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The Center of the Sunlit Sky: Madhyamaka in the Kagyu Tradition (Nitartha Institute) The Center of the Sunlit Sky: Madhyamaka in the Kagyu Tradition by Karl Brunnhölzl
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“Nagarjuna says:
For those for whom emptiness is possible, Everything is possible. For those for whom emptiness is not possible, Nothing is possible.”
Karl Brunnholzl, The Center of the Sunlit Sky: Madhyamaka in the Kagyu Tradition
“The Blessed One.... in accordance with their thinking, has eliminated all reifications without exception through progressively teaching the aggregates, constituents, and sources; mere mind; and the identitylessness of all phenomena.”
Karl Brunnholzl, The Center of the Sunlit Sky: Madhyamaka in the Kagyu Tradition
“In other words, in their own ways, both systems basically attempt to follow the Buddha in addressing the same fundamental problem of clinging to reference points or extremes. They just tackle this issue from different angles, with different terminologies and methods. As Harris says:
Nagarjuna and Asanga ... have set themselves the common task of rendering traditional Buddhist doctrine in such a way that it can be used to tackle particular problems. Furthermore it is pointless categorizing them as nihilists or idealists or anything else of the kind. They should be seen as expositors, adapting traditional doctrine to meet the needs of particular tasks while at the same time leaving the body of the doctrine fundamentally unchanged and unquestioned.”
Karl Brunnholzl, The Center of the Sunlit Sky: Madhyamaka in the Kagyu Tradition
“In summary, prior to Bhavaviveka, the Yogacaras sought to assimilate rather than to oppose Centrism. A particularly striking example of this is Kambala's (early sixth century) Garland ofLight,1212 which displays a most remarkable early synthesis of Yogacara and Madhyamaka. After Bhavaviveka's critique, however, though never rejecting Nagarjuna and Aryadeva, on certain points the later Yogacaras seemed to be at odds with the later Centrists,"" mainly accusing each other of reification or nihilism respectively. However, what often happened in these controversies was the general problem of one philosophical system attacking the other with its own terminology and systemic framework and not on the grounds of the terminology and the context of that other system. In particular, Bhavaviveka's interpretation of Yogacara is a perfect example of an extremely literal reading without considering the meaning in terms of the Yogacara system's own grounds, instead exclusively treating it on Centrist grounds. Thus, when abstracted from the obvious polemical elements and out-of-context misinterpretations of what the opponents actually meant by certain terms, not much is left in terms of fundamental differences between the later Centrists and Yogacaras,'''" which basically boil down to two issues: (i) whether there is an ultimately real mind (no matter whether this is called other-dependent nature, self-awareness, ground consciousness, or nondual wisdom) and (2) whether any epistemology is possible at all.”
Karl Brunnholzl, The Center of the Sunlit Sky: Madhyamaka in the Kagyu Tradition
“In fact, in much the same way as the Centrists, Yogacaras like Asanga and Vasuhandhu introduce and employ expedient concepts, such as "mere mind," only for the sake of dissolving previous ones. Once these concepts on different levels have fulfilled their purpose of redressing specific misconceptions, they are replaced by more subtle ones, which are similarly removed later in the gradual process of letting go of all reference points.”
Karl Brunnholzl, The Center of the Sunlit Sky: Madhyamaka in the Kagyu Tradition
“However, despite their synthesis of Yogacara and Centrism, all Yogacara-Madhyamikas, such as Jnanagarbha, Santaraksita, Kamalasila, and Haribhadra, unanimously refute the notion of a really existent consciousness or self-awareness in both the versions of the Real Aspectarians and the False Aspectarians, without, however, mentioning specific persons."They also attack Dharmakirti's presentations of causality (one cause producing many results, many causes producing one result, and many causes producing many results). At the same time, on the conventional level, they strongly rely on his principles of epistemology and reasoning.”
