Convoy Escort Commander Quotes

“most interesting times was, of course, in September 1931, when the Atlantic Fleet mutinied at Invergordon. The Dragon was then on the west coast of the United States, and life on board continued”
― Peter Gretton, Convoy Escort Commander: A Memoir of the Battle of the Atlantic

“Over the centuries it has been proved and re-proved that it is impossible to protect a ‘sea lane’ unless it is very narrow and very short. The aim is to protect ships, not bits of water — ships which are proceeding from one port to another. The only area of ocean in which we are really interested is the part in which the ship is physically placed at the time.”
― Peter Gretton, Convoy Escort Commander: A Memoir of the Battle of the Atlantic

“The opinion of the German High Command and of the U-boat Commanders was very clear. They did not want to attack convoys. It was too difficult and was only to be attempted if enough ‘independents’ could not be found. Contrary to the general impression, the ace U-boat Commanders such as Prien, Kretchmer, and Schepke gained most of their successes by sinking ships sailing singly and not by attacks on convoys. Indeed, these very three men were lost or captured in an attempt to attack the same convoy.”
― Peter Gretton, Convoy Escort Commander: A Memoir of the Battle of the Atlantic

“On 7th December 1941, the U.S. Navy had forgotten his words. No plans existed for convoys on the east coast of America, and merchant ships sailed independently, with warships and aircraft ‘patrolling the routes’. The results were disastrous. Shipping losses were critically high, and the U-boats were often able to pick off their victims by gunfire on the surface. Although small reinforcements of corvettes, trawlers and maritime aircraft were sent by the United Kingdom to help stop the slaughter of shipping at a time when we were very hard pressed in our own waters, it was only when the convoy system was instituted that losses diminished, and this occurred with almost magical effect in June and July 1942.”
― Peter Gretton, Convoy Escort Commander: A Memoir of the Battle of the Atlantic

“As Admiral Sims said in 1918, ‘it is a purely offensive measure’.”
― Peter Gretton, Convoy Escort Commander: A Memoir of the Battle of the Atlantic

“To take the requisite care of a large fleet of merchant vessels, there should be in the convoy a number of frigates, which are to be distributed ahead, astern and on the wings of the fleet, which is always to be kept in the order of three, four, five or six columns, according to the number it may be composed of. Some other frigates are also to be sent on the look-out, in order that the commanding officer may be informed of what passes at a certain distance, and warned in good time of the approach of the enemy. If the frigates which are sent to look-out should discover an enemy of superior force, they will make it known by signal, and perhaps it may be thought advisable that they should steer a different course from that of the fleet, in order to deceive the hostile ships in sight. The line of battleships are to hold themselves a little ahead and to windward of the weather column of the fleet; because, in that position, they will be able with promptitude to attend wherever their presence may be necessary. The commanding officer must not neglect to have all suspicious and neutral ships chased and even stopped by the frigates about him, and which are always to be supported by one or two lines of battleships, according to the exigency of the circumstances. The degree of progress which the whole fleet will make will be regulated by that of the worst-going ships, which, however, are to be abandoned when found to cause too great a loss of time; for sometimes it is better to risk a small loss than to expose the whole by delay. There will be placed between the columns, sloops of war and other swift-sailing vessels to maintain order and keep the ships in their stations. Their particular business will be to get the tardy ships to make more sail, and to oblige those which may be out of their post to resume it. In the evening they will give an account, to the frigates having charge of going the round, of those which have not well manoeuvred and these will be reported to the Commodore. During the night the same order will be maintained, except with respect to the look-out frigates which are to be called in within a certain distance of the fleet, and which are to be allowed lights as well as the rest of the men-of-war. They are to be particularly careful to oblige all straggling ships to return to the convoy, and to fire, without hesitating, on all strange vessels coming from the main sea, in order to give the alarm. Every night they are to be supported on the wings by some line of battleships.”
― Peter Gretton, Convoy Escort Commander: A Memoir of the Battle of the Atlantic

