Meade at Gettysburg Quotes

“Such was the bitter fruit of General Reynolds’s failed reconnaissance in force on 1 July.”
― Kent Masterson Brown, Meade at Gettysburg: A Study in Command

“The decision to remain at Gettysburg was very serious on a number of levels. What has never been written about the meeting on the night of 2 July was the generals’ discussion of the condition of the army wholly apart from its losses in combat.”
― Kent Masterson Brown, Meade at Gettysburg: A Study in Command

“On a railroad line that was sufficient to pass only three or four trains a day, Haupt concluded that he could pass thirty trains each day along the tracks between Baltimore and Westminster.”
― Kent Masterson Brown, Meade at Gettysburg: A Study in Command

“The events of 1 July provide a startling example of what happens when an advance corps fails to deploy fully and then fails to withdraw once the enemy concentrates against it. Because of what must be considered General Reynolds’s impulsive judgment on the field earlier that morning, Meade’s carefully planned use of an advance corps to cause the enemy to concentrate and show its hand completely failed in its execution. As a result, two of the three corps comprising the left wing of the army were shattered. Meade had all the earmarks of a disaster on his hands. Meade faced his first real test as an operational commander.”
― Kent Masterson Brown, Meade at Gettysburg: A Study in Command

“Rarely has a new commander been presented with such daunting and complex issues on his first day in command as was George Meade.”
― Kent Masterson Brown, Meade at Gettysburg: A Study in Command

“Rarely has a new commander been presented with such daunting and complex issues on his first day in command as was George Meade. He dealt with his limitations and deprivations with a steady head and evident equanimity.”
― Kent Masterson Brown Esq., Meade at Gettysburg: A Study in Command