Karl Brunnholzl, The Center of the Sunlit Sky: Madhyamaka in the Kagyu Tradition
“Beings become enraged and elated Through the causes for quarrels and celebrations. [154cd]
They grieve and toil, they despair, And they mutilate and slay each other.
Through all this and further evil deeds, they lead miserable lives, Always longing for their own happiness. [155]”
Karl Brunnholzl, The Center of the Sunlit Sky: Madhyamaka in the Kagyu Tradition
“4.2.2.1.4. Teaching That the Cognition That Negates the Existence of Objects Is a Valid Cognition
"If valid cognition is not valid cognition, Isn't what is validated by it delusive? In true reality, the emptiness of entities Is therefore unjustified." [138]'-"
[903] This verse states the objection.
The opponents might say, "If you assert in your Centrist system that even all valid cognition-which is the means of evaluation-is not valid cognition, isn't a phenomenon that is validated by it delusive too? If one analyzes in accord with
true Centrist analysis, emptiness is not established, and, in consequence, meditation on emptiness is unjustified as well."
Without referring to an imputed entity, One cannot apprehend the lack of this entity. Therefore, the lack of a delusive entity Is clearly delusive [too]. [139]
This verse teaches that [everything] is mere delusion.
Without referring to-that is, without relying on-a mere imputed entity, one is also not able to apprehend or present the lack of this entity, which is emptiness. The reason is that if one does not rely on the conventional term [or notion of] space, one is not able to present space as [referring to] the lack of any entities."" Therefore, since sentient beings cling to the reality of delusive entities that are mere appearances, they plunge into cyclic existence. If one understands that these very [appearances] are unreal and illusionlike, this [understanding] surely serves as the remedy for the [clinging to reality]. However, emptiness-which is this imputation in the sense of the lack of such delusive [appearances] that appear as entities-is clearly delusive too. In the same way as an illusory lion kills an illusory elephant, this is [nothing more than] engaging in the [particular] reification of understanding emptiness as the remedy for the reification that conceives of real [entities].
Thus, when one's son dies in a dream, The conception "He does not exist" Removes the thought that he does exist, But it is also delusive. [140]
This verse teaches that the [cultivation of emptiness] is the remedy for reification.
Thus, if one experiences in a dream that one's son has been born and then dies, inasmuch as this is a dream, there is definitely no difference between the [son]'s birth and his death. Still, due to one's seeing [in the dream] that he has been born, there arises the mental state that conceives, "My son exists." When there is the appearance that he has died, there emerges the conception "My son has died and now he does not exist," [904] which removes the thought that fancies, "My son does exist." However, since both-the existence and the nonexistence of this son too-are equal in being a dream, they are alike in being delusive.”
Karl Brunnholzl, The Center of the Sunlit Sky: Madhyamaka in the Kagyu Tradition
“A sprout as the subject is without arising, because it is free from arising from any of the four extremes, just as a frog's long hair."
Here, master Bhavya states [this as] the main argument and then formulates four autonomous reasons as the means to prove the subject property. The venerable and fearless Candrakirti presents this by labeling the mere refutation of arising from the four extremes a "position." He teaches the invalidation of the opposite [positions] of this [refutation] through consequences that reveal contradictions and through the analogous applicability of the [opponents'] reason [to something that contradicts their position]. However, he does not formulate a main argument, nor does he assert arguments that establish the subject property through valid cognition. It is merely on the grounds of this [difference] that one refers to Autonomists and Consequentialists. However, it is not that [884] there were any differences in terms of better or worse in the views of these two.”
Karl Brunnholzl, The Center of the Sunlit Sky: Madhyamaka in the Kagyu Tradition
“Through examples that are asserted by both, While not analyzing what serves the result. [4cd]
In the way that worldly people see things, They conceive them as facts But not as illusionlike. Herein lies the dispute between yogins and worldly people. [S]”
Karl Brunnholzl, The Center of the Sunlit Sky: Madhyamaka in the Kagyu Tradition
“Hence, [emptiness] is also not an object of [something like the] cognition of Buddhas, because they do not have [such a thing as] cognition.”