“And Muetzelburgh, another ace, recounts how in March 1941, when searching for a convoy reported by the Radio Interception Service ‘the noise of propellers was heard on the hydrophones. It resembled a dull, subterranean grinding noise.’ The U-boat surfaced, the visibility was excellent, but nothing could be seen. Only after over an hour and a half’s steaming in the direction of the noise was the top of a mast sighted over the horizon.”
― Peter Gretton, Convoy Escort Commander: A Memoir of the Battle of the Atlantic

“I think that the biggest surprise I got when reading the published accounts of the exploits of U-boat Commanders was to discover this ability to detect convoys by hydrophone at such long range. The official histories do not give the matter much emphasis, but in the German accounts the phrase ‘dived to listen on hydrophones’ comes up again and again.”
― Peter Gretton, Convoy Escort Commander: A Memoir of the Battle of the Atlantic

“I do not recollect that we ever realized how far they could ‘hear’ ships and convoys on their hydrophones, especially in good weather.”
― Peter Gretton, Convoy Escort Commander: A Memoir of the Battle of the Atlantic

“To heave to a convoy requires moral courage, for it is usually extremely difficult, if not impossible, to keep the ships together. I found, however, that by making the signal on low-power radio, ‘Heave to, keeping the wind on the bow’, it was possible to keep the convoy together, for as the wind shifted, ships automatically adjusted their heading, whereas if an attempt were made to heave to on a definite course, alterations would constantly be required which in such weather conditions were impossible to pass by flags. The communications experts disapproved of my breaking radio silence but it was only necessary to make one signal, and I believed that the risk was well worth taking, for the danger from the sea was far greater than from the enemy. During the worst gales many of the ships, particularly those in ballast, became unmanageable. The visibility would drop to about half a mile and control was quite impossible. In any case, the enemy could do little about it if they did hear the signal.”
― Peter Gretton, Convoy Escort Commander: A Memoir of the Battle of the Atlantic

“The majority of such losses and damage were quite unnecessary. Over one thousand ships were lost through collision and grounding alone, owing to a variety of reasons, perhaps the most important of which was undue insistence on not burning navigation lights and on maintaining radio silence. There were areas round the coast which, at certain periods of the war, were entirely safe from submarine or air attack, but which were highly dangerous navigationally. Yet ships battled on, darkened, without any navigation lights, and the collisions which occurred were inevitable. Similarly to break W/T silence to request a position when lost somewhere off the north-west coast of Scotland or Ireland would, again, at certain periods of the war, have been quite safe from the point of view of enemy attack and would have ensured the safety of ships from grounding, yet the rules were never relaxed. Let us hope again that this lesson will be remembered by future planners and that flexibility in the instructions will be allowed.”
― Peter Gretton, Convoy Escort Commander: A Memoir of the Battle of the Atlantic

“The ‘management’ of the convoy at sea has received, however, little attention, and here I speak more from the point of view of the Escort Commander than of the Commodore. In this connection, it is worthy of note that ‘marine disaster’ such as collision, grounding and weather damage caused over twenty-five per cent of all the ships lost during the war (though the size of such ships was generally smaller than average and so the percentage of tonnage so lost was less). In addition, a large number of ships received damage which necessitated long periods out of action for repairs. This figure, of course, includes ships sailing both independently and in convoy.”
― Peter Gretton, Convoy Escort Commander: A Memoir of the Battle of the Atlantic

“I yield to no one in my admiration of the performance of Coastal Command from early 1943 until the end of the war. It was magnificent. Nevertheless, owing to the inadequate weapons provided to both R.A.F. and F.A.A. aircraft and to the lack of training previously described, early results were very disappointing. Despite published claims, it is a fact that only one German submarine was sunk by the unaided effort of aircraft of Coastal Command or of the Fleet Air Arm from the start of the war until August 1941, and this was killed at anchor by the Warspite’s Swordfish at the second battle of Narvik. After that date, kills quickly increased until in 1943 success became the order of the day. But this should not have taken three years of war and millions of tons of lost shipping to achieve.”
― Peter Gretton, Convoy Escort Commander: A Memoir of the Battle of the Atlantic

“We took Royal Air Force officers to sea during exercises and sometimes on operations and we held post-mortem meetings either at Londonderry or at the airfield most concerned, after all convoys of interest. In this way we got to know the Captains of aircraft and broke down the barriers between us.”
― Peter Gretton, Convoy Escort Commander: A Memoir of the Battle of the Atlantic

