Srebrenica Quotes

“....as for the Clinton administration, it pursued a high moralistic policy for which it was totally unwilling to accept responsibility. It insisted particularly in the UN, on tougher action against the Serbs, but refused to support it with American ground troops.”
― Jan Willem Honig, Srebrenica: Record of a War Crime

“Muslims in general were aware of the fate that awaited them. Their desparate attempt, en masse to break through Bosnian Serb lines from the night of 11-12 July onwards reflected this.
Very few politicians and soldiers ever questioned this premise of impartiality. Few accepted that one could force such an obstreperous party into allowing convoys through and still remain impartial.
General Janvier in particular has unjustly been much maligned. He is often blamed for loosing Srebrenica because he did not authorize massive air strikes.”
― Jan Willem Honig, Srebrenica: Record of a War Crime

“The most fundamental dillemma of all, which the international community to its detriment never resolved was a moral one. How could one combine moral imperative to alleviate suffering with the moral imperative not to let agression pay? Was it right to have opposed ethnic cleansing and instituted safe areas in eastern Bosnia, if one was unwilling to put one`s life at risk to protect people in those areas?....”
― Jan Willem Honig, Srebrenica: Record of a War Crime

“Mladić harboured a particular resentment towards the Dutch, whose successive governments had consistently called for a tougher action against the Serbs since the beginning of the war.
Virtually all the captured men, guilty or not, were executed, an act that con stituted the most serious single war crime in Europe since WWII. Executing prisoners violates Geneva Convention but it is also classified as „crime against humanity“. What is more, there seems little doubt that Serbs intention was genocidal one.”
― Jan Willem Honig, Srebrenica: Record of a War Crime

“UNPROFOR intelligence officers long estimated that the Serbs would need large infantry force to overcome 3000 or 4000 armed defenders of Srebrenica. What they failed to detect was just such a large scale troop build-up during June. .....There had also been no sightings of an artillery build-up - another sure sign of offensive intent. .....Under attack, in July, Karremans was remarkably restrained in his official reports and played a significant role in mistakenly minimizing the sense of danger. The final contributing factor in the misreading of the situation was that many officers and politicians simply could not believe that the Serbs would dare take and area under UN protection.”
― Jan Willem Honig, Srebrenica: Record of a War Crime

“Ambassador Albright reportedly threatened to resign over what she called "softly-softly" pact with Milošević.”
― Jan Willem Honig, Srebrenica: Record of a War Crime

“Back in Washington Frasureˇs delicate diplomacy was supported by his direct superior flamboyant Assistant Secretary of State R.H. To Vice-President Al Gore, Secretary of State Christopher, Ambassador Albright and Leon Fuerth, Gores representative on the National Security Council, any lifting of sanctions against the Serbs would be anathema. They still believed that Serbs had to be punished not wooed. ......Frasure gave this account of talks with Milošević: ...look at him like this....he is a Mafia boss who has gotten tired of doing drugs in South Bronx and so he is planning on moving to Palm Beach and getting into junk bonds. .......
Milošević was not prepared to see the Bosnian Serbs getting defeated militarily, he was very keen on preventing Karadžić from becoming "King of all Serbs"........The moment in which the parties would substitute politics with force was approaching fast.”
― Jan Willem Honig, Srebrenica: Record of a War Crime

“Frasure was one of the most experienced diplomats in the State dept. In June 1991, President Bush awarded him Presidential Medal for Exceptional Service for his role in precipitating the downfall of Mengitsu regime in Ethiopia and organizing lifting of more than 15,000 Ethiopian Jews to Israel. Frasure was ambassador to Estonia when he was asked to return to Washington and join Holbrooke"s Yugoslavia team in July 1994. Almost from the beginning, the sharp-minded Frasure found it difficult to hide his exasperation with the indecision in his own government. Coming out of US inter-agency meeting on BIH he once commented: "Boy that was like a little league locker-room rally"......Frasure knew when to be tough with the Serbs. .....Back in Washington, his delicate diplomacy was supported by his direct superior, flamboyant Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke.”
― Jan Willem Honig, Srebrenica: Record of a War Crime

“With the 4 month cessation of hostilities in place, many Western governments, in an excess of relief, turned away from BiH. Sense of urgency faded. So it was until march 1995 that the Contact Group launched a serious initiative with Milošević, involving sanctions-lifting and recognition. Negotiations with Milošević were at first conducted principally by British, French, and German diplomats...Clinton admin remained as divided as ever and not yet ready as a whole to associate itself with the talks.”
― Jan Willem Honig, Srebrenica: Record of a War Crime

“Having publicly made a clear distinction between aggressors - the Serbs and victims - the Bosnians - from the moment they took office, they had stuck to this line ever since. Their credibility would be in doubt and their reputations damaged if they were not to give public approval to a territorial swap involving eastern enclaves.”
― Jan Willem Honig, Srebrenica: Record of a War Crime

“While the US stumped for the Bosnians, Russians defended the interests of Milošević (as distinct from the Bosnian Serb leader) and Germans supported Croats. .....Srebrenica itself was indefensible as Izetbegović admitted to a senior UN official 22 Sep 1994. ....Silajdžić indicated that if the Serbs traded Sarajevo for the enclaves he would be prepared to go to Srebrenica and explain to the people that they had to leave. ....The envoy said Izetbegović was ready to discuss a trade-off of the eastern enclaves for Sarajevo on the condition that Milošević was prepared to recognize BiH.
Although the Bosnian government and Western gov all privately admitted that ultimately Srebrenica and Žepa would go to the Serbs, no government was prepared to be seen publicly making territorial deals with the Serbs. After all, would not such a move be perceived as a rewarding of the ethnic cleansing and aggression? Dilemma was especially acute for countries where public opinion was strongly anti-Serbian - post pointedly the US, Germany and NL. .... Clinton administration in particular did not want to be publicly associated with any diplomatic proposal that ceded the enclaves to the Serbs.”
― Jan Willem Honig, Srebrenica: Record of a War Crime

“Smith proposed not to use air power, but to employ an ad hoc group to open Mount Igman road into Sarajevo. This was the last attempt (in Split) he made to come out on top in the face-off with the Bosnian Serbs. Again, Janvier rejected his proposal....."We are a peacekeeping mission. We do not have the option of going to war. We are not authorized to do so. It is not our mandate”
― Jan Willem Honig, Srebrenica: Record of a War Crime

“Although Mrs Albright stopped calling for further air strikes she still lamely insisted that the UN Sec General should consider cost of backing down in the face of Bosnian Serbs.”
― Jan Willem Honig, Srebrenica: Record of a War Crime

“Opposing redeployment US and Dutch ambassadors were making more robust action impossible.”
― Jan Willem Honig, Srebrenica: Record of a War Crime

“Albright and Biegman told Janvier that while the status quo was untenable and a more effective and robust UNPROFOR required, she could not accept a withdrawal from safe areas, nor could she accept abandoning weapons collection points. The mandate she said should be strengthened not reduced. As past experience indicated, only a resolute UN would get its way.”
― Jan Willem Honig, Srebrenica: Record of a War Crime