Russian Intelligence Quotes

“Foreign nongovernment organizations (NGOs) that support Russian democratic civic groups are a particular target of Russian accusations of foreign economic intrigue. In 2004, President Putin accused Russian NGOs of pursuing "dubious group and commercial interests" for taking foreign money. FSB Director Nikolai Patrushev told the Russian State Duma in 2005 that the FSB had uncovered spies working in foreign-sponsored NGOs. He further claimed, "Foreign secret services are ever more actively using non-traditional methods for their work and, with the help of different NGOs educational programs, are propagandizing their interests, particularly in the former Soviet Union." Patrushev accused the United States of placing spies undercover within the Peace Corps, which was expelled from Russia in 2002, the Saudi Red Crescent, and the Kuwaiti NGO Society for Social Reform. Patrushev attributed an economic motive to these perceived foreign plots, alleging that industrialized states did not want "a powerful economic competitor like Russia." Echoing Soviet-era accusations of nefarious Western economic intent, he claimed that Russia had lost billions of dollars per year due to U.S., EU, and Canadian "trade discrimination. Pushing for stronger regulation of NGOs, Patrushev said, "The imperfectness of legislation and lack of efficient mechanisms for state oversight creates a fertile ground for conducting intelligence operations under the guise of charity and other activities. In 2012, Putin signed the "foreign agent law," which ordered Russian civil rights organizations that received any foreign funding to register as "foreign agents.”
― Kevin P. Riehle, Russian Intelligence: A Case-based Study of Russian Services and Missions Past and Present

“A special operations element known as Zaslon is reportedly directly subordinate to the SVR director. Zaslon is responsible for protecting senior Russian embassy officials and other Russian government officials when they travel to dangerous locations. For example, Zaslon officers provided security when then-Russian Vice Prime Minister Dmitriy Rogozin traveled to Syria in 2014. The element also conducts covert action missions. Little is publicly known about the group, but it reportedly was created in 1998 to replace special forces units that had been subordinate to the KGB First Chief Directorate during the Soviet era and moved to the Ministry of Security after the dissolution of the Soviet Union.”
― Kevin P. Riehle, Russian Intelligence: A Case-based Study of Russian Services and Missions Past and Present

“The words clandestine and covert do not mean the same thing, even though they are often used interchangeably. Clandestinity conceals the operation, while covertness conceals the operator. Most of what has been discussed previously in this book falls into the category of clandestine activities-inter-nal security and intelligence collection operations performed in such a way that they are not publicly visible. Clandestine means secret; something is done so that only those involved in it know it is happening. Most intelligence operations are clandestine, because if they became public, sensitive sources and methods could be damaged or eliminated. However, the sponsoring government does not usually hide its involvement in the operation. For example, when an intelligence service pitches a HUMINT source, the source usually knows for what government he/she is working, unless the service is using a false flag to deliberately misrepresent its affiliation. Covert means the sponsoring government does not reveal its involvement. Although covert operations are usually clandestine in the planning stages, the result of a covert activity often becomes public, even intentionally. That includes covert sabotage, in which an object is damaged: for example, when a bomb explodes or a computer system goes offline. The primary element of covert activities is the phrase "plausible deniability," which means the action is visible, but the perpetrator's identity is hidden.”
― Kevin P. Riehle, Russian Intelligence: A Case-based Study of Russian Services and Missions Past and Present

“The German invasion of the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, put the Soviet Union at risk of collapsing altogether. In this environment, the Soviet tendency to merge espionage and sabotage into a single mission came to the fore, strengthening practices Soviet intelligence and state security services had implemented from the beginning of the Soviet era. Soviet intelligence activities were divided into two lines: intelligence and diversion. Initially, the intelligence directorate, led during World War II by Pavel Fitin, was responsible for collecting intelligence about Germany and its allies. The diversionary directorate, led by Pavel Sudoplatov, dispatched "intelligence sabotage" teams behind German lines to disrupt Germany's supply lines, command and control, and rear areas and to assassinate German officers. According to Fitin, the intelligence directorate supplied intelligence for the diversionary directorate, and officers were regularly exchanged between the two. This crossover between intelligence and sabotage operations is a continuing characteristic of Russian intelligence services today.”
― Kevin P. Riehle, Russian Intelligence: A Case-based Study of Russian Services and Missions Past and Present