Karl Brunnholzl, The Center of the Sunlit Sky: Madhyamaka in the Kagyu Tradition
“Thus, it is seen that the expanse of dharmas is not an object of speech, reflection, or expression. It is for just this [type of seeing] that the conventional terms "penetrating the nature of phenomena" and "beholding ultimate reality" are used. The conventional term "personally experienced wisdom" is then used for the very knowledge that does not observe the characteristics of discursiveness in terms of subject and object. Thus, the nature of phenomena is not seen through apprehending a subject and an object. Rather, if one knows that subject and object are not observable, one engages in the nature of phenomena. Therefore, [the expression] "personally experienced wisdom realizes the nature of phenomena" is a conventional term that is used based on something else. However, in no way does this abide in the mode of subject, object, something to be realized, and a realizer in
the way that these are imputed by cognition. Subject, object, something to be realized, and a realizer are merely entities that are based on superimposition; they are never entities that exist in this way through a nature of their own.”
Karl Brunnholzl, The Center of the Sunlit Sky: Madhyamaka in the Kagyu Tradition
“You might wonder, "Why is the ultimate not the sphere of cognition?" Because it is asserted that cognition, or consciousness, is the very seeming and it is impossible for the seeming to take the ultimate as its object.”
Karl Brunnholzl, The Center of the Sunlit Sky: Madhyamaka in the Kagyu Tradition
“You might say, "However, since the seeming is also nothing different, it is not the sphere of cognition. [Ultimately,] this is very true indeed. Therefore, it is definitely stated that all phenomena have one single reality and that just this that is called "real" or "delusive" is not observed.”
Karl Brunnholzl, The Center of the Sunlit Sky: Madhyamaka in the Kagyu Tradition
“Also, when one thoroughly analyzes a continuum on the seeming level, [one finds that] the utpala at the time when it is seen and the utpala at the time when it is [conceptually] apprehended are different entities. Furthermore, the sense consciousness that experiences it and the apprehending conception are different entities [as well].”
Karl Brunnholzl, The Center of the Sunlit Sky: Madhyamaka in the Kagyu Tradition
“For this expanse of dharmas just as it is, the conventional term "ultimate reality" is used.
You might object, "What do you mean? If it is not an object of any consciousness whatsoever, one is not even able to focus on it. Therefore, how can it at the same time be presented as the ultimate?" In general, in all this labeling with conventional terms, it is not the case that the direct observer of a given phenomenon is doing the labeling. [For example,] when one labels [something] with the conventional term "blue utpala,"""5 the observer of that is a [visual] sense consciousness. But this [consciousness itself] does not conceive of the attribute that is the name "utpala" or the attribute "blue color," [646] because it is nothing but mere direct and nonconceptual experiencing.”
Karl Brunnholzl, The Center of the Sunlit Sky: Madhyamaka in the Kagyu Tradition
“[Beings with such realization] do not behold sentient beings, but great compassion still flowers in them. They do not behold themselves either, but they still lend their support to all sentient beings. They do not behold anything to be attained whatsoever, but they still establish beings in great enlightenment. Just as there is no place whatsoever to go to beyond space, they do not behold anybody who would go somewhere beyond, but they still dis-I tv [the activity of] liberating sentient beings from cyclic existence.”
Karl Brunnholzl, The Center of the Sunlit Sky: Madhyamaka in the Kagyu Tradition
“The Buddha himself always emphasized that trust is good but knowing is better. He explicitly put his teachings out in the open to be tested and not simply
believed or accepted out of blind faith or polite respect for his sheer authority. Thus, if we really want to know whether and how these teachings work as techniques for mental transformation, we must find out for ourselves in the only suitable lab we have-our own mind.”
