Collision Course Quotes

“Quoting page 157: One consequence of this shift by management to a diversity rationale was the support it provided employers for hiring immigrants. Sociologist William Julius Wilson, surveying employment practices in a representative sample of 179 firms in the greater Chicago area in 1987-88, was “overwhelmed” by the willingness of Chicago employers to talk with his interviewers “in a negative way about blacks.” Three-fourths of the employers surveyed expressed some negative views about black workers, especially inner-city black men. They were seen as lazy, dishonest, undependable, and lacking in a work ethic. Employers strongly preferred Hispanic and Asian workers, seeing them as hardworking, dependable, and honest.”
― Hugh Davis Graham, Collision Course: The Strange Convergence of Affirmative Action and Immigration Policy in America

“Quoting page 150-151: Political camouflage, needed by legislators eager to please civil rights and minority organizations while avoiding punishment by voters for supporting racial quotas, was provided by the bureaucratic obscurity of the government’s procurement process. Voters did not understand the complexities of government contracting and agency regulation. …

The weaknesses of minority set-asides were chiefly two. First, they were indubitably racial and ethnic quotas, and hence were politically controversial. As government benefits tied to ancestry, they violated the classic liberal creed that Americans possessed equal individual rights. … Nonminority contractors were barred by their ancestry or their skin color from even bidding on contracts paid for by taxpayer dollars, including their own.

Second, and less obviously, set-aside programs produced a common set of flaws in implementation. The most severe problem was the concentration of set-aside contracts on a few successful firms. Agency officials, needing to spend a large amount of money on minority procurement contractors every fiscal year, found very few minority contractors able to do the job. Four-fifths of all certified minority firms had no employees, their personnel roster consisting solely of the owner of the enterprise. As a consequence, agency set-aside contracts were typically concentrated on only a few firms large enough and sufficiently experienced to meet the terms of the contracts, providing constructing, street paving, computer services, military uniforms, or other goods and services. In 1990, for example, only fifty firms, representing less than 2 percent of the certified minority firms in the 8(a) program, accounted for 40 percent of the $4 billion awarded. … such firms never seemed to “graduate” from the set-aside program, weaned from the incubator and ready to compete in the normal marketplace of competitive government contracting. … Almost all the contracts were awarded on a no-bid or “sole source” basis; in fiscal 1991, for example, only 1.9 percent of the 4,576 contracts in the 8(a) program were awarded on a competitive basis.”
― Hugh Davis Graham, Collision Course: The Strange Convergence of Affirmative Action and Immigration Policy in America

“Quoting page 148: … the SBA [Small Business Administration] next, in 1982, considered a petition [for inclusion in the 8(a) program] on behalf of Asian Indians. SBA guidelines required petitioners to provide evidence of several factors, including “evidence of long-term prejudice and discrimination in American society suffered by an overwhelming majority” of the petitioning group, and evidence of “past and present effects of discriminatory practices” that together “have resulted and continue to result in substantial economic deprivation for an overwhelming majority” of the group, including “substantial impediments in the business world.” This would seem to be a tall order for Asian-Indian Americans. … In 1980, the percentage of college graduates and managers or professionals among Asian Indians was 52 and 49 percent, respectively, while for all Americans it was 16 and 23 percent. In 1989, Asian Indians had the highest median household income ($48,320 in 1989 dollars) of all immigrant groups in the country. … The SBA, avoiding socioeconomic data and comparisons, added India to the presumptively eligible list in February 1982.”
― Hugh Davis Graham, Collision Course: The Strange Convergence of Affirmative Action and Immigration Policy in America

“Quoting page 144: Organized minority groups competing for official recognition were quick to punish government officials for treating their group less favorably than others. In 1978, when Congress in the Small Business Investment Act provided a statutory basis for the SBA’s 8(a) program, the law omitted Asian-Americans from the list of minorities (blacks, Hispanics, and Native Americans) considered presumptively “socially and economically disadvantaged.” Responding to this omission, Asian-American groups hammered the SBA, which within a year reinstated them among the presumptively eligible groups. Yet there was something bizarre about awarding taxpayer-subsidized business grants and loans to members of the country’s top income strata on the grounds that all members of the groups were presumed to be socially disadvantaged.”
― Hugh Davis Graham, Collision Course: The Strange Convergence of Affirmative Action and Immigration Policy in America

“Quoting page 115: The Hispanic civil rights organizations were heavily financed by the Ford Foundation, whose president from the late 1960s through the 1970s was McGeorge Bundy, Harvard alumni veteran of the Kennedy White House and tower of the nation’s eastern liberal establishment. In 1968 Ford had created MALDEF, as a Latino version of the NAACP, with a $2.2 million founding grant. La Raza, given a similar birthing grant of $630,000 by Ford in 1968, received $1,953,700 two years later. Between 1970 and 1999, Ford gave MALDEF $27.9 million and La Raza $21.5 million.

