Trillions Quotes

“The best long-term results come from buying a big, well-diversified portfolio of financial securities, and trading as little as possible.”
― Robin Wigglesworth, Trillions: How a Band of Wall Street Renegades Invented the Index Fund and Changed Finance Forever

“The data bears this out. In addition to a “persistence scorecard,” S&P Dow Jones Indices publishes snapshots of how many mutual funds beat their benchmarks. Most years, a majority underperform their indices, whatever the market. Over multiple years, the data becomes progressively grimmer. As of June 2020, only 15 percent of US stock-pickers had cumulatively managed to surpass their benchmark over the last decade. In bond markets, it is a similar tale, albeit varying depending on the flavor of fixed income. The data is more favorable for fund managers in more exotic, less efficient asset classes, such as emerging markets, but on the whole the data is clear that in the longer run most fund managers still underperform their passive rivals after fees.”
― Robin Wigglesworth, Trillions: How a Band of Wall Street Renegades Invented the Index Fund and Changed Finance Forever

“All journalists stand on the shoulders of giants, whether they admit it or not. In many cases, my book was vastly enhanced by the superlative work of other journalists, writers, and financial historians, who have themselves explored some of the subjects and themes I have tried to knit together in one sweeping narrative. Peter Bernstein is a huge inspiration, and his books were of tremendous help for some of the earlier chapters, as was Colin Read’s The Efficient Market Hypothesists. Lewis Braham’s biography of Jack Bogle is essential reading for anyone interested in the tumultuous life of Vanguard’s founder. Ralph Lehman’s The Elusive Trade was exhaustively detailed on the genesis of ETFs, and Anthony Bianco’s The Big Lie vividly tells the story of WFIA/BGI in the Pattie Dunn era. I have also learned an enormous amount from working with or admiring from afar financial journalists like John Authers, Gillian Tett, James Mackintosh, Philip Coggan, and Jason Zweig, as well as industry experts such as Deborah Fuhr, Ben Johnson, Eric Balchunas, and David Nadig. They are all titans upon whose shoulders I nervously perch.”
― Robin Wigglesworth, Trillions: How a Band of Wall Street Renegades Invented the Index Fund and Changed Finance Forever

“The Bogle Boys. Vanguard’s founder Jack Bogle always had a young assistant to mentor, and every year all past and present assistants would have a boozy Christmas dinner with their boss. From top left to right: Jeremy Duffield, Jim Riepe, Daniel Butler, Jan Twardowski, Duncan McFarland. From bottom left to right: Jack Brennan, Tim Buckley, Jack Bogle, Jim Norris.”
― Robin Wigglesworth, Trillions: How a Band of Wall Street Renegades Invented the Index Fund and Changed Finance Forever

“TWO AND A HALF CENTURIES AGO, Amsterdam was the world’s commercial center, but many of its wealthy merchants were reeling from one of the world’s first financial crises. The shares of the British East India Company had collapsed, culminating in a series of bank failures, government bailouts, and ultimately nationalization, a debacle that rippled across the continent’s nascent markets. For a little-known Dutch merchant and stockbroker, it proved the inspiration for an idea ahead of its time. In 1774, Abraham von Ketwich set up a novel, pooled investment trust he called Eendragt Maakt Magt—Dutch for “Unity Creates Strength.” This would sell two thousand shares for five hundred guilders each to individual investors, and invest the proceeds into a diversified portfolio of fifty bonds. These were divided into ten different categories, from plantation loans, bonds backed by Spanish or Danish toll road payments, to an assortment of European government bonds. At the time, bonds were physical certificates written on paper or even goatskin, and these were stored in a solid iron chest with three locks, which could be opened only by Eendragt Maakt Magt’s board and an independent notary. The aim was to pay a 4 percent annual dividend, and disburse the final proceeds only after twenty-five years, hoping that the diversity of the portfolio would protect investors.1 As it turns out, a subsequent Anglo-Dutch war in 1780 and Napoleon’s occupation of Holland in 1795 wreaked havoc on Eendragt Maakt Magt. The annual payments never materialized, and investors didn’t receive their money back until 1824, albeit then receiving 561 guilders a share. Nonetheless, Eendragt Maakt Magt was a brilliant invention that would go on to inspire the birth of investment trusts in Great Britain and eventually the mutual fund we know today. It is also arguably the ultimate intellectual forefather of today’s index funds, given its minimal trading, diversified approach, and low fees, charging a mere 0.2 percent a year.”
― Robin Wigglesworth, Trillions: How a Band of Wall Street Renegades Invented the Index Fund and Changed Finance Forever