“My next key point concerns the value of aircraft over the sea, which I have already stressed so often. Whether fixed or rotary winged, these machines are an integral part of a modern navy, and no ship can survive in a war against an up-to-date enemy without their help. That is why the navy must keep so close to Coastal Command, and why some form of ship to carry aircraft will always be needed. One can argue all day about the size of aircraft-carriers, and quote the merits of vertical take-off and other modern devices which can affect the size of the carrier. But ships cannot survive without aircraft, and shore air-bases cannot provide all the necessary protection.”
― Peter Gretton, Convoy Escort Commander: A Memoir of the Battle of the Atlantic

“And, finally, on material matters, the arrangements for resisting and then dealing with action damage due to shells, bombs, mines or torpedoes were inadequate, and many ships were lost unnecessarily in the early years of the war. A Damage Control School had to be set up to evolve better protection and methods, and to train officers and men in the art.”
― Peter Gretton, Convoy Escort Commander: A Memoir of the Battle of the Atlantic

“Without seeking excuses, I believe that if the designers of the equipment had appreciated that most of the ship and its gear would be drenched with salt water for weeks on end, there would have been far less trouble.”
― Peter Gretton, Convoy Escort Commander: A Memoir of the Battle of the Atlantic

“The second point which now strikes me forcibly is the need to design our warships, aircraft and weapons for a tough war in all climates and to try them out in realistic tests in peace in every kind of weather. In World War I, our shells had been no good; but in World War II, we remembered this, and our explosives were on the whole satisfactory, though some of the bombs were bad. Our torpedoes were elderly but well tried and reliable — both the Germans and the Americans started the war with advanced but useless torpedoes! The design of our main propulsion machinery was also rather ancient, but both engines and boilers were rugged and reliable and ran like trains throughout the war. The Germans introduced some sophisticated high-pressure, high-temperature machinery just before the war started, and they had many teething troubles which resulted in ships being out of action for months at a time. The lesson here is to avoid getting new equipment into full production until it has been thoroughly tested at sea.”
― Peter Gretton, Convoy Escort Commander: A Memoir of the Battle of the Atlantic

“There is every reason to believe that our potential enemies of today have a keen and accurate appreciation of maritime warfare, and we must ensure that we have enough merchant ships to sustain this island both in peace and war, and the ships and aircraft to protect them.”
― Peter Gretton, Convoy Escort Commander: A Memoir of the Battle of the Atlantic

“Thus ends the uneventful passage of B 7 Group’s last convoy operation. I consider it fortunate that providence has dictated that the enemy should so frequently have attacked convoys escorted by B 7, who have consistently beaten off all attacks and inflicted severe damage on the enemy, in particular, the prolonged battle fought in the early days of May 1943. Nevertheless, I consider it should be put on record that B 7, as a close escort group, has distinguished itself not only by sinking U-boats but the more unspectacular but equally important duty of protecting the convoys for whom it was responsible.”
― Peter Gretton, Convoy Escort Commander: A Memoir of the Battle of the Atlantic

“There was no doubt that whether it concerned the direction of the convoy, the escorting aircraft, or other groups which were supporting, the Commander of the close escort must exercise tactical command, whatever his rank. He usually had the best facilities, he was in the closest touch with the Commodore and he was with the convoy throughout the passage and so provided the continuity of experience which a support group lacked. This problem raised much controversy, but having carried out the roles of close escort commander, support group commander, and having flown often in escorting aircraft, I am convinced that it was the only answer.”
― Peter Gretton, Convoy Escort Commander: A Memoir of the Battle of the Atlantic

“As Captain Roskill puts it in his official summing up: The battle never again reached the same pitch of intensity nor hung so delicately in the balance, as during the spring of 1943. It is therefore fair to claim that the victory here recounted marked one of the decisive stages of the war; for the enemy made his greatest effort against our Atlantic life-line and he failed. After forty-five months of unceasing battle, of a more exacting and arduous nature than posterity may easily realize, our convoy escorts and aircraft had won the triumph they so richly merited.”
― Peter Gretton, Convoy Escort Commander: A Memoir of the Battle of the Atlantic