My Chernobyl Quotes

“In 2016, Cesium 137 contamination spread by the Chernobyl accident reached its half-life, and the New Safe Confinement (NSC) was rolled into place, beginning its one-hundred-year life of containing the radioactive remains of Chernobyl’s Unit 4 and the sarcophagus. A structure that cost $2.3 billion. Perhaps the most obvious lessons are that accidents with nuclear energy take a long time to resolve and cost a great deal of money. A subtle but possibly even more important lesson is that unanticipated catastrophes, for which we have no significant recognition or planning, ignite well-meant yet ineffective, costly, and potentially lethal initial phases.”
― Alexander Borovoi, My Chernobyl: The Human Story of a Scientist and the nuclear power Plant Catastrophe

“Now, the next stage of transformation—the dismantling, under the protection of the arch, of the most dangerous, damaged structural elements and contaminated radioactive materials and nuclear fuel from the destroyed Unit 4, and their final burial—will begin. There are also new difficulties. Extraction of the destroyed fuel: this is an operation that has not been practiced anywhere before, and for which there are no previous examples. However, the experts working at the platform of the CNPP had sufficient time to organize this work. By all current estimates, the new confinement will ensure full safety for one hundred years.”
― Alexander Borovoi, My Chernobyl: The Human Story of a Scientist and the nuclear power Plant Catastrophe

“It is necessary to say that so far, the cost for construction has exceeded one billion dollars. EBRD states on their website that the total cost was $2.3 billion.”
― Alexander Borovoi, My Chernobyl: The Human Story of a Scientist and the nuclear power Plant Catastrophe

“Unfortunately, as often happens, it was not possible to correctly estimate all the difficulties that would occur. The original plan wasn’t successful, and the work had to be reorganized. As a result, only by 2017 was decisive success with the SIP realized: the built metal arch (fig. 19) was pulled over the existing Shelter and the end was closed by special designs.”
― Alexander Borovoi, My Chernobyl: The Human Story of a Scientist and the nuclear power Plant Catastrophe

“Part of the work was to construct near Shelter, in a place where there were acceptable radiation fields, a huge arch. Then, on special rails, this arch would be pulled over Shelter and the end closed up (see fig. 18).”
― Alexander Borovoi, My Chernobyl: The Human Story of a Scientist and the nuclear power Plant Catastrophe

“In 1997, at a meeting of the Group of Seven (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the United States—Russia was a guest), the Shelter Implementation Plan (SIP) was accepted. This plan defined a number of the actions needed for Shelter’s transformation to an ecologically safe state. That same year in New York, the conference of the donor countries that created the Chernobyl Fund—Ukrytiye—took place. Management of the fund was entrusted to the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). The term for completing the SIP was determined to be eight to nine years. The cost of all the work was estimated at $758 million.”
― Alexander Borovoi, My Chernobyl: The Human Story of a Scientist and the nuclear power Plant Catastrophe

“The second shortcoming was the uncertain durability of the old building’s structural frame on which the new structure of Shelter leaned. These supports had been weakened by the explosion and fire. It was not possible to measure their strength or durability. In the case of a strong earthquake, which happens in this area once every one hundred to two hundred years, nobody could guarantee it would not collapse. Therefore, in 1989, S. T. Belyaev—also of the Kurchatov Institute—and I created a concept to transform Shelter to make it completely, ecologically safe. The main point of our concept: construct another tight cover (New Safe Confinement) over the existing Shelter, which would last many decades and protect the external environment from radioactive emissions. At the same time, it would protect Shelter from any external influences—an earthquake, a tornado, etc. This cover would allow the development of further technologies, which might make it safe to take, and then to bury, radioactive materials and nuclear fuel.”
― Alexander Borovoi, My Chernobyl: The Human Story of a Scientist and the nuclear power Plant Catastrophe

“The first of the large shortcomings of Shelter was the enormous number of cracks. Because of the huge radiation fields, it had been impossible to implement the established designs to achieve the fewest cracks and to weld seams closed. As a result, the total area of cracks in the roof and walls equaled about 1000 square meters. This meant that radioactive dust could get out of Shelter, and water from rains and snow could get inside.”
― Alexander Borovoi, My Chernobyl: The Human Story of a Scientist and the nuclear power Plant Catastrophe