“This may seem shrill, but in the United States, the birthplace of index investing, the trend is now stark, entrenched, and accelerating. Over the past decade, about 80 cents of every dollar that has gone into the US investment industry has ended up at Vanguard, State Street, and BlackRock. As a result, the combined stake in S&P 500 companies held by the Big Three has quadrupled over the past two decades, from about 5 percent in in 1998 to north of 20 percent today.”
― Robin Wigglesworth, Trillions: How a Band of Wall Street Renegades Invented the Index Fund and Changed Finance Forever

“Initially the common ownership theory was dismissed as a loony idea from ivory-tower economists. After all, the airline industry is infamously bankruptcy-prone and looked like poor evidence of anticompetitive behavior, overt or otherwise. Richard Branson, the billionaire entrepreneur, once joked that the best way to become an aviation millionaire was to be a billionaire and invest in an airline. However, the theory gradually started to garner attention. “Are Index Funds Evil?” was the provocative title of one piece examining the subject in The Atlantic in 2017.18”
― Robin Wigglesworth, Trillions: How a Band of Wall Street Renegades Invented the Index Fund and Changed Finance Forever

“Historically, many investment groups have in practice outsourced much of the hard but dull, unglamorous work around corporate governance to a small club of consultancies known as “proxy advisors.” The biggest by far are Glass Lewis and Institutional Shareholder Services. Between them, they utterly dominate this niche industry, and are a quietly influential duo at the heart of the crossroads between the corporate and financial worlds. Glass Lewis attends more than 25,000 annual meetings across over 100 markets around the world every year. ISS brags that it covers about 44,000 meetings in 115 countries. Together, they advise thousands of investment groups with cumulatively tens of trillions of dollars’ worth of assets, and make millions of votes every year on their behalf. Many corporate executives resent the often formulaic approach of the proxy advisors, and see relying on them as an abdication of an investor’s responsibility. This is partly self-serving, as they dislike the proxy advisors’ views on compensation, for example. Yet there is an element of truth to it. Most investment groups don’t want the hassle of having to deal with many mundane issues across hundreds or even thousands of companies they own shares in. ISS’s and Glass Lewis’s raison d’être is to relieve them of this headache.”
― Robin Wigglesworth, Trillions: How a Band of Wall Street Renegades Invented the Index Fund and Changed Finance Forever

“As more and more investable money is managed without regard to research, evaluation, corporate governance, quality of management and an actual assessment of long-term prospects, and instead is delegated to the index-constructors and the purveyors of index products, what does that trend mean for capitalism? Growth? Innovation?” he asked rhetorically.”
― Robin Wigglesworth, Trillions: How a Band of Wall Street Renegades Invented the Index Fund and Changed Finance Forever

“In 2019, Cyrus Taraporevala, the head of State Street Global Advisors, joked at a conference that the industry was at a crossroads, with “one path leading to despair and utter hopelessness, the other to total extinction.”25 Although he was being tongue-in-cheek, his words were indicative of the widespread pessimism in large parts of the investment industry.”
― Robin Wigglesworth, Trillions: How a Band of Wall Street Renegades Invented the Index Fund and Changed Finance Forever

“Perhaps there may be an element of the distortionary effects fingered by the likes of Green. But most fund managers willingly admit that the average skill and training of the industry keeps getting higher, requiring constant reinvention, retraining, and brain-achingly hard work. The old days of “have a hunch, buy a bunch, go to lunch” are long gone. Once upon a time, simply having an MBA or a CFA might be considered an edge in the investment industry. Add in the effort to actually read quarterly financial reports from companies and you had at least a good shot at excelling. Nowadays, MBAs and CFAs are rife in the finance industry, and algorithms can read thousands of quarterly financial reports in the time it takes a human to switch on their computer.”
― Robin Wigglesworth, Trillions: How a Band of Wall Street Renegades Invented the Index Fund and Changed Finance Forever

