Concentrated Investing Quotes

“The strategy we’ve adopted precludes our following standard diversification dogma. Many pundits would therefore say the strategy must be riskier than that employed by more conventional investors. We disagree. We believe that a policy of portfolio concentration may well decrease risk if it raises, as it should, both the intensity with which an investor thinks about a business and the comfort-level he must feel with its economic characteristics before buying into it. In stating this opinion, we define risk, using dictionary terms, as “the possibility of loss or injury.” —Warren Buffett, 19931”
― Allen C. Benello, Concentrated Investing: Strategies of the World's Greatest Concentrated Value Investors

“We always did our analysis just on the yellow pad. It makes you much more sensitive to getting something generally right, as opposed to a multi-variant, 600-line model that can get everything precisely wrong. The younger guys from the model generation figure that if it’s in the model with all the assumptions, then it must be right. Whatever that mental process is, it’s not something you can give to a computer.”
― Allen C. Benello, Concentrated Investing: Strategies of the World's Greatest Concentrated Value Investors

“Skilled investors can maximize their long-term performance by maximizing the margin of safety of each stock held in the portfolio, which is to say, by concentrating on the best ideas. To be “skilled,” an investor must be able to identify which stocks are more undervalued than others, and then construct a portfolio containing only the most undervalued stocks. In doing so, investors take on the risk that an unforeseeable event leads to an unrecoverable loss in the intrinsic value of any single holding, perhaps through financial distress or fraud. This unrecoverable diminution in intrinsic value is referred to in the value investing literature as a permanent impairment of capital, and it is the most important consideration for value investors. Value investors distinguish the partial or total diminution in the firm’s underlying value, which is a risk to be considered, from a mere drop in the share price, no matter how significant the drop may be, which is an event to be ignored or exploited. The extent to which the portfolio value is impacted by a portfolio holding suffering a permanent impairment of capital will depend on the size of the holding relative to the portfolio value—the bigger the holding, the greater the impact on the portfolio. Thus the more concentrated an investor becomes, the greater the need to understand individual holdings. Says Buffett of the “know-something” investor:28 [If] you are a know-something investor, able to understand business economics and to find five to 10 sensibly priced companies that possess important”
― Allen C. Benello, Concentrated Investing: Strategies of the World's Greatest Concentrated Value Investors

“The endowment would make a second serendipitous investment when Robert Noyce, a Grinnell trustee and alumnus, offered Grinnell stock in his then-private start-up, NM Electronics.22 Noyce had almost been expelled from Grinnell for stealing a pig and roasting it at a campus luau.23 He would have been expelled but for the intervention of his physics professor who felt that Noyce was the best student he’d ever taught. 24 The professor managed to persuade the school to reduce the expulsion to a one-semester suspension.25 Noyce never forgot the favor, and made the stock available to the school if it wanted it.26 Rosenfield told Noyce that the endowment would take all the stock he’d let it have.27 Grinnell’s endowment took 10 percent of the $3 million private placement (Grinnell put up $100,000, and Rosenfield and another trustee put up $100,000 each).28 Shortly thereafter the company, then renamed Intel, went public in 1971. Grinnell started selling the stake in 1974, at which time it was worth $14 million, more than half the value of the $27 million endowment. Noyce was concerned that Grinnell should have so much exposure to a single name associated with him, and cajoled Rosenfield to sell. He recalls, “Bob [Noyce] was trembling about it. He’d say, ‘I don’t want the college to lose any money on account of me.’ But I’d say, “We’ll worry about that, Bob. We’ll take the risk.”29 Noyce eventually wore Rosenfield down, however, and Grinnell fully exited the stake by 1980. On its sale, the Intel investment had generated a profit of 4,583 percent. Rosenfield told Zweig, “I wish we’d kept it. That was the biggest mistake we ever made. Selling must have cost us $50 million, maybe more.”30 Zweig didn’t have the heart to tell the then 96-year-old Rosenfield that the shares he sold would have been worth several billion dollars in 2000. Perhaps this is why Rosenfield “considers selling to be indistinguishable from error.”
― Allen C. Benello, Concentrated Investing: Strategies of the World's Greatest Concentrated Value Investors

“It’s a common theme among the highly concentrated investors profiled in this book. Permanent capital—capital not subject to withdrawal or redemption—is an essential component for achieving high returns in concentrated portfolios because it offers the luxury of ignoring the short-term fluctuations of the market:65 Why would we want those artificial constraints? Lou had considerable periods in the dotcom bubble when the averages were outperforming Lou. It was years and he got well all at once. Nobody was saying to him, “How can you do this to us for three years running?” The money management business is not necessarily a good way to manage money if you are really trying to maximize your returns over 30 years.”
― Allen C. Benello, Concentrated Investing: Strategies of the World's Greatest Concentrated Value Investors

“When Buffett was asked by business students in 2008 about his views on portfolio diversification and position sizing, he responded that he had “two views on diversification:”13 If you are a professional and have confidence, then I would advocate lots of concentration. For everyone else, if it’s not your game, participate in total diversification. If it’s your game, diversification doesn’t make sense. It’s crazy to put money in your twentieth choice rather than your first choice. . . . [Berkshire vice-chairman] Charlie [Munger] and I operated mostly with five positions. If I were running $50, $100, $200 million, I would have 80 percent in five positions, with 25 percent for the largest. In 1964 I found a position I was willing to go heavier into, up to 40 percent. I told investors they could pull their money out. None did. The position was American Express after the Salad Oil Scandal.”
― Allen C. Benello, Concentrated Investing: Strategies of the World's Greatest Concentrated Value Investors

