Himalayan Blunder Quotes

“While the Indian people maintain a large standing Army they are perhaps unique in the world, in that, few of them have any understanding or experience of war. We are apt to panic or indulge in extreme emotionalism in a crisis. It is only by understanding the ramifications of war that we can resist hustling Government and the Army to undertake rash military ventures. However indignant we may be, we just cannot stop the rains or bulldoze mountain passes from our path. We cannot wish our enemies away. We cannot create dumps with a conjuror’s flourish. Military operations are cool, calculated, and deliberate actions. Haste is the enemy of military planning. These statements which are cliches in Europe and America where most adults have rendered national service, had to be learnt the hard way by us.”
― J.P. Dalvi, Himalayan Blunder: The Angry Truth About India's Most Crushing Military Disaster

“We have been outnumbered and out-weaponed”. This phrase concedes the ineffectiveness of the policy-makers of the nation.”
― J.P. Dalvi, Himalayan Blunder: The Curtain Raiser to the Sino Indian War of 1962

“troops in battle require a cause and leadership and not threats.”
― J.P. Dalvi, Himalayan Blunder: The Curtain Raiser to the Sino Indian War of 1962

“Anyone who has tried to walk over a moss-covered boulder, in a new pair of Army boots without studs will understand the fury of the soldier at the persons responsible. Readers will also appreciate the enormity of the crimes of those who fed the Country and the Army with tall talk of self-sufficiency in arms productions, grandiose plans to build planes and tanks, while leaving the Army short of this simple, indigenously produced item.”
― J.P. Dalvi, Himalayan Blunder: The Curtain Raiser to the Sino Indian War of 1962

“In those days the simple solution to every problem was to sack someone. The tragic neglect of the years, by those in the highest positions, in keeping the Army without suitable mountain equipment, was conveniently forgotten.”
― J.P. Dalvi, Himalayan Blunder: The Curtain Raiser to the Sino Indian War of 1962

“It is intolerable that those who brought us to the sorry pass of October 1962 should dare to sit in judgement on the brave men who were never given a chance; never given the tools; never given the time, and never given the leadership to prepare for any sort of military operation of war.”
― J.P. Dalvi, Himalayan Blunder: The Curtain Raiser to the Sino Indian War of 1962

“wars are not decided in the corridors of the Central Secretariat at Delhi. Wars are not based on wishful thinking. Wars are not based on rash promises nor improvident expectations.”
― J.P. Dalvi, Himalayan Blunder: The Curtain Raiser to the Sino Indian War of 1962

“Military operations are cool, calculated and deliberate actions. Haste is the enemy of military planning.”
― J.P. Dalvi, Himalayan Blunder: The Curtain Raiser to the Sino Indian War of 1962

“The Chinese must have known by 1962 that no Indian Commander had any initiative to act without consulting Government. This was the natural corollary to the lack of clear long-term orders and plans.”
― J.P. Dalvi, Himalayan Blunder: The Curtain Raiser to the Sino Indian War of 1962

“We had no allies, as our non-aligned policy did not permit us to get involved militarily. Our known weaknesses and lack of allies tempted the Chinese to teach us a lesson without inviting retaliation.”
― J.P. Dalvi, Himalayan Blunder: The Curtain Raiser to the Sino Indian War of 1962

“In contrast with the thoroughness of the Chinese preparations, India was completely unprepared in every way for hostilities. In fact, there was an air of unreality and complacency that would have damned any Government. The possibility of a Chinese attack having been ignored, we did not have an organised war plan.”
― J.P. Dalvi, Himalayan Blunder: The Curtain Raiser to the Sino Indian War of 1962

“After the subjugation of Tibet, especially after 1959, the continued preparations were clearly aimed at India and yet we failed to heed all the transparent evidence of the massive Chinese build-up.”
― J.P. Dalvi, Himalayan Blunder: The Curtain Raiser to the Sino Indian War of 1962