“The first of the large shortcomings of Shelter was the enormous number of cracks. Because of the huge radiation fields, it had been impossible to implement the established designs to achieve the fewest cracks and to weld seams closed. As a result, the total area of cracks in the roof and walls equaled about 1000 square meters. This meant that radioactive dust could get out of Shelter, and water from rains and snow”
― Alexander Borovoi, My Chernobyl: The Human Story of a Scientist and the nuclear power Plant Catastrophe

“The second form of fuel was dust. Or to sound more professional, hot fuel particles (hot meaning radioactive). These particles penetrated the surfaces of walls, floors, ceilings, and were in the air. Almost all the premises of Shelter were contaminated. Later, we’ll talk about this, an especially “pleasant” fuel modification for us And the last, lava. Excepting the famous Elephant Leg, lava was discovered in many other places in Shelter, even at the lowest points of Unit 4. It spread via steam relief valves and pipes (fig. 15).”
― Alexander Borovoi, My Chernobyl: The Human Story of a Scientist and the nuclear power Plant Catastrophe

“We already knew that after the accident, the fuel existed in three different types. First, in the form of unbroken and destroyed fragments in the active zone: assemblies, rods, uranium tablets, and their parts. Some quantity of those fragments were hurled by the explosion to the area surrounding the Unit—on the buildings’ roofs, on the grounds of the ventilation tube. They were gathered partially and thrown back into the ruins or put into containers. Some of those containers were also situated inside Shelter, walled up in concrete. But, of course, all those “visible” fragments were only a small part of what remained in the active zone. It was supposed that the main part lay in the Central Hall under the thousands of tons of various materials thrown from helicopters, “invisible” to us.”
― Alexander Borovoi, My Chernobyl: The Human Story of a Scientist and the nuclear power Plant Catastrophe

“During the previous year, analyses of tens of thousands of ground samples were done, samples from near Unit 4 and at the distance of hundreds of kilometers. Planes and helicopters equipped with special instruments explored over the territories of Ukraine, Byelorussia, Russia. Data from foreign colleagues was received. Numerous “cesium spots”—locations of radioactive cesium—were found. And all of that showed that not more than 5% of the fuel—uranium particles with nonflying radionuclides—had been thrown out of the Unit.”
― Alexander Borovoi, My Chernobyl: The Human Story of a Scientist and the nuclear power Plant Catastrophe

“By the summer of 1987, it became clear that searches for nuclear fuel inside Unit 4, with the help of exploring groups, had reached the limit of opportunities. The people were exposed to more danger, and the information gathered grew scant. What did we know by this time? That almost all the fuel was situated inside Shelter, approximately 180 tons out of the 190 tons of uranium situated in the reactor of Unit 4 before the accident.”
― Alexander Borovoi, My Chernobyl: The Human Story of a Scientist and the nuclear power Plant Catastrophe

“Legasov was treated especially poorly. On the eve of the publication of the list of rewarded people, everybody was absolutely sure he would be awarded, with other chosen ones, the high Soviet reward of Hero Star, Hero of Russia. Alexandrov, director of the Institute, congratulated Legasov in public at the Institute. And in the morning, his name wasn’t on the list. It was crossed out. There was a lot of talk and rumors about this. Then the Chernobylers decided that this was done by Gorbachev, who disliked the famous Academician. The image of the ex-president, firmly formed by people, was in absolute conformity with this action.[3]”
― Alexander Borovoi, My Chernobyl: The Human Story of a Scientist and the nuclear power Plant Catastrophe

“The stream of rewards rushed onto people who had any connection to Chernobyl exceeded all expectations. Not only those who worked in the Zone and near it were rewarded. Those who helped them, working far from Chernobyl, were rewarded also. The total number of the rewarded, according to my evaluations, was tens of thousands of people.”
― Alexander Borovoi, My Chernobyl: The Human Story of a Scientist and the nuclear power Plant Catastrophe

“Not long before his death, I met Academician Legasov in a corridor of the main building. He had been ill for the last months, didn’t work on Chernobyl, looked very bad. To my question about his health, Legasov answered quietly, “How can a man feel without a liver?”
― Alexander Borovoi, My Chernobyl: The Human Story of a Scientist and the nuclear power Plant Catastrophe

“After several encroachments that left the Leg intact, we finally managed to take samples of the substance for analyses. The analyses showed no signs of lead, but there existed a peculiar glasslike mass that contained the whole set of nuclear fuel radionuclides. So, for the first time we came across the most original substance, born in the devil kitchen of the accident. This was the substance we called lava.”
― Alexander Borovoi, My Chernobyl: The Human Story of a Scientist and the nuclear power Plant Catastrophe