“Although financial markets are a wildly more dynamic game, with infinitely more permutations and without the fixed rules of poker, the metaphor is a compelling explanation for why markets actually appear to be becoming harder to beat even as the tide of passive investing continues to rise. Mediocre fund managers are simply being gradually squeezed out of the industry. At the same time, the number of individual investors—the proverbial doctors and dentists getting stock tips on the golf course and taking a bet—has gradually declined, depriving Wall Street of the steady stream of “dumb money” that provided suckers for the “smart money” of professional fund managers to take advantage of.”
― Robin Wigglesworth, Trillions: How a Band of Wall Street Renegades Invented the Index Fund and Changed Finance Forever

“The hope of many traditional investors is that markets will eventually reach a tipping point where they are so inefficient that it opens up a bonanza of lucrative opportunities for them to take advantage of. But so far there are no signs of that point approaching. Some analysts are skeptical that there will ever be a promised land of abundant alpha. Michael Mauboussin, one of Wall Street’s most pedigreed analysts and an adjunct professor at Columbia Business School, has an apt metaphor to show how the hope among many active managers that index funds will eventually become so big that markets become easier to beat is likely in vain: Imagine that investing is akin to a poker game between a bunch of friends of varying skill. In all likelihood, the dimmer players will be the first to be forced out of the game and head home to nurse their losses. But that doesn’t mean that the game then becomes easier for the remaining cardsharps. In fact, it becomes harder, as the players still in the game are the best ones.24”
― Robin Wigglesworth, Trillions: How a Band of Wall Street Renegades Invented the Index Fund and Changed Finance Forever

“There is a conundrum at the heart of the efficient-markets hypothesis, often called the Grossman-Stiglitz Paradox after a seminal 1980 paper written by hedge fund manager Sanford Grossman and the Nobel laureate economist Joseph Stiglitz.22 “On the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient Markets” was a frontal assault on Eugene Fama’s theory, pointing out that if market prices truly perfectly reflected all relevant information—such as corporate data, economic news, or industry trends—then no one would be incentivized to collect the information needed to trade. After all, doing so is a costly pursuit. But then markets would no longer be efficient. In other words, someone has to make markets efficient, and somehow they have to be compensated for the work involved. This paradox has hardly held back the growth of passive investing. Many investors gradually realized that whatever academic theory one subscribes to, the cold unforgiving fact is that over time most active managers underperform their benchmarks. Even if they do beat the market, a lot of the “alpha” they produce is then often gobbled up by their fees. With his usual wit, Bogle dubbed this the “Cost Matters Hypothesis.”23 However, the truth of the Grossman-Stiglitz Paradox does raise some pertinent questions around whether markets may become less efficient as more and more investing is done through index funds.”
― Robin Wigglesworth, Trillions: How a Band of Wall Street Renegades Invented the Index Fund and Changed Finance Forever

“But some investors and analysts fret that given the strength of the trend toward greater passive investing, the market’s efficiency will gradually atrophy, with potentially dire consequences. “A given investment in active may or may not be the best decision for an individual particular investor but for the system overall there is a benefit in the efficient allocation of capital,” Fraser-Jenkins argued.21 “Rather than looking at the real economy and seeking to understand its future development, passive allocation self-referentially looks to the financial economy to inform its asset allocation choices.”
― Robin Wigglesworth, Trillions: How a Band of Wall Street Renegades Invented the Index Fund and Changed Finance Forever

“Although the framing was deliberately provocative, it is undeniably true that index funds are free riders on the work done by active managers, which has an aggregate societal value—something even Jack Bogle admitted. If everyone merely invested passively, the outcome would be “chaos, catastrophe,” Bogle noted a few years before passing away. “There would be no trading. There would be no way to turn a stream of income into a pile of capital or a pile of capital into a stream of income,” Vanguard’s founder observed in 2017.20 Bogle rightly pointed out that the likelihood of such a scenario—where everyone was merely invested in an index fund—was zero.”
― Robin Wigglesworth, Trillions: How a Band of Wall Street Renegades Invented the Index Fund and Changed Finance Forever