“It now seems incredible that this was our operational thinking as late as August 1962, barely a fortnight before the Chinese incursion. At that time we were still indulging in the inexcusable game of guessing China’s intentions and capability, while she was massing a huge army only a few miles from our border.”
― J.P. Dalvi, Himalayan Blunder: The Curtain Raiser to the Sino Indian War of 1962

“deliberately kept the Private Sector out of defence production.”
― J.P. Dalvi, Himalayan Blunder: The Curtain Raiser to the Sino Indian War of 1962

“The advice of capable generals who counselled caution, restraint and adherence to the basic principles of war was ignored and the principles of war violated. Such generals were labelled pro-West, alarmists or over-cautions.”
― J.P. Dalvi, Himalayan Blunder: The Curtain Raiser to the Sino Indian War of 1962

“Emotion is the arch-enemy of reason and precludes the possibility of sober consideration of the military implications of any given situation.”
― J.P. Dalvi, Himalayan Blunder: The Curtain Raiser to the Sino Indian War of 1962

“From 1956 onwards China gradually began to shed her cloak of friendship and started a clever campaign to claim and assert her rights to vast areas in Ladakh and NEFA, while retaining an outward facade of reasonableness and readiness to engage in talks.”
― J.P. Dalvi, Himalayan Blunder: The Curtain Raiser to the Sino Indian War of 1962

“The years between 1947 and 1955 must go down in our history as wasted years, in our defence thinking and military preparedness.”
― J.P. Dalvi, Himalayan Blunder: The Curtain Raiser to the Sino Indian War of 1962

“During 1954-55 Mr. Nehru was extolling the 2,000 years of Sino-Indian friendship. China was, at that time, surveying various routes through Aksai Chin, while India remained apparently ignorant of this. India did not even know that a route was being built till the Chinese announced, in September 1957, that they would open the route for traffic within a month.”
― J.P. Dalvi, Himalayan Blunder: The Curtain Raiser to the Sino Indian War of 1962

“In well regulated armies it is not the statutory function of superior commanders to order the moves of units, or to evict junior commanders from their HQs. A formation is
given a task, and the formation commander executes it. If he fails, he should be removed.”
― J.P. Dalvi, Himalayan Blunder: The Angry Truth About India's Most Crushing Military Disaster

“In 1944, Field-Marshal Sir William Slim, Commander of the British/Indian 14th Army, faced a major Japanese offensive from Burma into India, aimed at capturing the base at Dimapur. Slim had the option of fighting from his positions or falling back to Kohima. After careful deliberation, he opted for the latter course despite strong political pressure not to abandon any Indian territory and give the Indians the impression that the Allies were losing. He stood firm and based his plans entirely on military considerations. Had he fought from his forward positions on the Chindwin River, his Lines of Communication would have been long and tenuous. A defeat would open the way to the plains of Assam. His decision to fall back and shorten his lines, and to a better killing ground at Kohima, forced the Japanese Commander, General Mutaguchi, to extend his lines. By standing fast at Kohima despite being invested, till the outbreak of the monsoons, victory was assured. The Japanese could not maintain their forces and had to retreat. The defeat was so overwhelming that Field-Marshal Slim followed up his Kohima victory with the classic pursuit operation to Rangoon itself, which fell in May 1945.”
― J.P. Dalvi, Himalayan Blunder: The Angry Truth About India's Most Crushing Military Disaster

“It will always be a pity that the title of this great formation [the 4th Infantry Division] was given to the scattered troops, deployed on policing duty. The matchless, professional excellence of this formation was greatly admired by the Germans - no mean professionals themselves. It is said that General Von Arnim, Commander of the German Forces in Tunis in 1943, insisted on surrendering to the 4th. His caravan is today used by the GOC of 4 Division. No wonder the Chinese were aghast at the poor “performance” of this famous formation. It is ironic that the fame of this formation is more widely known and respected by foreigners than by the Indian people. Perhaps this is the price of segregating the Army from the public, except for the annual pat on the back during the debate on defence appropriations.”
― J.P. Dalvi, Himalayan Blunder: The Angry Truth About India's Most Crushing Military Disaster

