Choosing War Quotes

“It is becoming increasingly clear that, without an effective government, backed by a loyal military and some kind of national consensus in support of independence, we cannot do anything for South Vietnam. The economic and military power of the United States … must not be wasted in a futile attempt to save those who do not wish to be saved.”
(Page 399)”
― Fredrik Logevall, Choosing War: The Lost Chance for Peace and the Escalation of War in Vietnam by Fredrik Logevall

“By the time a settlement was reached, at the beginning of 1973, under terms no better than Washington could have had in 1963 or 1964 to 1965, fifty-eight thousand Americans, and between 1.5 and three million Vietnamese, lay dead.”
(Page 335)”
― Fredrik Logevall, Choosing War: The Lost Chance for Peace and the Escalation of War in Vietnam

“When de Gaulle and Bohlen met at the Elysee a few days after the coup the French leader spoke in harsh tones. "You will be blamed for the deaths of Diem and Nhu," he told the American. "You may do and say what you like; no one will believe you. It is you who will be held responsible.”
― Fredrik Logevall, Choosing War: The Lost Chance for Peace and the Escalation of War in Vietnam

“Already in mid September the dissident generals had renewed their scheming.”
― Fredrik Logevall, Choosing War: The Lost Chance for Peace and the Escalation of War in Vietnam

“Meanwhile, with each day that passes, there is an increasing danger that the GVN's deteriorating relations with the South Vietnamese people will begin to produce a general sag of enthusiasm for continuing the war against the Viet Cong, both among the populace and the armed forces. Should this occur, the likelihood of achieving ultimate U.S. objectives in South Vietnam will have virtually disappeared.”
― Fredrik Logevall, Choosing War: The Lost Chance for Peace and the Escalation of War in Vietnam

“November 1963, the administration adhered firmly to the position that the insurgency in the South had to be defeated and that no diplomacy should be undertaken until that result was ensured. Negotiations should be entered into only when there was nothing to negotiate. Note here that American officials were not merely skeptical of what negotiations might bring; they were downright fearful of the likely results.”
― Fredrik Logevall, Choosing War: The Lost Chance for Peace and the Escalation of War in Vietnam

“Leaders in”
― Fredrik Logevall, Choosing War: The Lost Chance for Peace and the Escalation of War in Vietnam

“prize of a Tito-istic Vietnam would be a great let-out for the West," as one put it.) Moreover, given Hanoi's desire to be rid of the Americans, it ought to be possible at a conference to negotiate a concession that would help the Americans save face-the most likely such concession being a delay in reunifying”
― Fredrik Logevall, Choosing War: The Lost Chance for Peace and the Escalation of War in Vietnam

“if the GVN did not soon show a capacity to beat back the Vietcong challenge-and on its own, without increased American participation. "If the conclusion is reached that the Viet Cong are not being beaten," one analyst at the Foreign
Office wrote in late summer, "the only alternative is negotiation." The West's bargaining position would be poor, this and other British analysts agreed, but the likely end result, a reunified, Titoist Vietnam, would be acceptable. ("The”
― Fredrik Logevall, Choosing War: The Lost Chance for Peace and the Escalation of War in Vietnam