In 1981 Ford started funding LULAC, the oldest Hispanic association. Noted since its origins in Texas in 1929 for espousing patriotism, political moderation, self-help ethnic, support for English language mastery, and bourgeois civic boosterism, LULAC in the 1970s adopted the strident tone of Chicano nationalism common to La Raza and MALDEF. In 1983 the Ford Foundation, led by Ford’s first African-American president, Franklin A. Thomas, began funding the National Immigration Forum, an umbrella association modeled on the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights, to coordinate lobbying against [immigration] restrictionist organizations such as FAIR. LULAC, although joining the racialized agenda of MALDEF and La Raza in the 1970s, retained its character as a membership-based organization rooted in the Hispanic (mainly Mexican-American) community. But the constituency represented by MALDEF and La Raza was essentially the Ford Foundation and the tightly networking community of Latino political careerists.”
― Hugh Davis Graham, Collision Course: The Strange Convergence of Affirmative Action and Immigration Policy in America

“Quoting Page 109: An Urban Institute study found that when public school costs were included, Mexican immigrant households in Los Angeles County in 1980 cost almost twice as much in state and local government expenditures than they paid in taxes.”
― Hugh Davis Graham, Collision Course: The Strange Convergence of Affirmative Action and Immigration Policy in America

“Quoting Page 87: In 1978 a four-year study by the American Institutes for Research, sponsored by the USOE [U.S. Office of Education], concluded that most of the Hispanic students involved [in bilingual/bicultural programs[ were native speakers of English, that those who needed to learn English competence were not in fact acquiring it, that most bilingual programs were aimed at linguistic and cultural maintenance rather than learning English, and that the segregated Hispanic students who were already alienated from school simply remained so.”
― Hugh Davis Graham, Collision Course: The Strange Convergence of Affirmative Action and Immigration Policy in America

“Quoting page 85: The OCR [Office for Civil Rights] in the early 1970s in effect experienced an internal capture shift. The black agenda activists who had dominated the office between 1965 and 1970 were joined and to some extend displaced by a new cadre of Latino activists. Not content with the transitional model of bilingual education, which used native-language instruction as a bridge to English language proficiency, the Latino nationalists called for Spanish-based cultural maintenance programs of indefinite duration. La Raza Unida’s 1967 founding statement captured the Chicano spirit of cultural nationalism and linguistic ethnocentrism: “The time of subjugation, exploitation, and abuse of human rights of La Raza in the United States is hereby ended forever,” the manifesto proclaimed. “[We] affirm the magnificence of La Raza, the greatness of our heritage, our history, our language, our traditions, our contributions to humanity and culture.”
― Hugh Davis Graham, Collision Course: The Strange Convergence of Affirmative Action and Immigration Policy in America

“Quoting page 74-75: The ability of the minority rights interest groups to win control of the new agencies of civil rights enforcement established in the 1960s followed a traditional pattern in the politics of regulation that students of public administration called “clientele capture.” The practice is as old as Jacksonian democracy, which set the American tradition wherein party patronage ruled the civil service and mission agencies were expected to cater to the needs of their organized constituencies: farmers, veterans, laborers, and business interests. By the 1960s, journalists referred to these arrangements as iron triangles.” They were three-way coalitions of mutual back-scratching, operating in Washington and in state and municipal governments throughout America. Three points of the triangle were organized interests which lobbied legislators to establish or expand programs beneficial to their members; legislative committees, which obliged the lobbyists by authorizing and funding programs for the mission agencies to manage; and government bureaucrats, who expanded their empire building service programs to benefit the interest groups. To complete the triangular cycle, interest groups supported the legislators. … because environmental and consumer protection regulation is cross-cutting and horizontal—covering pollution, for example, from all industrial sources, rather than single industry and vertical … it is a difficult target for capture.

The new agencies of civil right regulation, however, were different in ways that made them highly vulnerable to capture. Most important, the cost-benefit structure of civil right regulation is the opposite of that found in environmental and consumer protection regulation. Benefits (jobs, promotions, admissions, contract set-asides) are narrowly concentrated among protected-class clienteles (racial and ethnic minorities, women, the handicapped). Costs, on the other hand, are widely distributed (government and corporate budgets).”
― Hugh Davis Graham, Collision Course: The Strange Convergence of Affirmative Action and Immigration Policy in America