“According to accepted military teaching, formal orders should contain an Information paragraph; an Intention; a Method paragraph; Administrative arrangements and the Intercommunications set-up. An Intention by itself is a mere slogan.”
― J.P. Dalvi, Himalayan Blunder: The Angry Truth About India's Most Crushing Military Disaster

“Individual politicians are expendable, but a country’s Army is a permanent institution. The good name of the Army and its tested formations are infinitely more important than the political reputation of any individual, whatever his temporary stature and importance.”
― J.P. Dalvi, Himalayan Blunder: The Angry Truth About India's Most Crushing Military Disaster

“An enlightened public and a strong, independent Press must maintain strict impartiality in judging a major policy crisis arising out of a disagreement between the professional and political heads of the Armed Forces. The intrusion of fallacious concepts of Civil Supremacy will only stifle argument and still the professional voice till the time comes for rude awakening – as in 1962. In a serious divergence of opinion, which forces a Chief to submit his resignation, both the Service Chief and the politician must get a fair hearing at the bar of public opinion and during Parliamentary scrutiny. The high standards of the Western armies is largely due to this healthy and time-honoured custom. Any attempt to brow-beat a Service Chief or to pick one who is likely to conform is a self-defeating arrangement. The elimination of outspoken generals is unfair both to the Army as well as the Nation.”
― J.P. Dalvi, Himalayan Blunder: The Angry Truth About India's Most Crushing Military Disaster

“In both World Wars Britain had powerful and self-willed Prime Ministers in Mr. Lloyd George and Sir Winston Churchill. It is to their credit that they selected equally powerful and capable Army Chiefs in Generals Robertson and Lord Alanbrooke. Alanbrooke is the beau-ideal of a great Chief of Staff and is the type of man and officer required to shield the Army from any misuse of the temporary power bestowed on the political head, or to resist the imposition of impossible military tasks. Churchill and Alanbrooke worked that most misused term Civil Supremacy in the correct and healthy way, although their personal relations were not always cordial. They led Britain from the despondency of Dunkirk in 1940 to the final Allied victories in 1945.”
― J.P. Dalvi, Himalayan Blunder: The Angry Truth About India's Most Crushing Military Disaster

“Public opinion is an unsatisfactory reason for abandoning the basic canons of war.”
― J.P. Dalvi, Himalayan Blunder: The Angry Truth About India's Most Crushing Military Disaster

“The moral of all this is that never again must the fate and destiny of India be placed in the hands of any one or two men. We must also learn that a democracy has no room for proven failures. This is not a matter of sentiment. Mr. Chamberlain was removed after Hitler invaded France in May 1940 with Cromwell’s classic plea, “For God’s sake, go”. Mr, Anthony Eden was forced out of office after the disastrous Suez adventure of 1956. History records many instances where heads of elected Governments had the courage to resign, or who were forced to resign by public indignation and angry legislators.”
― J.P. Dalvi, Himalayan Blunder: The Angry Truth About India's Most Crushing Military Disaster

“Instead of gracefully accepting responsibility for erroneous policies, the guilty men sought alibis and scapegoats. In any developed democracy the Government would have been replaced, instead of being allowed to continue in office and sit in judgment on their subordinates.”
― J.P. Dalvi, Himalayan Blunder: The Angry Truth About India's Most Crushing Military Disaster

“Both in 1812, when Napoleon invaded Russia, and in 1941 when Hitler launched an invasion, the Russians drew the advancing armies deep into Russian territory. They relied on their most formidable weapons – snow in winter and the dreaded spring thaw (facetiously known as Generals January and February) which turns Russia into a vast sea of mud, that brings armies to a grinding halt. In both cases the Russians sapped the vitality of the advancing enemy; and on both occasions mighty Russian counter-offensives regained all lost territories and destroyed or ejected the invaders.”
― J.P. Dalvi, Himalayan Blunder: The Angry Truth About India's Most Crushing Military Disaster