How We Won and Lost the War in Afghanistan Quotes

“A failing district would cause the entire government to fail, he added, and so the government was on course to fail because the districts were starved by the system.”
― Douglas Grindle, How We Won and Lost the War in Afghanistan: Two Years in the Pashtun Homeland

“Taliban commanders have reported the movement derives direct support from Pakistan’s ISI, or Inter-Service Intelligence Directorate, the intelligence service. One study noted, “According to Taliban commanders the ISI orchestrates, sustains and strongly influences the movement. They say it gives sanctuary to both Taliban and Haqqani groups, and provides huge support in terms of training, funding, munitions, and supplies. In their words, this is ‘as clear as the sun in the sky.’”3 The same study noted, “As a south-eastern commander put it: ‘We receive a lot of training, weapons, ammunition and expenses from the Pakistan government. . . . Everyone knows Pakistan gives money, it goes centrally, then flows down.’”4”
― Douglas Grindle, How We Won and Lost the War in Afghanistan: Two Years in the Pashtun Homeland

“The embassy bureaucrat responded that there was no problem with creating a system that did not work very well. He said the Afghan system was designed to be third rate and that the villagers wouldn’t know any better because they had never seen a decent government.”
― Douglas Grindle, How We Won and Lost the War in Afghanistan: Two Years in the Pashtun Homeland

“when people thought the country was headed in the wrong direction, corruption was their second-biggest concern, after security.3”
― Douglas Grindle, How We Won and Lost the War in Afghanistan: Two Years in the Pashtun Homeland

“Only the district could be trusted to make spending a priority, but how could the district do that if it had no money? The district was legally forbidden to raise its own funds through taxes, and provinces never gave cash grants to districts.”
― Douglas Grindle, How We Won and Lost the War in Afghanistan: Two Years in the Pashtun Homeland

“The bulk of development funding was spent by the international donors themselves, as USAID or the Canadians did when they spent millions of dollars on roads. They contracted the work directly. None of that money got near the ministries. This proved to be a problem, because when USAID drew down its spending the Afghan government needed to continue to push projects into the villages to motivate people to stay on board with the government.”
― Douglas Grindle, How We Won and Lost the War in Afghanistan: Two Years in the Pashtun Homeland

“In Afghanistan when a woman is widowed, she is generally taken in by her late husband’s family. His brother might marry her if she is still young and desirable or offer charity and provide for her if she is not. But if neither option appeals, the woman is out on her own.”
― Douglas Grindle, How We Won and Lost the War in Afghanistan: Two Years in the Pashtun Homeland

“the government worked, if it could be trusted, and what they really needed. As Antoine Huss moved out and was succeeded in August by Cip Jungberg, we were able to complete the picture we had received from the district staff by talking directly with the elders in their own villages. Without a weekly hands-on encounter, we would not have a good feel for the current situation.”
― Douglas Grindle, How We Won and Lost the War in Afghanistan: Two Years in the Pashtun Homeland

“In midsummer Cip Jungberg, the second USAID officer for the district, arrived. As Antoine Huss left, the district needed two officers to work there, plus Mohammad Zahir, our local cultural advisor-cum-interpreter. Cip, who was from North Dakota, had worked on a provincial reconstruction team in Iraq, knew plenty about working in war zones, and had good ideas about developing new businesses. With a wiry beard, a wry sense of humor, and midwestern common sense, Cip was an immediate hit with the Afghans, who were impressed by his empathy and willingness to try anything at least once to get results and back them”
― Douglas Grindle, How We Won and Lost the War in Afghanistan: Two Years in the Pashtun Homeland

“Spend a small amount of money that gives big results in the village. Always respond to people’s needs.”
― Douglas Grindle, How We Won and Lost the War in Afghanistan: Two Years in the Pashtun Homeland

“One true measure of progress in Afghanistan is the relationship between the government and the people. The more the villagers support the government, the better the war is going. And this is relatively simple to measure. The best metric is how many people visit the district center every week. The presence of many elders indicated the government was doing well, because the people weren’t afraid to work with government staff.”
― Douglas Grindle, How We Won and Lost the War in Afghanistan: Two Years in the Pashtun Homeland

“How to measure progress has never been satisfactorily answered. In counterinsurgency almost no simple metrics used in a vacuum, such as the number of attacks, are suitable.”
― Douglas Grindle, How We Won and Lost the War in Afghanistan: Two Years in the Pashtun Homeland

“Though analysts differ on the details, they agree that the centuries-old jostling between the Zirak Durranis and their rivals, the Panjpai Durranis and the Ghilzais, fuels the conflict today.4 Many ordinary Afghans of the Zirak Durrani, such as Nazak, would have turned naturally against the Taliban. The Taliban’s tribalism and radical ideology separates it from Karzai’s ethnically mixed government and most of the Afghan people, because banning the education of girls, employment for women, and even music is counter to most of the closely held beliefs of ordinary Afghans.”
― Douglas Grindle, How We Won and Lost the War in Afghanistan: Two Years in the Pashtun Homeland

“In each village Nazak said the same thing: don’t work with the Taliban; work with me and get projects. Supporting the Taliban will lead to nothing. It is time to switch sides. Nazak said the visits took the initiative away from the Taliban, calling into question their control over the district.”
― Douglas Grindle, How We Won and Lost the War in Afghanistan: Two Years in the Pashtun Homeland

“Despite our cultural training, we remained ignorant of the cultural and political nuances that would affect our ability to run meetings effectively. The sole advice given to us in the FSI lecture halls was to never promise more than you can deliver or, even better, never promise anything at all.”
― Douglas Grindle, How We Won and Lost the War in Afghanistan: Two Years in the Pashtun Homeland

“The high point of the days at the speedway involved ramming through a car that blocked the road, using the heavy Crown Vic as a battering ram. Tips from our burly and brainy instructor included, “Slow down before hitting the blocking vehicle,” “leave enough room to accelerate hard through it,” and even more to the point, “hit the wheels, which are attached to axles; this the most solid part of the opposing car.”
― Douglas Grindle, How We Won and Lost the War in Afghanistan: Two Years in the Pashtun Homeland