“Quoting page 65-66: Race-conscious affirmative action is a familiar term of journalistic convenience. It identifies unambiguously the controversial element of minority preferences in distributing benefits. But it also conflates racially targeted civil rights remedies with affirmative action preferences for groups, such as Hispanics and women, given protected class status irrespective of race. … It includes nonracial as well as racial preferences, and it distinguishes such remedies, available only to officially designated protected classes, from the soft affirmative action … which emphasized special outreach programs for recruiting minorities … within a traditional liberal framework of equal individual rights for all Americans. …

The architects of race-conscious affirmative action, Skrentny observes, developed their remedy in the face of public opinion heavily arrayed against it. Unlike most public policy in America, hard affirmative action was originally adopted without the benefit of any organized lobbying by the major interest groups involved. Instead, government bureaucrats, not benefiting interest groups, provided the main impetus. The race-conscious model of hard affirmative action was developed in trial-and-error fashion by a coalition of mostly white, second-tier civil servants in the social service agencies of the presidency…

To Skrenty’s core irony, we may add three further ironies, first, the key to political survival for hard affirmative action was persistent support from the Republican Party… Second, the theories of compensatory justice supporting minority preference policies were devised only after the adoption of the policies themselves. Finally, affirmative action preferences which supporters rationalized as necessary to compensate African-Americans for historic discrimination, and which for twenty years were successfully defended in federal courts primarily on those grounds, soon benefited millions of immigrants newly arrived from Latin America and Asia.”
― Hugh Davis Graham, Collision Course: The Strange Convergence of Affirmative Action and Immigration Policy in America

“Quoting page 63: Business interests not surprisingly supported the [1965 immigration reform] bill as well, but were not a driving force behind it. Because the baby boom was pouring new workers into the economy, and the assault on racial discrimination promised to feed millions of underemployed blacks into the workforce as well, employers did not seem to be looking for workers overseas. Even the growers were quiet. Sponsors of the Bracero farm worker program that had imported hundreds of thousands of mostly Mexican contract workers since 1942—the program averaged 430,000 guestworkers a year from Mexico during its peak 1955-60 years—the growers had been attacked by organized labor, religious, and civil rights organization for exploiting foreign workers and depressing labor standards. The same liberal coalition that backed the civil rights and immigration reforms of 1964-65 had persuaded Congress to terminate the Bracero program in 1964. …

The Wall Street Journal, commenting on the conservative nature of the immigration reform, noted on October 4, 1965, that the family preference priorities would ensure that “the new immigration system would not stray radically from the old one.” The historically restrictionist American Legion Magazine agreed, reassured by the promises of continuity. As Senator Edward Kennedy had pledged in the Senate hearings on immigration, first, “Under the proposed bill, the present level of immigration remains substantially the same,” and second, “the ethnic mix of this country will not be upset.”
― Hugh Davis Graham, Collision Course: The Strange Convergence of Affirmative Action and Immigration Policy in America

“Quoting page 63: The Wall Street Journal, commenting on the conservative nature of the immigration reform, noted on October 4, 1965, that the family preference priorities would ensure that “the new immigration system would not stray radically from the old one.” The historically restrictionist American Legion Magazine agreed, reassured by the promises of continuity. As Senator Edward Kennedy had pledged in the Senate hearings on immigration, first, “Under the proposed bill, the present level of immigration remains substantially the same,” and second, “the ethnic mix of this country will not be upset.”
― Hugh Davis Graham, Collision Course: The Strange Convergence of Affirmative Action and Immigration Policy in America

“Quoting page 56-57: Most important for the content of immigration reform, the driving force at the core of this movement, reaching back to the 1920s, were Jewish organizations long active in opposing racial and ethnic quotas. These included the American Jewish Congress, the American Jewish Committee, the Anti-Defamation League of B’nai B’rith, and the American Federation of Jews from Eastern Europe. Jewish members of Congress, particularly representatives from New York and Chicago, had maintained steady but largely ineffective pressure against the national origins quotas since the 1920s. But the war against Hitler and the postwar movement against colonialism sharply changed the ideological and moral environment, putting defenders of racial, caste, and ethnic hierarchies on the defensive. Jewish political leaders in New York, most prominently Governor Herbert Lehman, had pioneered in the 1940s in passing state antidiscrimination legislation. Importantly, these statutes and executive orders added “national origin” to race, color, and religion as impermissible grounds for discrimination.