“The evaluation of securities and businesses for investment purposes has always involved a mixture of qualitative and quantitative factors. At the one extreme, the analyst exclusively oriented to qualitative factors would say, “Buy the right company (with the right prospects, inherent industry conditions, management, etc.) and the price will take care of itself.” On the other hand, the quantitative spokesman would say, “Buy at the right price and the company (and stock) will take care of itself.” . . . Interestingly enough, although I consider myself to be primarily in the quantitative school (and as I write this no one has come back from recess—I may be the only one left in the class), the really sensational ideas I have had over the years have been heavily weighted toward the qualitative side where I have had a “high-probability insight.” This is what causes the cash register to sing. However, it is an infrequent occurrence, as insights usually are, and, of course, no insight is required on the quantitative side—the figures should hit you over the head with a baseball bat. So the really big money tends to be made by investors who are right on qualitative decisions, but, at least in my opinion, the more sure money tends to be made on the obvious quantitative decisions.”
― Allen C. Benello, Concentrated Investing: Strategies of the World's Greatest Concentrated Value Investors

“[My] theory of risk is that it is better to take a substantial holding of what one believes in than scatter holdings in fields where he has not the same assurance. But perhaps that is based on the delusion of possessing a worthwhile opinion on the matter.”
― Allen C. Benello, Concentrated Investing: Strategies of the World's Greatest Concentrated Value Investors

“some of the things which I vaguely apprehend are, like the end of the world, uninsurable risks and it is useless to worry about them”
― Allen C. Benello, Concentrated Investing: Strategies of the World's Greatest Concentrated Value Investors

“Keynes had been appointed to the board of the National Mutual, one of the oldest institutions in the city, in 1919.107 He had served as chairman of the insurer, and helped manage its investment portfolio from 1921. That portfolio lost £641,000 ($61 million), an enormous sum of money in 1937. While Keynes was recuperating from a heart attack, F. N. Curzon, the acting chairman of the insurer called him to account for the loss.108 Curzon and the board criticized Keynes’s investment policy of remaining invested in his “pet” stocks during the decline.109 In a response to Curzon in March 1938, Keynes wrote:110 1. I do not believe that selling at very low prices is a remedy for having failed to sell at high ones. . . . As soon as prices had fallen below a reasonable estimate of intrinsic value and long-period probabilities, there was nothing more to be done. It was too late to remedy any defects in previous policy, and the right course was to stand pretty well where one was. 2. I feel no shame at being found owning a share when the bottom of the market comes. I do not think it is the business, far less the duty, for an institutional or any other serious investor to be constantly considering whether he should cut and run on a falling market, or to feel himself open to blame if shares depreciate on his hands. . . . An investor is aiming, or should be aiming, primarily at long-period results, and should be solely judged by these. . . . The idea that we should all be selling out to the other fellow and should all be finding ourselves with nothing but cash at the bottom of the market is not merely fantastic, but destructive of the whole system. 3. I do not feel that we have in fact done particularly badly. . . . If we deal in equities; it is inevitable that there should be large fluctuations.”
― Allen C. Benello, Concentrated Investing: Strategies of the World's Greatest Concentrated Value Investors

“Chambers et al. conclude that Keynes had no skill as a market timer. By then, however, the man who had started out as a top-down speculator relying upon his “superior knowledge” to forecast the macroeconomic climate, was behaving more like a bottom-up, fundamental investor who sought solid, dividend-paying stocks with good long-term prospects. His gains came from taking large positions in those securities that had financial statement sheets he could understand, and sold products or services he believed he could assess objectively.”
― Allen C. Benello, Concentrated Investing: Strategies of the World's Greatest Concentrated Value Investors

“When as a young and unknown man I started to be successful I was referred to as a gambler. My operations increased in scope. Then I was a speculator. The sphere of my activities continued to expand and presently I was known as a banker. Actually I have been doing the same thing all the time.”
― Allen C. Benello, Concentrated Investing: Strategies of the World's Greatest Concentrated Value Investors

“The ones that have the edge are the ones who really have the temperament to look at a business, look at an industry and not care what the person next to them thinks about it, not care what they read about it in the newspaper, not care what they hear about it on the television, not listen to people who say, “This is going to happen,” or, “That’s going to happen.” You have to come to your own conclusions, and you have to do it based on facts that are available. If you don’t have enough facts to reach a conclusion, you forget it. You go on to the next one. You have to also have the willingness to walk away from things that other people think are very simple. A lot of people don’t have that. I don’t know why it is. I’ve been asked a lot of times whether that was something that you’re born with or something you learn. I’m not sure I know the answer. Temperament’s important.”
― Allen C. Benello, Concentrated Investing: Strategies of the World's Greatest Concentrated Value Investors

“The successful warrior is the average man, with laser-like focus. —Allen Carpé Benello”
― Allen C. Benello, Concentrated Investing: Strategies of the World's Greatest Concentrated Value Investors

“A lightbulb turned on when I realized the investors I admire the most (and this admiration comes only in part from the amazing success they’ve achieved) tend to share one characteristic: They are concentrated value investors. That is, they adhere to a concentrated approach to portfolio construction, holding a small number of securities as opposed to a broadly diversified portfolio.”
― Allen C. Benello, Concentrated Investing: Strategies of the World's Greatest Concentrated Value Investors

“When my information changes, I alter my conclusions. What do you do, sir? —Keynes, in response to a criticism during the Great Depression of having changed his position on monetary policy”
― Allen C. Benello, Concentrated Investing: Strategies of the World's Greatest Concentrated Value Investors