1962 Quotes

“Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence’ that would be applicable to international behaviour of modern states. Considering the fact that the future of the Tibetan people who had been subjugated by military force was at stake, the preamble was ironic. The Chinese premier gleefully accepted the treaty which not only recognized China’s possession of Tibet but, in fact, legalized it. Additionally, while allowing for trade with the Chinese government in Tibet, the Indians gave up their right over numerous facilities that existed in Lhasa and along the trade route that linked the Tibetan capital to Kalimpong in West Bengal. The Indian infantry detachments at both Gyantse and Yatung and the Indian Mission in Lhasa were to be withdrawn.”
― Kunal Verma, 1962: The War That Wasn't

“4 Garhwal Rifles, after blowing up the bridge, had climbed up to Nuranang but left most of their heavy equipment behind, including four mortars.”
― Kunal Verma, 1962: The War That Wasn't

“Why the Intelligence Bureau chose to deliberately mislead the government and why the air chief failed to arrive at an independent assessment will remain another one of the unsolved mysteries of 1962.”
― Kunal Verma, 1962: The War That Wasn't

“Not only did the IB paint for Nehru a highly exaggerated picture about the PLAAF’s strike capability, it was downright dishonest in its overall appreciation”
― Kunal Verma, 1962: The War That Wasn't

“By the end of the 1950s the civil-military equation had become so warped that a man of General Thimayya’s stature could be reduced to a virtual non-entity.”
― Kunal Verma, 1962: The War That Wasn't

“On 3 March 1963, Pakistan ceded to the People’s Republic of China the 5,800-square-kilometre Shaksgam Valley ‘pending the settlement of the dispute over Kashmir’ with the Indians.”
― Kunal Verma, 1962: The War That Wasn't

“That the government should first hear of the unilateral Chinese ceasefire on the morning of 21 November through the media while its own embassy had known of it thirty-six hours earlier is yet another aspect of the events of 1962 that defy belief.”
― Kunal Verma, 1962: The War That Wasn't

“Nehru, the architect of India’s non-aligned policy, was openly asking for the intervention and active participation of the United States and Britain for the defence of India.”
― Kunal Verma, 1962: The War That Wasn't

“The Chinese held their infantry back, preferring to keep up the bombardment from artillery, direct firing RCL weapons and mortars.”
― Kunal Verma, 1962: The War That Wasn't

“Unfortunately, Mullik’s, and by extension the government’s, belief that the mere presence of Indian posts in the area was enough and the Chinese would do nothing, eventually turned the few soldiers in the region (one infantry company minus a platoon) into cannon fodder for the PLA.”
― Kunal Verma, 1962: The War That Wasn't

“the Chinese had usually succeeded in entering an unoccupied isolated area and New Delhi had been reduced to sending notes of protest to Peking asserting that the territorial integrity of India had been violated.”
― Kunal Verma, 1962: The War That Wasn't

“Local commanders were at their wits’ end about how to convince ‘Finance’ to sanction these vital and essential items.”
― Kunal Verma, 1962: The War That Wasn't

“The funds available were residual amounts after allowing for the Third Five Year Plan, which, in the wisdom of politicians and bureaucrats, remained supreme.”
― Kunal Verma, 1962: The War That Wasn't

“The whereabouts of Gurbax Singh on the afternoon and night of 18 November are a mystery.”
― Kunal Verma, 1962: The War That Wasn't

“The commander of 154 Regiment (419 Unit) had urged his men to ruthlessly gun down as many surviving Indians as possible.”
― Kunal Verma, 1962: The War That Wasn't

“So long as the Chinese played the game in a conventional manner, the Indians were in their element, as had been demonstrated by 1 Sikh at Bum-la and 4 Garhwal at Nuranang. However, the moment the Chinese got behind Indian set piece formations, under the garb of a ‘withdrawal’, most units chose self-preservation over valour.”
― Kunal Verma, 1962: The War That Wasn't

“Chinese troops belonging to the No. 2 Company of 154 Regiment (419 Unit) had been mercilessly hunting down and gunning Indian stragglers in the region (according to Chinese records, in a total of thirty encounters with Indian troops, they killed 434 and captured 618 Indian soldiers).”
― Kunal Verma, 1962: The War That Wasn't

“The ruthless execution of the Garhwalis out in the open was a clear indication of the Chinese intention to kill as many Indian troops as possible with a view towards completely annihilating 4 Division.”
― Kunal Verma, 1962: The War That Wasn't

“As had been the case with 2 Rajput and 1/9 GR earlier in the month, each man was in Angola shirts and inappropriate footwear, and had just a couple of blankets.”
― Kunal Verma, 1962: The War That Wasn't

“the new units coming in from the plains were short of blankets, digging tools and critical signals equipment.”
― Kunal Verma, 1962: The War That Wasn't

“Kaul gave Rawlley orders for battle that were vague enough to absolve the general of having ordered the withdrawal himself. In language typical of Kaul, he and Mohinder Pathania informed Rawlley: ‘…hold on to your present position to the best of your ability. If the position becomes untenable you are to take up an alternative position and man it to the best of your ability. In the event that also becomes untenable you are to continue to take up a series of layback positions and keep delaying the enemy.”
― Kunal Verma, 1962: The War That Wasn't

“Samvatsar asked for permission to fall back on Maha Plateau. Permission was granted, but the men were not willing to fall back without the company commander and the other wounded.”
― Kunal Verma, 1962: The War That Wasn't

“Two puris were allocated to each man. It would be the last cooked meal that they would get to eat in the Walong Sector.”
― Kunal Verma, 1962: The War That Wasn't

“The terrain in Walong had resulted in defences that were isolated posts or strongholds. These were not mutually supportive of each other, resulting in a situation where each commanding officer had to fight his own independent battle.”
― Kunal Verma, 1962: The War That Wasn't

“It takes more courage to appear a coward than risk being killed”.”
― Kunal Verma, 1962: The War That Wasn't

“Rikh knew the hour of reckoning was at hand. For days he had done what he was trained to do—follow orders despite the impossibility of the task.”
― Kunal Verma, 1962: The War That Wasn't

“Don’t worry, sir, despite their superiority the Rajputs won’t let you down. If you do get back, see to it that those who got us into this mess get their due.”
― Kunal Verma, 1962: The War That Wasn't

“The Intelligence Chief, Mullik, on whose advice Nehru depended heavily, was openly suggesting sacking Umrao Singh and appointing a new corps commander.”
― Kunal Verma, 1962: The War That Wasn't

“The withholding of this crucial bit of information by both Mullik, the Intelligence Bureau chief, and by Palit, the DMO, on the assumption that the Chinese would not use this force to actually attack, has to be one of the most bizarre acts of omission in the entire tragedy.”
― Kunal Verma, 1962: The War That Wasn't

“The foreign secretary said the Chinese reaction in Ladakh was not expected to be beyond the capturing of a few posts. The army chief then asked for the order to be given in writing.”
― Kunal Verma, 1962: The War That Wasn't