Science of Coercion Quotes

“Discussion of psychological warfare remains controversial because reexamination of its record leads in short order to a heretical conclusion: The role of the United States in world affairs during our lifetimes has often been rapacious, destructive, tolerant of genocide, and willing to sacrifice countless people in the pursuit of a chimera of security that has grown ever more remote. Rethinking psychological warfare's role in communication studies, in turn, requires reconsideration of where contemporary Western ideology comes from, whose interests it serves, and the role that social scientists play in its propagation. Such discussions have always upset those who are content with the present order of things. For the rest of us, though, they permit a glimmer of hope.”
― Christopher Simpson, Science of Coercion: Communication Research and Psychological Warfare, 1945-1960

“The path of scientific discovery in U.S. communication research was not decided in advance by the government or anyone else, of course. Although government funding did not determine what could be said by social scientists, it did play a major role in determining who would do the "authoritative" talking about communication and an indirect role in determining who would enjoy access to the academic media necessary to be heard by others in the field.”
― Christopher Simpson, Science of Coercion: Communication Research and Psychological Warfare, 1945-1960

“The secrecy that surrounds
any CIA operation makes complete documentation impossible, but the
fragmentary information that is now available permits identification of
several important examples.”
― Christopher Simpson, Science of Coercion: Communication Research and Psychological Warfare, 1945-1960

“In reality, though, U.S. and Soviet psychological warfare programs each fed its rival’s appetite for escalated conflicts, particularly in contested countries in the Third World. Scientific research programs on either side that claimed to be a defensive reaction to foreign intrigues were easily interpreted in the rival’s camp as aggressive preparations for war.”
― Christopher Simpson, Science of Coercion: Communication Research and Psychological Warfare, 1945-1960

“At least six of the most important U.S. centers of postwar communication studies grew up as de facto adjuncts of government psychological warfare programs.”
― Christopher Simpson, Science of Coercion: Communication Research and Psychological Warfare, 1945-1960

“The journal openly ridiculed writers who failed to use "scientific" formats for their ideas when offering heretical points of view on mass communication issues. Two examples of this can be found in Avery Leiserson's scathing review of George Seldes' The People Don't Know
and Lloyd Barenblatt's commentary on Vance Packard's Hidden Persuaders. Both Seldes and Packard argued that the mass media in the United States presented a monolithic, ideologically charged version of "reality" that had succeeded in shaping popular consciousness to a much greater degree than was generally recognized; POQ presented both authors to its readers as irresponsible crackpots.”
― Christopher Simpson, Science of Coercion: Communication Research and Psychological Warfare, 1945-1960

“The conclusion is inescapable: The U.S. social scientists active in psychological warfare were not ignorant of their role, or of the violence that usually accompanied psychological operations. They were, rather, "insulated," just as Biderman and Crawford say, from consideration of the implications of their work.”
― Christopher Simpson, Science of Coercion: Communication Research and Psychological Warfare, 1945-1960