Following the shock of the Holocaust, Jewish leaders had been especially active in Washington in furthering immigration reform. To the public, the most visible evidence of the immigration reform drive was played by Jewish legislative leaders, such as Representative Celler and Senator Jacob Javits of New York. Less visible, but equally important, were the efforts of key advisers on presidential and agency staffs. These included senior policy advisers such as Julius Edelson and Harry Rosenfield in the Truman administration, Maxwell Rabb in the Eisenhower White House, and presidential aide Myer Feldman, assistant secretary of state Abba Schwartz, and deputy attorney general Norbert Schlei in the Kennedy-Johnson administration.”
― Hugh Davis Graham, Collision Course: The Strange Convergence of Affirmative Action and Immigration Policy in America

“Quoting page 60: In the 1960s, racism was chiefly understood to mean discrimination by whites against African-Americans. But in the immigration debate of the Progressive Era, the nation’s most prominent black leaders—most notably the Republican conservative, Booker T. Washington, and the socialist intellectual, W.E.B. DuBois—supported the restrictionists. Washington, in his famous Atlanta address at the Cotton States Exposition in 1895, pleaded with industrial leaders to employ loyal, hardworking freedmen, rather than import millions of European immigrants to take the industrial jobs that otherwise might have freed native-born African-Americans from segregated misery in the rural South.”
― Hugh Davis Graham, Collision Course: The Strange Convergence of Affirmative Action and Immigration Policy in America

“Page 35:
The quota laws [that maintained existing ethnic proportions] of the 1920s, however, had themselves been reform achievements, supported by a broad coalition that included middle-class “Progressives” (both Republicans and Democrats), organized labor, and the most prominent African-American leaders of the day. Immigration restrictionists from the left side of the political spectrum included leaders of organized labor, prominent spokesmen for black Americans, social justice Progressives, and conservationists. They argued that uncontrolled immigration, encouraged by industrial employers seeking docile low-wage workers, flooded the national labor pool, depressed wages, worsened working conditions and tenement housing, weakened organized labor, provided the basis for the corrupt city political machines, and threatened overpopulation.”
― Hugh Davis Graham, Collision Course: The Strange Convergence of Affirmative Action and Immigration Policy in America

“Quoting page 32:
Third, the riots spurred aggressive efforts by federal officials to dampen the violence by speeding delivery of benefits, especially jobs paying good wages, to urban minorities who found little payoff in the civil right legislation of 1964-65. The Small Business Administration (SBA), seeking to aid proprietors of riot-damaged stores and to encourage minority ownership in urban rebuilding efforts, established in 1968 the section 8(a) program. Targeted to aid heavily damaged core areas through grants and subsidized business loans, the 8(a) program avoided the racial quota taboo by funneling aid to “socially disadvantaged” persons, not to minorities per se. But most participants in the 8(a) program were minority business entrepreneurs.”
― Hugh Davis Graham, Collision Course: The Strange Convergence of Affirmative Action and Immigration Policy in America

“Page 9: Whereas civil rights reform was driven by a mass-based social movement and was characterized by intense controversy, polarized voting blocs, regional tension, and high media visibility, immigration reform was primarily an inside-the-beltway effort, engineered by policy elites largely in the absence of public demand or controversy.”
― Hugh Davis Graham, Collision Course: The Strange Convergence of Affirmative Action and Immigration Policy in America

“Page 5-6:
The elected branches in the liberal breakthrough of 1964-65 passed three great civil rights laws: the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Voting Rights Act of 1965, and the Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1965. All were based on the principle of nondiscrimination by race or national origin. … The Immigration and Naturalization Act ended a long-standing policy, so repugnant to liberal values and so embarrassing in cold war competition, of immigration quotas by national origin preference. … Then came the unintended consequences of reform. Government agencies and federal courts approved affirmative action policies, based ironically on the nondiscrimination laws of 1964-65, that imposed preferences, justified to compensate for past discrimination and designed to win proportional representation for minority groups in education, jobs, and government contracts. Similarly, in immigration policy, the reforms of 1965, intended to purge national origin quotas but not to expand immigration or to change its character, produced instead a flood of new arrivals that by the mid-1990s exceeded 30 million people, more than three-quarters of them arriving not from Europe but from Latin America and Asia. Despite the purging of racial and ethnic preferences by the 1964-65 laws, the ancestry of most immigrants in the 1990s entitled them to status as presumptive victims of historic discrimination in the united states. As members of protected classes, they enjoyed priority over most native-born Americans under affirmative action regulations.”
― Hugh Davis Graham, Collision Course: The Strange Convergence of Affirmative Action and Immigration Policy in America

“… The Johnson administration was quick to assure labor that the immigration bill [abandoning a requirement that immigrants be skilled workers, which threatened American labor, to family reunification] would have no appreciable impact on employment. Labor Secretary Willard Wirtz told Congress that once the act became fully operative, the total number of immigrants entering the workforce every year “will be equal to about one tenth of 1 percent of the workforce.” Reassured, union leaders generally joined the call for expanded family reunification preferences.”
― Hugh Davis Graham, Collision Course: The Strange Convergence of Affirmative Action and Immigration Policy in America