Karl Brunnholzl, The Center of the Sunlit Sky: Madhyamaka in the Kagyu Tradition
“On the one hand, using precise philosophical categories and analyses in scriptures such as the Centrist ones, whose primary aim is to provide the means for the transcendence of dualistic thinking altogether, in order to give way to unmediated direct insight into the nature of all phenomena is like attempting to apply a mathematical formula in order to capture the experience of being completely absorbed in a wonderful piece of music or watching a breathtaking sunset. So, "pure logic" is surely not the ultimate key to understanding Buddhist texts and views, and we should not expect to find the ultimately correct conceptual presentation of facts and experiences on the Buddhist path that by definition lie outside the realm of conceptual mind anyway. Even on the mundane plane, what would be the finally correct presentation of the taste of chocolate? And even if there were such a thing, what would its relevance be for the actual experience of tasting chocolate? After all that has been said here, it should be clear that I do not hold a brief for some kind of "mysticism" or even "irrationalism." At the same time, we must accept that "pure experience" per se does not lead to an understanding of treatises that are grounded in a rational format to speak about something that is beyond the confines of language and reason. In the realm of the actual experience that such texts point to, reason and language have lost all meaning and the work of the scholar has reached its end.”
Karl Brunnholzl, The Center of the Sunlit Sky: Madhyamaka in the Kagyu Tradition
“Suzuki:
We must keep one thing always before our minds, . . . which is, that Buddhist thought is always the outcome of Buddhist life; that is, its logic, or psychology, or metaphysics cannot be understood adequately unless we realize that facts of Buddhist experience are at its basis and, therefore, that pure logic is not the key to the understanding of Buddhist philosophy.144”
Karl Brunnholzl, The Center of the Sunlit Sky: Madhyamaka in the Kagyu Tradition
“In brief, if Centrism is explained as a consistent philosophical, ontological, or logical system, that may appeal to our wish for some well-organized, all-explanatory picture of the world and how we perceive it. Usually, we just want to have something that makes good sense, something on which we can build our belief systems or, in the case of Centrism, a belief system for why and how we should not have any belief system. However, all attempts to force Centrism into any kind of system at all must necessarily fail due to the very nature of what Centrism is: the radical deconstruction of any system and conceptualization whatsoever, including itself. Reintroducing into Centrism any notions of justification, validity, or making sense (with more subtle ones being more tricky here than gross ones) precisely reestablishes and fortifies the very traps that the Centrist approach wants us to let go of altogether. To this, Centrists could be tempted to say, "Talking heads, stop making sense!”
Karl Brunnholzl, The Center of the Sunlit Sky: Madhyamaka in the Kagyu Tradition
“what Nagarjuna and Candrakirti demonstrated so
extensively is precisely that nothing makes sense when it is analyzed, not even such ordinary, everyday things as going. In this sense, the fact that nothing really makes sense is called samsara. Experientially, as long as nobody analyzes ordinary appearances, they just appear and function. From this perspective, the question of whether they make sense or not does not even arise. This is merely a matter of questioning what appears to us and trying to make sense of it. Nirvana then does not mean the grand idea that suddenly everything makes sense or that one realizes the true meaning of life. From the perspective of attaining nisprapanca, it just means letting go of trying to make sense of all these things that cannot make sense. Thus, the decisive criterion for any presentation of the heart of Centrism is not whether it makes good sense (which does not, of course, mean that, conventionally, it should not make sense) but whether what is presented serves as a means for ending ignorance and afflictions and thus leading to Buddhahood.”