“The most cutting, colorful illustration of this conundrum is from Inigo Fraser-Jenkins, the Bernstein analyst who penned the sarcastic homage to a fictional indexer attempting to build the Ultimate Index. In 2016, Fraser-Jenkins published an even punchier report entitled “The Silent Road to Serfdom: Why Passive Investment Is Worse Than Marxism.” His argument was that at least communist countries attempted to allocate resources to the most important areas. This may be less efficient than the decentralized, markets-oriented allocation method of capitalism, but it is still better than blindly allocating money according to the vagaries of an arbitrary index.”
― Robin Wigglesworth, Trillions: How a Band of Wall Street Renegades Invented the Index Fund and Changed Finance Forever

“FERNANDO IS NO APOLOGIST FOR the investment industry, arguing that despite huge strides over the past two decades there are still many mediocre money managers who spend too much time and money chasing the latest hot idea. As a result, retail investors often “get taken for a ride,” she concedes. But she worries that the now-indiscriminate shift into passive investment strategies is eroding the central role that financial markets play in the economy, with money blindly shoveled into stocks according to their size, rather than their prospects. “The stock market is supposed to be a capital allocation machine. But by investing passively you are just putting money into the past winners, rather than the future winners,” she argues. In other words, beyond the impact on markets or other investors, is the growth of index investing having a deleterious impact on economic dynamism?”
― Robin Wigglesworth, Trillions: How a Band of Wall Street Renegades Invented the Index Fund and Changed Finance Forever

“Can one unearth above-average fund managers, who can consistently or over time beat the market? Once again, the academic research is gloomy for the investment industry. Using the database first started by Jim Lorie’s Center for Research in Security Prices, S&P Dow Jones Indices publishes a semiannual “persistence scorecard” on how often top-performing fund managers keep excelling. The results are grim reading, with less than 3 percent of top-performing equity funds remaining in the top after five years. In fact, being a top performer is more likely to presage a slump than a sustained run.18 As a result, as Fernando’s defenestration highlighted, the hurdle to retain the faith of investors keeps getting higher, even for fund managers who do well.* In the 1990s, the top six deciles of US equities-focused mutual funds enjoyed investor inflows, according to Morgan Stanley.19 In the first decade of the new millennium, only the top three deciles did so, and in the 2010–20 period, only the top 10 percent of funds have managed to avoid outflows, and gathered assets at a far slower pace than they would have in the past.”
― Robin Wigglesworth, Trillions: How a Band of Wall Street Renegades Invented the Index Fund and Changed Finance Forever

“The seminal paper in the field was published in 1991 by William Sharpe, whose theories underpinned the original creation of the index fund, and was bluntly titled “The Arithmetic of Active Management.”16 This expanded on Sharpe’s earlier work, and addressed the suggestion that the index investing trend that was starting to gain ground at the time was a mere “fad.” The paper articulated what Sharpe saw as two iron rules that must hold true over time: The return on the average actively managed dollar will equal that of a dollar managed passively before costs, and after costs the return on that actively managed dollar will be less than that of a passively managed dollar. In other words, mathematically the market represents the average returns, and for every investor who outperforms the market someone must do worse. Given that index funds charge far less than traditional funds, over time the average passive investor must do better than the average active one. Other academics have later quibbled with aspects of Sharpe’s 1991 paper, with Lasse Heje Pedersen’s “Sharpening the Arithmetic of Active Management” the most prominent example. In this 2016 paper, Pedersen points out that Sharpe’s assertions rest on some crucial assumptions, such as that the “market portfolio” never actually changes. But in reality, what constitutes “the market” is in constant flux. This means that active managers can at least theoretically on average outperform it, and they perform a valuable service to the health of a markets-based economy by doing so. Nonetheless, Pedersen stresses that this should not necessarily be construed as a full-throated defense of active management. “I think that low-cost index funds is one of the most investor-friendly inventions in finance and this paper should not be used as an excuse by active managers who charge high fees while adding little or no value,” he wrote.17 “My arithmetic shows that active management can add value in aggregate, but whether it actually does, and how much, are empirical questions.”
― Robin Wigglesworth, Trillions: How a Band of Wall Street Renegades Invented the Index Fund and Changed Finance Forever

