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Who Can Hold the Sea: The U.S. Navy in the Cold War 1945-1960 Who Can Hold the Sea: The U.S. Navy in the Cold War 1945-1960 by James D. Hornfischer
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“Communism has no greater ally in this country than the half-baked hysterical charges against leaders of this country by political opponents.”
James D. Hornfischer, Who Can Hold the Sea: The U.S. Navy in the Cold War 1945-1960
“The enemies of this faith know no god but force, no devotion but its use. They tutor men in treason. They feed upon the hunger of others. Whatever defies them, they torture, especially the truth. Here, then, is joined no argument between slightly differing philosophies. This conflict strikes directly at the faith of our fathers and the lives of our sons. No principle or treasure that we hold, from the spiritual knowledge of our free schools and churches to the creative magic of free labor and capital, nothing lies safely beyond the reach”
James D. Hornfischer, Who Can Hold the Sea: The U.S. Navy in the Cold War 1945-1960
“It was sometimes said that the only difference between Omaha and the North Pole was all the barbed wire.”
James D. Hornfischer, Who Can Hold the Sea: The U.S. Navy in the Cold War 1945-1960
“At the time of Nautilus’s launching back in January, the Caribbean Sea Frontier, an area command with bases in San Juan, Trinidad, Guantánamo, and Aruba-Curaçao, had begun running air-sea patrols in the Gulf of Honduras after the leftist government of Guatemala requested arms from the Soviet bloc in reaction to a U.S. decision to give covert support to an antigovernment “liberation” movement. To protect Honduras from invasion and to monitor and regulate arms shipments into the region in violation of the Monroe Doctrine, which had since 1823 warned European powers against meddling in the Western Hemisphere, the United States airlifted arms to Honduras. On May 20, the first Soviet arms shipment arrived in Guatemala. A few days later, the commander in chief of the U.S. Atlantic Fleet ordered a contingency evacuation force into the area comprised of an antisubmarine carrier and five amphibious ships with a Marine battalion embarked. On June 18, the United States announced an arms embargo against Guatemala. The crisis ended eleven days later with a U.S.-backed coup that installed a new government under the dictator Carlos Castillo Armas.”
James D. Hornfischer, Who Can Hold the Sea: The U.S. Navy in the Cold War 1945-1960
“The United States was an empire not for the purpose of subjugation or exploitation, but for the aspiration of advancing the expressly articulated ideals of the United Nations, the Atlantic Charter, and NATO: namely, the right of nations to stand free from outside coercion or subversion of peoples to chart their own destiny.”
James D. Hornfischer, Who Can Hold the Sea: The U.S. Navy in the Cold War 1945-1960
“In addition to the peerless Levering Smith, Raborn held another trump card in dealing with the Pentagon—a “magic piece of paper”: a memo from the CNO, Admiral Burke, affirming that Raborn “was to have absolute top priority on anything he wants to do” and that everyone in the Navy was to be responsive to his requests. If they found that they could not be, they were to report to Burke, and he would take it upon himself to say no if he felt the denial was proper. This unprecedented talisman got Raborn whatever he needed from the Navy’s frequently rivalrous bureaus, though Burke preferred to build willing support within the Pentagon rather than compulsory (and thus potentially grudging) support. In this, his and Raborn’s personal credibility and persuasive gifts carried the day. The economics of the SLBM program were useful too.”
James D. Hornfischer, Who Can Hold the Sea: The U.S. Navy in the Cold War 1945-1960
“accepting a cease-fire, threatening to cause a run on the British pound or drive its value to zero if Eden didn’t require his withdrawing commanders to step lively. France had no choice but to go along, and the two nations ended their military operations that night at midnight and effected their withdrawal the first week of December, whereupon the International Monetary Fund disbursed $1.3 billion to the British Exchequer.”
James D. Hornfischer, Who Can Hold the Sea: The U.S. Navy in the Cold War 1945-1960
“Keen to bring about a cease-fire, on November 6, Election Day, Eisenhower unleashed an impassioned campaign of personal diplomacy aimed mostly at Whitehall. But it was old-fashioned power politics that enabled him to get the job done. He mobilized world opinion against England and France through the UN Security Council—an embarrassing project that placed him in alignment with his Soviet counterparts against his lifelong friends. Ike knew his best play was to exploit Britain’s fiscal weakness, which was driving Prime Minister Eden’s notably deteriorating domestic political situation. Britain was running out of financial reserves. Refusing to repatriate dollars that Britain had supplied to the International Monetary Fund, Eisenhower muscled Great Britain into”
James D. Hornfischer, Who Can Hold the Sea: The U.S. Navy in the Cold War 1945-1960
“On the evening of November 1, at a campaign rally in Philadelphia, Eisenhower addressed the tensions in the Mediterranean by letting fly a salvo of antitribal idealism, declaring, “We cannot and will not condone armed aggression—no matter who the attacker, and no matter who the victim. We cannot—in the world, any more than in our own nation—subscribe to one law for the weak, another law for the strong; one law of those opposing us, another for those allied with us.”
James D. Hornfischer, Who Can Hold the Sea: The U.S. Navy in the Cold War 1945-1960
“All maritime nations have vital interests beyond their borders. All maritime nations, then, to the extent that they project power over an international commons, are empires. But the degree of that projection, its character and the actual motives animating it, matter. The United States was an empire not for the purpose of subjugation or exploitation, but for the aspiration of advancing the expressly articulated ideals of the United Nations, the Atlantic Charter, and NATO: namely, the right of nations to stand free from outside coercion or subversion of peoples to chart their own destiny.”
James D. Hornfischer, Who Can Hold the Sea: The U.S. Navy in the Cold War 1945-1960