“Our main efforts were directed at understanding where and in what condition the remaining fuel was, and then to take all the possible and impossible measures to ensure its safekeeping.”
― Alexander Borovoi, My Chernobyl: The Human Story of a Scientist and the nuclear power Plant Catastrophe

“The end of the summer and the autumn of 1986 was the period of the Great Building. Concrete plants were built in Chernobyl and in the Station's neighborhood. Huge machines milled compositions of concrete, sand, and crushed stone constantly. Every two minutes, at night and in daylight, powerful petrol tanks with roaring motors ran by the roads to the Station. They were followed by watering machines, which misted the dust in the air so that it wouldn’t spread. Small Chernobyl houses, kept under the cover of fruit gardens and having lost their owners forever, trembled at the thunder of the passing vehicles. At the Station, concrete was flowing like a river. Cranes of the Demagy worked day and night. Workers, engineers, and soldiers labored in four shifts, by sunlight and by searchlight. At the same time, about ten thousand people were working at the ground.”
― Alexander Borovoi, My Chernobyl: The Human Story of a Scientist and the nuclear power Plant Catastrophe

“At that time, only one type of “robot” truly existed and moved farther and farther in high fields and into dark, ruined rooms. These robots were people. By somebody’s light hand they were called BIO-ROBOTS. This name stuck for a long time to those who worked inside and around the block.”
― Alexander Borovoi, My Chernobyl: The Human Story of a Scientist and the nuclear power Plant Catastrophe

“We have spoken already that on the sixth of May, ten days after the accident, the release of radioactivity out of the destroyed Unit, which threatened to cause serious disasters, decreased suddenly by hundreds of times. At the time, the reason for this decrease was considered to be the effect of all the materials that had been thrown from the helicopters. Now we know that those materials hadn’t played their proper role. The explanation is different now. At that time, the fuel, having melted the lower protective plate of the reactor, dissolved in other melted materials and formed radioactive lava, never seen in nature before. Lava spread in the lower stores of the block and started to cool. The radioactive release was practically stopped. China Syndrome—the burning of concrete plates and the gradual falling of the fuel— worked only for that lower plate and, to some extent, for the floor of the room situated right under the reactor.”
― Alexander Borovoi, My Chernobyl: The Human Story of a Scientist and the nuclear power Plant Catastrophe

“The work of the operative group became more concentrated on the construction of the cover that was to encase the destroyed Unit 4. It was called “Shelter of the Fourth Unit,” but later—by the light hand of a writer—it got a new name: Sarcophagus.”
― Alexander Borovoi, My Chernobyl: The Human Story of a Scientist and the nuclear power Plant Catastrophe

“At this time, our personal dosimeters—accumulators that registered doses of contamination a person got during his working time—were checked. Usually, these small badges were fastened to the outer part of our clothes, on our chests. Periodically, the dosimeters were examined in the laboratory, where they were burned in a special way, doses were measured, and then the badges were returned to their owners. With this procedure, the dosimeter “forgot” its previous history and was ready to register doses again. We fought against dosimeters constantly and secretly. The point was that a person having received a dose of 25 roentgen (25 R/h) should, according to the medical terms, leave Chernobyl immediately. With this, he got five months’ salary. Good money in this time. Why 25 R/h was the limit, it is difficult for me to say. I am not a specialist. I just remembered for myself that if you got more than 100 R/h, you got radiation sickness. When the authorities came to this decision, those working at the station became diametrically opposed to it. One pole—not very numerous—consisted of those who wanted to leave the Zone as soon as possible and with the five-month salary. These people, who aspired later to the reputation of Chernobyl heroes, usually tried to “forget” their accumulators and other types of dosimeters in dangerous, high-radiation places, and then would return secretly to get them. During the checking, the desired dose of 25 R/h was discovered; and if everything was done well and there was no evidence of swindle, the “hero” went back to his motherland with money and respect. There he started his struggle for privileges with more energy than a person who had actually gotten such a high dose could possibly have. The major part of the Kurchatovers—and it did them credit—took the opposite pole. People who did research in areas with doses of hundreds and thousands roentgen per hour tried to leave their dosimeters in safe places, or to shield the instruments so that they couldn't register that fatal 25 R/h. Then they could stay in Chernobyl. This was the secret war with our accumulators. The authorities knew everything about it, but did nothing. They needed specialists like air.”
― Alexander Borovoi, My Chernobyl: The Human Story of a Scientist and the nuclear power Plant Catastrophe