“THE POWER OF MSCI, FTSE RUSSELL, and S&P Dow Jones Indices is largely over only stock markets. Of even greater and direct importance to countries are their presence and weighting in various influential bond market indices. These may not have the cachet of the brand-name stock market benchmarks bandied about on TV bulletins, but indices like the Bloomberg Barclays Global Aggregate or JPMorgan’s EMBI and GBI-EM are also powerful in their own way.”
― Robin Wigglesworth, Trillions: How a Band of Wall Street Renegades Invented the Index Fund and Changed Finance Forever

“It is fair to say the attendees of the carnival-like conference just outside Miami took little note of McNabb’s consternation. Investors have in recent years been able to buy niche, “thematic” ETFs that purport to benefit from—deep breath—the global obesity epidemic; online gaming; the rise of millennials; the whiskey industry; robotics; artificial intelligence; clean energy; solar energy; autonomous driving; uranium mining; better female board representation; cloud computing; genomics technology; social media; marijuana farming; toll roads in the developing world; water purification; reverse-weighted US stocks; health and fitness; organic food; elderly care; lithium batteries; drones; and cybersecurity. There was even briefly an ETF that invested in the stocks of companies exposed to the ETF industry. Some of these more experimental funds gain traction, but many languish and are eventually liquidated, the money recycled into the latest hot fad.”
― Robin Wigglesworth, Trillions: How a Band of Wall Street Renegades Invented the Index Fund and Changed Finance Forever

“Given how investors preferred the use of brand-name indices, and how investor inflows and tradability is a virtuous circle for ETFs, it essentially allowed BGI to seize and fortify important tracts of the investment landscape undisturbed. The iShares Russell ETF alone manages about $70 billion today, more than its three biggest competitors combined. It was in effect what Silicon Valley today terms a “blitzscaling”—a well-funded, rapid, and aggressive move to build an unassailable market share as quickly as possible.”
― Robin Wigglesworth, Trillions: How a Band of Wall Street Renegades Invented the Index Fund and Changed Finance Forever

“Most’s eclectic background also provided the spark behind the invention of what would become known as the ETF. During his travels around the Pacific, he had appreciated the efficiency of how traders would buy and sell warehouse receipts of commodities, rather than the more cumbersome physical vats of coconut oil, barrels of crude, or ingots of gold. This opened up a panoply of opportunities for creative financial engineers. “You store a commodity and you get a warehouse receipt and you can finance on that warehouse receipt. You can sell it, do a lot of things with it. Because you don’t want to be moving the merchandise back and forth all the time, so you keep it in place and you simply transfer the warehouse receipt,” he later recalled.19 Most’s ingenious idea was to, after a fashion, mimic this basic structure. The Amex could create a kind of legal warehouse where it could place the S&P 500 stocks, and then create and list shares in the warehouse itself for people to trade. The new warehouse-cum-fund would take advantage of the growth and electronic evolution in portfolio trading—the simultaneous buying and selling of big baskets of stocks first pioneered by Wells Fargo two decades earlier—and a little-known aspect of mutual funds: They can do “in kind” transactions, exchanging shares in a fund for a proportional amount of the stocks it contains, rather than cash. Or an investor can gather the correct proportion of the underlying stocks and exchange them for shares in the fund. Stock exchange “specialists”—the trading firms on the floor of the exchange that match buyers and sellers—would be authorized to be able to create or redeem these shares according to demand. They could take advantage of any differences that might open up between the price of the “warehouse” and the stock it contained, an arbitrage opportunity that should help keep it trading in line with its assets. This elegant creation/redemption process would also get around the logistical challenges of money coming in and out continuously throughout the day—one of Bogle’s main practical concerns. In basic terms, investors can either trade shares of the warehouse between themselves, or go to the warehouse and exchange their shares in it for a slice of the stocks it holds. Or they can turn up at the warehouse with a suitable bundle of stocks and exchange them for shares in the warehouse. Moreover, because no money changes hands when shares in the warehouse are created or redeemed, capital gains tax can be delayed until the investor actually sells their shares—a side effect that has proven vital to the growth of ETFs in the United States. Only when an ETF is actually sold will investors have to pay any capital gains taxes due.”
― Robin Wigglesworth, Trillions: How a Band of Wall Street Renegades Invented the Index Fund and Changed Finance Forever