Karl Brunnholzl, The Center of the Sunlit Sky: Madhyamaka in the Kagyu Tradition
“Buddhism in general and Centrism in particular is not meant as a philosophical edifice but as a set of tools for experientially attaining an irreversible state of freedom from suffering for both oneself and others. From the point of view of the Buddha, Nagarjuna, and Candrakirti, it is not at all the point to be eloquent and erect an impressive monument of brilliant ideas and concepts. If anything, this is the complete antithesis (if there is such a thing) of what Buddhism and Centrism are about and just turns the whole project of striving for the freedom from reference points upside down. Particularly in Centrism, we are not talking about philosophical elegance, systemic coherence, or the need to make perfect sense on the level of conceptual conventions, but about the liberation of our mind, which is a different ball game altogether. Setting up some philosophy is simply not the same as striving for all beings' freedom from suffering. 1131”
Karl Brunnholzl, The Center of the Sunlit Sky: Madhyamaka in the Kagyu Tradition
“the expression "illusionlike arising and ceasing without real existence" that is used by Centrists refers to passages that prove that, from the perspectives of analysis and the perception of noble ones, arising and ceasing in terms of dependent origination are free from arising and ceasing, just like the merely seeming arising and ceasing of an illusion. Centrists would never even dream of considering such an expression to prove any established existence of arising and ceasing.”
Karl Brunnholzl, The Center of the Sunlit Sky: Madhyamaka in the Kagyu Tradition
“the Centrist approach of presenting mere conditionality without analysis is in clear opposition to any reifications of asserting arising from the four extremes. Hence, the Centrist way of presenting the two realities is highly superior to any such approach by realists, since it expresses the knowable objects of all persons from ordinary beings to Buddhas in a way that does not contradict common worldly consensus. As was said before, to abstain from reifying things such as karma, cause and effect, ethics, and the means to achieve liberation in no way makes these things lack their justification or functioning. To the contrary, it is precisely the fact of their emptiness-their lack of solid and independent existence-that allows for the unimpeded and dynamic flow of the dependent origination of conditioned phenomena.”
Karl Brunnholzl, The Center of the Sunlit Sky: Madhyamaka in the Kagyu Tradition
“it can only be repeated that all reasonings and negations work solely on the level of seeming reality. At best, as nonimplicative negations, they can refer to the nominal ultimate but never to the actual ultimate
free from all discursiveness and reference points, such as existence, nonexistence, affirmation, and negation.”
Karl Brunnholzl, The Center of the Sunlit Sky: Madhyamaka in the Kagyu Tradition
“In general, every negation must depend on the rejection of an affirmation or proposition, which means that emptiness as a nonimplicative negation is not only conceptual but also dependent on something else. In fact, the very existence of a negation can only make sense in opposition to an affirmation. Hence, it is a mutually dependent phenomenon caught in the dichotomies of being and not being, thus belonging to the realm of seeming reality. How could such a dichotomous conceptual fabrication be the ultimate nature of all phenomena? In addition, as a seeming, dependent phenomenon that is an object of a conceptual consciousness, every nonimplicative negation in itself cannot withstand analysis. This means that if emptiness were a nonimplicative negation, then it would not be findable under analysis for the ultimate.”
Karl Brunnholzl, The Center of the Sunlit Sky: Madhyamaka in the Kagyu Tradition
“The Karmapa clearly says that both the object of negation of reasoning and the object of negation of the path are nothing but the innate clinging to an intrinsic nature or identity of persons and phenomena.”
Karl Brunnholzl, The Center of the Sunlit Sky: Madhyamaka in the Kagyu Tradition
“Prajnapdramita sutras sav:
In the perfection of knowledge, no [notions] such as "form is permanent" or "form is impermanent" are observable. If even a form as such is not observable, how could this be the case for [its] being permanent or impermanent? The same holds for [all phenomena] up through omniscience.”
Karl Brunnholzl, The Center of the Sunlit Sky: Madhyamaka in the Kagyu Tradition
“On the level of no analysis, the Karmapa says, when Centrists speak with people who do not like to talk in a manner consistent with the principle of dependent origination, for the purpose of removing such people's fear of this principle and on the level of the expedient meaning, Centrists speak about existence and nonexistence. When they speak with people who like to talk in a manner consistent with dependent origination, Centrists speak about the utter freedom from all discursiveness in terms of existence and nonexistence.”
Karl Brunnholzl, The Center of the Sunlit Sky: Madhyamaka in the Kagyu Tradition

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