“When radioactivity falls onto the surface of water, it subsides quickly and is seized by the aquatic plants at the bottom. They cling to the smallest particles of nuclear fuel that were expelled with the explosion. This can be perfectly seen from a helicopter during measurements. When a helicopter passes the territory of the power plant, all instruments show high contamination. Hardly is the helicopter above the water when all indicators decrease by hundreds of times. Radiation from the plant is absorbed by the water, but the water itself is comparatively clear. As for the banks, though, where there is silt and river dust cast up by waves, they are highly contaminated by radioactivity.”
― Alexander Borovoi, My Chernobyl: The Human Story of a Scientist and the nuclear power Plant Catastrophe

“Thermal hazard: sometimes called the China Syndrome, also caused fear and anxiety. This name, taken from the 1979 film of the same name, means that nuclear fuel, which gets hot because of residual afterheat, starts to burn through the floors of a reactor’s buildings one by one, going down until it reaches underground waters and contaminates them. And last, radioactive hazard: it was there, growing every hour. With every release of smoke, radioactivity contaminated more and more territories.”
― Alexander Borovoi, My Chernobyl: The Human Story of a Scientist and the nuclear power Plant Catastrophe

“As far as nuclear fuel was concerned, it presented three types of hazard at once: nuclear hazard thermal hazard radioactive hazard Nuclear hazard: the beginning of a spontaneous, self-maintaining chain nuclear reaction (CNR). It could begin in the destroyed fuel, impregnated with water, but most likely between the safe remains of the reactor’s assembly—if there were any after the explosion. The point is that a channel reactor of such high power is very big, and its separate parts can work independently.”
― Alexander Borovoi, My Chernobyl: The Human Story of a Scientist and the nuclear power Plant Catastrophe

“was interested in human reaction, human behavior in emergencies. The general picture was the following. In most cases, everyday workers displayed great courage and responsibility after the accident. They realized that these events had dangerous consequences, but they didn't have enough information to estimate the real extent of the disaster. Authorities at different levels tried to interpret the known information in the most soothing manner—and the higher the authority’s level was, the more obvious this manner was. They weren’t preventing the creation of panic—and they often talked about this later—so much as they were trying to distort the objective picture of those terrible events. Although the majority of people demonstrated courage during the disaster, they weren’t brave enough to tell the truth to others, or to come to serious decisions. Unit 3, situated in the same building with the unsafe Unit 4, went on working. Ventilation of Units 1 and 2 went on working also, gradually filling the rooms with radioactive aerosols. More and more people were affected by nuclear radiation.”
― Alexander Borovoi, My Chernobyl: The Human Story of a Scientist and the nuclear power Plant Catastrophe

“Our dosimeters can't display more than 200 roentgens per hour,”[1] I am saying. “Maybe there are about 2000? How can we get out of this situation?” “By using your own senses!” "But a man doesn't feel radiation. Even in our books and in lectures, they say that radiation has no color, no smell, no taste.” “This is only in lectures. The lecturers have been staying in Moscow and can’t reach Chernobyl. High radiation fields have a smell. And if you smell this, don't display any heroism, but quickly—quickly—reel your fishing lines in and run away as quickly as you can.” "What is the smell?” “Ozone. The first precept: be afraid of the smell of ozone.”
― Alexander Borovoi, My Chernobyl: The Human Story of a Scientist and the nuclear power Plant Catastrophe

“Landau said, “Happiness—when you give yourself a difficult but a solvable task.” Then he gave an explanation for those who didn’t understand. “If the task is easy, you can’t feel any pleasure in solving it. If the problem is too difficult to solve, and you can’t come to any decision, you may get an inferiority complex.”
― Alexander Borovoi, My Chernobyl: The Human Story of a Scientist and the nuclear power Plant Catastrophe

“Xenon poisoning—with which it’s difficult to operate a reactor—started increasing. Let’s avoid giving technical details and just say that this was the first step into the embrace of the accident.”
― Alexander Borovoi, My Chernobyl: The Human Story of a Scientist and the nuclear power Plant Catastrophe