Moral Theology Book 1 Quotes

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Moral Theology Book 1 (Theologia Moralis) Moral Theology Book 1 by Alfonso María de Liguori
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Moral Theology Book 1 Quotes Showing 1-12 of 12
“Furthermore, conscience is divided into right, erroneous, confused, scrupulous, doubtful and probable. A right conscience is that which dictates the truth; therefore one sins if they work against it, since the Apostle says: “Everything which is not of faith (namely from the dictate of conscience,”
Alfonso María de Liguori, Moral Theology Book 1
“11.—Let us treat in this last place on a scrupulous conscience, on which it is necessary to have a longer discussion. A scrupulous conscience is that which, on account of a light motive without any rational foundation (for a scruple is an empty perception), he often is afraid of sin where there none is really present”
Alfonso María de Liguori, Moral Theology Book 1
“We respond: If he can suspend an action, he is bound to postpone it until he consults a learned man: but if he cannot suspend it, he is held to choose a lesser evil by avoiding a greater transgression of natural law than of human or divine positive law. Moreover, if he cannot discern what is the lesser evil, and he were to choose either part, he would not sin because in a case of this sort he would lack the freedom necessary for formal sin.”
Alfonso María de Liguori, Moral Theology Book 1
“A perplexed conscience is one in which someone that has been placed in the middle of two precepts believes he sins no matter which side he chooses, e.g. if someone could save the life of the defendant in a trial by perjury, and on the one hand he is distressed by the precept of religion to not commit perjury, while on the other (deduced from an error) by the precept of charity towards his neighbor,”
Alfonso María de Liguori, Moral Theology Book 1
“but a prudent confessor ought to judge that when they thought about accomplishing the sin, truly they also sinned formally from a wicked will turning themselves from God.”
Alfonso María de Liguori, Moral Theology Book 1
“Still, I could never reckon this opinion to be probable, because I have never availed to understand how someone would deliberately exercise an action in which he knows God is offended and could inculpably believe that he does not offend God while he efficaciously desires to carry it out, whereby he certainly recognizes he turns away from God.”
Alfonso María de Liguori, Moral Theology Book 1
“St. Bernard gives a stronger confirmation when he teaches (de Praecept. et Dispenstione, c. 12 et 17), that a subject obeying a prelate with a right intention acts meritoriously, although materially he errs against the law. He so writes in chapter 14, n. 55, “I will also say even a mere pious intention is worthy of praise; clearly, the good will itself will not be defrauded of worthy reward in a work that is also not good.”
Alfonso María de Liguori, Moral Theology Book 1
“A human act is judged to be virtuous or vicious according to which the will is imposed and not according to the material object of the act.” (Quodlibet. 3. art. 27).”
Alfonso María de Liguori, Moral Theology Book 1
“We say: 2. Someone that has an invincibly erroneous conscience, not only does not sin by acting according to it, but even that he is held to follow it at any time. The reasoning of each is that he does not sin, because although the action may not be right in itself, nevertheless, it is right according to the conscience of the one who does the act; at anytime one is held to act according to it, if his conscience, which is the proximate rule, so suggests it must be done.”
Alfonso María de Liguori, Moral Theology Book 1
“Innocent III confirms this in cap. Litteras, de rest. spol. “Whatever is against conscience, paves the way to hell.” But an erroneous conscience is that which dictates what is false as though it were true. Moreover, some erroneous consciences are vincible, and some are invincible. A conscience is vincible, when it may and must be conquered by the operation, or because it notices an error, or at least hesitates about an error, and at the same time notices the obligation to conquer it, but does nothing to conquer it, as many teach (S. Anton. 2. p. tit. 5, c. 1 §5; Navarr. praelud. 9. n. 9; Salm. tr. 20. c. 14. punct. 2. n. 9; Suarez in 5. p. d. 4. sect. 8. n. 18 with Sylvius, Cajetan, communissime aliisque ex S. Thoma de Veritate, q. 15. art. 4. ad 10). Furthermore, the Salamancans (loc. cit.) and Alphonse de Castro (tr. 2, de pecc. d. 1. p. 15. n. 6, with Azor, Suarez, Vasquez, Bonac. etc. and Wigandt de consc. ex 1. q. 5, n. 7), teach that it is not necessary to apply oneself to the utmost so as to conquer error, rather it is sufficient to do what is common and ordinary. On the other hand, an invincible conscience is such that cannot be morally conquered, since no thought or doubt comes into the mind of the one who acts, nor even confusion while he acts, or when he considers the cause of the action, as it is explained in greater length in the Treatise On sins (book 2) where it is argued on the knowledge that is required for sin.”
Alfonso María de Liguori, Moral Theology Book 1
“Innocent III confirms this in cap. Litteras, de rest. spol. “Whatever is against conscience, paves the way to hell.” But an erroneous conscience is that which dictates what is false as though it were true. Moreover, some erroneous consciences are vincible, and some are invincible.”
Alfonso María de Liguori, Moral Theology Book 1
“Conscience is so defined: “It is a judgment, or practical command of reason, in which we judge something must be done here and now as a good, or something must be avoided as an evil.”
Alfonso María de Liguori, Moral Theology Book 1