“At one point Booth was cornered by the assistant treasurer of one big customer, who angrily grabbed his arm and snarled, “I want you to know you’re the worst performing manager we have in any asset class. Do you still believe that small-cap stocks have higher expected returns?” Booth stuck to the DFA script and replied, “We believe small-cap stocks are riskier than big-cap stocks and risk and return are related. Which part of the argument are you no longer comfortable with?”14 DFA eventually did make it through the lean years, but not without casualties.”
― Robin Wigglesworth, Trillions: How a Band of Wall Street Renegades Invented the Index Fund and Changed Finance Forever

“Whatever the reason, the existence of some persistent investment factors is today accepted by almost every (if not all) financial economist and investor. In an ingenious bit of marketing, factors are often called “smart beta.” Sharpe himself grew to hate the term, as it implies that all other forms of beta are dumb.10 Most financial academics prefer the term “risk premia,” to more accurately reflect the fact that they think these factors primarily yield an investment premium from taking some kind of risk—even if they cannot always agree what the precise risk is. An important milestone was when Fama and his frequent collaborator Ken French—another Chicago finance professor who would later also join DFA—in 1992 published a paper with the oblique title “The Cross-Section of Expected Stock Returns.”11 It was a bombshell. In what would become known as the three-factor model, Fama and French used data on companies listed on the NYSE, the American Stock Exchange, and the Nasdaq from 1963 to 1990 and showed that both value (the tendency of cheap stocks to outperform expensive ones) and size (the tendency of smaller stocks to outperform bigger ones) were distinct factors from the broader market factor—the beta. Although Fama and French’s paper termed these factors as rewards for taking extra risks, coming from the father of the efficient-markets hypothesis, it was a signal event in the history of financial economics.12 Since then academics have identified a panoply of factors, with varying degrees of durability, strength, and acceptance. Of course, factors do not always work. They can go through long fallow stretches where they underperform the market. Value stocks, for example, suffered a miserable bout of performance in the dotcom bubble, when investors wanted to buy only trendy technology stocks. And to DFA’s chagrin, after small caps enjoyed a robust year in DFA’s first year of existence, they would then undergo a long, painful seven-year period of trailing dramatically behind the S&P 500.13 DFA managed to keep growing, losing very few clients, partly because it had always stressed to them that stretches like this could happen. But it was an uncomfortable period that led to many awkward conversations with clients.”
― Robin Wigglesworth, Trillions: How a Band of Wall Street Renegades Invented the Index Fund and Changed Finance Forever

“Ross’s “arbitrage pricing theory” and Rosenberg’s “bionic betas” posited that the returns of any financial security are the result of several systematic factors. Although seemingly stating the obvious, this was a seminal moment in the move toward a more vibrant understanding of markets. The eclectic Rosenberg was even put on the cover of Institutional Investor in May 1978, the bald, mustachioed man depicted as a giant meditating guru with flowers in his hair, worshipped by a gathering of besuited portfolio managers. The headline was “Who Is Barr Rosenberg? And What the Hell Is He Talking About?”8 What he was talking about was how academics were beginning to classify stocks according to not just their industry or their geography, but their financial characteristics. And some of these characteristics might actually prove to deliver better long-term returns than the broader stock market. In 1973, Sanjoy Basu, a finance professor at McMaster University in Ontario, published a paper that indicated that companies with low stock prices relative to their earnings did better than the efficient-markets hypothesis would suggest. Essentially, he showed that the value investing principles espoused by Benjamin Graham in the 1930s—which revolved around buying cheap, out-of-favor stocks trading below their intrinsic worth—was a durable investment factor. By systematically buying all cheap stocks, investors could in theory beat the broader market over time. Then Banz showed the same for small caps, another big moment in the evolution of factor investing. Follow-up studies on smaller stocks in Japan and the UK showed similar results, so in 1986 DFA launched dedicated small-cap funds for those two markets as well. In the early 1990s, finance professors Narasimhan Jegadeesh and Sheridan Titman published a paper indicating that simply surfing market momentum—in practice buying stocks that were already bouncing and selling those that were sliding—could also produce market-beating returns.9 The reasons for these apparent anomalies divide academics. Efficient-markets disciples stipulate that they are the compensation investors receive for taking extra risks. Value stocks, for example, are often found in beaten-up, unpopular, and shunned companies, such as boring industrial conglomerates in the middle of the dotcom bubble. While they can underperform for long stretches, eventually their underlying worth shines through and rewards investors who kept the faith. Small stocks do well largely because small companies are more likely to fail than bigger ones. Behavioral economists, on the other hand, argue that factors tend to be the product of our irrational human biases. For example, just like how we buy pricey lottery tickets for the infinitesimal chance of big wins, investors tend to overpay for fast-growing, glamorous stocks, and unfairly shun duller, steadier ones. Smaller stocks do well because we are illogically drawn to names we know well. The momentum factor, on the other hand, works because investors initially underreact to news but overreact in the long run, or often sell winners too quickly and hang on to bad bets for far longer than is advisable.”
― Robin Wigglesworth, Trillions: How a Band of Wall Street Renegades Invented the Index Fund and Changed Finance Forever

