is its persistent habit of auto-diplomacy. The West is odd in that it does most of its intensely exciting negotiating with itself. While you may well think that that is because the West is – structurally – not united, that is, actually, not the real reason for this narcissistic habit.

In reality, the reason for this self-damaging refusal to face reality is something else. Namely, a deep, entirely misplaced, and pathologically unquestionable sense of superiority. It is as if the West were so powerful that it need not bother with what others have to say but only with its own soliloquy. A fantasy both absurd and highly detrimental.

Consider the so-called “Coalition of the Willing,” in essence, a loose ad-hoc grouping of mostly European (Canada does a Canada and can’t make up its mind) states that seem unable to stop planning – with whatever degree of sincerity – to somehow place their troops in postwar Ukraine, even if only with a US “backstop” no one can plausibly define.

Follow merely Western debates and mainstream media about this ongoing and confused effort and you will find it hard to even notice a rather important fact: Russia’s answer to any such scheme is a very hard no. And yet the West sticks with its geopolitical inner monologue: endlessly discussing a thing that – if its leaders ever actually listened to their Russian counterparts – they knew cannot be realized. Because insisting on realizing it means that Moscow will not settle but continue fighting – and winning.

That may, of course, be the real Western intention here: to produce a deal-breaker. But if that is so, then the next question is why the US tolerates this stalling and sabotage operation by its European vassals.

There are three possible answers to that question: Either the US is already secretly planning to override its European dependents and therefore does not care how they keep themselves busy with their fantasies. Or Washington is still as blind to reality as the Europeans. Or, finally, Trump and his team believe that they can use the Europeans’ ongoing chatter about their coalition-with-nowhere-to-go as some sort of leverage in negotiations with Moscow.

Of those three American postures, only one would be realistic and productive: the first. The other two would mean that Washington is as learning-incapable as Europe, because a US attempt to use the European talk as some kind of bluff to exert pressure on Russia would signal that Trump’s team has not come to terms with Russia’s resolve not to concede major war goals while winning on the battlefield.

Further examples could be added. For instance, Washington’s erratic statements and arms sales regarding Kiev either not being granted or needing a capability to strike deep within Russia. Or its latest attempt to once again operate with a deadline and vague warnings: this time, it’s two weeks and, so the US president has told us, within them he will decide what to do about Ukraine and America’s policy toward it. In essence, if there still is no progress toward a peace settlement, either double down again on confronting Russia, Biden-style, or abandon this terribly misguided proxy war to those Europeans who are too obstinate to finally drop it.

Trump’s recent decisions and actions seem to show that, with regard to the Ukraine war, the US is actually turning a corner and leaving that flat, closed circle of non-learning behind, in favor of becoming a country with a more normal foreign-policy learning curve, just like Russia. We can only hope that this saner attitude will prevail, even if Western Europe wants to stay behind in its impotent fantasy realm of splendid omnipotence.

Moon of Alabama: Ukraine – Zelenski Rejects Giving Land As Fascists Promise To Kill Him

Moon of Alabama, 8/25/25

The (former) President Zelenski of Ukraine is refusing any compromise in negotiations with Russia. He would be killed and replaced by a more right wing figure if he would consider otherwise.

In a speech on Sunday marking Ukraine’s independence Zelenski insisted of recapturing all of Ukraine including Crimea.

As the Washington Post summarizes (archived):

In Kyiv on Sunday, Ukraine’s Independence Day, Zelensky addressed the nation and vowed to restore its territorial integrity.

“Ukraine will never again be forced in history to endure the shame that the Russians call a ‘compromise,’” he said. “We need a just peace.”

He listed some of the regions occupied by Russia — including Donetsk, Luhansk and Crimea — and said “no temporary occupation” could change the fact that the land belongs to Ukraine.

Zelenski thus rejects calls by U.S. President Trump to give up Ukrainian territory in exchange for peace.

One reason why he does so may be the personal danger he is in. Any compromise about territory may well cost his life.

The London Times continues to make propaganda for Nazis. After a recent whitewashing interview with Azov Nazi leader Biletsky (archived) it yesterday published an interview with the former leader of the fascist Right Sector in Odessa Serhii Sterneneko.

‘Russia has repeatedly tried to kill me — I must be doing something right’ (archived)

Sterneneko had a leading role in the 2014 massacres in Maidan Square and at the Trade Union’s House in Odessa. The Times is whitewashing his participation in those events. It does not mind to publish his threats against Zelenski:

[A]mong Ukraine’s younger generation of soldiers and civilians, Sternenko’s brand of truth to power has wide popularity. “I say what I think, and people like what I say.”

His views on President Putin’s demand for Ukraine to cede the territory it defends in the eastern Donbas region as a precondition for possible peace are typically direct. “If [President] Zelensky were to give any unconquered land away, he would be a corpse — politically, and then for real,” Sternenko said. “It would be a bomb under our sovereignty. People would never accept it.”

Sternenko, who himself has avoided the draft, wants the war to go on forever:

Indeed, as he discussed Russian intransigence and President Trump’s efforts to end the war, Sternenko’s thoughts on the possibility of peace appeared to be absent of any compromise over Ukrainian soil.

“At the end there will only be one victor, Russia or Ukraine,” he said. “If the Russian empire continues to exist in this present form then it will always want to expand. Compromise is impossible. The struggle will be eternal until the moment Russia leaves Ukrainian land.”

Other British media continue to promote the rise of Nazi affiliated figures in Ukraine. The Guardian adds by promoting the presidential campaign of the former Ukrainian general and now ambassador to the UK Valeri Zaluzhny:

In private conversations, Zaluzhnyi has not confirmed he plans to go into politics, but he has allowed himself to speculate on what kind of platform he could propose if he does make the decision. Those close to him say he sees Israel as a model, despite its current bloody actions in Gaza, viewing it as a small country surrounded by enemies and fully focused on defence.

He would style himself as a tough, wartime leader who would promise “blood, sweat and tears” to the Ukrainian people in return for saving the nation, channelling Winston Churchill. In one private conversation, he said: “I don’t know if the Ukrainian people will be ready for that, ready for these tough policies.”

A day before being fired as the commander of the Ukrainian army Zaluzhny took a selfie with the leader of the fascist Right Sector and commander of Right Sector brigade of Ukrainian military in front of a portrait of Nazi collaborator Stepan Bandera and the fascist OUN flag.

The picture was already part of his campaign to become the leader of a Bandera-ized Ukraine.

It seems that the British deep-state does its best to support him in that.