“Many have been supposedly foolproof but zany formulae that have made no one rich but the hucksters who sold them to the gullible. But over the years there have been some approaches that have enjoyed at least a modicum of success. These range from the Dow Theory first espoused by Wall Street Journal founder Charles Dow—essentially using technical indicators to try to identify and profit from different market phases—and David Butler’s CANSLIM system, to the value investing school articulated by Benjamin Graham. The earth-shattering suggestion of the research conducted in the 1960s and 1970s was that the code might actually be unbreakable, and efforts to decipher it were expensive and futile. Harry Markowitz’s modern portfolio theory and William Sharpe’s CAPM indicated that the market itself was the optimal balance between risks and return, while Gene Fama presented a cohesive, compelling argument for why that was: The net effect of the efforts of thousands upon thousands of investors continually trying to outsmart each other was that the stock market was efficient, and in practice hard to beat. Most investors should therefore just sit on their hands and buy the entire market. But in the 1980s and 1990s, a new round of groundbreaking research—some of it from the same efficient-markets disciples who had rattled the investing world in the 1960s and 1970s—started revealing some fault lines in the academic edifice built up in the previous decades. Perhaps the stock market wasn’t entirely efficient, and maybe there were indeed ways to beat it in the long run? Some gremlins in the system were always known, but often glossed over. Already in the early 1970s, Black and Scholes had noted that there were some odd issues with the theory, such as how less volatile stocks actually produced better long-term returns than choppier ones. That contradicted the belief that return and risk (using volatility as a proxy for risk) were correlated. In other words, loopier roller coasters produce greater thrills. Though the theory made intuitive sense, in practice it didn’t seem to hold up to rigorous scrutiny. This is why Scholes and Black initially proposed that Wells Fargo should set up a fund that would buy lower-volatility stocks (that is, low-beta) and use leverage to bring the portfolio’s overall volatility up to the broader stock market.7 Hey, presto, a roller coaster with the same number of loops as everyone else, but with even greater thrills. Nonetheless, the efficient-markets hypothesis quickly became dogma at business schools around the United States.”
― Robin Wigglesworth, Trillions: How a Band of Wall Street Renegades Invented the Index Fund and Changed Finance Forever

“At Chicago, Booth also got to know another precocious student in the year below him—Rex Sinquefield. Both young students grew close to their professor and absorbed Fama’s acerbic view of fund managers. “I’d compare stock pickers to astrologers. But I don’t want to bad-mouth the astrologers,” the professor once quipped.”
― Robin Wigglesworth, Trillions: How a Band of Wall Street Renegades Invented the Index Fund and Changed Finance Forever

“To Bogle—who had years earlier battled with Samuelson’s textbook at Princeton—the column was electrifying. It inspired his future mantra that “strategy follows structure,” and this was a strategy that arguably suited Vanguard’s hamstrung structure perfectly. The few existing index funds were almost solely the preserve of pension funds, and while they were beginning to gain traction, none of Vanguard’s competitors in the mutual fund industry—mostly aimed at ordinary investors—would want to start a low-cost product that might show up its pricier, traditional actively managed funds. Meanwhile, Vanguard’s at-cost structure was the perfect match. Plus, he obviously knew a few gunslingers in Boston whom he wouldn’t mind humbling.”
― Robin Wigglesworth, Trillions: How a Band of Wall Street Renegades Invented the Index Fund and Changed Finance Forever